

SYNTAX
OF
THE MOODS AND TENSES
OF
THE GREEK VERB

William Watson Goodwin

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SYNTAX
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OF
THE GREEK VERB

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PREFACE.

THE present work is the result of an attempt to revise the much smaller book which was first published under the same title in 1860, and again, somewhat enlarged, in 1865. When it falls to the lot of a writer to revise, under the greater sense of responsibility which doubled years and more than doubled experience have brought him, a book written in the enthusiasm of youth as an ephemeral production, he is sure to be his own severest critic; and what he begins as a revision inevitably becomes, as he proceeds, more and more a new and independent work. I cannot forget that this book is addressed in great part to a different generation of scholars from that to which the former one was offered; and a treatment of the subject which was permissible in 1860 would be far from satisfactory now. I then attempted chiefly to give "a plain and practical statement of the principles which govern the relations of the Greek Moods and Tenses," avoiding theoretical discussions as far as possible. At that time prevailing theories, based chiefly on abstract speculations, had obscured some of the most important facts in the syntax of the moods, and perhaps no better service could be rendered by a new writer than the clearing away of some of the clouds. Few younger scholars are aware how modern are many of the grammatical doctrines which are now taught in all classical schools. It is hard to believe that so elementary a principle as that by which the aorist infinitive is past in *φῆσιν ἐλθεῖν* and future in *βούλεται ἐλθεῖν* was never distinctly stated until 1847, when it appeared simultaneously in the *Greek*

Syntax of Professor Madvig at Copenhagen and in the *Greek Grammar* of Professor Sophocles at Harvard University. Something more than mere statement of facts has been attempted in the present work, although nothing has been further from my thoughts than a complete theoretical discussion of all the principles which govern the use of the moods. He who ventures far upon that sea is in great danger of being lost in the fog or stranded; for, while Comparative Philology has thrown much and most welcome light on the early history of the Greek language, it has also made us more painfully aware of our ignorance, although it is a more enlightened ignorance than that of our predecessors.

Since the publication of the first edition, many most important additions have been made to our resources. Of these I can undertake to notice only a few. Delbrück's elaborate treatise on the Greek Subjunctive and Optative (in his *Syntaktische Forschungen*, vol. i.), with a comparison of Greek and Sanskrit usages, is familiar to all scholars. Whatever may be thought of Delbrück's main thesis, the distinction of the subjunctive as the mood of *will* from the optative as the mood of *wish*, none can fail to be impressed and instructed by his attractive and original treatment of the subject, which has made an epoch in grammatical science. Lange's unfinished work on the Particle *Ei* in Homer is a model of careful and thorough investigation. When I think of my deep and continued indebtedness to Lange's learned discussions, which include a treatment of all the 200 examples of *ei* with the optative in Homer, I am grieved to dissent so frequently from his most important conclusions. His chief argument is discussed in Appendix I. Schanz, in his *Beiträge zur Griechischen Syntax*, has undertaken a work of immense extent, involving an amount of labour which it is hard to over-estimate. His plan is to give full and accurate statistics of the use of every construction bearing on the history of Greek syntax, and thus to make a true historic syntax of the language a possibility. The work of collecting, classifying, and discussing the examples of different constructions has been assigned by him

to a large number of colleagues, and every year testifies to substantial progress. The following treatises bearing on the construction of the moods and tenses have already been published by Schanz : Weber, *Entwicklungsgeschichte der Absichtssätze* ; Sturm, *Geschichtliche Entwicklung der Constructionen mit Πρίν* ; Schmitt, *Ueber den Ursprung des Substantivsatzes mit Relativpartikeln im Griechischen* ; Grünewald, *Der freie formelhafte Infinitiv der Limitation im Griechischen* ; Birklein, *Entwicklungsgeschichte des substantivirten Infinitivs*. The amount of patient labour devoted to these compilations, in which the exact number of examples of each construction in each Greek author before Aristotle is given, while the most important passages are quoted and nearly all are cited, will be most gratefully appreciated by those who would be least willing to undertake the work themselves. The results of such dry enumerations are often interesting and surprising. No one knows whether statistics will be dry and barren or not, until they are collected and classified ; and though it may seem a useless task to count the examples of each of the final particles in all Greek literature before Aristotle, it is interesting to know that in all the Attic prose, except Xenophon, *ὥς* final occurs only five or six times, while *ἵνα* occurs 999 times. Some of the results derived from Weber's statistics of the use of the final particles are given in Appendix III., and an account of Xenophon's peculiar use of *ὥς*, *ὥς ἄν*, and *ὅπως ἄν* in Appendix IV., for the benefit of those who have not Weber's book at hand, or want the patience to follow his elaborate historical statements. Monro's *Homeric Grammar* is one of the best results of recent English scholarship, and for the study of Homeric usages in the moods it is invaluable. I regret that the new edition of this book, soon to be published, has not come in time to benefit the present work. It seems a mere form to acknowledge my obligations to the standard Grammars ; but I must repeat my former expression of thanks to Madvig, Krüger, and Kühner, not to mention a host of others. To Madvig I am indebted for the first conviction that the syntax of the Greek moods belonged

to the realm of common sense. To Krüger I have been indebted in the study of every construction ; and I have still retained most of the remarks on the tenses of the indicative which were originally borrowed from him. The revised edition of Kühner's *Griechische Grammatik* has supplied a large store of examples, to which I have frequently had recourse. I am under especial obligation to him for many of the examples which illustrate the uses of the Supplementary Participle, and the corresponding uses of the infinitive with many of the same verbs. Frequent references are made in the notes to the authorities which I have mentioned, and to many others.

It is with pride and pleasure that I acknowledge my deepest indebtedness to an American scholar, whose writings have thrown light upon most of the dark places in Greek syntax. I need not say that I refer to my friend, Professor Gildersleeve of Baltimore. As editor of the *American Journal of Philology* he has discussed almost every construction of the Greek moods, and he has always left his mark. His two reviews of Weber's work on the Final Sentence in vols. iv. and vi. of his *Journal* may well save many scholars the trouble of reading the book itself, while they contain much new matter which is valuable to every one. The acute observation, that the use of *ἄν* and *κέ* in final constructions depends on the force of *ὥς*, *ὅπως*, and *ὅφρα* as conditional relative or temporal adverbs, explains much which before seemed inexplicable. His article on *πρίν* in vol. ii. stated important principles of classic usage which were confirmed by Sturm's statistics ; and this, with the later review of Sturm's volume, has done much to correct current errors and to establish sounder views about *πρίν*. His articles on the Articular Infinitive in the *Transactions of the American Philological Association for 1878* and in the third volume of his *Journal* practically anticipated the results of Birklein's statistics. I can mention further only his article in vol. vii. of the *Journal* on the Consecutive Sentence, which gives (it seems to me) the clearest statement ever made of the relations of *ὥστε* with the infinitive to *ὥστε* with the finite moods. I have expressed my

indebtedness to these and other writings of Gildersleeve as occasion has required ; but I have also often referred to his articles in his *Journal* by the simple mention of that periodical. I have sometimes omitted a reference where one might seem proper, lest I should appear to make him responsible for what he might deem some dangerous heresy.

I am also under the greatest obligation to my friends and colleagues in Harvard University, Professors Allen, Greenough, Lane, Lanman, White, and Wright, and Dr. Morgan, for valuable suggestions, and to most of them for important help in revising and proof-reading. I regret that I have not had the advantage of their aid in reading the proofs of the last two-thirds of the work. To my friendship of twenty-one years with Dr. Henry Jackson, of Trinity College, Cambridge, I am indebted for some of the most important suggestions which I have received since the publication of the former editions.

The Index to the Examples includes all of the more than 4800 examples quoted or cited in the main body of the work, but not those in the Appendix nor those which are given in the classified lists in the footnotes on pp. 92, 115, 152, 172, and 290. It may seem useless to index many examples which merely illustrate a common principle, like those of a simple aorist infinitive or present indicative ; but it would be difficult to discriminate here, and one seldom knows what may make an example useful to another. The same consideration has induced me to give as great a variety of examples as possible, from authors of different classes, illustrating many constructions which apparently need no such aid.

Every teacher will see that many parts of this work, in its present enlarged form, are not adapted to the ordinary uses of a grammatical text-book for the recitation room. On the other hand, it is hoped that the increased fulness and the greater space given to discussions will make the work more useful for private study and for reference.

The Dramatists are cited by Dindorf's lines ; except the tragic fragments, which follow Nauck's edition, and the

comic fragments, which follow Kock. The lyric fragments follow Bergk's *Poetae Lyrici*. Plato is cited by the pages and letters of Stephanus, and the Orators by the numbers of the orations and the sections now in universal use. The other citations will be easily understood.

In conclusion, I must express my grateful thanks to the University Libraries of Heidelberg and Leyden, and to the Royal Library at The Hague, for the hospitality which was kindly shown me while I was correcting the proofs.

W. W. GOODWIN.

PALLANZA, LAGO MAGGIORE,

24th September 1889.

In the impression of 1897 many errors have been corrected, some forms of expression have been changed, and some new examples have been added. The most important change is that in §§ 572 and 573; this is further explained in the new Appendix VI., page 411. A list of the new examples is given on page 440, omitting those which have been inserted in the regular Index.

ROME, November 1896.

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CHAPTER I.

GENERAL VIEW OF THE MOODS.

1. THE Mood of a verb shows the *manner* in which the assertion of the verb is made.

The Greek verb has four moods, properly so called,—the indicative, the subjunctive, the optative, and the imperative. The infinitive, which is a verbal noun, and the participle and the verbal in *-τέος*, which are verbal adjectives, are so closely connected with the moods in many constructions, that they are discussed with them in Syntax.

The four proper moods, as opposed to the infinitive, are sometimes called the *finite* moods. The subjunctive, optative, imperative, and infinitive, as opposed to the indicative, are sometimes called the *dependent* moods.

I. INDICATIVE.

2. The indicative, in its most primitive use, makes a simple, absolute assertion, or asks a question which includes or concerns such an assertion. *E.g.*

Γράφει, *he is writing*; ἔγραφεν, *he was writing*; ἔγραψεν, *he wrote*; γράψει, *he will write*. Γράφει; *is he writing?* ἔγραψατε; *did you write?* γράψετε; *will you write?* τί ἔγραψεν; *what did he write?*

3. The indicative may also express

(a) A dependent statement (or quotation) of such an absolute assertion or question. *E.g.*

Λέγει ὅτι γράφει, *he says that he is writing* (he says γράφω); λέγει ὅτι γράψει, *he says that he will write* (he says γράψω); ἐρωτᾷ τί ἔγραψαμεν, *he asks what we wrote*; ἐρωτᾷ εἰ ἔγραψα, *he asks whether I wrote*.

(b) A distinct statement of an object aimed at or feared. *E.g.*

Ἐπιμελεῖται ὅπως τοῦτο γενήσεται, *he takes care that this shall be done* (339); φοβούμεθα μὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἡμαρτήκαμεν, *we fear that we have missed both* (369, 2).

(c) A distinct supposition of an absolute statement, that is, a supposition that such a statement is, was, or will be true. *E.g.*

Εἰ γράφει, *if he is writing*; εἰ ἔγραψεν, *if he wrote*; εἰ γέγραφε, *if he has written*; εἰ γράψει, *if he shall write or if he is to write*. What is supposed in each case could be expressed by γράφει, ἔγραψεν, γέγραφε, or γράψει.

4. The past tenses of the indicative may, further, express a supposition that some statement either *had been* or *were now* true, while it is implied that really it *was not* or *is not* true. *E.g.*

Εἰ ἔγραψα, *if I had written*; εἰ ἔγραφον, *if I were now writing or if I had been writing*; the context indicating that really *I did not write or am not writing* (410). These expressions originally always referred to the past, as they do in Homer.

5. Out of the form of unreal supposition (4) were developed after Homer the use of the past tenses of the indicative with εἴθε or εἰ γάρ in wishes (732); and also the Attic construction of the past tenses of the indicative to express an unaccomplished purpose (333), where there is an assimilation of the final clause to a preceding indicative. *E.g.*

Εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο ἐποίησα, *O if I had only done this!* Εἴθε τοῦτο εἶχες, *O if you only had this!*

Εἴθε τότε ἀπέθανον, *ἵνα μὴ τοῦτο ἔπαθον, would that I had then perished, that I might not have suffered this.*

For the indicative with ἄν or κέ, the potential indicative, see 243.

II. SUBJUNCTIVE.

6. (a) The subjunctive, in its simplest and apparently most primitive use, seen in Homer (284), expresses futurity, like the future indicative, and has οὐ for its negative. *E.g.*

Οὐ γάρ πω τοίους ἴδον ἀνέρας οὐδὲ ἴδωμαι, *for never did I see such men nor shall I ever see them*, Il. i. 262; καὶ ποτὲ τις εἴπησιν, *and some one will some time say*, Il. vi. 459.

(b) Though this primitive use disappears in the later language,

the subjunctive still remains closely related in sense to the future indicative, and in most of its constructions can be interchanged with it.

7. The subjunctive in questions of appeal as to the future (287) has, even in Homer, developed the idea of propriety or expediency. *E.g.*

Ἀθὼι μένω ᾗε θέω; *shall I remain here or run?* Il. x. 62. So πῇ ἵω; *whither shall I go?* Od. xv. 509. But the future indicative can be used in the same sense; as τί δῆτα δρῶμεν; μητέρ' ἣ φονεύσομεν; *what are we to do? shall we slay our mother?* EUR. EL. 967. (See 68.)

8. (a) In exhortations and in prohibitions with μή (250-259) the subjunctive has an imperative force, and is always future; as in ἴωμεν, *let us go*; μὴ θαυμάσητε, *do not wonder*.

The future indicative occasionally occurs in prohibitions with μή (70).

(b) The subjunctive with μή, especially in Homer, may express a future object of fear with a desire to avert it; as in μὴ νῆας ἔλωσι, *may they not seize the ships (as I fear they will)*. (See 261.) From such expressions combined with verbs of fearing arose the dependent use of μή with the subjunctive expressing a future object of fear; as φοβοῦμαι μὴ ἀπόληται, *I fear that he may perish*.

9. In the constructions with οὐ μή (294) the subjunctive and the future indicative are used, without apparent distinction, in a future sense; as οὐ μὴ γένηται and οὐ μὴ γενήσεται, *it will not happen*.

10. The subjunctive may express a future purpose or a future object of care or exertion. *E.g.*

Ἔρχεται ὅπως τοῦτο ἴδῃ, *he comes that he may see this* (317); ἐπιμελείται ὅπως τοῦτο γένηται (or γενήσεται), *he takes care that this shall be done* (339). In clauses of purpose the future indicative is sometimes used (324), and in the construction of 339 it became the regular Attic form.

11. In conditional clauses the subjunctive expresses either a future supposition (444), or a general supposition which is indefinite (never strictly present) in its time (462).

(a) In the former it supposes such a future case as the Homeric subjunctive (6) states; as εἰάν τις εἴπῃ, *if one shall say* (the thing supposed being εἴπῃ τις, *one will say*); here the future indicative may be used

in essentially the same sense (447). In the general condition it supposes an event to occur at any time, as we say *if any one ever goes* or *whoever goes*, with an apodosis expressing repetition or a general truth; as *ἐάν τις κλέψῃ* (or *ὅς ἂν κλέψῃ*), *κολάζεται*, *if any one steals* (or *whoever steals*), *he is always punished*.

(b) The subjunctive in general suppositions is the only subjunctive which does not refer to future time, and here the future indicative can never be used. In most other languages (as in English and generally in Latin), and sometimes in Greek, such a condition is expressed by the present indicative, like an ordinary present supposition; but the Greek, in its desire to avoid a form denoting present time, generally fell into one which it uses elsewhere only for future time. The construction, however, appears in Homer imperfectly established, except in relative clauses (468): this indicates that it does not belong to the primitive uses of the subjunctive. (See 17.)

For the Homeric subjunctive with *κέ* or *ἄν* in independent sentences, which does not differ perceptibly in meaning from the future with *κέ* or *ἄν*, see 201, 1.

III. OPTATIVE.

12. The optative is commonly a less distinct and direct form of expression than the subjunctive, imperative, or indicative, in constructions of the same general character as those in which these moods are used.

13. This is seen, especially in independent sentences, where the optative either expresses a wish or exhortation, or is used (regularly with *ἄν* or *κέ*) in a potential sense.

Thus *ἴοιμεν*, *may we go*, corresponds as a weaker form to *ἴωμεν*, *let us go*. Corresponding to *ἐξελθὼν τις ἰδέτω*, *let some one go out and see*, we have *ἐξελθὼν τις ἴδοι*, *may some one go out and see*, Od. xxiv. 491. *Ἐλοιτο ἄν*, *he would take* or *he might take*, corresponds to the Homeric *ἔλῃται* or *ἔλῃται κε*, *he will take* or *he may take* (201, 1).

We find in Homer a few optatives expressing concession or permission, which have a neutral sense and can hardly be classed as either potential or wishing. See Il. iv. 17, *εἰ δ' αὖ πως τόδε πᾶσι φίλον καὶ ἡδὺ πέλοιτο*, *ἥ τοι μὲν οἰκέοιτο πόλις Πριάμοιο ἄνακτος*, *αὖτις δ' Ἀργεῖν Ἑλένην Μενέλαος ἄγοιτο*, where we may translate the apodosis either *let the city still be a habitation and let M. carry away Helen*, or *the city may still be a habitation and M. may carry away Helen*. In iii. 72 we have *γυναικά τε οἶκαδ' ἀγέσθω*, and in iii. 255 *τῷ δέ κε νικήσαντι γυνή καὶ κτήμαθ' ἔποιτο*, where *ἀγέσθω* and *ἔποιτό κε* refer to essentially the same thing with *ἄγοιτο* in iv. 19. Following Il. iii. 255 (above) we have *οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ναίοιμεν Τροίην*, *τοὶ δὲ νέονται*, i.e. *the rest of us may remain dwellers in Troy, while*

they will return to Greece. From such neutral future expressions were probably developed the two distinct uses of the optative. In its hortatory sense as a form of wishing, the optative was distinguished by the use of μή as a negative; while in its potential sense it had οὐ as its negative (as in οὐ μὴν γάρ τι κακώτερον ἄλλο πάθοιμι, for really I can suffer nothing worse, II. xix. 321), and it was soon further marked by the addition of κέ or ἄν. (See Appendix I.)

14. In dependent clauses expressing purpose or the object of exertion or of fear, the optative is never an original form; but it always represents a dependent subjunctive or future indicative (8, b; 10) in the changed relation in which either of them is placed when its leading verb is changed from present or future to past time.

We represent this change in English by a change from *may* to *might*, or from *shall* or *will* to *should* or *would*; as ἐρχεται ἵνα ἴδῃ, he comes that he may see, ἦλθεν ἵνα ἴδοι, he came that he might see; ἐπιμελεῖται ὅπως τοῦτο γενήσεται, he takes care that this shall be done, ἐπεμελεῖτο ὅπως τοῦτο γενήσοιτο, he took care that this should be done; φοβείται μὴ τοῦτο πάθῃ, he fears that he may suffer this; ἐφοβήθη μὴ τοῦτο πάθῃ, he feared that he might suffer this. Here the original subjunctive or future indicative (especially the latter) is very often used in place of the optative.

15. In all forms of indirect discourse the same principle (14) holds, that the optative after past tenses represents (in a changed relation) an indicative or a subjunctive of the direct form, which original mood is always used after present and future tenses, and may be retained after past tenses (667, 1).

Here again we see what the change is, for we represent it by our change from *is* to *was*, *have* to *had*, *shall* and *will* to *should* and *would*, etc.; as λέγει ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστιν, he says that it is true; ἔλεξεν ὅτι ἀληθές εἶη (or ἐστίν), he said that it was true; λέγει ὅτι γράψει, he says that he will write; ἔλεξεν ὅτι γράψῃ (or γράψει), he said that he would write. So οὐκ οἶδα τί εἴπω, I know not what I shall say; οὐκ ᾔδεν τί εἴποιμι (or εἴπω), I knew not what I should say.

16. In future conditions the optative expresses the supposition in a weakened future form, as compared with the stronger future of the subjunctive and the future indicative.

Compare ἐὰν ἔλθω, if I (shall) go (444), with εἰ ἔλθοιμι, if I should go (455). Often the form of the leading sentence (the apodosis) decides whether a given supposition shall be expressed by a subjunctive or by an optative; thus in DEM. iv. 11 we have ἄν οὐτός τι πάθῃ, if any-

thing happens (shall happen) to him (Philip), depending on ποιήσετε; and in the next sentence, referring to precisely the same contingency, we have εἰ τι πάθῃ, depending on two optatives with ἄν.

17. The only remaining form of dependent optative is that found in past general suppositions, as εἴ τις κλέψειεν (or ὅς κλέψειεν), ἐκολάζετο, *if ever any one stole (or whoever stole), he was (always) punished* (462; 531).

Here the optative after a past tense represents an original subjunctive after a present tense (11), differing in this from the optative in future conditions (16), which is in an original construction. The late development of this optative appears from its almost total absence in protasis with εἰ in Homer (468), where the corresponding subjunctive in protasis is also infrequent. It may therefore be disregarded in considering the primitive uses of the optative. (See 11, b.)

For a more full discussion of the relations of the optative to the other moods, see Appendix I.

IV. IMPERATIVE.

18. The imperative expresses a command, exhortation, entreaty, or prohibition (250 and 259). *E.g.*

Φεύγε, *begone!* Ἐλθέτω, *let him come.* Δός μοι τοῦτο, *give me this.* Μὴ ποίει ἄδικα, *do not do what is unjust.*

CHAPTER II.

THE TENSES.

19. THERE are seven Tenses,—the present, imperfect, perfect, pluperfect, aorist, future, and future perfect. The imperfect and pluperfect occur only in the indicative; the futures are wanting in the subjunctive and imperative.

20. These tenses may express two relations. They may designate the time of an action as *present*, *past*, or *future*; and also its character as *going on*, *finished*, or simply *taking place*. The latter relation is expressed by the tenses in all the moods and in the infinitive and the participle; the former is always expressed in the indicative, and to a certain extent (to be explained below) in the dependent moods and the participle.

21. The tenses are divided into *primary* tenses, which denote present or future time, and *secondary* or *historical* tenses, which denote past time. This distinction applies properly only to the tenses of the indicative; but it may be extended to any forms of the dependent moods which have the same distinction of time as the tenses of the indicative.

The primary tenses of the indicative are the present (in its ordinary uses), perfect, future, and future perfect. The secondary tenses are the imperfect, pluperfect, and aorist (in its ordinary uses).

This distinction will be more fully explained at the end of this chapter (165-191). It must be noted that the historic present (33) is a secondary tense, and the gnomic aorist (154) is a primary tense.

22. In speaking of the time denoted by any verb, we must distinguish between time which is present, past, or future with

reference to the time of speaking or writing (that is, time *absolutely* present, etc.), and time which is present, past, or future with reference to the time of some verb with which the verbal form in question is connected (that is, time *relatively* present, etc.) Thus, when we say τοῦτο ἀληθές ἐστιν, *this is true*, ἐστίν is present with reference to the time of speaking; but when we say ἔφη τοῦτο ἀληθές εἶναι or εἶπεν ὅτι τοῦτο ἀληθές ἐστίν (or εἶη), *he said that this was true*, (i.e. *he said "this is true"*), the present tense which we use denotes time present to the time of the leading verb, i.e. time *absolutely* past and only *relatively* present. The same distinction is seen between the future in τοῦτο γενήσεται, *this will happen*, and that in ἔφη τοῦτο γενήσεται or εἶπεν ὅτι γενήσεται (γενήσεται), *he said that this would happen*; where the future in the first case is *absolutely* future, but in the other cases is only *relatively* future and may be even *absolutely* past. Again, in τοῦτο ἐγένετο, *this happened*, the aorist is *absolutely* past; but in ἔφη τοῦτο γενέσθαι, or εἶπεν ὅτι τοῦτο ἐγένετο (or γένοιτο), *he said that this had happened*, it denotes time past to the time of the past leading verb, and so is *doubly* past. But in connection with a future expression an aorist, though *relatively* past, may be *absolutely* future; as in PLAT. Rep. 478 D, τὸ φανέν as subject of ἔσεσθαι means *that which will hereafter have appeared*. So διαπραξάμενος in 496 E. (See 143.)

It is a special distinction between the Greek and the English idioms, that the Greek uses its verbal forms much more freely to denote merely relative time. Thus, we translate the Greek presents εἶναι and ἐστί after ἔφη or εἶπεν (above) by our *was*; the futures γενήσεται and γινήσεται by *would happen*; and the aorists γενέσθαι and ἐγένετο by *had happened*. This distinction appears especially in the indicative, optative, and infinitive of indirect discourse; in future forms after past tenses in final and object clauses with ἵνα, ὅπως, etc.; and usually in the participle; but not in protasis.

I. TENSES OF THE INDICATIVE.

PRESENT.

23. The present indicative represents an action as *going on* at the time of speaking or writing; as γράφω, *I write*, or *I am writing*.

An important exception occurs when the present indicative in indirect discourse denotes time which is present *relatively* to the leading verb. See above, 22; 669, 2; 674, 1.

24. As the limits of such an action on either side of the present moment are not defined, the present may express a *customary or repeated action or a general truth*. *E.g.*

Ἡ πρύμνα τοῦ πλοίου ὃ εἰς Δῆλον Ἀθηναῖοι πέμπουσιν, *the stern of the ship which the Athenians send to Delos (every year)*. PLAT. PHAED. 58 A. Τίττει τοι κόρος ὕβριν, ὅταν κακῷ ὄλβος ἔπηται, *satiety begets insolence, whenever prosperity follows the wicked*. THEOG. 153. Ἐν χρόνῳ ἀποφθίνει τὸ τάρβος ἀνθρώποισιν, *in time timidity dies out in men*. AESCH. Ag. 857.

25. The present denotes merely the continuance or progress of an action, without reference to its completion. It may, however, be implied by the context that the action is *not* to be completed, so that the present denotes an *attempted or intended action*. Especially *δίδωμι*, in the sense of *offer*, and *πείθω*, *try to persuade*, are thus used. *E.g.*

Νῦν δ' ἅμα τ' αὐτίκα πολλὰ διδοῖ, *he offers many things*. IL. ix. 519. Πείθουσι ὑμᾶς ἐναντία καὶ τοῖς νόμοις καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ ψηφίσασθαι, *they are trying to persuade you to vote contrary both to the laws and to justice*. ISAE. i. 26.

This *conative* signification is much more common in the imperfect. See 36 and the examples.

26. The present is often used with expressions denoting past time, especially *πάλαι*, in the sense of a perfect and a present combined. *E.g.*

Κεῖνον ἰχνεύω πάλαι, *I have been tracking him a long time (and still continue it)*. SOPH. Aj. 20. Οὐ πάλαι σοι λέγω ὅτι ταυτὸν φημι εἶναι; i.e. *have I not long ago told you (and do I not still repeat) that I call it the same thing?* PLAT. GORG. 489 C. Θεοὺς αἰτῶ . . . φρουρὰς ἐτέρας μῆκος. AESCH. Ag. 1. So πολλὸν χρόνον τοῦτο ποιῶ. So in Latin, iam dudum loquor.

27. The presents ἔκω, *I am come*, and οἶχομαι, *I am gone*, are used in the sense of the perfect. An approach to the perfect sense is sometimes found in such presents as *φεύγω*, in the sense *I am banished*, *ἀλίσκομαι*, *I am captured*, *νικῶ* and *κρατῶ*, *I am victorious*, *ἡττῶμαι*, *I am conquered*, *ἀδικῶ*, *I have been unjust* (*I am ἄδικος*). So the Epic ἔκω and ἰκάνω, with ὄλλυμαι and sometimes *τίκτω* in tragedy. *E.g.*

Οἶχεται εἰς ἅλα διάν, *he is gone to the divine sea*. IL. xv. 223. Θερμιοκλῆς ἔκω παρὰ σέ, *I, Themistocles, am come to you*. THUC. i. 137. Τοὺς ἀδίκως φεύγοντας δικαίως κατήγαγον, *they justly restored those who were unjustly banished*. PLAT. MENEX. 242 B. Ἰλίου ἀλίσκομένου, *after the capture of Ilium*. THUC. vi. 2. So ἀλίσκομένου τοῦ τείχεος. HDT. i. 85. Ὅπισθε τῆς ἀνοικομένης θύρης, *behind the open door*. HDT. i. 9. Εἰ πάντα ταῦτα ἐλυμαίνετο τοῖς ὄλοις, ἕως ἀνέτρεψε, τί Δημοσθένης ἀδικεῖ; *how is Demosthenes to*

blame? DEM. xviii. 303. Πύργων ὀλλυμένων ἐν ναυσὶν ἔβαν, *I embarked after the towers had been destroyed*. EUR. I. T. 1108. Ἦδε τίκτει σε, *this woman is thy mother*. Id. Ion. 1560.

Present participles are given in some examples here where they illustrate the meaning of the tense.

28. The Greek, like other languages, often uses such presents as *I hear, I learn, I say*, even when their action is finished before the time to which they strictly refer. *E.g.*

Εἰ στασιάζουσιν, ὥσπερ πυνθανόμεθα, *if they (the Sicilians) are in discord, as we learn*. THUC. vi. 16. Ἐπὶ πόλεις, ὡς ἐγὼ ἀκοῇ αἰσθάνομαι, μέλλομεν ἵναί μεγάλας. Id. vi. 20.

(Εἶμι as Future.) 29. The present εἶμι, *I am going*, and its compounds, have a future sense. Εἶμι thus became a future of ἔρχομαι, the future ἐλεύσομαι not being in good use in Attic prose. *E.g.*

Σεῦ ὕστερος εἶμι ὑπὸ γαίαν, *I shall go*. II. xviii. 333. Εἶμι πάλιν ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα, *I shall recur to that*. PLAT. Phaed. 100 B. ὦ φίλ', ἐγὼ μὲν ἄπειμι, σῶας καὶ κείνα φυλάξων. Od. xvii. 593. Ἄλλ' εἴσειμι, σοῦ δ' οὐ φροντιῶ, *but I'll go in and not mind you*. AR. Nub. 125. Εἰ δ' οἶδοι ἀπίαςιν, ἡμεῖς μόνον μενούμεν, *but if they (shall) depart, we alone shall remain*. XEN. Cyr. iv. 5, 24.

In Homer εἶμι is used also as a present; as οἶος δ' ἀστὴρ εἶσι μετ' ἀστράσι, II. xxii. 317. So ii. 87, xi. 415; Od. iv. 401; and often in similes. This is doubtful in Attic; as in πρόσσειμι δῶμα καὶ βρέτας τὸ σόν, AESCH. Eum. 242, where πρόσσειμι may be πρὸς + εἶμι. See Krüger and Classen on ἐπίασιν, THUC. iv. 61.

30. The future sense of εἶμι and its compounds extends to the optative, infinitive, and participle in indirect discourse, and often to the participle in other uses (especially when it expresses purpose with ὥς). *E.g.*

Προείπον ὅτι, εἰ μὴ παρесьόμεθα συστρατευσόμενοι, ἐκεῖνοι ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ἵοιεν, *i.e. that they would come against us*. XEN. Hell. v. 2, 13. See also v. 1, 34, where εἰ μὴ ἀπίοιεν corresponds to εἰ μὴ ἐκπέμψοιεν. As ἵοιμι in this use is equivalent to a future optative, it is naturally rare (128). Ἀπίεναι ἐνόμιζεν ὅταν βούληται, *he believed he could depart (ἀπειμι) whenever he pleased*. THUC. v. 7. So οὐκ ἔφασαν (ἔφη) ἵεναι, XEN. An. i. 3, 1 and 8; i. 4, 12: cf. ii. 1, 3, ii. 6, 10. Καὶ τὸ πῦρ γε αὖ προσιώντος τοῦ ψυχροῦ αὐτῷ ἢ ὑπεξίεναι ἢ ἀπολεῖσθαι. PLAT. Phaed. 103 D. (Προσιώντος is an ordinary present participle: see 31.) Οὐ γὰρ ᾔδειν ἐξιών, *for he did not know that he was to go*. AR. Pac. 1182. Ὁ δ' εἰς Πέρσας ἰδὼν παρῆν συνεσκευασμένος. XEN. Cyr. iv. 5, 26. Ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ἀνιστάμεν ὡς ἀπίων. PLAT. Prot. 335 C (this might come under 31). So ἀνεστήκη ὡς ἐξιών, ib. 335 D. Παρεσκευάζετο ὡς ἀπιοῦσα. XEN. Cyr. i. 3, 13. So THUC. vi. 63.

31. In the optative and infinitive not in indirect discourse, and

often in the participle, the same forms of εἶμι are used as ordinary presents. *E.g.*

Οὐδὲν ἂν διάφορον ποιοῖ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ταῦτ' ἔοικεν. PLAT. Rep. 360 C. Εἰ πολέμιος ἔοι. Ib. 415 E. See εἶμι in Rep. 490 B, in a peculiar indirect quotation. "Ὅτε ἔοι. Id. Tim. 78 C. In XEN. AN. i. 3, 1, after ἰέναι as future (30), we have ἐβιάζετο ἰέναι and ἤρξατο προῖέναι. Ἐξὸν αὐτῷ εἰσιόντι εἰς τὰς οἰκίας συγγίγνεσθαι ὅτ' βούλοιτο. PLAT. Rep. 360 C. Ἀποτρεπόμενος δ' ἄηρ καὶ διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔξω ἰών. Id. Tim. 79 C. So ANT. v. 78, vi. 45.

In the subjunctive and imperative there can of course be no special future sense in these verbs.

32. In animated language the present often refers to the future, to express *likelihood, intention, or danger*. *E.g.*

Εἰ αὕτη ἡ πόλις ληφθήσεται, ἔχεται ἡ πᾶσα Σικελία, *if this city shall be captured, all Sicily is (at once) in their possession*. THUC. vi. 91. Μένομεν ἕως ἂν ἕκαστοι κατὰ πόλεις ληφθῶμεν; *shall we wait until we are each captured, city by city?* Id. vi. 77. Εἰ δέ φησιν οὗτος, δεῖξάτω καὶ παρασχέσθω, κἀγὼ καταβαίνω, *and I will take my seat*. DEM. xix. 32. So ἀπόλλυμαι, *I am to perish*, LYS. xii. 14. For a similar use of the perfect, see 51. (See also 61.)

33. (*Historic Present*.) The present is often used in narration for the aorist, sometimes for the imperfect, to give a more animated statement of past events. This is called the historic present. *E.g.*

Βουλὴν ἐπιτεχνᾷται ὅπως μὴ ὀλισθεῖεν Ἀθηναῖοι, *he contrives a plan to prevent the Athenians from assembling*. HDT. i. 63. Κελεύει πέμψαι ἄνδρας ἀποστέλλουσιν οὖν, καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς κρύφα πέμπει. THUC. i. 91. Δαρείου καὶ Παρυσάτιδος γίγνονται παῖδες δύο. XEN. AN. i. 1, 1. Τοιαῦτα τοῦ παρόντος ἡνίκ' ἡλίψ' δείκνυσσι τοῦναρ ἔκλυον ἐξηγουμένον. SOPH. EL. 424.

The historic present is not found in Homer.

IMPERFECT.

34. The imperfect represents an action as *going on* in past time; as ἔγραφον, *I was writing*.

35. The imperfect is thus a present transferred to the past, retaining all the peculiarities of the present which are consistent with the change. Thus it may denote a customary or repeated action, or a series of actions; or, if it refers to a single action (as it very frequently does), it represents it in its progress rather than as a simple past occurrence (like the

aorist). In narration it dwells on the course of an event instead of merely stating its occurrence. *E.g.*

Ἐπὶ Κέκροπος ἡ Ἀττικὴ κατὰ πόλεις ψέκεϊτο, καὶ οὐ ξυνήεσαν βουλευσόμενοι, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ ἑκαστοὶ ἐπολιτεύοντο καὶ ἐβουλεύοντο. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ Θησεὺς ἐβασίλευσεν, ἐς τὴν νῦν πόλιν οὖσαν ξυνώκισε πάντας. THUC. ii. 15. (Here the imperfects refer to the state of the country or to customs; the aorists state events, ἐβασίλευσε, became king, ξυνώκισε, collected into one state.) Καὶ παραστὰς ὁ μὲν ἔνθεν ὁ δ' ἐνθεν, ἐβόων, ἐξέκρουόν με, τελευτῶντες ἐχλεύαζον· ὑμεῖς δ' ἐγελᾶτε, καὶ οὐτ' ἀκούειν ἠθέλετε οὔτε πιστεύειν ἐβούλεσθε, *they kept on shouting, etc., and you laughed, etc.* DEM. xix. 23. Ἐπειρώμην τι λέγειν τούτων ὧν εἰς τὴν βούλην ἀπήγγεila. Ibid. Πότερον ταῦτα πάντα ποιῶν ἡδίκηει καὶ παρεσπόνδει καὶ ἔλυσεν τὴν εἰρήνην ἢ οὐ; *in doing all these things was he acting unjustly and breaking the peace, etc.?* Id. xviii. 71; see also ib. 69. (Compare τὴν εἰρήνην ἔλυσεν τὰ πλοῖα λαβών, of the event, ib. 73.) Παρελθὼν ἐπὶ Θράκης Βυζαντίους ἡξίου συμπολεμῆν. Ib. 87. Ὑμεῖς γὰρ ταῦτ' ἐπράττετε, καὶ ταῦτα πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἤρεσκεν (of a course of action). Id. xix. 189. Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ εἶλεν Ὀλυνθον Φίλιππος, Ὀλύμπια ἐποίει, εἰς δὲ τὴν θυσίαν πάντας τοὺς τεχνίτας συνήγαγεν. Ib. 192. Ἐἴτα τότ' οὐκ ἔλεγε παραχρῆμα ταῦτα οὐδ' ἐδίδασκες ἡμᾶς; *did you then not tell this at once on the spot, or instruct us?* Ib. 25.

The same action (as in the last two examples) could easily have been mentioned, without reference to its continuance, as a mere event. For the relations of the imperfect to the aorist, see 56.

36. The imperfect, like the present (25), sometimes denotes attempted action, being here strictly an imperfect tense. So especially ἐδίδουν and ἔπειθον. *E.g.*

(Φίλιππος) Ἀλόννησον ἐδίδου, *Philip offered Halonnesus* (lit. *tried to give it*). AESCHIN. iii. 83. Ἐκαστος ἔπειθεν αὐτὸν ὑποστήναι τὴν ἀρχήν, *each one tried to persuade him to undertake the command*. XEN. AN. vi. 1, 19.

Κῦμα ἴστατ' ἀειρόμενον, κατὰ δ' ἤρεε Πηλεΐωνα, *and was about to overpower the son of Peleus*. IL. xxi. 327. Ἐμισθοῦτο παρ' οὐκ ἐκδιδόντος τὴν αὐλήν, *he tried to hire the yard of one who refused to let it*. HDT. i. 68. Πέμψαντες ἐς Σάρδεις χρυσὸν ὠνέοντο, *they sent to Sardis and wanted to buy gold*. HDT. i. 69. Ἐπεθύμησε τῆς χλανίδος, καὶ αὐτὴν προσελθὼν ὠνέετο, *he took a fancy (aor.) to the cloak, and tried to buy it*. HDT. iii. 139. Ἄ ἐπράσσετο οὐκ ἐγένετο, *what was attempted did not happen*. THUC. vi. 74. So προσετίθει, *she wanted to add*, AR. Nub. 63.

37. When the present has the force of the perfect (27), the imperfect has regularly the force of a pluperfect. *E.g.*

Ὁ ὄχλος κατὰ θέαν ἦκεν, *the crowd had come to look on*. THUC. vi. 31. Ἐπεὶ ᾤχεο νηὶ Πύλονδε, *after thou wast gone by ship to Pylos*. OD. xvi. 24.

38. The imperfect sometimes denotes *likelihood, intention, or danger* in past time (see 32). *E.g.*

Ἐπειδὴ τῷ ψεύδεσθαι ἀπώλλυτο, *when he was on the point of ruin through his deceit.* ANT. v. 37. Καὶ τὰμ' ἔθνησκε τέκν', ἀπωλλύμην δ' ἐγώ, *and my children were about to die, and I was about to perish.* EUR. H. F. 538. Ἐκαινόμην ξίφει, *I was to be slain.* Id. I. T. 27.

39. The imperfect ἦν (generally with ἄρα) may express a fact which is just recognised as such by the speaker or writer, having previously been denied, overlooked, or not understood. *E.g.*

Ὁ πόποι, οὐκ ἄρα πάντα νοήμονες οὐδὲ δίκαιοι ἦσαν Φαίηκων ἡγήτορες ἡδὲ μέδοντες, *i.e. they are not, as I once imagined.* Od. xiii. 209. Οὐκ ἄρα μούνον ἦν ἐρίδων γένος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ γαίαν εἰσὶ δύο, *there is not after all merely one race of discords, but there are two on earth.* HES. Op. 11. Ὅδ' ἦν ἄρα ὁ ξυλλαβίων με, *this is then the one who seized me.* SOPH. Ph. 978. Οὐ σὺ μόνος ἄρ' ἦσθ' ἔποιψ; *are you not then the only erops (as I thought)?* AR. Av. 280. Ἄρ' οὐ τότε ἦν τὸ δένδρον, ἐφ' ὅπερ ἦγες ἡμῶς; *is not this then the tree to which you were bringing us?* PLAT. Phaedr. 230 A.

Other imperfects are rare; as ἡπίστω, XEN. Hell. iii. 4, 9.

40. In like manner the imperfect may express something which is the result of a previous discussion, with reference to which the past form is used. This is sometimes called the *philosophic imperfect*. *E.g.*

Ἦν ἡ μουσικὴ ἀντίστροφος τῆς γυμναστικῆς, εἰ μέμνησαι, *music then (as we proved) corresponds, if you remember, to gymnastics.* PLAT. Rep. 522 A. Καὶ δίκαιον δὴ φήσομεν ἄνδρα εἶναι τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ, ὥπερ καὶ πόλις ἦν δικάια, *and now we shall say that a man is just in the same way in which also a state was (shown to be) just.* Ib. 441 D. Δι-αφθερούμεν ἐκείνο, ὃ τῷ μὲν δικάῳ βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο, τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλλυτο, *we shall destroy that which (as we proved) becomes better by justice and is ruined by injustice.* PLAT. Crit. 47 D.

41. The Greek sometimes uses an idiom like the English *he was the one who did it* for *he is the one who did it*; as ἦν ὁ τὴν γνώμην ταύτην εἰπὼν Πείσανδρος, THUC. viii. 68; τίς ἦν ὁ βοηθήσας τοῖς Βυζαντίοις καὶ σώσας αὐτούς; DEM. xviii. 88.

PERFECT AND PLUPERFECT.

42. The perfect represents an action as already finished at the *present* time; as γέγραφα, *I have written* (that is, *my writing is now finished*).

43. The pluperfect represents an action as already finished at a given *past* time; as ἐγγράφειν, *I had written* (that is, *my writing was finished at some specified past time*).

44. The perfect, although it implies the performance of the action

in past time, yet states only that it *stands completed* at the *present* time. This explains why the perfect is classed with the present as a primary tense, that is, as a tense of *present* time.

45. The perfect and the pluperfect may be expressed by the perfect participle with the present and imperfect of εἰμι. Here, however, each part of the compound generally retains its own signification, so that this form expresses more fully the continuance of the *result* of the action of the perfect to the *present* time, and of that of the pluperfect to the *past* time referred to. *E.g.*

Πεποιηκώς ἐστίν (or ἦν), he *is* (or *was*) in the condition of having done,—he *has done* (or *had done*). Ἐμοῦ οἱ νόμοι οὐ μόνον ἀπεγνωκότες εἰσὶ μὴ ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κεκελευκότες ταύτην τὴν δίκην λαμβάνειν, it is the laws which not only have acquitted me of injustice, but have commanded me to inflict this punishment. LYS. i. 34. Ἐτόλμα λέγειν ὡς ἐγὼ τὸ πρᾶγμ' εἰμὶ τοῦτο δεδρακώς, he dared to say that I was the one who had done this deed. DEM. xxi. 104. In DEM. xviii. 23, οὔτε γὰρ ἦν πρεσβεία πρὸς οὐδένα ἀπεσταλμένη τότε τῶν Ἑλλήνων means for there was no embassy then out on a mission to any of the Greeks; whereas ἀπέσταλτο would have given the meaning no embassy had ever been sent out (see 831).

This of course does not apply to cases where the compound form is the only one in use, as in the third person plural of the perfect and pluperfect passive and middle of mute and liquid verbs.

46. On the other hand, although the simple form very often implies the continuance of the result of the action down to the present time or to a specified past time, it does so less distinctly than the compound form, and not necessarily (see the last two examples below). *E.g.*

Ἐπιμελῶς οἱ θεοὶ ὧν οἱ ἄνθρωποι δέονται κατεσκευάκασιν, the Gods have carefully provided what men need. XEN. Mem. iv. 3, 3. Τῶν ποιητῶν τινες ὑποθήκας ὡς χρὴ ζῆν καταλελοίπασιν, some of the poets have left us suggestions how to live. ISOC. ii. 3. Ἀκήκοα μὲν τοῦνομα, μνημονεύω δ' οὐ, I have heard the name, but I do not remember it. PLAT. Theaet. 144 B. "Α σοὶ τύχῃ κέχρηκε, ταῦτ' ἀφείλετο, Fortune has taken back what she has lent you. MEN. Fr. 598.

47. Ἐχω with the aorist and sometimes the perfect participle may form a periphrastic perfect (831). In tragedy and in Herodotus this is often fully equivalent to our perfect with *have*; elsewhere, especially in Attic prose, the participle and ἔχω are more or less distinct in their force. Still, this is the beginning of the modern perfect. *E.g.*

Ποίω σὺν ἔργῳ τοῦτ' ἀπειλήσας ἔχεις; have you made this threat? SOPH. O. C. 817. Τὸν μὲν προτίσας, τὸν δ' ἀτιμάσας ἔχει; Id. Ant. 22; see ib. 32. Ἡμᾶς πρᾶγος ἄσκοπον ἔχει περάνας. Id. Aj. 21. Ἡδᾶτο γὰρ ταῦτ', οὐδέ πω λήξαντ' ἔχει, i.e. the story has not yet ceased to be told. Id. O. T. 731; see Tr. 37, ταρβήσας' ἔχω. "Ος σφε νῦν ἀτιμάσας ἔχει. EUR. Med. 33; see ib. 90. Ἄρεως τε

μοῖραν μεταλαβὼν ἔχει τινά. Id. Bacch. 302. Σοῦ θανύμασας ἔχω τόδε. SOPH. Ph. 1362; so PLAT. Phaedr. 257 C (in poetic language). Οἶά μοι βεβουλευκῶς ἔχει. SOPH. O. T. 701 (after στήσας ἔχεις in 699). 'Ὅστις γ' ἔχει μου ἔξαρπάσας τὸ παιδίον, *whoever has snatched away* (though here ἔχει may mean *keeps*). AR. Th. 706. 'Εγκλήσας' ἔχει τὰ σιτία. Id. Eccl. 355. 'Υπὲρ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοὺς σὺ δουλώσας ἔχεις, i.e. *whom you hold in slavery or whom you have enslaved*. HDT. i. 27. 'Αμφοτέρων με τούτων ἀποκλήσας ἔχεις. Id. i. 37; so i. 41. 'Αλαζόνι ἐπιτρέψαντες ἡμέας αὐτοὺς ἔχομεν, *we have entrusted ourselves*, etc. Id. vi. 12. Πολλὰ χρήματα ἔχομεν ἀνηρπακότες. XEN. An. i. 3, 14 (here ἔχομεν expresses possession). See THUC. i. 68; DEM. ix. 12, xxvii. 17.

The beginning of this usage appears in HES. Op. 42:—

Κρύψαντες γὰρ ἔχουσι θεοὶ βίον ἀνθρώποισι.

48. Εἶχον or ἔσχον with the participle may form a periphrastic pluperfect in the same way (47). *E.g.*

'Ὁν γ' εἶχον ἥδη χρόνιον ἐκβεβληκότες. SOPH. Ph. 600. See HDT. i. 28, 73, and 75; XEN. An. iv. 7, 1.

49. (a) The perfect of many verbs has the signification of a present, which may usually be explained by the peculiar meaning of the verbs. Thus *θνήσκειν*, to die, *τεθνηκέναι*, to be dead; *καλεῖν*, to call, *κεκλησθαι*, to be called or named; *γίγνεσθαι*, to become, *γεγονέναι*, to be; *μιμνήσκειν*, to remind, *μεμνήσθαι*, to remember; *εἰδέναι*, to know; *ἱστάναι*, to place, *ἑστάναι*, to stand. So *βεβηκέναι*, to stand; *ἐγνωκέναι*, to know; *ἡμφιέσθαι*, to wear; *κεκτήσθαι*, to possess; *πεποιθέναι*, to trust; *πεφυκέναι*, to be (by nature); etc.

(b) The pluperfect of such verbs has the signification of the imperfect; as *οἶδα*, I know, *ᾔδειν*, I knew.

50. In epistles, the perfect and aorist are sometimes used where we might expect the present, the writer transferring himself to the time of the reader. *E.g.*

'Ἀπὸσταλκά σοι τόνδε τὸν λόγον, I send you this speech. ISOC. i. 2. Μετ' Ἀρταβάξου, ὃν σοι ἔπεμψα, πρῶσσε. THUC. i. 129. (Here ὃν ἔπεμψα refers to the man who was to carry the letter.) So *scripsi* and *misi* in Latin.

51. The perfect sometimes refers to the future, to denote certainty or likelihood that an action will immediately take place, in a sense similar to that of the present (32), but with more emphasis, as the change in time is greater. *E.g.*

"Ὅστ' εἴ με τόξων ἐγκρατὴς αἰσθήσεται, ὄλωλα, I shall perish at once. SOPH. Ph. 75. Κἂν τοῦτο νικῶμεν, πάνθ' ἡμῖν πεποιήται. XEN. An. i. 8, 12. So *perii* in Latin.

52. In a somewhat similar sense (51), the pluperfect may express the immediate or sudden occurrence of a past action. This occurs especially in Homer and Herodotus. *E.g.*

Οὐδ' ἀπῆλθεν μύθος Ἀθηναίης· ἡ δ' Οὐλυμπόνδε βεβήκειν, and she was gone to Olympus. Π. i. 221. Ἡ μὲν θαμβήσασα πάλιν οἰκόνδε βεβήκειν. Od. i. 360. Τὸν δ' ἔλιπε ψυχὴ, κατὰ δ' ὀφθαλμῶν κέχυτ' ἀχλὺς. Π. v. 696. Ἄλλοι δὲ ἡγεμόνας ἔχοντες ὥρμεατο ἐπὶ τὸ ἱρόν, i.e. they were on their way (at once). HDT. viii. 35; see ix. 61.

For the gnomic perfect, see 154 and 155.

AORIST.

53. The aorist indicative expresses the simple occurrence of an action in past time; as ἔγραψα, I wrote.

54. This fundamental idea of *simple occurrence* remains the essential characteristic of the aorist through all the dependent moods, however indefinite they may be in regard to time. The aorist takes its name (ἀόριστος, *unlimited, unqualified*) from its thus denoting merely the occurrence of an action, without any of the limitations (ὅροι) as to completion, continuance, repetition, etc., which belong to other tenses. It corresponds to the ordinary preterite (e.g. *did, went, said*) in English, whereas the Greek imperfect corresponds generally to the forms I was doing, etc. Thus, ἐποίει τοῦτο is he was doing this or he did this habitually; πεποίηκε τοῦτο is he has already done this; ἐπεποιήκει τοῦτο is he had already (at some past time) done this; but ἐποίησε τοῦτο is simply he did this, without qualification of any kind.

55. The aorist of verbs which denote a state or condition generally expresses the entrance into that state or condition. E.g.

Βασιλεύω, I am king, ἐβασίλευσα, I became king; ἄρχω, I hold office, ἤρξα, I took office; πλουτῶ, ἐπλούτησα, I became rich. Τῇ ἀληθείᾳ συνῴκει καὶ οὐδέπω καὶ τήμερον ἀπολέλοιπεν· ἀλλὰ παρὰ ζώντος Τιμοκράτους ἐκείνῃ συνῴκησε, she was his wife in good faith, and has not yet even to this day been divorced; but she went to live with him from Timocrates while T. was still living. DEM. xxx. 33.

56. The aorist is distinguished from the imperfect by expressing only the occurrence of an action or the entrance into a state or condition, while the imperfect properly represents an action or state as going on or as repeated. See the examples of the imperfect and aorist in 35, and compare συνῴκει and συνῴκησε in DEM. xxx. 33 (in 55). The aorist is therefore more common in rapid narration, the imperfect in detailed description. It must be remembered that the same event may be looked upon from different points of view by the same person; thus in DEM. xviii. 71 and 73 (quoted in 35) ἔλue τὴν εἰρήνην and τὴν εἰρήνην ἔλυσε refer to the same thing, once as an act in progress, and once as a fact accomplished. No amount of duration in an act, therefore,

can make the aorist an improper form to express it, provided it is stated as a single past event viewed as a whole. Thus ἐβασίλευσε δέκα ἔτη (see HDT. ii. 157) means *he had a reign of ten years*, (which is viewed as a single past event), while ἐβασίλευε δέκα ἔτη might refer to the same reign in the sense *he was reigning during ten years*. The aorist may refer even to a series of repetitions; but it takes them collectively as a whole, while the imperfect would take them separately as individuals. See DEM. xviii. 80, μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ τοὺς ἀποστόλους ἅπαντας ἀπέστειλα, and afterwards *I sent out all the naval armaments*; and xviii. 60, ἃ μὲν πρὸ τοῦ πολιτεῦσθαι καὶ δημηγορεῖν ἐμὲ προὔλαβε καὶ κατέσχε Φίλιππος, the (succession of) advantages which Philip secured during the period before I entered public life, emphatically opposed (as a whole) to Philip's many failures after that time, which are mentioned in ἃ δὲ καὶ διεκωλύθη. If the orator had wished to dwell on the number of the advantages or failures, or on their duration, he could have used the imperfect. See the last example under 35.

57. Since the same event may thus be stated by the aorist or the imperfect according to the writer's point of view, it is natural that it should occasionally be a matter of indifference which form is used, especially when the action is of such a nature that it is not important to distinguish its duration from its occurrence. For example, this distinction can seldom be important in such expressions as *he said, he commanded*; and we find ἔλεγον and ἐκέλευον in the historians where no idea of duration can have been in mind. See οἱ δ' ἐκέλευόν τε ἐπιέναι, καὶ παρελθόντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔλεγον τοιάδε, THUC. i. 72, followed, at the end of the speech in 79, by τοιαῦτα δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι εἶπον and Ἀρχίδαμος ἔλεξε τοιάδε. In such cases as the following (cited with others by Krüger) it was not important to the narrative whether the idea of duration was included in the expression or not: βάλλετο and βάλετο, II. ii. 43 and 45; θῆκεν and τίθει, xxiii. 653 and 656; δῶκε and δίδου, vii. 303 and 305; ἔλεπεν and λείπε, ii. 106 and 107; compare also μύστυλλον with ἔπειραν, ὥπτησαν, and ἐρύσαντο, i. 465 and 466. In all these cases the fundamental distinction of the tenses, which was inherent in the form, remained; only it happened that either of the two distinct forms expressed the meaning which was here needed equally well. It must not be thought, from these occasional examples, that the Greeks of any period were not fully alive to the distinction of the two tenses and could not use it with skill and nicety. But the Greeks, like other workmen, did not care to use their finest tools on every occasion; and it is often necessary to remember this if we would avoid hair-splitting.

58. The aorist, expressing simply a past occurrence, is sometimes used where we should expect a perfect or pluperfect, the action being merely referred to the past without the more exact specification which these tenses would give. *E.g.*

Τῶν οἰκετῶν οὐδένᾳ κατέλιπεν, ἀλλ' ἅπαντα πέπρακεν, *he (has) left none of the servants, but has sold everything.* AESCHIN. i. 99. Ἐτράποντο εἰς τὸν Πάνορμον, ὅθενπερ ἀνηγάγοντο, *they turned towards Panormus, whence they (had) set sail.* THUC. ii. 92. Κύρον δὲ μεταπέμπεται ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἧς αὐτὸν σατράπην ἐποίησεν, *from the dominion of which he (had once) made him satrap.* XEN. AN. i. 1, 2.

59. The aorist is generally used with ἐπεὶ or ἐπειδὴ, *after that*, the aorist with the particle being equivalent to our pluperfect. So after ἔως and πρὶν, *until.* *E.g.*

Ἐπειδὴ ἐτελεύτησε Δαρείος καὶ κατέστη Ἀρταξέρξης, *after Darius (had) died and Artaxerxes had become established.* XEN. AN. i. 1, 3. Οὐ πρόσθεν ἐξενεγκεῖν ἐτόλμησαν πρὸς ἡμᾶς πόλεμον πρὶν τοὺς στρατηγούς ἡμῶν συνέλαβον, *they did not dare to bring war upon us until they (had) seized our generals.* Ib. iii. 2, 29. But the pluperfect may still be used after ἐπεὶ or ἐπειδὴ, to give additional emphasis to the doubly past action; as in DEM. xviii. 42, ἐπειδὴ ἐξηπάτησθε μὲν ὑμεῖς, ἐξηπάτηντο δὲ οἱ Φωκεῖς καὶ ἀνῆρηντο αἱ πόλεις, τί ἐγένετο;

So in Latin we have generally *postquam venit*, but occasionally *postquam venerat*.

60. The aorist is sometimes used colloquially by the poets (especially the dramatists), when a sudden action, which is *just taking place*, is spoken of as if it had already happened. *E.g.*

Ἐπῆνεσ' ἔργον καὶ πρόνοιαν ἦν ἔθον, *I must approve your act, etc.* SOPH. AJ. 536. Ἦσθην ἀπειλαῖς, ἐγέλασα ψολοκορπίαις, *I am amused by your threats, I cannot help laughing, etc.* AR. EQ. 696.

61. The aorist sometimes refers vividly to the future, like the present (32) or perfect (51); as ἀπωλόμην εἰ με λείψεις, *I perish if you leave me.* EUR. ALCE. 386: so MED. 78. See also ὤλετο, IL. IX. 413 and 415.

62. In questions with τί οὐ, expressing surprise that something is not already done, and implying an exhortation to do it, the aorist is sometimes used strangely like a future. *E.g.*

Τί οὖν οὐ διηγῆσω ἡμῖν τὴν ξυνουσίαν; *why then don't you tell us about the meeting?* PLAT. PROT. 310 A. Τί οὖν οὐ καὶ Πρόδικον καὶ Ἱππίαν ἐκαλέσαμεν; *why then don't we call Prodicus and Hippias too?* Ib. 317 D. So τί οὖν οὐ . . . ἐσκέψω; Id. SOPH. 251 E. See also SOPH. O. T. 1003.

For the gnomic aorist see 154.

FUTURE.

63. The future denotes that an action is to take place

in time to come; as γράψω, *I shall write* or *I shall be writing*, sometimes *I will write*; πείσεται, *he will suffer*, sometimes *he shall suffer*.

64. In indirect discourse and in all final constructions the future expresses time future relatively to the leading verb. See 22.

65. The future may represent an action in its duration, its mere occurrence, or its inception; as ἔξω, *I shall have*, or *I shall obtain*; τοῦτο δώσω, *I shall give this*; ἄρξω, *I shall rule*, or *I shall obtain power* (cf. 55). *E.g.*

Πραγματεύονται ὅπως ἄρξουσιν, *they take trouble to gain power*. XEN. Rep. Lac. xiv. 5. Ἄρ' οὐ (διαίρετόν) οὔτινες ἄρξουσιν τε καὶ ἄρξονται; *must we not distinguish between those who are to rule and those who are to be ruled?* PLAT. Rep. 412 B. Πῇ στασιάζουσιν οἱ ἐπικούροι καὶ οἱ ἄρχοντες; *how will they fall into faction?* Ib. 545 D (see below, ὅπως δὴ πρῶτον στάσις ἔμπεσε).

66. The future may be used in a *gnomic* sense, denoting that something will always happen when an occasion offers. *E.g.*

Ἀνὴρ ὁ φεύγων καὶ πάλιν μαχήσεται. MEN. Mon. 45. "*He that fights and runs away may turn and fight another day.*"

67. The future is sometimes used to express what will hereafter be proved or be recognised as a truth. Compare the use of the imperfect in 40. *E.g.*

Φιλόσοφος ἡμῖν ἔσται ὁ μέλλων καλὸς κάγαθος ἔσεσθαι φύλαξ, *he will prove to be a philosopher*. PLAT. Rep. 376 C.

68. The future is sometimes used in questions of doubt, where the subjunctive is more common (287). *E.g.*

Τί δῆτα δρώμεν; μητέρ' ἢ φονεύσομεν; *what shall we do? shall we kill our mother?* EUR. El. 967: so Ion. 758. Ποῖ τρέφομαι; *whither shall I turn?* Id. Hipp. 1066. Εἴτ' ἐγὼ σου φείσομαι; AR. Ach. 312. Τί οὖν ποιήσομεν; πότερον εἰς τὴν πόλιν πάντας τοὺς παραδεξιόμεθα; *what then shall we do? Are we to receive all these into the state?* PLAT. Rep. 397 D.

69. The second person of the future may express a concession or permission; and it often expresses a command, like the imperative. *E.g.*

Πρὸς ταῦτα πράξεις οἷον ἂν θέλῃς, *you may act as you please*. SOPH. O. C. 956. Πάντως δὲ τοῦτο δράσεις, *but by all means do this*. AR. Nub. 1352. So in the common imprecations, ἀπολείσθαι, οἰμώξεσθαι, *may you perish*, etc. Χεῖρὶ δ' οὐ ψεύσεις ποτέ. EUR. Med. 1320. Compare the Latin *facies ut sciam*, *let me know*; *abibis*, *depart*.

70. In a few instances the future indicative with μή expresses a prohibition, like the imperative or subjunctive with μή (259). *E.g.*

Ταύτην, ἂν μοι χρῆσθε συμβούλῃ, φυλάξτε τὴν πίστιν πρὸς

τοῦτον τὸν Θράκα, καὶ μὴ βουλήσεσθε εἰδέναι, κ.τ.λ., *if you follow my advice, hold fast to this security* (69), *and do not wish to know*, etc. DEM. xxiii. 117. Ἐὰν δὲ εἴ φρονήτε, καὶ νυνὶ τοῦτο φανερόν ποιήσετε, καὶ μηδεμίαν αὐτοῖς ἄδειαν δώσετε. LYS. xxix. 13. Ξένον ἀδικήσεις μηδέποτε καιρὸν λαβών. MEN. MON. 397. So probably οὐ σίγα; μηδὲν τῶνδ' ἔρεῖς κατὰ πόλιν, *silence! say nothing of all this in the city*. AESCH. Sept. 250. (See 279.)

71. The future sometimes denotes a present intention, expectation, or necessity that something shall be done, in which sense the periphrastic form with μέλλω (73) is more common. *E.g.*

Τί διαφέρουσι τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης κακοπαθόντων, εἴ γε πεινίησουσι καὶ διψήσουσι καὶ βίγῃσουσι καὶ ἀγρυπνήσουσι; *if they are to endure hunger and thirst*, etc. XEN. Mem. ii. 1, 17. (Here εἰ μέλλουσι πεινῇν καὶ διψῇν, etc., would be more common, as in the last example under 73.) Αἶρε πλῆκτρον, εἰ μαχεῖ, *raise your spear, if you are going to fight*. AR. Av. 759. The distinction between this and the ordinary future (63) is important in conditional sentences (see 407).

72. A still more emphatic reference to a present intention is found in the question τί λέξεις; *what do you mean to say?* often found in tragedy; as ὦμοι, τί λέξεις; ἢ γὰρ ἐγγύς ἐστί που; EUR. Hec. 1124. So Hec. 511, 712; Hipp. 353; Ion. 1113; SOPH. Ph. 1233.

For the future in protasis, see 447 and 407; in relative clauses expressing a purpose, 565; with ἄν, 196; with οὐ μή, 294-301.

73. (Μέλλω with the Infinitive.) A periphrastic future is formed by μέλλω and the present or future (seldom the aorist) infinitive. This form sometimes denotes mere futurity, and sometimes intention, expectation, or necessity. *E.g.*

Μέλλει τοῦτο πράττειν (or πράξειν), *he is about to do this, or he intends to do this*. So in Latin, *facturus est faciet*. Μέλλω ἡμᾶς διδάξειν ὅθεν μοι ἡ διαβολὴ γέγονε. PLAT. Ap. 21 B. Οὐκοῦν δεήσει τοῦ τοιούτου τινὸς αἰεὶ ἐπιστάτου, εἰ μέλλει ἡ πολιτεία σφῆξεσθαι; *if the constitution is to be preserved*. PLAT. Rep. 412 A. (See 71.)

74. Although the present and the future infinitive were preferred with μέλλω (73), the aorist was still used by some writers, as by Euripides. See AESCH. Prom. 625 (μέλλω παθεῖν); EUR. Ion. 80 (μέλλω τυχεῖν), 760 (θαεῖν μέλλω), EL. 17 (μέλλοντα θαεῖν), PHOEN. 300 (μέλλεις θιγεῖν);—where the metre allows no change.

75. The future infinitive with μέλλω forms the only regular exception to the general principle which restricts the use of the future infinitive to indirect discourse (see 86; 112).

76. The imperfect (seldom the aorist) of μέλλω with the infinitive expresses *past* intention, expectation, or necessity. *E.g.*

Κύκλωψ, οὐκ ἄρ' ἔμελλες ἀνάλκιδος ἀνδρὸς ἑταίρους ἔδμεναι ἐν σπῆι γλαφυρῷ, so you were not after all to eat, etc. (cf. 39). *Od.* ix. 475. See *Il.* ii. 36. "Ἐμελλόν σ' ἄρα κινήσειν ἐγώ, I thought I should start you off. *AR. Nub.* 1301. 'Ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν, ὃς ἔμελλεν αὐτῷ καλῶ τε κἀγαθῷ ποιήσειν. *PLAT. Ap.* 20 A. 'Ἐμέλλησαν ἐμβάλλειν. *THUC.* i. 134.

FUTURE PERFECT.

77. The future perfect denotes that an action will be *already finished* at some future time. It is thus a perfect transferred to the future. *E.g.*

Καί με ἐὰν ἐξελέγξης, οὐκ ἀχθεσθήσομαι σοι, ἀλλὰ μέγιστος εὐεργέτης παρ' ἐμοὶ ἀναγεγράφει, you will have been enrolled as my greatest benefactor. *PLAT. Gorg.* 506 C. "Ἦν δὲ μὴ γένηται, μάτην ἐμοὶ κεκλαύσεται, σὺ δ' ἔγχανὼν τεθνήξεις, I shall then have had my whippings for nothing, and you will have died grinning. *AR. Nub.* 1435.

78. The future perfect often denotes the continuance of an action, or the permanence of its results, in future time. *E.g.*

Δύναμιν, ἧς ἐς αἶδιον τοῖς ἐπιγιγνομένοις μνήμη καταλείψεται, power, the memory of which will be left to our posterity for ever. *THUC.* ii. 64. (Compare 105.)

79. The future perfect sometimes denotes certainty or likelihood that an action will *immediately* take place, which idea is still more vividly expressed by the perfect (51). *E.g.*

Εἰ δὲ παρελθὼν εἰς ὕστισοῦν δύναιτο διδάξαι, πᾶς ὁ παρὼν φόβος λελύσεται, all the present fear will be at once dispelled. *DEM.* xiv. 2. (Here the inferior Mss. have λέλυται, which would be like ὄλωλα, quoted in 51.) Φράζε, καὶ πεπράξεται, speak, and it shall be no sooner said than done. *AR. Plut.* 1027. Εὐθύς Ἀριαῖος ἀφεστῆξει, ὥστε φίλος ἡμῖν οὐδεὶς λελείψεται. *XEN. AN.* ii. 4, 5.

80. The future perfect can be expressed by the perfect participle and ἔσομαι. In the active voice this is the only form in use, except in a few cases (chiefly ἐστήξω and τεθνήξω). *E.g.*

"Ἄν ταῦτ' εἰδῶμεν, καὶ τὰ δέοντα ἐσόμεθα ἐγνωκότες καὶ λόγων ματαίων ἀπηλλαγμένοι, we shall have already resolved to do our duty and shall have been freed from vain reports. *DEM.* iv. 50. (See 45 and 831.)

81. A similar circumlocution with the aorist participle and ἔσομαι is sometimes found, especially in the poets. *E.g.*

Οὐ σωπῆσας ἔσει; *SOPH. O. T.* 1146. Λιπηθεὶς ἔσει. *SOPH. O. C.* 816. (See 47 and 831.)

82. When the perfect is used in the sense of a present (49), the

future perfect is its regular future; as *κεκλήσομαι, μεμνήσομαι, ἀφελήσω*, *I shall be named, I shall remember, I shall withdraw*, etc.

83. In many other verbs, the future perfect differs very slightly, if at all, from an ordinary future. Thus *πεπράσσομαι* is the regular future passive of *πιπράσκω*. Still, where there is another future, the future perfect is generally more emphatic.

84. It must be remembered that, in most cases in which the Latin or the English would use a future perfect in a dependent clause, the Greek uses an aorist or even a perfect subjunctive. (See 90 and 103, with the examples.)

II. TENSES OF THE DEPENDENT MOODS.

85. The distinctions of time which mark the various tenses in the indicative are retained when the optative and infinitive represent the indicative in indirect discourse, and usually in the participle. But in other constructions these distinctions of time disappear in the dependent moods, and the tenses here differ only in their other character of denoting the *continuance*, the *completion*, or simply the *occurrence* of an action (20). The infinitive with *ἄν* is not included in this statement (see Chap. III.)

The tenses in these two uses must, therefore, be discussed separately.

A. NOT IN INDIRECT DISCOURSE.

86. In the subjunctive and imperative, and also in the optative and infinitive not in indirect discourse (666; 684), the tenses chiefly used are the present and the aorist. The perfect is used here only when the completion of the action is to be emphasized (see 102-110). For the occasional future, see 111-113; 130-132.

PRESENT AND AORIST.

87. The present and aorist here differ only in this, that the present expresses an action in its *duration*, that is, as *going on* or *repeated*, while the aorist expresses simply its *occurrence*, the time of both tenses being otherwise precisely the same. *E.g.*

Ἐάν ποιεῖ τοῦτο, *if he shall be doing this*, or *if he shall do this (habitually)*; εἰ ποιεῖ τοῦτο, (simply) *if he shall do this*; εἰ ποιοίη τοῦτο, *if he should be doing this*, or *if he should do this (habitually)*.

ally); εἰ ποιήσῃς τοῦτο, if he should do this; ποιεῖ τοῦτο, do this (habitually); ποιήσον τοῦτο, do this. Οὕτω νικήσαιμί τ' ἐγὼ καὶ νομιζοίμην σοφός, on this condition may I gain the victory (aor.) and be considered (pres.) wise. AR. Nub. 520. Βούλεται τοῦτο ποιεῖν, he wishes to do this (habitually); βούλεται τοῦτο ποιήσαι, (simply) he wishes to do this. For other examples see below.

This is a distinction entirely unknown to the Latin, which has (for example) only one form, *si faciat*, corresponding to εἰ ποιοίῃ and εἰ ποιήσῃ, and only *facere* to correspond to both ποιεῖν and ποιήσαι (as used above).

88. It is sometimes difficult here, as in the corresponding case of the imperfect and the aorist indicative (56; 57), to see any decisive reason for preferring one tense to the other; and it can hardly be doubted that the Greeks occasionally failed to make use of this, as well as of other fine distinctions, when either form would express the required sense equally well, although they always had the distinction ready for use when it was needed. Compare the present and the aorist subjunctive and optative in the following examples:—

Ἐὰν γὰρ τί σε φανῶ κακὸν πεποιηκώς, ὁμολογῶ ἀδικεῖν· ἐὰν μέντοι μηδὲν φαίνωμαι κακὸν πεποιηκώς, μηδὲ βουληθεῖς, οὐ καὶ σὺ ὁμολογήσεις μηδὲν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; if I shall appear (aor.) to have done you any wrong, and if I shall appear (pres.) to have done you no wrong. XEN. Cyr. v. 5, 13. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ προσδέξαιτο Φωκίας συμμάχους . . . εἰ δὲ μὴ προσδέχοιτο, κ.τ.λ. DEM. xix. 318. Εἴ τις πολλῶν θανάτων ἦσαν αἰτίαι, (ἵνα) πάντων τούτων δεκαπλασίας ἀλγηδόνας ὑπὲρ ἐκάστου κομίσαιντο, καὶ αὖ εἴ τινες εὐεργεσίας εὐεργετηκότες εἶεν, (ἵνα) κατὰ ταῦτα τὴν ἀξίαν κομίζοιεντο, if any had caused many deaths, that they might receive (aor.) suffering for all these, tenfold for each; and again, if they had done kind services to any, that they might in like manner receive (pres.) their due reward. PLAT. Rep. 615 B. In the last example, it is obvious that the change from κομίσαιντο to κομίζοιεντο is connected with the change from εἰ ἦσαν to εἰ εὐεργετηκότες εἶεν; but it is questionable whether the latter change is the cause or the effect, and it is also quite as hard to see the reason for this change in the protasis, when both conditions are equally general, as for that in the final clause. Probably no two scholars would agree in the reasons which they might assign for the use of the tenses in these examples. It is certain, however, that either present or aorist would express the meaning equally well in all these cases.

Subjunctive and Imperative.

89. The present and aorist subjunctive and imperative are always future, except that in general conditions (462; 532) the subjunctive is general in its time. In all final constructions the subjunctive is future relatively to the

leading verb. The following examples will show the distinction of the two tenses:—

Πειθώμεθα πάντες· φεύγωμεν σὺν νηυσὶ φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαίαν, *let us all be persuaded; let us fly, etc.* II. ii. 139. Τί φῶ; τί δρῶ; *what shall I say? what shall I do?* Πῶς οὖν περὶ τούτων ποιῶμεν; *how then shall we act about this?* PLAT. Phil. 63 A.

Ἀναλογισώμεθα τὰ ὁμολογημένα ἡμῖν, *let us enumerate the points which have been conceded by us.* PLAT. Prot. 332 D. Μηδὲν φοβηθῆς, *fear not.* But μηδὲν φοβοῦ, *be not timid.* Τί ποιήσω; *what shall I do (in this case)?* But τί ποιῶ; *what shall I do (generally)?* Οὐ μὴ τοῦτο εἴπῃς, *you shall not say this.* Οὐ μὴ γένηται, *it will not happen.* So in the Homeric οὐδὲ ἴδωμαι, *nor shall I ever see* (6).

*Ἄν δέ τις ἀνθιστῇται, πειρασόμεθα χειροῦσθαι, *but if any one shall stand opposed to us, we will try to subdue him.* XEN. An. vii. 3, 11. Κἂν πόλεμος ᾗ, ἕως ἂν ἐπ' ἄλλον ἔχωμεν στρατεύεσθαι, σοῦ τε καὶ τῶν σῶν ἀφεξόμεθα, *and if there shall be war, so long as we shall be able, etc.* XEN. Hell. iv. 1, 38. Ἄλλ' ᾗ ἂν γιγνώσκω βέλτιστα ἐρῶ, *but I will speak as I shall think best.* THUC. vi. 9. Οὓς ἂν βούλῃ ποιήσασθαι φίλους, ἀγαθόν τι λέγε περὶ αὐτῶν πρὸς τοὺς ἀπαγγέλλοντας, *whomsoever you shall wish, etc.* ISOC. i. 33. Ἄπας λόγος, ἂν ἀπῇ τὰ πράγματα, μάταιόν τι φαίνεται καὶ κενόν, *all speech, if (wherever) deeds are wanting, appears vain and empty.* DEM. ii. 12. Συμμαχεῖν τοῦτοις ἐθέλουσιν ἅπαντες, οὓς ἂν ὀρώσι παρεσκευασμένους, *all are willing to be allied to those whom they see prepared.* DEM. iv. 6.

Ὡς ἂν εἴπω πειθώμεθα, *let us obey as I shall direct.* II. ix. 704. Ἦν ἐγγὺς ἔλθῃ θάνατος, οὐδεὶς βούλεται θνήσκειν, *if death comes near (the moment that death comes near), no one wants to die.* EUR. Alc. 671. Ἦν τὴν εἰρήνην ποιησώμεθα, μετὰ πολλῆς ἀσφαλείας τὴν πόλιν οἰκήσομεν, *if we (shall) make the peace, etc.* ISOC. viii. 20. Ὅν μὲν ἂν ἴδῃ ἀγνώτα, (sc. ὁ κύων), χαλεπαίνει· ὃν δ' ἂν γνῶριμον (sc. ἴδῃ), ἀσπάσεται, i.e. *whomsoever the dog sees (at any time).* PLAT. Rep. 376 A.

Δοκεῖ μοι κατακαῦσαι τὰς ἀμάξας, ἵνα μὴ τὰ ζεύγη ἡμῶν στρατηγῇ, ἀλλὰ πορευώμεθα ὅπῃ ἂν τῇ στρατιᾷ συμφέρῃ, *it seems good to me to burn the wagons, that our beasts of burden may not be our generals, and that we may go on whithersoever it may be best for the army.* XEN. An. iii. 2, 27. Καὶ γὰρ βασιλεὺς αἰρεῖται, οὐχ ἵνα ἑαυτοῦ καλῶς ἐπιμελήται, ἀλλ' ἵνα καὶ οἱ ἐλόμενοι δι' αὐτὸν εὖ πράττωσι. XEN. Mem. iii. 2, 3.

Δέδοικα μὴ ἐπιλαθώμεθα τῆς οἴκαδε ὁδοῦ, *I fear lest we may forget the road home.* XEN. An. iii. 2, 25. Διανοεῖται αὐτῇ, λῦσαι, ὥς μὴ διαβῇτε ἀλλ' ἀποληφθῇτε, i.e. *he intends to destroy the bride, that you may not pass over but be caught.* Ib. ii. 4, 17.

Φεῦγε, begone; χαίροντων, *let them rejoice;* μὴ νομίζετε, *do not believe.* Εἰπέ μοι, *tell me;* δότε μοι τοῦτο, *give me this.* Σφενδόνῃν τίς μοι δότω, *let some one give me a sling.* AR. Av. 1187.

90. When the aorist subjunctive depends on ἐπειδάν (or ἐπάν, ἐπὶν), *after that*, it is referred by this meaning of the particle to time *preceding* the action of the leading verb, so that ἐπειδάν τοῦτο ἴδω, ἥξω means *after I (shall) have seen this, I will come*; and ἐπειδάν τοῦτο ἴδω, ἀπέρχομαι, *after I have seen this, I (always) depart*. In such cases it may be translated by our future perfect when the leading verb is future, and by our perfect when the leading verb denotes a general truth and is translated by the present. As the subjunctive here can never depend upon a verb of simply *present* time, it can never refer to time absolutely *past*; and we use the perfect indicative in translating such an aorist after a verb expressing a general truth, merely because we use the present in translating the leading verb, although this is properly not present but general in its time.

In like manner, after ἕως, πρίν, and other particles signifying *until, before that*, and even after the relative pronoun or ἕάν, the aorist subjunctive may be translated by our future perfect or perfect, when the context shows that it refers to time *preceding* that of the leading verb. *E.g.*

Χρὴ δέ, ὅταν μὲν τιθῇσθε τοὺς νόμους, ὅποιοί τινές εἰσι σκοπεῖν, ἐπειδάν δὲ θῇσθε, φυλάττειν καὶ χρῆσθαι, *while you are enacting laws, you must look to see of what kind they are; but after you have enacted them, you must guard and use them*. DEM. xxi. 34. (Here the present τιθῇσθε with ὅταν, *while*, refers to an action continuing through the time of the leading verb; but θῇσθε with ἐπειδάν, *after that*, refers to time *past* relatively to the leading verb.) Ταῦτα, ἐπειδάν περὶ τοῦ γένους εἶπω, τότε, ἂν βούλησθε ἀκούειν, ἐρῶ, *when I shall have spoken about my birth, then, if you desire to hear, I will speak of these things*. DEM. lvii. 16. (Here the aorist εἶπω, though absolutely future, denotes time *past* with reference to ἐρῶ.) Ἐπειδάν διαπράξωμαι ἃ θέομαι, ἥξω, *when I shall have accomplished what I desire, I will come*. XEN. AN. ii. 3, 29. Ἐπειδάν δὲ κρύψωσι γῇ, ἀνὴρ ἡρμῆμος ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως λέγει ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἔπαινον τὸν πρόποντα, *when they have covered them with earth, etc.* THUC. ii. 34. Ἔως ἂν σφύζηται τὸ σκάφος, τότε χρὴ προθύμους εἶναι· ἐπειδάν δὲ ἡ θάλαττα ὑπέροσχη, μάταιος ἡ σπουδή, *as long as the vessel remains in safety (present); but the moment that the sea has overwhelmed it (aorist)*. DEM. ix. 69. Ἔως ἂν ἐκμάθῃς, ἔχ' ἐλπίδα, *until you have learnt fully, have hope*. SOPH. O. T. 834. Μία δὲ κλίνη κενὴ φέρεται τῶν ἀφανῶν, οἱ ἂν μὴ εὐρεθῶσιν ἐς ἀναίρεσιν, *and one bier is always carried empty, in honour of the missing, whose bodies are not (have not been) found*. THUC. ii. 34. Διανοεῖται, ἃ ἂν ἄλλοι τῇ ἀρετῇ καταπράξωσι, τούτων ἰσομοιρεῖν; *i.e. he thinks of having an equal share in those things which others by their valour have acquired?* XEN. CYT. ii. 3, 5. Πάνθ' ὅς' ἂν ἐκ πολέμου γιγνομένης εἰρήνης προεθῇ, ταῦτα τοῖς ἀμελήσασιν ἀπόλλυται, *all things which are (or have been) abandoned when peace is made are always lost to those*

who abandoned them. DEM. xix. 151. Ἦν δ' ἄρα καὶ του πείρα σφαλῶσιν, ἀντελπίσαντες ἄλλα ἐπλήρωσαν τὴν χρεῖαν, *if they have been disappointed in anything, they always supply the deficiency, etc.* (154 and 171). THUC. i. 70. Οὐχὶ παύσομαι, πρὶν ἂν σε τῶν σῶν κύριον στήσω τέκνων, *I will not cease before I have (shall have) made you master of your children.* SOPH. O. C. 1040. Μὴ στέναζε πρὶν μάθης, *do not groan until you have heard.* SOPH. Ph. 917.

91. This use of the aorist subjunctive (90) sometimes seems to approach very near to that of the perfect subjunctive (103); and we often translate both by the same tense. But in the perfect, the idea of an action *completed* at the time referred to is expressed by the *tense* of the verb, without aid from any particle or from the context; in the aorist, the idea of relative past time can come *only* from the particle or the context. (See 103 with examples, and 104.) The Greek often uses the less precise aorist subjunctive and optative (see 95) where the perfect would be preferred but for its cumbrous forms; and we sometimes give the aorist more precision than really belongs to it in itself by translating it as a perfect or future perfect. (See the last six examples under 90.) The following example illustrates the distinction between the perfect and aorist subjunctive:—

Ὅν μὲν ἂν ἴδῃ ἀγνώτα (ὁ κύων), χαλεπαίνει· ὃν δ' ἂν γινώριμον (ἴδῃ), ἀσπάσεται, κἂν μηδὲν πρόποτε ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὸν πεπόνθῃ, *whomsoever he sees whom he knows, he fawns upon, even if he has hitherto received no kindness from him.* PLAT. Rep. 376 A. Compare this with εἰ ἂν ἀγαθὸν τι πάθῃ ὑπὸ τινος, ἀσπάσεται, *if he ever happens to receive any kindness from any one, he always fawns upon him*; and ἐπειδὴν ἀγαθὸν τι πάθῃ, ἀσπάσεται, *after he has received any kindness, he always fawns upon him.*

92. The present subjunctive with μή or ὅπως μή after verbs of *fearing*, though it generally refers to a future object of fear, may also denote what may hereafter *prove to be* an object of fear. *E.g.*

Δέδοικα μὴ ἀληθές ᾤ, *I fear it may prove true.* DEM. ix. 1. Δεινῶς ἀθνῶ, μὴ βλέπων ὁ μάντις ᾤ, *lest the prophet may prove to have his sight* (cf. the following δείξεις δὲ μάλλον). SOPH. O. T. 747; so ANT. 1114. Ὅρα μὴ περὶ τοῖς φιλτάτοις κυβεύης, *beware lest it may prove that you are staking what is dearest.* PLAT. Prot. 314 A. Ὅρα ὅπως μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ὁμολογῇς. Id. Crit. 49 C. In all these cases the present indicative would be required if the object of fear were really present (369, 1).

Compare the examples of the perfect subjunctive in 103.

93. In a few passages of Homer the aorist subjunctive with μή seems to express a similar fear that something may prove to have already happened; as δέιδουκα μὴ σε παρείπη, *I fear it may prove that she persuaded you*, Il. i. 555. So Il. x. 98, μὴ κοιμήσωνται ἄταρ λάθωνται, and x. 538, δέιδουκα μὴ τι πάθωσι, *I fear lest it may prove that they have met some harm.* The reference to the past here cannot come from any past force of the aorist subjunctive itself,

but is probably an inference drawn from the context. As the later language would use a perfect subjunctive in such cases, these aorists seem to be instances of an earlier laxity of usage, like the use of ἀπόλοιτό κε for both *would have perished* and *would perish* (440).

In II. x. 537 there is a similar case of the aorist optative in a wish: αἶ γὰρ δὴ δδ' ἄφαρ ἐκ Τρώων ἐλασαίαιτο μώνυχας ἵππους, i.e. *may it prove that they have driven the horses away from the Trojans* (95).

Optative.

94. The present and aorist optative in independent sentences (in wishes and with ἄν), and in all conditional sentences except past general conditions (462; 532), express future time, the relation of which to the future expressed by other moods is explained in 12, 13, and 16. (Some Homeric present or past unreal conditions and present wishes are exceptions: see 438-441.) In all final constructions the optative (which is used only after past tenses) represents the subjunctive after primary tenses, and is future relatively to the leading verb. *E.g.*

Εἴθε τοῦτο εἴη (utinam sit), *O that this may be*. Εἴθε μὴ ταῦτα πάσχοιεν, *may they not suffer these things* (with a view to the progress of their suffering). But εἴθε μὴ ταῦτα πάθοιεν, *may they not suffer these things* (viewed collectively). Εἴθε σὺ τοιοῦτος ὦν φίλος ἡμῖν γένοιτο, *may you become a friend to us*. XEN. Hell. iv. 1, 38. Μὴ γένοιτο, *may it not happen*. See examples of the optative with ἄν below.

Οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐπαινοίη με, εἰ ἐξελαύνοιμι τοὺς εὐεργέτας, *for he would not praise me, if I should banish my benefactors*. XEN. An. vii. 7, 11. Εἴης φορητὸς οὐκ ἂν, εἰ πρᾶσσοις καλῶς, *you would not be endurable, if you should be in prosperity (at any time)*. AESCH. Prom. 979. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν τις, ἃ γε μὴ ἐπίσταιτο, ταῦτα σοφὸς εἴη; *for how could any one be wise in that which he did not understand (i.e. εἴ τινα μὴ ἐπίσταιτο)?* XEN. Mem. iv. 6, 7. Ἀλλ' εἴ τι μὴ φέροιμεν, ὥτρυνεν φέρειν, *but if we neglected to bring anything, he always exhorted us to bring it*. EUR. Alc. 755. Οὐκ ἀπελείπετο ἔτι αὐτοῦ, εἰ μὴ τι ἀναγκαῖον εἴη, *he never left him, unless there was some necessity for it*. XEN. Mem. iv. 2, 40.

Εἰ ἔλθοι, πάντ' ἂν ἴδοι, *if he should go, he would see all*. Εἰ ἔλθοι, πάνθ' ἑώρα, *if ever (whenever) he went, he (always) saw all*. Οὐδ' εἰ πάντες ἔλθοιεν Πέρσαι, πλήθει γε οὐχ ὑπερβαλοίμεθ' ἂν τοὺς πολεμίους, *not even if all the Persians should come, should we surpass the enemy in numbers*. XEN. Cyr. ii. 1, 8. Ὅτε ἔξω τοῦ δεινοῦ γένοιεντο καὶ ἐξείη πρὸς ἄλλους ἀρχοντας ἀπιέναι, πολλοὶ αὐτὸν ἀπέλειπον, *but when they were come out of danger and it was in their power (present) to go to other commanders, (in all such cases) many left*

him. Id. An. ii. 6, 12. "Ανευ γὰρ ἀρχόντων οὐδὲν ἂν οὔτε καλὸν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν γένοιτο, *nothing could be done*, etc. Ib. iii. 1, 38. Οὐκ οἶδα ὅ τι ἂν τις χρήσαιο αὐτοῖς, *I do not know what use any one could make of them*. Ib. iii. 1, 40.

Τοῦτου ἐπεθύμει, ἵνα εὖ πράττοι, *he desired this in order that he might be in prosperity*. Ἐφοβεῖτο μὴ τοῦτο ποιοῖεν, *he feared lest they should do this (habitually)*. Δῆλος ἦν ἐπιθυμῶν ἄρχειν, ὅπως πλείω λαμβάνοι, ἐπιθυμῶν δὲ τιμᾶσθαι, ἵνα πλείω κερδαῖνοι· φίλος τε ἐβούλετο εἶναι τοῖς μέγιστα δυναμένοις, ἵνα ἀδικῶν μὴ διδοίῃ δίκην. XEN. An. ii. 6, 21. (Here the aorist optative would have referred to single acts of receiving, getting gain, and suffering punishment, while the present refers to a succession of cases, and to a whole course of conduct.)

Ἦν ὁ Φίλιππος ἐν φόβῳ μὴ ἐκφύγοι τὰ πράγματ' αὐτόν, *Philip was in fear lest the control of affairs might escape him*. DEM. xviii. 33.

95. The aorist optative with ἐπειδὴ or ἐπεὶ, *after that*, is referred by the meaning of the particle to time preceding that of the leading verb, like the aorist subjunctive in 90; so that ἐπειδὴ ἴδοι ἀπῆι means *after he had seen he (always) went away*. This gives the aorist in translation the force of a pluperfect. So after words meaning *until*, and in the other cases mentioned in 90. *E.g.*

Οὓς μὲν ἴδοι εἰτάκτως ἰόντας, τίνες τε εἶεν ἡρώτα, καὶ ἐπεὶ πύθοιτο ἐπῆνει, *he asked any whom he saw marching in good order, who they were; and after he had ascertained, he raised them*. XEN. Cyr. v. 3, 55. Περιεμένομεν ἐκάστοτε ἕως ἀνοιχθεῖν τὸ δεσμοτήριον· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀνοιχθεῖν, εἰσῆγειμεν παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη, *we waited each morning until the prison was opened (or had been opened); and after it was opened, we went in to Socrates*. PLAT. Phaed. 59 D. In PLAT. Rep. 331 C, εἴ τις λάβοι παρὰ φίλου ἀνδρὸς σωφρονούντος ὄπλα, εἰ μανείῃς ἀπαιτοῖ, is thus given by Cicero (Offic. iii. 95): Si gladium quis apud te sanae mentis deposuerit, *repetat* insaniens; and there can be no doubt that εἰληφὺς εἶη (the equivalent of *deposuerit*) would have been more exact than λάβοι in Greek (see 91). For a peculiar aorist optative in Il. x. 537, see above (93, end).

Infinitive.

96. A present or aorist infinitive (without ἄν) not in indirect discourse is still a verbal noun so far that it expresses no time except such as is implied in the context. Thus, when it depends on a verb of *wishing* or *commanding* or any other verb whose natural object is a future action, or when it expresses purpose, it is future without regard to its tense; as, in βούλομαι νικᾶν (or νικῆσαι), *I wish to be victorious (or to gain victory)*, the infinitive expresses time only so far as the noun νίκην would in βούλομαι νίκην. Likewise,

when the present or aorist infinitive (without *ἄν*) has the article, except in the rare cases in which it stands in indirect discourse (794), it has no reference to time in itself; as in τὸ γινῶναι ἐπιστήμην λαβεῖν ἔστιν, *to learn is to obtain knowledge*, where γινῶναι expresses time only as the noun γνῶσις would in its place. *E.g.*

"Ἐξέστι μένειν, *it is possible to remain*. 'Ἐξέσται τοῦτο ποιεῖν, *it will be possible to do this*. Δέομαι ὑμῶν μένειν, *I beg you to remain*. 'Τὶ τὸ κωλῶν ἔτ' αὐτὸν ἔσται βαδίζειν ὅποι βούλεται, *what will there be to prevent him from going whither he pleases?* DEM. i. 12. 'Ἐκέλευσα αὐτὸν τοῦτο ποιεῖν, *I commanded him to do this*. 'Εβούλετο σοφὸς εἶναι, *he wished to be wise*. Δεινὸς ἔστι λέγειν, *he is skilled in speaking*. "Ὡρα βαδίζειν, *it is time to be going*. Πάν ποιοῦσιν ὥστε δίκην μὴ διδόναι, *they do everything so as to avoid being punished*. PLAT. Gorg. 479 C. Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐπιτιμᾶν ἵσως φήσαι τις ἂν ῥᾷδιον εἶναι, τὸ δ' ὅτι δὲ πράττειν ἀποφαίνεσθαι, τοῦτ' εἶναι συμβούλοι, *some one may say that finding fault is easy, but that showing what ought to be done is the duty of an adviser*. DEM. i. 16. ('Ἐπιτιμᾶν, ἀποφαίνεσθαι, and πράττειν belong here; but εἶναι in both cases is in indirect discourse, 117.) Οὐ πλεονεξίας ἔνεκεν ταῦτ' ἔπραξεν, ἀλλὰ τῷ δικαιοτέρα τοὺς Θηβαίους ἢ ὑμᾶς ἀξιούσιν, *he did this not from love of gain, but because of the Thebans making juster demands than you*. ID. vi. 13. 'Ἐτειχίσθη δὲ Ἀταλάντη νήσος, τοῦ μὴ ληστὰς κακουργεῖν τὴν Εὐβοίαν, *in order to prevent pirates from ravaging Euboea*. THUC. ii. 32.

Πόλεως ἔστι θάνατος ἀνάστατον γενέσθαι, *it is death for a city to be laid waste*. LYCURG. 61. "Ὡς περ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοῖς καλοῖς κύγαθοῖς αἰρετώτερόν ἐστι καλῶς ἀποθανεῖν ἢ (ζῆν αἰσχροῦς, οὕτω καὶ τῶν πόλεων ταῖς ὑπερεχούσαις λυσιτελεῖν (ἡγούντο) ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀφανισθῆναι μᾶλλον ἢ δούλαις ὀφθῆναι γενομέναις, *as it is preferable for honourable men to die (aor.) nobly rather than to continue living (pres.) in disgrace, so also they thought that it was better (pres.) for the pre-eminent among states to be (at once) made to disappear (aor.) from among men, than to be (once) seen (aor.) to fall into slavery*. ISOC. iv. 95. Πέμπουσιν ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν πρέσβεις, δέομενοι μὴ σφᾶς περιορᾶν φθειρομένους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τε φεύγοντας ξυναλλάξαι σφίσι καὶ τὸν τῶν βαρβάρων πόλεμον καταλύσαι, *asking them not to allow them to be destroyed, but to bring their exiles to terms with them, and to put an end to the barbarians' war*. THUC. i. 24. Τὸ γὰρ γινῶναι ἐπιστήμην πού λαβεῖν ἔστιν, *to learn is to obtain knowledge*. PLAT. Theæt. 209 E. Πάντες τὸ καταλιπεῖν αὐτὰ πάντων μάλιστα φεύγομεν, *we all try most of all to avoid leaving them behind*. XEN. Mem. ii. 2, 3. Οὐ γὰρ τὸ μὴ λαβεῖν τὰγαθὰ οὕτω γε χαλεπὸν ὥς περ τὸ λαβόντα στερηθῆναι λυπηρόν. ID. Cyr. vii. 5, 82. Τοῦ πιεῖν ἐπιθυμία, *the desire of obtaining drink*. THUC. vii. 84. Κελεύει αὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν, *he commands him to go*. 'Ἐκέλευσεν αὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν, *he commanded him to go*. Κε-

λεύσει αὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν, *he will command him to go*. Πρὸς τῷ μηδὲν ἐκ τῆς πρεσβείας λαβεῖν, τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους ἐλύσατο, *besides receiving nothing from the embassy, he ransomed the captives*. DEM. xix. 229. Εἰ πρὸ τοῦ τοὺς Φωκίας ἀπολέσθαι ψηφίσαιθε βοηθεῖν, *if before the destruction of the Phocians you should vote to go to their assistance*. Id. xviii. 33. Τὰς αἰτίας προῦγραψα, τοῦ μή τινα ζητῆσαι ποτε ἐξ ὅτου τοσοῦτος πόλεμος κατέστη, *that no one may ever ask the reason why, etc.* THUC. i. 23. Τὸν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ γενέσθαι ταῦτ' ἀγὼνα, *the contest to prevent these from being done*. DEM. xviii. 201.

No account is here taken of the infinitive with *ἄν* (204).

97. The distinction between the present and aorist infinitive is well illustrated by Aristotle, when he says of pleasure, *Eth. x. 3, 4*, ἡσθῆναι μὲν γὰρ ἔστι ταχέως ὥσπερ ὀργισθῆναι, ἡδεσθαι δ' οὐ, οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕτερον· βαδίζειν δὲ καὶ αὔξεσθαι καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μεταβάλλειν μὲν οὖν εἰς τὴν ἡδονὴν ταχέως καὶ βραδέως ἔστιν, ἐνεργεῖν δὲ κατ' αὐτὴν οὐκ ἔστι ταχέως, λέγω δ' ἡδεσθαι. *We may BECOME pleased (ἡσθῆναι) quickly, as we may get angry quickly; but we cannot BE pleased (ἡδεσθαι) quickly, even as compared with another person, although we can thus walk and grow and do such things. We may then change into a state of pleasure quickly or slowly, but we cannot actually enjoy the pleasure, I mean BE PLEASED (ἡδεσθαι), quickly.*

So in PLAT. *Theaet.* 155 C, Socrates says, *ἄνευ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι γενέσθαι ἀδύνατον* (sc. ἐμὲ ἐλάττω), *i.e. without going through the process of becoming (γίγνεσθαι) smaller, it is impossible for me to get (γενέσθαι) smaller.*

98. Χράω, ἀναίρῳ, θεσπίζω, and other verbs signifying to give an oracular response, generally take the present or the aorist infinitive, expressing the command or warning of the oracle, where we might expect the future in indirect discourse (135). These verbs here take the ordinary construction of verbs of commanding, advising, and warning. *E.g.*

Λέγεται δὲ Ἀλκμαίῳ τὸν Ἀπόλλω ταύτην τὴν γῆν χρῆσαι οἰκεῖν, *it is said that Apollo gave a response to Alcmaeon that he should inhabit this land* (warned him to inhabit it). THUC. ii. 102. Χρωμένῳ δὲ τῷ Κύλωνι ἀνείλεν ὁ θεὸς ἐν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς τῇ μεγίστῃ ἑορτῇ καταλαβεῖν τὴν Ἀθηναίων ἀκρόπολιν, *that he should seize*. Id. i. 126. Ἐκέχρητο γὰρ τοῖσι Σπαρτιήγησι, ἢ Λακεδαιμόνα ἀνάστατον γενέσθαι ἢ τὸν βασιλέα σφέναι ἀπολέσθαι. HDL. vii. 220. Ἐθέσπισε κομίσαι καὶ εἰσιδεῖν. EUR. I. T. 1014. Ὡς χρησμοῦ ὄντος τὴν πόλιν διαφθαρήναι, *as if there were an oracle dooming the city to perish*. PLAT. *Rep.* 415 C. Πολλάκι γάρ οἱ ἔειπε νόσφ' ὑπ' ἀργαλή φθίσθαι ἢ ὑπὸ Τρώεσσι δαμῆναι, *the diviner told him that he must either die by painful disease, or perish at the hands of the Trojans*. II. xiii. 667. But we find ἀνείλεν ἔσεσθαι, THUC. i. 118; χρήσαντος κρατήσιν, LYCURG. 99; ἐκέχρηστο βασιλεύσειν, HDL. ii. 147; as indirect discourse.

99. Even verbs of *saying* and *thinking*, as λέγω when it signifies *to command*, and δοκεῖ, *it seems good*, may take the present or aorist infinitive not in indirect discourse, like other verbs of the same meaning. Εἶπον seldom takes the infinitive, except when it signifies *to command* (753). The context will always distinguish these cases from indirect quotations. *E.g.*

Τοῦτοις ἔλεγον πλεῖν, *I told them to sail*. DEM. xix. 150. (Τοῦτους ἔλεγον πλεῖν would mean *I said that they were sailing*.) Εἶπων μηδένα παριέναι εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, *having given orders that no one should pass into the citadel*. XEN. Hell. v. 2, 29. Ὡ φίλοι, ἥδη μὲν κεν ἐγὼν εἴποιμι καὶ ἄμιν μνηστήρων ἐς ὄμιλον ἀκοντίσαι, *now I would command you to join me in hurling*, etc. Od. xxii. 262. Παραδοῦναι λέγει, *he tells us to give her up (he says, give her up)*. AR. AV. 1679. Δοκεῖ ἡμῖν τοῦτο ποιεῖν (or ποιῆσαι) *it pleases us to do this*. (But δοκεῖ μοι ὑμᾶς τοῦτο ποιεῖν (or ποιῆσαι) generally means *it seems to me that you are doing this, or did this*.) Ἐδοξε in the sense *it was resolved*, introducing a decree, is followed by the present or aorist (not future) infinitive.

100. Verbs of *hoping*, *expecting*, *promising*, and *swearing* form an intermediate class between those that take the infinitive in indirect discourse and other verbs (136). When they refer to a future object, they naturally take the future infinitive, but may also have the present or aorist infinitive (not in indirect discourse) like verbs of *wishing*, etc. Thus *he promised to give* may be ὑπέσχετο διδόναι (or δοῦναι) as well as ὑπέσχετο δώσειν.

To facilitate comparison, the examples of the present and aorist infinitive thus used are given with those of the future in 136.

101. The present αἰτιός εἰμι, *I am the cause*, is often used with reference to the past, where logically a past tense would be needed; as αἰτιός ἐστι τούτῳ θανεῖν, *he is the cause of his death*, instead of αἰτιος ἦν τούτῳ θανεῖν, *he was the cause of his death*. This may make an ordinary aorist infinitive appear like a verb of past time. *E.g.*

Αἱ τιοι οὖν εἰσι καὶ ὑμῖν πολλῶν ἤδη ψευσθῆναι καὶ δὴ ἀδίκως γέ τινας ἀπολέσθαι, *they are the cause why you were deceived and some even perished (i.e. they caused you to be deceived and some even to perish)*. LYS. xix. 51. Τεθῶσιν οἱ δὲ ζῶντες αἱ τιοι θανεῖν, *they are dead; and the living are the causes of their death*. SOPH. ANT. 1173. Ἡ μοι μητρὶ μὲν θανεῖν μόνῃ μεταίτιος. Id. Tr. 1233.

PERFECT.

102. As the perfect indicative represents an act as finished at the *present* time, so the perfect of any of the dependent moods properly represents an act as *finished* at

the time (present, past, or future) at which the present of that mood would represent it as going on.

103. The perfect subjunctive and optative are very often expressed in the active, and almost always in the passive and middle, by the perfect participle with ὦ and εἶην; and this combination of a present and a perfect makes the time denoted especially clear. Where the present would denote future time, the perfect denotes future-perfect time. *E.g.*

Τὸ χρόνον γεγενῆσθαι πολλὸν δέδοικα μή τινα λήθην ὑμῖν ποιοίῃκη, *I fear lest the lapse of a long time that has occurred may (when you come to decide the case) prove to have caused in you some forgetfulness* (see 91). DEM. xix. 3. (Μὴ ποιῇ would mean *lest it may cause*, the time being the same as before.) Χρὴ αὐτὰ [ἃ τελευτήσαντα ἐκάτερον περιμένει] ἀκοῦσαι, ἵνα τελέως ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν ἀπειλήφῃ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα, *we must hear what awaits each of them after death, that (when we have finished) each may have fully received his deserts*. PLAT. Rep. 614 A. Τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους, κὰν δεδωκότες ὦσιν εὐθύνας, τὴν ἀειλογίαν ὁρῶ προτεινόμενους, *I see that other men, even if they have already rendered their accounts,—i.e. if they are (in the state of) persons who have rendered their accounts,—always offer a perpetual reckoning*. DEM. xix. 2. Ἀνδρείον γε πάννυ νομίζομεν, ὃς ἂν πεπλήγῃ πατέρα, *we always consider one very manly who has (may have) beaten his father*. AR. Av. 1350. Νόμον θήσκειν μηδενὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὑμῶς βοηθεῖν ὃς ἂν μὴ πρότερος βεβηοκῶς ὑμῖν ᾖ, *to enact a law that you shall assist no one of the Greeks who shall not previously have assisted you*. DEM. xix. 16. (Ὅς ἂν μὴ πρότερος βοηθῇ would mean *who shall not previously assist you*.)

Ἐδευσαν μὴ λύσσα ἡμῖν ἐμπεπτῶκοι, *they feared lest madness might prove to have fallen upon us*. XEN. An. v. 7, 26. (Μὴ ἐμπίπτει would mean *lest it might fall upon us*.) Ἐδεήθην τῶν δικαστῶν μηδὲν τοιοῦτον πράξαι, ἵν' ἐγὼ μηδένα Ἀθηναίων ἀπεκτονῶς εἶην, *that I might not be in the position of having put an Athenian to death*. DEM. liii. 18. Ἦν γὰρ εὐρεθῇ λέγων σοὶ ταῦτ', ἔργω' ἂν ἐκπεφευγοίην πάθος, *I should (in that case) have escaped harm*. SOPH. O. T. 839. Πῶς οὐκ ἂν οἰκτρότατα πάντων ἐγὼ πεπονθὼς εἶην, εἰ ἐμὲ ψηφίσαιτο εἶναι ξένον; *how should I not have suffered the most pitiable of all things, if they should vote me to be an alien?* DEM. lvii. 44. (This could have been expressed, with a very slight difference in meaning, πῶς οὐ πεπονθὼς ἔσομαι, ἂν ψηφίσωνται; *how shall I not have suffered, etc.*) Εἰ ὅτιον πεπονθὼς ἐκάτερος ἡμῶν εἶη, οὐ καὶ ἀμφοτέρωι ἂν τοῦτο πεπόνθοιμεν; *if each of us should have suffered anything whatsoever, would not both of us have suffered it?* PLAT. Hipp. M. 301 A. Οὐκ ἂν διὰ τοῦτό γ' εἴεν οὐκ εὐθὺς δεδωκότες, *this, at least, cannot be the reason why they did not pay it at once; lit. they would not (on inquiry) prove to have not paid it at once on this account*. DEM. xxx. 10.

104. The perfect subjunctive in protasis corresponds exactly to the

Latin future perfect indicative; but the Greek seldom uses this cumbrous perfect, preferring the less precise aorist (91). The perfect optative, in both protasis and apodosis, corresponds to the Latin perfect subjunctive; but it is seldom used, for a similar reason (95).

The perfect optative can hardly be accurately expressed in English. For when we use the English forms *would have suffered* and *should have suffered* to translate the perfect optative, these are merely vaguer expressions for *will* and *shall have suffered*. (See the examples above.) *I should have suffered* is commonly past in English, being equivalent to $\epsilon\pi\alpha\theta\omicron\nu \acute{\alpha}\nu$; but here it is future, and is therefore liable to be misunderstood. There is no more reference to past time, however, in the perfect optative with $\acute{\alpha}\nu$, than there is in the future perfect indicative (77) in such expressions as $\mu\acute{\alpha}\tau\eta\nu \epsilon\mu\omicron\iota \kappa\epsilon\kappa\lambda\alpha\upsilon\sigma\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$, *I shall have had my whippings for nothing* (referring to those received in his boyhood), AR. Nub. 1436.

105. The perfect imperative is most common in the third person singular of the passive, where it expresses a command that something just done or about to be done shall be *decisive* and *final*. It is thus equivalent to the perfect participle with $\epsilon\sigma\tau\omega$. *E.g.*

$\tau\alpha\upsilon\tau\alpha \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu \delta\eta \tau\alpha\upsilon\tau\eta \epsilon\iota\rho\acute{\eta}\sigma\theta\omega$, *let so much have been thus said*, (= $\epsilon\iota\rho\eta\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\alpha \epsilon\iota\sigma\tau\omega$), i.e. *let what has been thus said be sufficient*. PLAT. Crat. 401 D. But $\delta\omicron\mu\omega\varsigma \delta\acute{\epsilon} \epsilon\iota\rho\acute{\eta}\sigma\theta\omega \sigma\tau\iota$, κ.τ.λ., *still let as much as this (which follows) be said (once for all), that*, etc. Id. Rep. 607 C. $\Pi\epsilon\rho\iota \tau\omicron\nu \iota\delta\omega\nu \tau\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\alpha} \mu\omicron\iota \pi\rho\omicron\epsilon\iota\rho\acute{\eta}\sigma\theta\omega$, *let this have been said (once for all) by way of introduction*. ISOC. iv. 14. $\tau\alpha\upsilon\tau\alpha \pi\epsilon\pi\alpha\iota\sigma\theta\omega \tau\epsilon \acute{\upsilon}\mu\iota\nu$, καὶ $\iota\sigma\omega\varsigma \iota\kappa\alpha\nu\acute{\omega}\varsigma \epsilon\chi\epsilon\iota$, *let this be the end of the play*, etc. PLAT. Euthyd. 278 D. $\tau\epsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}\chi\theta\omega \acute{\eta}\mu\iota\nu \kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha} \delta\eta\mu\omicron\kappa\rho\alpha\tau\iota\acute{\alpha}\nu \delta\prime \tau\omicron\iota\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma \acute{\alpha}\nu\eta\rho$, *let such a man remain (where we have placed him), corresponding to democracy*. Id. Rep. 561 E. $\text{Ἀπειργάσθω δὲ ἡμῖν αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία}$, *let this now be a sufficient description of this form of government*. Ib. 553 A. $\text{Μέχρι τοῦδε ὥρίσθω ὑμῶν ἡ βραδυτής}$, *at this point let the limit of your sluggishness be fixed*. THUC. i. 71.

The third person plural in the same sense could be expressed by the perfect participle with $\epsilon\sigma\tau\omega\nu$, as in PLAT. Rep. 502 A, $\omicron\delta\tau\omicron\iota \tau\omicron\iota\upsilon\nu \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron \pi\epsilon\pi\epsilon\iota\sigma\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\iota \epsilon\sigma\tau\omega\nu$, *grant then that these have been persuaded of this*.

106. On this principle the perfect imperative is used in mathematical language, to imply that something is to be considered as proved or assumed *once for all*, or that lines drawn or points fixed are to remain as data for a following demonstration. *E.g.*

$\text{Εἰλήφθω ἐπὶ τῆς AB τυχὸν σημείου τὸ Δ, καὶ ἀφ᾽ ἧς ἴσθω ἀπὸ τῆς ΑΓ τῇ ΑΔ ἴση ἡ ΑΕ}$, *let any point Δ be assumed as taken in the line AB, and AE equal to AD as cut off from AG*. EUCL. i. Pr. 9.

107. The perfect imperative of the *second* person is rare; when it is used, it seems to be a little more emphatic than the present or aorist. *E.g.*

'Hσὺ τὸνδε δέδεξο. II. v. 228. Μὴ πεφόβησθε, *do not be afraid*. THUC. vi. 17. Μόνον σὺ ἡμῖν πιστὰ θεῶν πεποίησο καὶ δεξιὰν δός, *only make us (immediately or once for all) solemn pledges and give the right hand*. XEN. Cyr. iv. 2, 7. Πέπανσο, *stop! not another word!* DEM. xxiv. 64.

108. In verbs whose perfect has the force of a present (49) the perfect imperative is the ordinary form; as μέμνησο, κεκλήσθω, ἔσταθι, ἑστάτω, τέθναθι, τεθνάτω, ἴστω. So κεχήνατε, AR. Ach. 133; μὴ κεκράγατε, Vesp. 415. The perfect imperative *active* seems to have been used only in such verbs. Occasionally we find the periphrastic form with the participle and εἰμί, as ἔστω ξυμβεβηκῖα, PLAT. Leg. 736 B.

109. The perfect infinitive not in indirect discourse generally represents an act as *finished* when the present would represent it as *going on* (96). *E.g.*

Οὐδὲ βουλευέσθαι ἔτι ὥρα, ἀλλὰ βεβουλευσθαι. τῆς γὰρ ἐπιούσης νυκτὸς πάντα δεῖ πεπράχθαι, *it is no longer time even to be deliberating, but (it is time) to have done deliberating; for all this must be finished within the coming night*. PLAT. Crit. 46 A. Καὶ μὴν περὶ ὧν γε προσετάξατε προσήκει διφκηκέναι, *and it is his duty to have attended to the business about which you gave him instructions*. DEM. xix. 6. (This refers to an ambassador presenting his accounts on his return.) Ξυνετῆρχανε πολλαχοῦ διὰ τὴν στενοχωρίαν τὰ μὲν ἄλλοις ἐμβεβληκέναι τὰ δ' αὐτοὺς ἐμβεβλησθαι, δύο τε περὶ μίαν ξυνηρτῆσθαι, *it often befell them to have made an attack on one side and (at the same time) to have been attacked themselves on the other, etc.* THUC. vii. 70. Ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὰ μὲν μέγιστ' αὐτῶν ἤδη κατακεχρησθαι μικρὰ δὲ τινα παραλελείφθαι, *for it must be that the most important subjects have been used up, and that only unimportant ones have been left*. ISOC. iv. 74. Οὐκ ἤθελον ἐμβαίνειν διὰ τὸ καταπεπληχθαι τῇ ἡσση, *they were unwilling to embark on account of having been terrified by the defeat*. THUC. vii. 72. Τὸ γὰρ πολλὰ ἀπολωλέκναι κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀμελείας ἂν τις θεῖη δικαίως, τὸ δὲ μῆτε πάλοι τοῦτο πεπονθέναι πεφηνέναι τέ τινα ἡμῖν συμμαχίαν τούτων ἀντίτροπον, τῆς παρ' ἐκείνων εὐνοίας εὐεργέτημ' ἂν ἔγωγε θεῖην, *for our having lost many things during the war one might justly charge upon our neglect; but our never having suffered this before, and the fact that an alliance has now appeared to us to make up for these losses, I should consider a benefaction, etc.* DEM. i. 10. (Compare γεγενῆσθαι in the first example under 103.) Ἐφθασαν παροικοδομήσαντες, ὥστε μηκέτι μῆτε αὐτοὶ κωλύεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ἐκείνους τε καὶ παντάσῃν ἀπεστερηκέναι . . . σφᾶς ἀποτευχίσαι, *i.e. they carried their own wall first beyond that of the Athenians, so as no longer to be themselves interfered with by them, and so as to have effectually prevented them from walling them in*. THUC. vii. 6. Ἐπεμελήθη καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν, ὥστε τῶν παρόντων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀγαθὼν μηδὲν μὲν ἄνευ τῆς πόλεως

εἶναι, τὰ δὲ πλείωτὰ διὰ ταύτην γεγενῆσθαι. ISOC. iv. 38. Τοιαῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα κατεσκέυασαν ἡμῖν, ὥστε μηδενὶ τῶν ἐπιγιγνομένων ὑπερβολὴν λελεῖφθαι, *they made such and so great acquisitions as to have no possibility of surpassing them left to any one who should come after them.* DEM. iii. 25. Δίδομεν αὐτοῖς προῖκα συγκεκρόφθαι, *we allow them to have cut us up for nothing (i.e. we make no account of their having done so).* AR. Nub. 1426.

See [ARISTOT.] Eth. Nic. vi. 2, 6 : οὐκ ἔστι δὲ προαιρετὸν οὐδὲν γεγονός, οἷον οὐδεὶς προαιρεῖται Ἴλιον πεπορθηκέναι, *but nothing past can be purposed; for example, nobody purposes to have sacked Ilion,* i.e. the expression προαιροῦμαι Ἴλιον πεπορθηκέναι would be nonsense. This illustrates well the restricted use of the perfect infinitive.

110. The perfect infinitive sometimes signifies that the action is to be *decisive* and *permanent* (like the perfect imperative, 105); and sometimes it seems to be merely more emphatic than the present or aorist infinitive. *E.g.*

Εἶπον τὴν θύραν κεκλείσθαι, *they ordered that the door should be shut (and remain so).* XEN. Hell. v. 4, 7. Βουλόμενος ἀγῶνι καὶ δικαστηρίῳ μοι διωρίσθαι παρ' ὑμῖν ὅτι τάναντία ἐμοὶ καὶ τούτοις πέπρακται, i.e. *wishing to have it once for all settled in your minds.* DEM. xix. 223. Θελούσας πρὸς πύλαις πεπτωκέναι, *eager to fall before the gates.* AESCH. Sept. 462. Ἥλανεν ἐπὶ τοὺς Μένωνος, ὥστ' ἐκείνους ἐκπεπλήχθαι καὶ τρέχειν ἐπὶ τὰ ὄπλα, *he marched against the soldiers of Menon, so that they were (once for all) thoroughly frightened and ran to arms.* XEN. An. i. 5, 13. (Here ἐκπεπλήχθαι is merely more emphatic than the present or aorist would be.)

FUTURE.

111. The future is used in the dependent moods only in the optative and the infinitive, and in these it is never regular except in indirect discourse and kindred constructions and in the periphrastic form with μέλλω (73).

For the future optative in indirect discourse see 128-134; for the future infinitive in indirect discourse see 135 and 136.

112. In constructions out of indirect discourse the present and aorist infinitive can always refer to future time if the context requires it (96), so that the future infinitive is here rarely needed. Therefore, after verbs which naturally have a future action as their object but yet do not introduce indirect discourse,—as those of *commanding*, *wishing*, etc. (684),—the present or aorist infinitive (not the future) is regularly used. Thus the Greek expresses *they wish to do this* not by βούλονται τοῦτο ποιήσιν, but by βούλονται τοῦτο ποιεῖν (or ποιῆσαι). So the infinitive in other future expressions, as after ὥστε and in its final sense, is

generally present or aorist. (For the single exception after μέλλω, see 73.)

113. On the other hand, when it was desired to make the reference to the future especially prominent, the future infinitive could be used exceptionally in all these cases. Thus we sometimes find the future after verbs signifying *to be able, to wish, to be unwilling*, and the like; sometimes also in a final sense or with ὥστε and ἐφ' ᾧ τε; and sometimes when the infinitive with the article refers to future time. This use of the future is a partial adoption of the form of indirect discourse in other constructions. It was a particularly favourite usage with Thucydides. *E.g.*

Ἐδεήθησαν δὲ καὶ τῶν Μεγαρέων ναυσὶ σφᾶς ξυμπροπέμψειν, *they asked the Megareans also to escort them with ships.* THUC. i. 27. Ἐβούλοντο προτιμωρήσεσθαι. Id. vi. 57. So ἐπιχειρήσειν ἐβελήσεις; AESCHIN. iii. 152. Τὸ στόμα αὐτοῦ διεννοοῦντο κληήσειν. THUC. vii. 56. Ἐφίεμενοι μὲν τῆς πάσης ἄρξειν, βοηθεῖν δὲ ἅμα εὐπρεπῶς βουλόμενοι τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ξυγγενέσι καὶ ξυμμάχοις. Id. vi. 6. (Here βοηθεῖν is regular.) Τοῦ ταῖς ναυσὶ μὴ ἀθυμεῖν ἐπιχειρήσειν, *to prevent them from being without spirit to attack them in ships.* Id. vii. 21. Οὐτ' ἀποκωλύσειν δύναται ὄντες. Id. iii. 28. Εἰ σέ γ' ἐν λόγοις πείσειν δυνησόμεσθα. SOPH. Ph. 1394. Εἴ τις εἰς τοῦτο ἀναβάλλεται ποιήσειν τὰ δέοντα, *if any one postpones doing his duty as far as this.* DEM. iii. 9. (The ordinary construction would be ἀναβάλλεται ποιεῖν or ποιῆσαι.) Οὐτε τῶν προγόνων μεμνήσθαι [δεῖ] οὔτε τῶν λεγόντων ἀνέχεσθαι, νόμον τε θήσειν καὶ γράψειν, κ.τ.λ. DEM. xix. 16. (Here we have δεῖ θήσειν.) Πολλοὺ δέω ἑμαντόν γε ἀδικήσειν καὶ κατ' ἑμαντοῦ ἐρεῖν αὐτός. PLAT. AP. 37 B.

Τοὺς ὁμήρους παρέδωσαν τῷ Ἀργείων δήμῳ διὰ ταῦτα διαχρήσεσθαι, *that they might put them to death.* THUC. vi. 61. So πείσεσθαι, Id. iii. 26. Ἐφ' ᾧ τε βοηθήσειν. AESCHIN. iii. 114 (see 610). Ἀποδείξω αὐτὸν τὴν προῖκα οὐ δεδοκῶτα οὕτω μεγάλους τεκμηρίους ὥστε ὑμᾶς ἅπαντας εἴσεσθαι. DEM. xxx. 5: so xxix. 5. Ἐλπίδι τὸ ἀφανὲς τοῦ κατορθώσειν ἐπιτρέψαντες, *having committed to hope what was uncertain in the prospect of success.* THUC. ii. 42. (Here κατορθώσειν is more explicit than the present κατορθοῦν would be: τὸ ἀφανὲς τοῦ κατορθοῦν would mean simply *what was uncertain in regard to success.*) Τοῦ ἐς χεῖρας ἔλθειν πιστότερον τὸ ἐκφοβήσιν ἡμᾶς ἀκινδύνως ἡγοῦνται, *they feel more confidence in the prospect of frightening us without risk than in meeting us in battle.* Id. iv. 126. Τὸ μὲν ὄν ἐξελέγξειν αὐτὸν θαρρῶ καὶ πάνυ πιστεύω, *I have courage and great confidence as to my convicting him.* DEM. xix. 3. (Here most of the ordinary Mss. read ἐξελέγχειν.)

See also THUC. iv. 115 and 121, v. 35, vii. 11, viii. 55 and 74; and Krüger's note on i. 27, where these passages are cited. In several of these there is some Ms. authority for the aorist infinitive.

114. The future perfect infinitive occurs only in indirect discourse (137), except in verbs whose perfect has the sense of a present (82).

B. OPTATIVE AND INFINITIVE OF INDIRECT DISCOURSE.

115. When the optative and infinitive are in indirect discourse, each tense represents the *corresponding tense* of the direct discourse; the present including also the imperfect, and the perfect also the pluperfect.

See the general principles of indirect discourse (667). The optative is included here only as it is used after past tenses to represent an indicative or subjunctive of the direct discourse. No cases of the optative or infinitive with ἄν are considered here: for these see Chapter III. For the meaning of the term "indirect discourse" as applied to the infinitive, see 684.

PRESENT OPTATIVE.

116. The present optative in indirect discourse may represent the following forms of direct discourse:—

1. The present indicative of a leading verb. *E.g.*

Περικλῆς προηγόρευε, ὅτι Ἀρχίδαμος οἱ ξένος εἴη, *Pericles announced that Archidamus was his friend* (i.e. he said ξένος μοί ἐστιν). THUC. ii. 13. Ἐγνώσαν ὅτι κενὸς ὁ φόβος εἴη, *they learned that their fear was groundless* (i.e. they learned κενός ἐστιν ὁ φόβος). XEN. AN. ii. 2, 21. Ἐπυνθάνετο εἰ οἰκοῖτο ἡ χώρα, *he asked whether the country was inhabited* (i.e. he asked the question οἰκεῖται ἡ χώρα;). XEN. CYR. iv. 4, 4.

2. The present indicative or subjunctive of a dependent verb. *E.g.*

Εἶπεν ὅτι ἄνδρα ἄγοι ὃν εἶρξαι δέοι, *he said that he was bringing a man whom it was necessary to confine* (he said ἄνδρα ἄγω ὃν εἶρξαι δεῖ). XEN. HELL. v. 4, 8. Ἠγείτο ἅπαν ποιήσειν αὐτὸν εἰ τις ἀργύριον διδοίη, *he believed that the man would do anything if one were to give him money* (he believed ἅπαν ποιήσει εἰάν τις ἀργύριον διδῶ). LYS. xii. 14.

3. The present subjunctive in a question of appeal (287). *E.g.*

Κλέαρχος ἐβουλευέτο, εἰ πέμποιέν τινας ἢ πάντες ἔοιεν, *Clearchus was deliberating whether they should send a few or should all go*. XEN. AN. i. 10, 5. (The question was, πέμπω μὲν τινας ἢ πάντες

ἴωμεν; *shall we send a few, or shall we all go?* See 677.) The context will always make it clear whether the optative represents a subjunctive (as here) or an indicative (1).

4. The imperfect indicative of a leading verb. *E.g.*

Ἀπεκρίναντο ὅτι οὐδεὶς μάρτυς παρείη, *they replied that no witness had been present* (when a certain payment was made). DEM. xxx. 20. (They said οὐδεὶς παρήν.)

This is the rare imperfect optative (673). The imperfect indicative is regularly retained in such cases, and is always retained in a *dependent* clause of a quotation (689, 2).

PRESENT INFINITIVE.

117. (*As Present.*) The present infinitive in indirect discourse generally represents a present indicative of the direct form. *E.g.*

Φησὶ γράφειν, *he says that he is writing*; ἔφη γράφειν, *he said that he was writing*; φήσκει γράφειν, *he will say that he is (then) writing*. (In all three cases he says γράφω.) Ἀρρωστεῖν προσφασίζεται, *he pretends that he is sick*; ἐξώμοσεν ἀρρωστεῖν τουτονί, *he took his oath that this man was sick*. DEM. xix. 124. Οὐκ ἔφη αὐτὸς ἀλλ' ἐκείνον στρατηγεῖν, *he said that not he himself, but Nicias, was general*; i.e. he said οὐκ ἐγὼ αὐτὸς ἀλλ' ἐκείνος στρατηγεῖ. THUC. iv. 28. See other examples under 683.

118. Verbs of *hoping* and *swearing* may thus take the present infinitive in indirect discourse. This must be distinguished from the more common use of the present and aorist infinitive (not in indirect discourse) after these verbs, referring to the future (100; 136). *E.g.*

Ἐλπίζων εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ὀλιβώτατος, ταῦτα ἐπειρώτα, *he asked this, trusting that he was the most happy of men*. HDT. i. 30. So i. 22, ἐλπίζων σιτοδείην τε εἶναι ἰσχυρὴν καὶ τὸν λεὼν τετρῶσθαι. Ξυνὰ δ' ἐλπίζω λέγειν, *and I hope I speak for the common good*. AESCH. Sept. 76. Ὀμνύντες βλέπειν τὸν οὐκέτ' ὄντα ζῶντ' Ἀχιλλέα πάλιν, i.e. *swearing that they saw Achilles alive again*. SOPH. Ph. 357.

Compare the first two examples with ἐλπίζει δυνάτος εἶναι, *he hopes to be able*, PLAT. Rep. 573 C; and the last with ὁμοῦσαι εἶναι μὲν τὴν ἀρχὴν κοινὴν, πάντας δ' ὑμῖν ἀποδοῦναι τὴν χώραν, *to swear that the dominion shall be common, and that all shall surrender the land*, DEM. xxiii. 170. (See 136 and the examples.)

119. (*As Imperfect.*) The present infinitive may also represent an imperfect indicative of the direct discourse, thus supplying the want of an imperfect infinitive. *E.g.*

Τίνας οὖν εὐχὰς ὑπολαμβάνει εὔχεσθαι τοῖς θεοῖς τὸν Φίλιππον ὅτ' ἔσπενδεν; *what prayers then do you suppose Philip made to the Gods when he was pouring his libations?* DEM. xix. 130. (Here the temporal clause ὅτ' ἔσπενδεν shows that εὔχεσθαι is past.) Πότερ' οἴεσθε πλέον Φωκίας Θηβαίων ἢ Φιλίππου ἡμῶν κρατεῖν τῷ πολέμῳ; *do you think that the superiority of the Phocians over the Thebans or that of Philip over you was the greater in the war (the war being then past)?* DEM. xix. 148. (Here the direct discourse would be ἐκράτουν and ἐκράτει.) Πῶς γὰρ οἴεσθε δυσχερὲς ἀκούειν Ὀλυνθίους, εἰ τίς τι λέγοι κατὰ Φιλίππου κατ' ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους ὅτ' Ἀνθεμόντα αὐτοῖς ἀφίει; . . . ἄρα προσδοκᾶν αὐτοὺς τοιαῦτα πεῖσεσθαι (sc. οἴεσθε); . . . ἄρ' οἴεσθε, ὅτε τοὺς τυράννους ἐξέβαλλε, (τοὺς Θετταλοὺς) προσδοκᾶν, κ.τ.λ.; *for how unwillingly do you think the Olynthians used to hear it, if any one said anything against Philip in those times when he was ceding Anthemus to them, etc.? Do you think they were expecting to suffer such things? Do you think that the Thessalians, when he was expelling the despots, were expecting, etc.?* DEM. vi. 20 and 22. (The direct questions were πῶς ἤκουον εἰ λέγοι; and προσεδόκων;) Καὶ γὰρ τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν προγόνων ἡμῶν λέγοντας ἀκούω τούτῳ τῷ ἔθει χρῆσθαι, *I hear that they used to follow this custom.* DEM. iii. 21. Τὰ μὲν πρό Ἑλληνος οὐδὲ εἶναι ἢ ἐπικλησῆαι αὕτη (sc. δοκεῖ), *in the times before Hellen this name does not appear to have even existed.* THUC. i. 3. Again, in the same sentence of Thucydides, παρέχεσθαι, *to have furnished.* Μηδὲν οἷον ἄλλο μηχανᾶσθαι ἢ ὅπως . . . δέξοιντο, ἵνα . . . γίγνοιντο. PLAT. Rep. 430 A. Μετὰ ταῦτα ἔφη σφᾶς μὲν δειπνεῖν, τὸν δὲ Σωκράτη οὐκ εἰσιέναι τὸν οὖν Ἀγάθωνα πολλάκις κελεύειν μεταπέμψασθαι τὸν Σωκράτη, ἔδὲ οὐκ εἶν. PLAT. Symp. 175 C. (He said, ἐδειπνοῦμεν, ὁ δὲ Σ. οὐκ εἰσῆγει· ὁ οὖν Ἀ. ἐκέλευεν· ἐγὼ δὲ οὐκ εἶων.) Συντυχεῖν γὰρ (ἔφη) Ἀτρεστίδα παρὰ Φιλίππου πορευομένῳ, καὶ μετ' αὐτοῦ γυναῖκα καὶ παιδάρια βαδίζειν, *for he said that he had met (aor.) Atrestidas coming from Philip, and that there were walking with him (impf.), etc.* DEM. xix. 305. Τοῦτ' ἐγὼ φημι δεῖν ἐμὲ μὴ λαθεῖν, *I say that this ought not to have escaped my notice.* DEM. xviii. 190. (The direct form was τοῦτ' ἔδει ἐμὲ μὴ λαθεῖν, 415.)

The imperfect infinitive is found even in Homer; as καὶ σέ, γέρον, τὸ πρὶν μὲν ἀκούομεν ὄλβιον εἶναι, *we hear that you were once prosperous.* IL xxiv. 543. So IL v. 639; Od. viii. 181, 516.

For the imperfect participle, see 140.

120. This use of the present infinitive as an imperfect must be carefully distinguished from its ordinary use after past tenses, where we translate it by the imperfect, as in ἔφη τὸ στράτευμα μάχεσθαι, *he said that the army was fighting.* This has sometimes been called an imperfect infinitive; but here μάχεσθαι refers to time *present* relatively to ἔφη; whereas, if it had been used as an imperfect, it would have referred to time *past* relatively to ἔφη, as in ἔφη τὸ στράτευμα τῇ προτεραίᾳ μάχεσθαι, *he said that the army had been fighting on the day*

before. In the former case the direct discourse was *μάχεται*, in the latter it was *ἐμάχετο*. Such an *imperfect* infinitive differs from the aorist in the same construction only by expressing the duration or repetition of an action (as in the indicative); it gives, in fact, the only means of representing in the infinitive what is usually expressed by *λέγει ὅτι ἐποίει*, *he says that he was doing*, as opposed to *λέγει ὅτι ἐποίησεν*, *he says that he did*. (For the similar use of the present optative to represent the imperfect, see 116, 4.) This construction is never used unless the context makes it certain that the infinitive represents an imperfect and not a present, so that no ambiguity can arise. See the examples.

So sometimes in Latin: Q. Scaevolam memoria teneo bello Mar-sico, cum esset summa senectute, cotidie *facere* omnibus conveniendi potestatem sui. Cic. Phil. viii. 31. So Q. Maximum acceperimus facile *celare, tacere, dissimulare, insidiari, praeipere* hostium consilia. Cic. de Off. i. 108.

PERFECT OPTATIVE.

121. The perfect optative in indirect discourse may represent—

1. The perfect indicative of a leading verb. *E.g.*

Ἔλεγε ὅσα ἀγαθὰ Κύρος Πέρσας πεποιήκοι, *he told how many services Cyrus had done the Persians*. Hdt. iii. 75. (*Πεποιήκοι* here represents *πεποίηκε*.) *Οἷτοι ἔλεγον ὡς πεντακόσιοι αὐτοῖς εἴησαν ἐκ τοῦ Πειραιῶς δεδεκασμένοι*. Lys. xxix. 12. (Here the direct discourse was *πεντακόσιοι εἰσιν δεδεκασμένοι*.)

2. The perfect indicative or subjunctive of a dependent verb. *E.g.*

Εἶπεν ὅτι Δέξιππον οὐκ ἐπαινοῖ εἰ ταῦτα πεποικῶς εἴη (he said *οὐκ ἐπαινῶ εἰ ταῦτα πεποίηκε*, *I do not approve him if he has done this*). Xen. An. vi. 6, 25.

Ἐλέγομεν ὅτι ἕνα ἕκαστον ἐν δέοι ἐπιτηδεύειν, εἰς δ' αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις ἐπιτηδειωτάτη πεφυκνία εἴη (we said *ἕκαστον ἐν δέει ἐπιτηδεύειν, εἰς δ' αὖν πεφυκῶς ἦ*, *each one is to practise one thing, for which his nature is best fitted*; though this might be *πέφυκε*, like *πεποίηκε* in the first example). Plat. Rep. 433 A.

PERFECT INFINITIVE.

122. The perfect infinitive in indirect discourse generally represents a perfect indicative of the direct form. *E.g.*

Φησὶ τοῦτο πεπραχέναι *he says that he has done this*; *ἔφη τοῦτο πεπραχέναι*, *he said that he had done this*; *φήσει τοῦτο πεπραχέναι*, *he will say that he has done this* (the direct form in each case being

πέπραχα). "Ἐφ' ἡμέρας" ἑαυτῷ τοὺς Θηβαίους ἐπικεκηρυχέναι, *he said that the Thebans had offered a reward for his seizure*. DEM. xix. 21. In AR. Nub. 1277, προσκεκλησθαι μοι δοκεῖς (according to Mss. Rav. and Ven.), *you seem to me to be sure to be summoned to court (to be as good as already summoned)*, the infinitive represents a perfect indicative referring to the future (51). There is probably a regard to the perfect of the preceding verse, σεσεῖσθαι μοι δοκεῖς. So THUC. ii. 8 : ἐν τούτῳ τε κεκωλύσθαι ἑδόκει ἐκάστῳ τὰ πράγματα ᾧ μὴ τις αὐτὸς παρέσται, *and each man thought that things were the same as stopped in that matter in which he was not himself to take part*. After a verb of swearing : ὤμνε μὴδὲν εἰρηκέναι περὶ αὐτοῦ φαῦλον, DEM. xxi. 119. After ἐλπίζω : ἐλπίζων τὸν λεὼν τετρῶσθαι, HDT. i. 22 (see 118, above).

123. The perfect infinitive rarely represents a pluperfect of the direct form. *E.g.*

Λέγεται ἄνδρα ἐκπεπλήχθαι πολὺν τινα χρόνον ἐπὶ τῷ κάλλει τοῦ Κύρου, *it is said that a man had been struck with amazement for some time at the beauty of Cyrus* (i.e. ἐξεπέπληκτο). XEN. Cyr. i. 4, 27. Ἀντίλεγον, λέγοντες μὴ ἐπηγγέλθαι πω τὰς σπονδὰς ὅτ' ἐσέμεψαν τοὺς ὀπίτας, *saying that the truce had not yet been proclaimed* (ἐπηγγέλο). THUC. v. 49.

AORIST OPTATIVE.

124. The aorist optative in indirect discourse may represent—

1. The aorist indicative of a leading verb. *E.g.*

Ἐλεξαν ὅτι πέμψειε σφᾶς ὁ βασιλεύς, *they said that the king had sent them* (i.e. *they said* ἐπέμψεν ἡμᾶς ὁ βασιλεύς). XEN. Cyr. ii. 4, 7. Τότε ἐγνώσθη ὅτι οἱ βάρβαροι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὑποπέμψαιεν, *then it became known that the barbarians had sent the man*. XEN. An. ii. 4, 22. Ἐτόλμα λέγειν ὡς πολλὰ τῶν ἐμῶν λάβοιεν, *he dared to say that they had taken* (ἔλαβον) *much of my property*. DEM. xxvii. 49. Ἡρώτων αὐτὸν εἰ ἀναπλεύσειεν ἔχων ἀργύριον, *I asked him whether he had set sail with money* (i.e. *I asked him the question, ἀνέπλευσας*); DEM. L. 55. (This form is rare; see 125.) Ἐπειρώτα τίνα ἴδοι, *he asked whom he had seen* (i.e. *τίνα εἶδες, whom did you see?*). HDT. i. 31. So i. 116 : εἶρετο κόθεν λάβοι.

2. The aorist subjunctive of a dependent verb. *E.g.*

Εὔξαντο σωτήρια θύσειν ἔνθα πρῶτον γῆν ἀφίκοιντο, *they vowed that they would make thank offerings for their deliverance whenever they should first enter a friendly land* (i.e. *ἐνθα ἂν . . . ἀφικώμεθα, θύσομεν*). XEN. An. v. 1, 1 (see iii. 2, 9).

An aorist indicative in a dependent clause of a quotation is regularly retained (689, 3).

3. The aorist subjunctive in a question of appeal (287).

E.g.

Οἱ Ἐπιδάμνιοι τὸν θεὸν ἐπῆροντο εἰ παραδοῖεν Κορινθίοις τὴν πόλιν, *they asked whether they should deliver up their city to the Corinthians* (i.e. *they asked the question, παραδῶμεν τὴν πόλιν; shall we deliver up our city?*). THUC. i. 25. Ἐσκόπουν ὅπως κάλλωτ' ἐνέγκαιμ' αὐτόν, *I looked to see how I could best endure him* (i.e. *I asked, πῶς ἐνέγκω αὐτόν; how can I endure him?*). EUR. Hipp. 393. Διεσιώπησε σκοπῶν ὃ τι ἀποκρίναίτο, *he continued silent, thinking what he should answer* (i.e. *thinking τί ἀποκρίνωμαι*). XEN. Mem. iv. 2, 10. (See 677.)

125. The context must decide whether an aorist optative in an indirect question represents the aorist subjunctive (as in 3) or the aorist indicative (as in the last examples under 1). Thus the first example under 3 might mean *they asked whether they had given up their city, παρέδομεν τὴν πόλιν*; But in most cases the aorist subjunctive is the direct form implied, and an aorist indicative used in a direct question is generally retained; εἰ ἀναπλεύσειεν in 1 is, therefore, exceptional.

AORIST INFINITIVE.

126. The aorist infinitive in indirect discourse represents an aorist indicative of the direct form. E.g.

Φησὶν τοῦτο ποιῆσαι, *he says that he did this* (i.e. *he says τοῦτο ἐποίησα*); ἔφη τοῦτο ποιῆσαι, *he said that he had done this* (i.e. *he said τοῦτο ἐποίησα*); φήσει τοῦτο ποιῆσαι, *he will say that he did this* (i.e. *he will say τοῦτο ἐποίησα*). Ὁ Κῦρος λέγεται γενέσθαι Καμβύσῳ, *Cyrus is said to have been the son of Cambyses*. XEN. Cyr. i. 2, 1. Παλαιότατοι λέγονται ἐν μέρει τινὶ τῆς χώρας Κύκλωες οἰκῆσαι, *the Cyclops are said to have settled most anciently in a part of the country*. THUC. vi. 2. Ἦσαν ὑποπτοὶ αὐτοῖς μὴ προθύμως σφίσι πέμψαι ἃ ἐπεμψαν, *they were suspected by them of not having sent to them with alacrity what they did send*. THUC. vi. 75.

127. Although the usage of the language is very strict, by which the aorist infinitive after verbs of *saying, thinking, etc.* is past, as representing an aorist indicative, still several passages are found, even in the best authors, in which an aorist infinitive after such verbs as νομίζω, οἶμαι, and even φημί refers to future time. Many critics, especially Madvig,¹ deny the existence of this anomaly, and emend the offending aorists to the future or insert ἄν. If they are allowed (and most of the passages still stand uncorrected in many editions), they must be treated as strictly exceptional; and no principle, and no consistent exception to the general principle, can be based on them. E.g.

Φάτο γὰρ τίσασθαι ἀλείτας, *for he said that he should punish the*

¹ See Madvig's *Bemerkungen über einige Punkte der griechischen Wortföhrungslehre*, pp. 34-44: *Griech. Syntax*, § 172 a, Anm.

offenders. Od. xx. 121. (In Il. iii. 28, we have in most Mss. and editions φάτο γὰρ τίσεσθαι ἀλείτην, in precisely the same sense; but Bekker has τίσασθαι.) So ἐφάμην τίσασθαι in Il. iii. 366. Καὶ αὐτῷ οὐ μέμψασθαι Ἀπρίην (sc. ἀπεκρίνατο)· παρέσεσθαι γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ ἄλλους ἄξιει, and (he answered) that Apries should not have reason to blame him; for he not only would be present himself, but would bring others. Hdt. ii. 162. (Notice the strange transition from the aorist (?) to the two futures.) Φησὶν οὐδὲ τὴν Διὸς Ἔριν πέδῳ σκῆψασαν ἐμποδῶν σχεθεῖν. AESCH. Sept. 429. Οἶμαι γὰρ νῦν ἰκετεύσαι τάδε, I think of imploring. EUR. I. A. 462. (Hermann reads ἰκετεύσειν by conjecture.) Ἐνόμισαν ἐπιθέμενοι ῥαδίως κρατῆσαι, they thought they should gain the victory. THUC. ii. 3. Νομίζω, ἣν ἱππεὺς γένωμαι, ἄνθρωπος πτηνὸς γενέσθαι. XEN. Cyr. iv. 3, 15. Οὐκ ἔφασαν ἐπιτρέψαι ταῦτα γενέσθαι, they said they would not permit this to happen. LYS. xiii. 15; same in xiii. 47. Τοῦτο δὲ οὐδαί οἱ μάλιστα γενέσθαι, εἰ σοὶ συγγένοιτο, and he thinks that this would be most likely to happen to him if he should join himself with you. PLAT. Prot. 316 C. (Here we should expect γενέσθαι ἄν, to correspond to εἰ συγγένοιτο.)

AR. Nub. 1141 is commonly quoted in this list, as having δικάσασθαι φασί μοι in all Mss.; but in the year 1872 I found δικάσεσθαι in Cod. Par. 2712 (Brunck's A) and by correction in 2820, so that this emendation (as it is commonly thought to be) is confirmed.

It may be thought that the aorist is less suspicious in the Homeric passages than in Attic Greek, where the uses of indirect discourse are more precisely fixed.

FUTURE OPTATIVE.

128. The future optative is used chiefly in indirect discourse after past tenses, to represent a future indicative of the direct form. Even here the future indicative is generally retained (670, b). *E.g.*

Ὑπειπὼν ἄλλα ὅτι αὐτὸς τάκεῖ πράξει, ᾗχετο, having suggested as to what remained, that he would himself attend to things there, he departed. THUC. i. 90. (Here πράξει represents πράξω of the direct discourse, for which we might have πράξει in the indirect form. See, in the same chapter, ἀποκρινάμενοι ὅτι πέμψουσιν, having replied that they would send, where πέμψοιεν might have been used.) Εἰ τινα φεύγοντα λήψοιτο, προηγόρευεν ὅτι ὡς πολέμῳ χρήσοιτο. XEN. Cyr. iii. 1, 3. (Here the announcement was εἰ τινα λήψομαι, ὡς πολέμῳ χρήσομαι.) Ἐλεγεν ὅτι ἔτοιμος εἴη ἡγείσθαι αὐτοῖς εἰς τὸ Δέλτα, ἐνθα πολλὰ λήψοιτο. XEN. An. vii. 1, 33. (He said ἔτοιμός εἰμι . . . ἐνθα λήψεσθε.) Here belongs the rare use after ἐλπίς in THUC. vi. 30, μετ' ἐλπίδος τε ἄμα καὶ ὀλοφυρμῶν, τὰ μὲν ὡς κτήσονται, τοὺς δ' εἰ ποτε ὀψοῖντο, i.e. (they sailed) with hope and

lamentations at once,—hope that they might acquire Sicily, lamentations at the thought whether they should ever see their friends again (ὀψόμεθα;).

129. The future optative occurs first in Pindar, in an indirect question, ἐκέλευσεν διακρίναι ἄντινα σχήσοι τις ἥρων, *to decide which maiden each of the heroes should take (τίνα σχήσει;)*, Py. ix. 126. It is used chiefly by the Attic prose writers, as the correlative of the future indicative, that tense having had no corresponding optative form in the older language, as the present, perfect, and aorist indicative and subjunctive had. It is never used with ἄν.

130. Apart from its use after verbs of *saying* and *thinking*, the future optative is found in object clauses with ὅπως after verbs of *striving*, etc. (339). Here its use is closely akin to that in indirect discourse, as it always represents thought which was originally expressed by the future indicative. *E.g.*

Ἐπεμελείτο ὅπως μήτε ἄσιτοι μήτε ἄποτοι ἔσονται, *he took care that they should be neither without food nor without drink (his thought was ὅπως μήτε . . . ἔσονται)*. XEN. Cyr. viii. 1, 43. Ἐπεμελήθη ὅπως οἱ στρατιῶται τοὺς πόρους δυνήσονται ὑποφέρειν. XEN. Ag. ii. 8. Μηδὲν οἶον ἄλλο μηχανᾶσθαι, ἢ ὅπως ἡμῖν ὅτι κάλλιστα τοῖς νόμοις δέξονται ὥσπερ βαφὴν. PLAT. Rep. 430 A. See Tim. 18 C, μηχανωμένους ὅπως μηδεὶς γνώσοιτο, νομιοῦσι δὲ πάντες (where γνώσοιτο represents γινώσεται, while the next word νομιοῦσι is retained in the indicative). Ἐσκόπει ὁ Μενεκλῆς ὅπως μὴ ἔσοιτο ἄπαις, ἀλλ' ἔσοιτο αὐτῷ ὅστις ζῶντά τε γηροτροφήσοι καὶ τελευτήσαντα θάψοι αὐτόν, καὶ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον τὰ νομιζόμενα αὐτῷ ποιήσοι, *Meneclæ took thought that he might not be childless, but might have some one to support his old age while he lived and to bury him when he died, etc.* ISAE. ii. 10 (see 134). Other examples are XEN. Cyr. viii. 1, 10; Hell. vii. 5, 3; Oec. vii. 5; PLAT. Ap. 36 C; ISOC. xxi. 13; ISAE. vi. 35; DEM. xxvii. 40 (ὅπως μισθώσοιτο, in the MSS.) In XEN. Hell. ii. 1, 22 we have ὥς with the future optative: προείπεν ὥς μηδεὶς κινήσοιτο ἐκ τῆς τάξεως μηδὲ ἀνάξοιτο.

In all such cases the future indicative is generally retained (340).

131. The future optative is found in four passages after verbs of *fearing*, three times with μή, and once with ὅπως μή:—

Κατέβαλε τὸ Ἡρακλεωτῶν τεῖχος, οὐ τοῦτο φοβούμενος, μή τινες πορεύσοιτο ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκείνου δύναμιν, *not fearing this, lest any should march into his dominions*. XEN. Hell. vi. 4, 27. So XEN. Mem. i. 2, 7. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἂν ἔδεισας παρακινδυνεύειν, μὴ οὐκ ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ ποιήσοις. PLAT. Euthyphr. 15 D. Οὐ μόνον περὶ τῆς βασάνου καὶ τῆς δίκης ἐδεδόκει, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τοῦ γραμματείου, ὅπως μὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ Μενεξένου συλληφθήσοιτο. ISOC. xvii. 22. (Here the fear was expressed originally by ὅπως μὴ συλληφθήσεται, 370.)

As μή with the future indicative is rare after verbs of *fearing* (367), it is still rarer with the future optative after such verbs.

132. No case is quoted of the future optative in a pure final

clause, except a peculiar one with *μή* in PLAT. Rep. 393 E: 'Αγαμέμνων ἡγρίαιεν, ἐντελλόμενος νῦν τε ἀπιέναι καὶ αὖθις μὴ ἔλθειν, μὴ αὐτῷ τό τε σκήπτρον καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ στέμματα οὐκ ἐπαρκέσοι. (Another reading, *ἐπαρκέσειεν*, of inferior authority, is adopted by Bekker.) If *ἐπαρκέσοι* is retained (as it is by most editors), it can be explained only by assuming that Plato had in his mind *μὴ οὐκ ἐπαρκέσει* as the direct form. *Μή* final with the future indicative occurs in Aristophanes, Homer, and Theognis (see 324); there is therefore no objection to *μὴ ἐπαρκέσοι* as representing *μὴ ἐπαρκέσει*. We must remember that Plato is here paraphrasing Homer (Il. i. 25-28), but by no means literally. The Homeric line is *Μή νύ τοι οὐ χραίσμῃ σκήπτρον καὶ στέμμα θεοῖο* (see 263).

133. As *ἵνα* never takes the future indicative, it can never have the future optative.

134. A future optative rarely occurs in a relative clause of purpose after a past tense; as *αἰρεθέντες ἐφ' ᾧτε συγγράφαι νόμους, καθ' οὓσιν αὖς πολιτεύουσιντο*, *having been chosen for the purpose of making a code of laws, by which they were to govern*. XEN. Hell. ii. 3, 11. (Here we have an indirect expression of the thought of those who chose the Thirty, of which the direct form is found in ii. 3, 2, *ἔδοξε τριάκοντα ἄνδρας ἐλέσθαι, οἱ τοὺς πατρίους νόμους συγγράψουσι, καθ' οὓς πολιτεύουσιν*.) See ISAE. ii. 10 (quoted in 130).

FUTURE INFINITIVE.

135. The future infinitive is regularly used only in indirect discourse (111, 112), where it always represents a future indicative of the direct form. *E.g.*

Γράφειν φησίν, *he says that he will write*; *γράψειν ἔφη*, *he said that he would write*; *γράψειν φήσει*, *he will say that he will write*: all representing *γράφω*, *I will write*. *Πολλοὺς γε ἔσσεσθαι ἔλεγον τοὺς ἐθελήσοντας*, *they said that there would be many who would be willing*. XEN. Cyr. iii. 2, 26.

136. Verbs of *hoping*, *expecting*, *promising*, *swearing*, and a few others of like meaning, form an intermediate class between those which take the infinitive in indirect discourse (with the time of its tense preserved) and those which do not. When these refer to a future object, they regularly take the future infinitive in indirect discourse; but they also allow the aorist and even the present infinitive (not in indirect discourse), like verbs of *wishing*, etc. Examples are given of different verbs of this class with both constructions:—

Τρωσὶν δ' ἔλπετο θυμὸς ἡῶς ἐνιπρήσειν κτενέειν θ' ἥρωας Ἀχαιοὺς. Il. xv. 701. *Ἐέλπετο κῦδος ἀρέσθαι*, *he was hoping to obtain glory*. Il. xii. 407. *Ἦλπιζον γὰρ μάχην ἔσσεσθαι*, *for they*

expected that there would be a battle. THUC. iv. 71. Ἐν ἐλπίδι ὦν τὰ τείχη αἰρήσειν. THUC. vii. 46. Ἐλπίζει δύνατος εἶναι ἀρχειν, *he hopes to be able to rule.* PLAT. Rep. 573 C. (Compare εἶναι in HDT. i. 22 and 30, quoted in 118.) Πάλιν ἔμολ' ἃ πάρος οὔποτε ἤλπισεν παθεῖν. EUR. H. F. 746. Εἰ γὰρ κρατήσεσαν τῷ ναυτικῷ, τὸ Ῥήγιον ἤλπιζον ῥαδίως χειρώσασθαι, *they hoped to subdue Rhegium.* THUC. iv. 24. Οὐδ' ἂν ἐλπίς ἦν αὐτὰ βελτίω γενέσθαι, *there would not be even a hope of their becoming better.* DEM. iv. 2. Besides these constructions, ἐλπίζω (or ἐλπός) has the infinitive with ἂν in THUC. vii. 61; ὥς with the future indicative in EUR. El. 919, with the future optative in THUC. vi. 30 (see 128), with the aorist optative and ἂν in THUC. v. 9; ὅπως with the future indicative in SOPH. El. 963, EUR. Her. 1051.

Τὸν στρατηγὸν προσδοκῶ ταῦτα πράξειν. XEN. An. iii. 1, 14. Μενέλεων προσδόκα μολεῖν, *expect M. to come.* AESCH. Ag. 675. Προσδοκῶν ῥαδίως ὑμᾶς ἐξαπατήσασθαι. ISAE. xi. 22.

Ὑπὸ τ' ἔσχετο καὶ κατένευσεν δωσέμεναι. II. xiii. 368. Ἐκ τούτου ὑπέσχετο μηχανὴν παρέξειν. XEN. Cyr. vi. 1, 21. Σὺ γὰρ ὑπέσχου ζητήσῃν. PLAT. Rep. 427 E. Ὑποσχόμενος μὴ πρόσθεν παύσασθαι πρὶν αὐτοὺς καταγάγοι οἴκαδε, *having promised not to stop until he had restored them to their homes.* XEN. An. i. 2, 2. Ὑπέσχετο μοι βουλευέσθαι. Ib. ii. 3, 20.

Ὡμολόγησα εἰς τήμερον παρέσεσθαι. PLAT. Symp. 174 A. Ὁμολογήσαντε ποιήσῃν τὸ κελευόμενον. Id. Phaedr. 254 B. So ANT. vi. 23; AND. i. 62. Compare φαμέν τοῦτον ὁμολογηκέναι ταῦτα ποιήσῃν with φάσκοντές σε ὁμολογηκέναι πολιτεύεσθαι, PLAT. Crit. 51 E and 52 D. See Crit. 52 C; and compare ξυνέθου πολιτεύεσθαι, Ib. 52 D. Ἐπέσθην τὴν σύνοδον τῇ ὀγδόῃ ὁμολογήσαι ποιήσασθαι. DEM. xlii. 12.

Ἥγγυάτο μηδὲν αὐτοὺς κακὸν πείσεσθαι, *he pledged himself that they should suffer no harm.* XEN. An. vii. 4, 13. Προσαγαγὼν ἐγγυητὰς ἢ μὴν πορεύεσθαι, *having given securities as a pledge that he would go.* Id. Cyr. vi. 2, 39.

Καὶ δὴ μοι γέρας αὐτὸς ἀφαιρήσεσθαι ἀπειλεῖς. II. i. 161. So xv. 179; Od. xi. 313; HDT. vi. 37; EUR. Med. 287. Ἠπέλησεν νῆας ἅλαδ' ἐλκέμεν. II. ix. 682. Ἠπέλησαν ἀποκτείνειν ἅπαντας τοὺς ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ. XEN. Hell. v. 4, 7.

Τάχα οὐδένα εἰκὸς σὺν αὐτῷ βουλήσεσθαι εἶναι, *it is likely that soon nobody will want to be with him.* XEN. Cyr. v. 3, 30. Ἐκ μὲν τοῦ κακῶς πράττειν τὰς πόλεις μεταβολῆς τυχεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον εἰκὸς ἔστιν, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ παντάπασι γενέσθαι ἀνάστατον καὶ τῶν κοινῶν ἐλπίδων στερεηθῆναι. LYCURG. 60.

Ὁμοσον ἢ μὴν μοι ἀρήξειν. II. i. 76; so x. 321. Ὁμόσας ἀπάξειν οἴκαδ', ἐς Τροίαν μ' ἄγει, SOPH. Ph. 941; cf. Ph. 594, 623. Ὁμόσαντες ταύταις ἐμμενεῖν. XEN. Hell. v. 3, 26. Ἀναγκάζει τὸν Κερσοβλέπτην ὁμόσαι εἶναι μὲν τὴν ἀρχὴν κοινήν, πάντας δ' ὑμῖν ἀποδοῦναι τὴν χώραν. DEM. xxiii. 170.

FUTURE PERFECT.

137. The future perfect of the dependent moods is rare, except in verbs whose perfect has the meaning of a present (49), where it is an ordinary future (82).

When it occurs in other verbs, it is only in the infinitive of indirect discourse. *E.g.*

Ταῦτα (ἔφη) πεπράξεσθαι δυοῖν ἢ τριῶν ἡμερῶν, *he said that we should see these things already accomplished within two or three days.* DEM. xix. 74. (Here the direct discourse was πεπράξεται ταῦτα, *these things will have been already accomplished.*)

III. TENSES OF THE PARTICIPLE.

138. The tenses of the participle generally express time present, past, or future relatively to the time of the verb with which they are connected.

The uses of the participle with ἄν are not included here. For these see Chapter III.

PRESENT PARTICIPLE.

139. The present participle generally represents an action as going on at the time of its leading verb. *E.g.*

Τοῦτο ποιῶσιν νομίζοντες δίκαιον εἶναι, *they do this thinking it is just.* Ἐποιοῦν νομίζοντες, *they were doing it in the thought, etc.* Ἐποίησαν νομίζοντες, *they did it in the thought, etc.* Ποιήσουσιν νομίζοντες, *they will do it in the thought, etc.* Ταῦτ' ἐπράχθη Κόνωνος στρατηγούντος, *these things were done when Conon was general.* ISOC. ix. 56. (Στρατηγούντος is present relatively to ἐπράχθη.) Καίτοι ταῦτα πράττων τί ἐποίει; *now in doing this what was he doing?* DEM. ix. 15. Ταῦτα περιδεῖν γιγνόμενα, *to see this go on.* DEM. xviii. 63.

140. The present participle is also used as an imperfect, like the present infinitive (119). With the participle this use is not confined (as it is with the infinitive) to indirect discourse. *E.g.*

Οἱ συμπρεσβεύοντες καὶ παρόντες καταμαρτυρήσουσιν, *those who were his colleagues on the embassy and who were present will testify.* DEM. xix. 129. (Here the embassy is referred to as a well-known event in the past.) Φαίνεται γὰρ ἡ νῦν Ἑλλάς καλουμένη οὐ πάλαι βεβαίως οἰκουμένη, ἀλλὰ μετανασάσεις τε οὔσαι τὰ πρότερα, καὶ ῥαδίως ἑκαστοι τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀπολείποντες, *i.e. the following things are evident, 'Ελλάς οὐ πάλαι βεβαίως ᾤκειτο, ἀλλὰ μετανασάσεις*

ἦσαν, καὶ ἕκαστοι τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀπέλειπον. THUC. i. 2. Οἶδα τὸν Σωκράτην δεικνύντα τοῖς ξυνοῦσιν ἑαυτὸν καλὸν κάγαθον ὄντα· οἶδα δὲ κακίῳ σωφρονούντε ἔστε Σωκράτει συνήστην. XEN. Mem. i. 2, 18. (The direct discourse was ἐδεῖκνυ and ἐσωφρονείτην.)

In THUC. iv. 3, ἡ Πύλος ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ Μεσσηνίᾳ ποτὲ οὖσῃ γῇ, *Pylos is in the country which was once Messenia, οὖσῃ is imperfect, and denotes time absolutely past, as is shown by ποτὲ, without which it would be the country which is (now) Messenia.*

141. An attributive present participle (824) occasionally refers to time absolutely present, even when the leading verb is not present. This is always denoted by νῦν or some other word in the context. *E.g.*

Τὴν νῦν Βοιωτίαν καλουμένην ᾤκησαν, *they settled in the country now called Boeotia.* THUC. i. 12. Ὁ τοίνυν Φίλιππος ἐξ ἀρχῆς, οὐπω Διοπέιθους στρατηγούντος, οὐδὲ τῶν ὄντων ἐν Χερρονήσῳ νῦν ἀπεσταλμένων, Σέρρειον καὶ Δορίσκον ἐλάμβανε, *Philip then in the beginning, when Diopeithes was not yet general, and when the soldiers who are now in the Chersonese had not yet been sent out, seized upon Serrimum and Doriscus.* DEM. ix. 15. (Here στρατηγούντος is present to the time of ἐλάμβανε, while ὄντων is present to the time of speaking.)

For a corresponding use of the aorist participle, see 152.

PERFECT PARTICIPLE.

142. The perfect participle in all its uses represents an action as already finished at the time of its leading verb. *E.g.*

Ἐπαινοῦσι τοὺς εἰρηκότας, *they praise those who have spoken.* Ἐπῆνεσαν τοὺς εἰρηκότας, *they praised those who had spoken.* Ἐπαινέσουσι τοὺς εἰρηκότας, *they will praise those who will (then) have spoken.* Ἐπέδειξα οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς ἀπηγγελκότα (Αἰσχίνην), *I showed that Aeschines had announced nothing that was true (i.e. I showed, οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς ἀπῆγγελκεν).* DEM. xix. 177. Τοὺς δεσμώτας μετεμέλοντο ἀποδεδωκότες, *they repented of having restored the captives.* THUC. v. 35. Τῆς Αἰολίδος χαλεπῶς ἔφερεν ἀπεστερημένος, *he took it hard that he had been deprived of Aeolis.* XEN. Hell. iii. 2, 13.

AORIST PARTICIPLE.

143. The aorist participle generally represents an action as past with reference to the time of its leading verb. *E.g.*

Ταῦτα ποιήσαντες ἀπελθεῖν βούλονται, *having done this, they (now) wish to go away.* Ταῦτα εἰπόντες ἀπῆλθον, *having said this, they went away.* Οὐ πολλοὶ φαίνονται ξυνελθόντες, *not many appear to have joined in the expedition.* THUC. i. 10. Βοιωτοὶ ἐξ Ἀρνης ἀναστάντες τὴν Βοιωτίαν ᾤκησαν, *Boeotians who had been driven*

from Arne settled Boeotia. THUC. i. 12. "Εφαμεν οὔτε ἐπιστημὴν οὔτε ἄγνοιαν ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μεταξὺ αὐτῶν φανέν ἄγνοίας καὶ ἐπιστήμης, i.e. we said that it would be the province of neither knowledge nor ignorance, but of that which should have appeared (φανέν) in due course between these. PLAT. Rep. 478 D. (Here φανέν is past to ἔσεσθαι, though absolutely future; see 22.) 'Αφίκετο δεῦρο τὸ πλοῖον, γνόντων τῶν Κεφαλλήνων, ἀντιπράττοντος τούτου, ἐνταῦθα καταπλεῖν αὐτό, the vessel arrived here, the Cephallenians having determined that it should return to this port, although this man opposed it. DEM. xxxii. 14. (Here γνόντων denotes time past relatively to ἀφίκετο, and ἀντιπράττοντος time present relatively to γνόντων, which is its leading verb.)

144. When the aorist participle is used with any form of λαμβάνω, to escape the notice of, τυγχάνω, to happen, and φθάνω, to anticipate, except the present and imperfect, it does not denote time past with reference to the verb, but coincides with it in time. Thus ἔλαθον ἀπελθόντες means they went away secretly (= ἀπῆλθον λάθρα); οὐκ ἔφθησαν ἀπελθόντες, no sooner were they gone (= οὐ πρότερον ἀπῆλθον); ἔτυχον εἰσελθόντες, they came in by chance, or they happened to come in (= εἰσῆλθον τύχῃ). E.g.

Τοὺς δ' ἔλαθ' εἰσελθὼν Πρίαμος, and Priam entered unnoticed by them. II. xxiv. 477; so xvii. 2 and 89. "Ελαθεν (αὐτὴν) ἀφ'θέντα πάντα καὶ καταφλεχθέντα, everything took fire and was consumed before she knew it. THUC. iv. 133. Λαμβάνει (historic present) στήλην παίσας. SOPH. El. 744. "Εφθῃ ὀρεξάμενος, he aimed a blow first II. xvi. 322. Αὐτοὶ φθίσονται αὐτὸ δράσαντες, they will do it first themselves. PLAT. Rep. 375 C. Οὐ γὰρ ἔφθῃ μοι συμβῆσα ἢ ἀτυχία, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐπεχείρησαν, κ.τ.λ., for no sooner did this misfortune come upon me, than they undertook, etc. DEM. lvii. 65. Στρατιὰ οὐ πολλὴ ἔτυχε μέχρι Ἰσθμοῦ παρελθούσα, an army of no great size had by chance marched as far as the Isthmus. THUC. vi. 61. "Ετυχε δὲ κατὰ τοῦτο τοῦ καιροῦ ἔλθων, and he happened to come just at that moment. Id. vii. 2. 'Ολίγα πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα τυχεῖν πράξαντες (sc. ἡγούνται), they think that it was their fortune to accomplish only a little in comparison with their expectations. Id. i. 70. So τοῦτ' ἔτυχον λαβὼν, I happened to take this, AN. Eccl. 375.

'Οπιοτέρως κε φθῆσιν ὀρεξάμενος χροῖα καλόν, whichever shall first hit, etc. II. xxiii. 805. Βουλοίμην ἂν λαθεῖν αὐτὸν ἀπελθόν, I should like to get away without his knowing it. XEN. AN. i. 3, 17. Τοὺς ἀνθρώπους λήσομεν ἐπιπεσόντες. Ib. vii. 3, 43. Εὐλαβεῖσθαι παρεκελεύεσθε ἀλλήλους, ὅπως μὴ πέρα τοῦ δέοντος σοφώτεροι γινόμενοι λήσετε διαφθαρέντες, you exhorted one another to take care not to become wise overmuch and so get corrupted unawares. PLAT. Gorg. 487 D. (Here γινόμενοι is an ordinary aorist, past with reference to the future phrase λήσετε διαφθαρέντες.)

The last four examples show that this use of the aorist participle is allowed even when both participle and verb refer to the future.

145. The aorist participle has the same use with συμπίπτω, to *happen*, in Herodotus (890). *E.g.*

Καὶ τότε ἕτερον συνέπεσε γινόμενον, *and this other event occurred (as it chanced)*. HDT. ix. 101.

So συγκυρέω in HDT. viii. 87 (see 889).

146. An aorist participle with the present or imperfect of any of the above verbs (144) cannot coincide with the verb in time, and retains its own reference to past time. This combination seldom occurs.¹ *E.g.*

Ὅπερ λαβοῦσα τυγχάνει μήτηρ χεροῖν, *which, as it happens, the mother has taken in her hands (happens to have taken)*. EUR. Bacch. 1140. Ἀριστὰ τυγχάνουσι πράξαντες, *it happens that they fared the best*. ISOC. iv. 103. Δικαίως ἂν τὴν αὐτὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἀπολάβοιμεν, ἥνπερ αὐτοὶ τυγχάνομεν εἰς ὑμᾶς ὑπάρξαντες, *we should justly receive back the same kindness which it is our own fortune to have first shown to you (we happen to have begun)*. ID. xiv. 57. Πρὸς τί τοῦτ' εἰπὼν κυρεῖς; *wherefore did you chance to speak thus (does it chance that you spoke)?* SOPH. EL. 1176. Ποῦ κυρεῖ ἐκτόπιος συθείς; ID. O. C. 119. Ὅρα καθ' ὕπνον μὴ καταυλισθεῖς κυρῇ, *see lest it may chance that he has retired to sleep within*. ID. Ph. 30. Compare συνεκύρησε παραπεσοῦσα, *happened to collide*. HDT. viii. 87 (889). Μίξις μία λύτης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς συμπίπτει γεινομένη, *i.e. happens to have occurred* (Badham proposes γιγνομένη). PLAT. Phil. 47 D.

Οὐδ' ἄρα Κίρκην ἐξ Ἀΐδew ἐλθόντες ἐλήθομεν, *nor was it unknown to Circe that we had returned from Hades*. OD. xii. 16. Ὅσοι ἐτύγχανον οὕτως ἀθροοὶ ξυνεξελθόντες, *all who happened to have thus come out together*. THUC. iii. 111. Εἴ τί που αἰγῶν περιλειφθὲν ἐτύγχανε γένος, *if any race of goats happened to have been left*. PLAT. Leg. 677 E. Ἀρισταγόρῃ δὲ συνέπιπτε τοῦ αὐτοῦ χρόνου πάντα συνελθόντα, *and it was the fortune of A. that all these came to him at the same time*. HDT. v. 36. (Here it is difficult to distinguish the doubly past time; but the analogy of the other examples, and the difficulty of conceiving an imperfect and aorist as coincident in time, seem decisive.) Ὅρθως σφι ἡ φήμη συνέβαινε ἐλθοῦσα, *rightly, as it happened, had the report come to them*. ID. ix. 101. Just below: τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρης συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι, *i.e. they (the battles of Plataea and Mycale) happened to fall on the same day*.

In LYS. xii. 27 we have the aorist and perfect participles together with ἐτύγχανε, each expressing its own time: ὅστις ἀντειπὼν γε ἐτύγχανε καὶ γνώμην ἀποδεδειγμένος, *who chanced to have spoken in opposition and to have shown his opinion*.

It appears from these examples that the aorist participle can coincide in its time only with forms which have a similar aoristic or complexive meaning, while in other cases the verb and participle are distinct in time.

¹ For the examples of τυγχάνω here given I am indebted to an unpublished paper on this construction by Dr. James R. Wheeler, in which notice of this peculiarity is taken for the first time (so far as I am aware).

147. 1. The perfect participle can always be used with the verbs of 144 to denote an action which is completed at the time of the leading verb. This is the most common way of expressing past time in the participle here. *E.g.*

Ἐτύγχανον ἄρτι παρειληφότες τὴν ἀρχήν, *they happened to have just received their authority*. THUC. vi. 96. Ἐάν τις ἥδικηκώς τι τυγχάνῃ τὴν πόλιν, *if it ever happens that one has wronged the city*. DEM. xviii. 123. So THUC. i. 103 (see 887).

2. The present participle with these verbs is regular, representing an action as *going on* at the time of the verb. See PLAT. CRIT. 49 B and the four following examples (with others), in 887.

148. In many constructions in which the aorist participle follows a verb in the sense of the ordinary object infinitive (not in indirect discourse), it does not refer to past time, but differs from the present participle only as the aorist infinitive in such a construction would differ from the present (96). This applies especially to the participle with περιωρῶ and ἔφορῶ (περιεῖδον, ἐπεῖδον), in the sense of *allow*, *not interfere with*, and ὀρῶ (εἶδον) *permit* and *see* (cf. 884 and 885). *E.g.*

Προσδεχόμενος τοὺς Ἀθηναίους κατοκνήσειν περιεῖδεν αὐτὴν [τὴν γῆν] τμηθεῖσαν, ἀνείχεν, *expecting that they would be unwilling to see their land ravaged*, etc. THUC. ii. 18. But in ii. 20 we find the aorist infinitive, ἤλπιζεν τὴν γῆν οὐκ ἂν περιεῖδεν τμηθῆναι, *would not let their land be ravaged*, referring to precisely the same event from another point of view (see 903, 6). Μὴ περιύδῃτε ἡμέας διαφθαρέντας, *do not look on and see us destroyed*. HDT. iv. 118. Οὐ μὴ σ' ἐγὼ περιόψομαι ἀπελθόντα, *I will by no means let you go*. AR. RAN. 509. Ἐπλησαν ἐπιδεῖν ἐρήμην μὲν τὴν πόλιν γενομένην τὴν δὲ χώραν πορθομένην, ἅπαντα δὲ τὸν πόλεμον περὶ τὴν πατρίδα τὴν αὐτῶν γιγνόμενον. ISOC. iv. 96. (Here the aorist participle denotes the *laying waste* of the city (as a single act), while the presents denote the continuous *ravaging* of the country and the gradual *coming on* of a state of war. This is precisely the difference between the present and aorist infinitive in similar constructions.) Ἐπεῖδον τὴν ἑαυτῶν πατρίδα ἀνάστατον γενομένην. ANT. v. 79.

Εἰ κείνόν γε ἴδοιμι κατελθόντ' Ἀϊδὸς εἶσω, *if I should see him go down and enter Hades*. IL. vi. 284. Μὴ μ' ἰδεῖν θανόνθ' ὑπ' ἀσπῶν, *not to see me killed by the citizens*. EUR. OR. 746. Διὰ τὸ σωφρονεῖν τῷ πάπῳτ' εἶδες ἤδη ἀγαθόν τι γερόμενον; AR. NUB. 1061. Ὅταν αὐτὸν ἰδῇ ἐξαίφνης πταίσαντα πρὸς τῇ πόλει καὶ ἐκχέαντα τὰ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑαυτὸν, . . . ἢ ἀποθανόντα ἢ ἐκπεσόντα ἢ ἀτιμωθέντα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἅπασαν ἀποβαλόντα. PLAT. REP. 553 A. So Rep. 498 D, Prot. 324 B; AESCH. SUPP. 423; SOPH. ANT. 476.

So after ἀκούω; as αἶ κ' ἐθέλῃς ἐπιόντος ἀκούμεν, *in case he will hear me speak*, IL. vi. 281. Τόσαυτα φωνήσαντος εἰσηκούσαμεν, *so much we heard him say*. SOPH. O. C. 1645. So also πρᾶθέντα τλήναι, *endured to be sold*, AESCH. AG. 1041; σπείρας ἔτλα, Sept. 754:

for τλάω with the regular infinitive, see *Isoc.* iv. 96, quoted above. So μένειν νοστήσαντα ἀνακτα, *to await the king's return*, *Il.* xiii. 38.

149. The aorist participle loses its reference to past time also in the peculiar construction in which the participle with its noun has the force of the infinitive with its subject; as μετὰ Συρακούσας οἰκισθείσας, *after the founding of Syracuse* (= μετὰ τὸ Συρακούσας οἰκισθῆναι), *Thuc.* vi. 3. See examples in 829 (b).

150. An aorist participle denoting that in which the action of a verb (generally aorist) consists may express time coincident with that of the verb, when the actions of the verb and the participle are practically one.¹ *E.g.*

Νεῦσ' ἐπὶ οἱ καλέσας, *he called him to him by a nod.* *Od.* xvii. 330. Βῆ αἰξάσα. *Il.* ii. 167. Εὖ γ' ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας με, *you did well in reminding me.* *PLAT.* *Phaed.* 60 C. Μῆ τι ἐξαμάρτητε ἐμοῦ καταψηφισάμενοι, *lest you make any mistake in condemning me.* *Id.* *Ap.* 30 D. Παῖδα κατακανὼν ξυήλη πατάξας, *having killed a child by the stroke of a dagger.* *XEN.* *An.* iv. 8, 25. Ἦδη πώποτε οὖν ἡ δακοῦσα κακὸν τί σοι ἔδωκεν ἢ λακτίσας; *did your mother ever do you any harm by biting or kicking you?* *Id.* *Mem.* ii. 2, 7. Πέμπει ὡς τὸν Ἀσπύοχδον κρύφα ἐπιστείλας ὅτι Ἀλκιβιάδης αὐτῶν τὰ πράγματα φθείρει, *i.e. he sends a private message, etc.* *Thuc.* viii. 50. After a perfect: ὅσ' ἡμᾶς ἀγαθὰ δέδρακας εἰρήνην ποιήσας, *what blessings you have done us in making a peace!* *Ar.* *Pac.* 1199.

The following examples among many in the New Testament illustrate the usage:—

Ἀποκριθεὶς εἶπεν ἐν παραβολαῖς αὐτοῖς, λέγων, *he answered and spake to them in parables, and said.* *MATT.* xxii. 1. (Λέγων is the ordinary present, less closely connected with εἶπον than ἀποκριθεὶς.) Προσευξάμενοι εἶπαν, *they prayed and said.* *Act.* *Apost.* i. 24. Καλῶς ἐποίησας παραγενόμενος, *thou hast well done that thou art come.* *Ib.* x. 33.

151. In such passages as ὡμολόγησαν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τείχη τε περιελόντες καὶ ναῦς παραδόντες φόρον τε ταξάμενοι, *Thuc.* i. 108, the aorist participle is past with reference to the time of the beginning of the peace to which ὡμολόγησαν refers, and the meaning is, *they obtained terms of peace, on condition that they should first (before the peace began) tear down their walls, etc.* Such passages are *Thuc.* i. 101, 108, 115, 117. See *Krüger's* note on i. 108, and *Madvig's Bemerkungen*, p. 46. *Madvig* quotes, to confirm this view, *Lys.* xii. 68: ὑπέσχετο εἰρήνην ποιῆσειν μήτε ὄμηρα δοῦς μήτε τὰ τείχη καθελὼν μήτε τὰς ναῦς παραδούς, *i.e. he promised to make a peace without giving pledges, etc.*

152. An attributive aorist participle occasionally refers to

¹ See the discussion of this, with especial reference to the New Testament, where examples of this kind are frequent, by Professor W. G. Ballantine, in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for October 1884, p. 787.

time *absolutely* past, without regard to the time of its verb. *E.g.*

Ἠγεμόνα παρεχόμενοι Μεγάπανον τὸν Βαβυλῶνος ὕστερον τούτων ἐπιτροπεύσαντα, i.e. *they had as their leader Megarannus, who after this was made governor of Babylon.* Hdt. vii. 62. (Here the aorist participle is past at the time of writing only; it is even future compared with the time of παρεχόμενοι.) So in vii. 106: κατέλιπε δὲ ἄνδρα τούονδε Μασκάμην γενόμενον, and *he left M. (in authority), who (afterwards) proved himself such a man* (the evidence of his later merits follows in a relative sentence).

For the corresponding use of the present participle see 141.

For the use of the aorist infinitive and participle with ἄν, see 207 and 215. For the aorist participle with ἔχω and εἶχον as a circumlocution for the perfect and pluperfect, as θαυμάσας ἔχω and εἶχον, see 47 and 48. For the rare use of the aorist participle with ἔσομαι for the future perfect, see 81. For the aorist participle in protasis, see 472 and 841.

FUTURE PARTICIPLE.

153. The future participle represents an action as future with reference to the time of its leading verb. *E.g.*

Τοῦτο ποιήσων ἔρχεται, *he is coming to do this; τοῦτο ποιήσων ἦλθεν, he came to do this. Περμφθήσεται ταῦτα ἔρῳν, he will be sent to say this. Οἶδα αὐτὸν τοῦτο ποιήσοντα, I know that he will do this; οἶδα τοῦτο ποιήσων, I know that I shall do this; ᾔδειν αὐτὸν τοῦτο ποιήσοντα, I knew that he would do this.*

For the various uses of the future participle, and examples, see Chapter VI.

GNOMIC AND ITERATIVE TENSES.

GNOMIC AORIST AND PERFECT.

154. The aorist and sometimes the perfect indicative are used in animated language to express *general truths*. These are called the *gnomic aorist* and the *gnomic perfect*, and are usually to be translated by our present.

155. These tenses give a more vivid statement of general truths, by employing a distinct case or several distinct cases in the past to represent (as it were) all possible cases, and implying that what has occurred is likely to occur again under similar circumstances. *E.g.*

Κάτθαν' ὁμῶς ὃ τ' ἀεργὸς ἀνὴρ ὃ τε πολλὰ ἔοργός, *the idle man and he who has laboured much alike must die.* Il. ix. 320. Ὅστε καὶ ἀλκιμον ἄνδρα φοβεῖ καὶ ἀφείλετο νίκην, *who terrifies even a valiant*

man and snatches his victory away. II. xvii. 177 (see 157, below). Βία καὶ μέγανον χρονον ἔσφαλεν ἐν χρόνῳ. PIND. Py. viii. 15. Σοφοὶ δὲ μέλλοντα τριταῖον ἀνεμον ἔμαθον, οὐδ' ὑπὸ κέρδει βλάβειν. Id. Nem. vii. 17. Καὶ δὴ φίλον τις ἔκταν' ἀγνοίας ὕπο, and now one may kill a friend through ignorance. AESCH. Supp. 499. Ἀλλὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰς μὲν ἅπαξ καὶ βραχὺν χρόνον ἀντέχει, καὶ σφόδρα γε ἦνθησεν ἐπὶ ταῖς ἐλπίσιν, ἂν τύχῃ, τῷ χρόνῳ δὲ φωρᾶται καὶ περὶ αὐτὰ καταρρεῖ. DEM. ii. 10 (see 157 and 171). Ἦν ἄρα σφαλῶσιν, ἀντελπίσαντες ἄλλα ἐπλήρωσαν τὴν χρεῖαν, they supply the deficiency (as often as one occurs). THUC. i. 70. Ἦν δὲ τις τούτων τι παραβαίνει, ζημίαν αὐτοῖς ἐπέθεσαν, i.e. they impose a penalty upon every one who transgresses. XEN. Cyr. i. 2, 2. Δεινῶν τ' ἄημα πνευμάτων ἐκοίμισε στένοντα πόντον. SOPH. Aj. 674. Μί' ἡμέρα τὸν μὲν καθεῖλεν ὑψόθεν, τὸν δ' ἦρ' ἄνω. EUR. Fr. 424. Ὄταν ὁ Ἔρως ἐγκρατέστερος γένηται, διαφθείρει τε πολλὰ καὶ ἡδίκησεν. PLAT. Symp. 188 A. Ὄταν τις ὥσπερ οὗτος ἰσχύσῃ, ἡ πρώτη πρόφασις καὶ μικρὸν πταῖσμα ἅπαντα ἀνεχαίτισε καὶ διέλυσεν. DEM. ii. 9.

Ἐπειδὴν τις παρ' ἐμοῦ μάθῃ, εἰ μὲν βούληται, ἀποδέδωκεν ὁ ἐγὼ πράττομαι ἀργύριον· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐλθὼν εἰς ἱερὸν ὁμόσας, ὅσων ἂν φῇ ἄξια εἶναι τὰ μαθήματα, τοσούτον κατέθηκεν. PLAT. Prot. 328 B. (Here the perfect and aorist, according to the Mss., are used in nearly the same sense, he pays. But Sauppe reads ἀπέδωκεν for ἀποδέδωκεν.) Πολλοὶ διὰ δόξαν καὶ πολιτικὴν δύνανται μεγάλα κακὰ πεπονθασιν, i.e. many always have suffered, and many do suffer. XEN. Mem. iv. 2, 35. Τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐμποδῶν ἀναισθητοῦ εὐνοίᾳ τετίμηται. THUC. ii. 45.

. The gnomic perfect is not found in Homer.

156. The sense as well as the origin of the gnomic aorist is often made clearer by the addition of such words as *πολλάκις*, *ἤδη*, or *οὕτω*. Such examples as these form a simple transition from the common to the gnomic use of the aorist:—

Πολλὰ στρατόπεδα ἤδη ἔπεσεν ὑπ' ἐλασσόνων, i.e. many cases have already arisen, implying it often happens. THUC. ii. 89. Μέλλον γ' ἰατρὸς, τῇ νόσῳ διδοὺς χρόνον, ἰάσασ' ἤδη μάλλον ἢ τεμὼν χρόα, the slow physician, by giving the disease time, may work more cures than he who cuts too deep. EUR. Fr. 1057. Πολλάκις ἔχων τις οὐδὲ τὰναγκαῖα νῦν αὖριον ἐπλούτησ', ὥστε χατέρους τρέφειν, i.e. cases have often occurred in which such a man has become rich the next day, etc. PHIL. Fr. 120. Ἀθυμῶντες ἄνδρες οὕτω τρόπαιον ἔστησαν. PLAT. Criti. 108 C. Οὐδεὶς ἐπλούτησεν ταχέως δίκαιος ὢν, no man ever became rich suddenly who was just. MEN. Fr. 294. Compare DEM. iv. 51. (See Krüger, § 53, 10, A. 2.)

157. General truths are more commonly expressed in Greek, as in English, by the present. The present and aorist appear together above, in nearly the same sense; the gnomic aorist is, however, commonly distinguished from the present by referring to a single or a sudden occurrence, while the present (as usual) implies duration.

Thus in DEM. ii. 10, above, the aorist ἤνθησεν implies a sudden *blossoming out* with hopes, as opposed to the continuance or repetition expressed by ἀντέχει, *hold out*, φωράται, *are detected*, and καταρρεῖ, *fall in ruin*.

158. An aorist somewhat resembling the gnomic is very common in Homeric *similes*, where it is usually to be translated by the present. *E.g.*

"Ἦριπε δ' ὥς ὅτε τις δρῦς ἤριπεν, *and he fell, as when an oak falls*, (literally, *as when an oak once fell*). IL. xiii. 389.

This can better be seen in the longer and more complicated examples which are quoted under 547 and 548.

159. The gnomic aorist is found in indirect discourse in the infinitive and participle, and even in the optative. *E.g.*

- (a) "Οπου δ' ὑβρίζειν δρῶν θ' ἃ βούλεται παρῇ,
ταύτην νόμιξε τὴν πόλιν χρόνῳ ποτὲ
ἐξ οὐρίων δραμοῦσαν ἐς βυθὸν πεσεῖν,

but where man is permitted to insult and to work his own will, believe that that state, though it may run before fair breezes, must in time sink to the depths. SOPH. Aj. 1082. (Here πεσεῖν represents ἔπεσεν of the direct form, which can be only gnomic.) Εἰ σοι δέος παρέστηκεν ἡγουμένῳ χαλεπὸν εἶναι φιλίαν συμμένειν, καὶ διαφορᾶς γενομένης κοινὴν ἀμφοτέροις καταστήναι τὴν συμφορὰν, *if you fear, thinking that it is hard for friendship to abide, and that when a quarrel occurs the calamity that arises is common to both* (the direct form would be χαλεπὸν ἐστίν, καὶ κοινὴ κατέστη ἡ συμφορὰ). PLAT. Phaedr. 232 B. Ἐγουμένης δὲ ἀληθείας οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ φαίμεν αὐτῇ χορὸν κακῶν ἀκολουθήσαι, *now when truth leads, we never could say that a chorus of evils accompanying her* (ἡκολούθησεν). PLAT. Rep. 490 C.

(b) Σμικρῷ χαλινῷ δ' οἶδα τοὺς θυμονέουσιν ἵππους καταρτυθέντας, *and I know that high-spirited horses are tamed by a small bit.* SOPH. Ant. 478. Οἶδα τοὺς τοιοῦτους ἐν μὲν τῷ κατ' αὐτοὺς βίῳ λυπηροὺς ὄντας, τῶν δὲ ἔπειτα ἀνθρώπων προσποιήσιν ξυγγενείας τιῶν καὶ μὴ οὖσαν καταλιπόντας, *I know that such men, although in their own lifetimes they are offensive, yet often leave to some who come after them a desire to claim connexion with them, even where there is no ground for it.* THUC. vi. 16.

(c) A clear case of the gnomic aorist in the optative is seen in PLAT. Rep. 490 B, in the peculiar *oratio obliqua* introduced by ἀπολογησόμεθα ὅτι (in A), which implies a philosophic imperfect (40) and thus takes the optative. We have πεφυκὼς εἶη, ἐμμένοι, ἰοί, etc., representing πέφυκε, ἐμμένει, εἰσι, etc.; and afterwards γνοίη τε καὶ ἀληθῶς ζῶη καὶ τρέφοιτο (representing ἔγνω τε καὶ ἀληθῶς ζῇ καὶ τρέφεται), i.e. *he attains knowledge (aor.), and then truly lives and is nourished (pres.)*, where the gnomic force of the aorist is plain. (See 676.)

160. The gnomic perfect is found in the infinitive of indirect discourse in DEM. ii. 18: εἰ δέ τις σῶφρων ἢ δίκαιος, παρεῶσθαι καὶ

ἐν οὐδενὸς εἶναι μέρει τὸν τοιοῦτον (φησὶν), *such a man (he says) is always thrust aside and is of no account.*

161. The imperfect was probably never used in a gnomic sense, except where the form is aoristic in other respects, as ἔκλυν in II. i. 218, ix. 509; cf. xiv. 133.

ITERATIVE IMPERFECT AND AORIST WITH "Αν.—IONIC

ITERATIVE FORMS IN -σκον AND -σκόμην.

162. The imperfect and aorist are sometimes used with the adverb ἄν to denote a customary action, being equivalent to our narrative phrase *he would often do this* or *he used to do it.* *E.g.*

Διηρώτων ἄν αὐτοὺς τί λέγοιεν, *I used to ask them (I would ask them) what they said.* ΠΛΑΤ. AP. 22 B. Εἴ τινες ἰδοῖεν πῇ τοὺς σφετέρους ἐπικρατοῦντας, ἀνεθάρσυνον ἄν, *whenever any saw their friends in any way victorious, they would be encouraged (i.e. they were encouraged in all such cases).* ΘΥC. vii. 71. Πολλάκις ἠκούσαμεν ἄν τι κακῶς ὑμᾶς βουλευσάμενους μέγα πρᾶγμα, *we used very often to hear you, etc.* AR. LYS. 511. Εἴ τις αὐτῷ περὶ τοῦ ἀντιλέγουι μὴδὲν ἔχων σαφὲς λέγειν, ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἐπανήγεν ἄν πάντα τὸν λόγον, *he always brought the whole discussion back to the main point.* ΧΕΝ. MEM. iv. 6, 13. Ὅποτε προσβλέψει τις τῶν ἐν ταῖς τάξεσι, τότε μὲν εἶπεν ἄν· ὦ ἄνδρες, κ.τ.λ. τότε δ' αὖ ἐν ἄλλοις ἄν ἔλεξεν. ID. CYR. vii. 1, 10. So HDT. ii. 109, iii. 51 and 148.

This construction must be distinguished from the potential indicative with ἄν (243). See, however, 249. For the iterative imperfect and aorist with ἄν transferred to the infinitive, see 210.

163. The Ionic iterative imperfect and aorist in -σκον and -σκόμην express the repetition of such actions as the ordinary imperfect and aorist express. *E.g.*

"Ἄλλους μὲν γὰρ παῖδας ἐμὸν πόδας ὥκεις Ἀχιλλεὺς πέρνασχι', ὅν τιν' ἔλεσκε. II. xxiv. 751. Ὅκως ἔλθοι ὁ Νεῖλος ἐπὶ ὀκτὼ πήχειας, ἄρδεσκε Αἴγυπτον τὴν ἐνέρθε Μέμφιος. HDT. ii. 13.

164. Herodotus sometimes uses the iterative forms in -σκον and -σκόμην with ἄν in the construction of 162. He uses this form of the aorist in only two passages, in both with ἄν. *E.g.*

Φοιτέουσα κλαίεσκε ἄν καὶ ὀδυρέσκετο. iii. 119. Ἐς τοῦτους ὅκως ἔλθοι ὁ Σκύλης, τὴν μὲν στρατιὴν καταλείπεσκε ἐν τῷ προουστειῷ, αὐτὸς δὲ ὅκως ἔλθοι ἐς τὸ τεῖχος, λάβεσκε ἄν Ἑλληνίδα ἐσθῆτα. iv. 78. So λάβεσκον ἄν, iv. 130. See Krüger, II. § 53, 10, 5.

DEPENDENCE OF MOODS AND TENSES.

165. In dependent sentences, where the construction allows both the subjunctive and the optative, the subjunctive is used if the leading verb is primary, and the optative if it is secondary. (See 21.) *E.g.*

Πράττουσιν ἃ ἂν βούλωνται, *they do whatever they please*; but ἔπραττον ἃ βούλοιντο, *they did whatever they pleased*.

166. In like manner, where the construction allows both the indicative and the optative, the indicative follows primary, and the optative follows secondary tenses. *E.g.*

Λέγουσιν ὅτι τοῦτο βούλονται, *they say that they wish for this*; ἔλεξαν ὅτι τοῦτο βούλοιντο, *they said that they wished for this*.

167. To these fundamental rules we find one special exception. In indirect discourse of all kinds (including sentences denoting a purpose or object after ἵνα, ὅπως, μή, etc.) either an indicative or a subjunctive may depend upon a secondary tense, so that the mood and tense actually used by the speaker may be retained in the indirect form. (See 667, 1.) *E.g.*

Εἶπεν ὅτι βούλεται, *for εἶπεν ὅτι βούλοιντο, he said that he wished (i.e. he said βούλομαι)*. Ἐφοβείτο μὴ τοῦτο γένηται, *for ἐφοβείτο μὴ τοῦτο γένοιτο, he feared lest it should happen (i.e. he thought, φοβοῦμαι μὴ γένηται)*. (See 318.)

168. An only apparent exception occurs when either a potential optative or indicative with ἂν, or an optative expressing a wish, stands in a dependent sentence. In both these cases the original form is retained without regard to the leading verb. It is obvious that a change of mood would in most cases change the whole nature of the expression. *E.g.*

Ἐγὼ οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἂν τις σαφέστερον ἐπιδείξειεν, *I do not know how any one could show this more clearly*. DEM. xxvii. 48. Δεῖ γὰρ ἐκείνῳ τοῦτο ἐν τῇ γνώμῃ παραστήσαι, ὥς ὑμεῖς ἐκ τῆς ἀμελείας ταύτης τῆς ἄγαν ἴσως ἂν ὀρμήσαιτε. DEM. iv. 17. Εἰ δ' ὑμεῖς ἄλλο τι γνώσεσθε, ὃ μὴ γένοιτο, τίνα οἴεσθε αὐτὴν ψυχὴν ἔξειν; DEM. xxviii. 21.

A few other unimportant exceptions will be noticed as they occur.

169. It is therefore important to ascertain which tenses (in all the moods) are followed, in dependent sentences, as primary tenses by the indicative or subjunctive, and which as secondary tenses by the optative.

INDICATIVE.

170. In the indicative the general rule holds, that the present,

perfect, future, and future perfect are primary, and the imperfect, pluperfect, and aorist are secondary tenses.

171. But the historical present is a secondary tense, as it refers to the past; and the gnomic aorist is a primary tense, as it refers to the present.

See HDT. i. 63 (under 33), where the optative follows an historical present; and DEM. ii. 10, THUC. i. 70, XEN. Cyr. i. 2, 2 (under 155), where the subjunctive follows gnomic aorists.

172. The imperfect indicative in the protasis or apodosis of an unfulfilled condition (410) and in its potential use (243), when it refers to *present* time, is a primary tense. *E.g.*

"Εγραφον ἂν ἡλίκᾳ ὑμᾶς εἰ ποιεῖω, εἰ εἴ ᾔδειν, *I would tell you in my letter how great services I would render you, if I knew*, etc. DEM. xix. 40. Πάνν ἂν ἐφοβούμην, μὴ ἀπορήσωσι λόγων. PLAT. Symp. 193 E. 'Εφοβούμην ἂν σφόδρα λέγειν, μὴ δόξω, κ.τ.λ., *I should be very much afraid to speak, lest I should seem*, etc. PLAT. Theaet. 143 E. Ταῦτ' ἂν ἤδη λέγειν ἐπεχείρουν, ἢν' εἰδῇτε. DEM. xxiii. 7 (for the construction here see 336). See XEN. An. v. 1, 10; DEM. xvi. 12.

173. On the other hand, the aorist indicative in the same constructions (172), and also the imperfect when it refers to the *past*, are secondary tenses. *E.g.*

'Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἂν ἔδεισας παρακινδυνεύειν, μὴ οὐκ ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ ποιήσοις. PLAT. Euthyph. 15 D. 'Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μετὰ πολλῶν μαρτύρων ἀποδιδούς εἰκὴ τις ἂν ἐπίστευσεν, ἢν' εἴ τις γίγνοιτο διαφορὰ, κομίσασθαι ῥαδίως παρ' ὑμῖν δύνηται. DEM. xxx. 20. (Here the subjunctive δύνηται is properly used after a past tense (318), but the optative shows that the leading verb is secondary.) See ἵνα γίγνοιτο, after an imperfect with ἂν, PLAT. Men. 89 B.

Χρὴν ἐπείρεσθαι κότερα τὴν ἑωυτοῦ ἢ τὴν Κύρου λέγοι ἀρχήν, *he ought to have asked whether the oracle meant his own or Cyrus's empire*. HDT. i. 91.

SUBJUNCTIVE AND IMPERATIVE.

174. All the tenses of the subjunctive and imperative are *primary*, as they refer to future or to present time (89). *E.g.*

"Επεσθ' ὅπῃ ἂν τις ἡγῇται, *follow whithersoever any one leads the way*. THUC. ii. 11. Σκοπῶμεν εἰ πρέπει ἢ οὐ. PLAT. Rep. 451 D.

175. But when a subjunctive depends upon a past tense, as often happens in final clauses (318), it may be followed by an optative; as in XEN. Hell. vi. 5, 21, ἦγε τὴν ταχίστην εἰς τὴν Εὐταίαν, βουλόμενος ἀπαγαγεῖν τοὺς ὀπλίτας πρὶν καὶ τὰ πυρὰ τῶν πολεμίων ἰδεῖν, ἵνα μή τις εἴπῃ ὡς φεύγων ἀπαγάγοι, *he led on, wishing to lead off his soldiers before they even saw the enemies' fires, that no one might say that he had led them off in flight* (187). With the other reading, ἵνα μή τις εἴποι, the example would illustrate 176 A (below).

OPTATIVE.

176. As the optative refers sometimes to the future and sometimes to the past, it exerts upon a dependent verb sometimes the force of a primary, and sometimes that of a secondary tense.

A. When it refers to the past, as in general suppositions with *εἰ* and relatives after past tenses, or when it takes its time from a past verb (as in a final clause), it has the force of a secondary tense.

B. When it refers to the future, as in future conditions, in its use with *ἄν*, and in wishes, it is properly to be considered primary. In many cases, however, a double construction is here allowed. On the principle of assimilation the Greeks preferred the optative to the subjunctive in certain clauses depending on an optative, the dependent verb referring to the future like the leading verb, and differing little from a subjunctive in such a position. A dependent indicative is, however, very seldom assimilated to a leading optative. Such assimilation of a dependent verb to an optative takes place (1) *regularly* in protasis and conditional relative clauses depending on an optative of future time; (2) *seldom* in final and object clauses after *ἵνα*, *ὅπως*, *μή*, etc.; (3) *very rarely* in the case of the indicative in indirect quotations or questions, but (4) more freely in the case of the subjunctive in indirect questions.

These four classes of sentences which depend on an optative referring to the future are treated separately below (I.-IV.)

177. *J. (a)* In protasis and conditional relative sentences depending upon an optative which *refers to the future*, the optative rather than the subjunctive is regularly used to express a future condition. *E.g.*

Εἴης φορητὸς οὐκ ἂν, εἰ πρᾶσσοις καλῶς, *you would be unendurable, if you should be prosperous.* AESCH. Prom. 979. Ἄνδρὶ δέ κ' οὐκ εἴξει μέγας Τελαμώνιος Αἴας, ὃς θνητὸς τ' εἴη καὶ ἔδοι Δημήτερος ἀκτήν. Π. xiii. 321. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν τις, ἃ γὰρ μὴ ἐπίσταίτο, τὰτα σοφὸς εἴη; *for how could any one be wise in those things which he did not understand?* XEN. Mem. iv. 6, 7. Δέοιτο ἂν αὐτοῦ μένειν, ὅτε σὺ ἀπέλθοις. Id. Cyr. v. 3, 13. Εἰ ἀποθνήσκοι μὲν πάντα ὅσα τοῦ ζῆν μεταλάβοι, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀποθάνοι μένοι ἐν τούτῳ, ἂρ' οὐ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη τελευτῶντα πάντα τεθνάναι; *if all things partaking of life should die, and after dying should remain dead, must it not very certainly follow that all things would finally be dead?* PLAT. Phaed. 72 C. Ὡς ἀπόλοιτο καὶ ἄλλος ὃ τις τοιαῦτά γε ῥέξοι, *may any other man also perish who shall do such things.* Od. i. 47. Τεθναίην, ὅτε μοι μῆκετι ταῦτα μέλοι, *may I die, when I (shall) no longer care for these!*

MIMN. Fr. i. 2. (Here ὅταν μηκέτι μέλλῃ might be used without change of meaning. See the second example under b.)

178. (b) On the other hand, the dependent verb is sometimes in the subjunctive or future indicative, on the ground that it follows a tense of future time, especially when the leading verb is an optative with ἄν used in its sense approaching that of the future indicative (235). *E.g.*

Ἦν οἶν μάθης μοι τοῦτον, οὐκ ἂν ἀποδοίην, *if then you should (shall) learn this for me, I would not pay, etc.* AR. Nub. 116. Ἦν σε ἀφ'έλωμαι, κάκιστ' ἀπολοίμην. Id. Ran. 586. Ἐγὼ δὲ ταύτην μὲν τὴν εἰρήνην, ἕως ἂν εἰς Ἀθηναίων λείπηται, οὐδέποτ' ἂν συμβουλεύσασμαι ποιήσασθαι τῇ πόλει, *I would never advise the city to make this peace, as long as a single Athenian shall be (should be or was) left.* DEM. xix. 14. (Here ἕως λείποιτο would be the common form.) Ὡςπερ ἂν ὑμῶν ἕκαστος αἰσχυνθείη τὴν τάξιν λιπεῖν ἢν ἂν ταχθῇ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, *as each one of you would be ashamed to leave the post at which he may be (might be) placed in war.* AESCHIN. iii. 7. (Here ἢν ταχθείη would be the more common expression.) Τῶν ἀτοπωτάτων ἂν εἴη, εἰ ταῦτα δυνηθεῖς μὴ πράξει, *it would be one of the strangest things if, when he gets the power, he fails (shall fail) to do this.* DEM. i. 26.

179. It will be understood that no assimilation to the optative can take place when the protasis is present or past, as a change to the optative here would involve a change of time. See 561.

180. II. (a) In final and object clauses with ἵνα, ὥς, ὅπως, ὅφρα, and μή, the subjunctive (or future indicative) is generally used after a potential optative with ἄν or after an optative in protasis referring to the future. *E.g.*

Ἦ ῥά κε νῦν ἄμ' ἡμῖν οἴκαδ' ἔποιο, ὅφρα ἔδῃ, κ.τ.λ. Od. xv. 431. So Od. vi. 57, xvi. 87; II. xxiv. 264. Δι' ὧτος ἂν παῦρα συμφέρειοι, ὥς ὀρούσῃ. SOPH. El. 1439. Τίς αὐτὸν ἂν καλέσειεν, ὥς ἔδῃ με; EUR. Bacch. 1258. Ὀκνοίην ἂν εἰς τὰ πλοῖα ἐμβαίνειν, μὴ καταδύσῃ φοβοίμην δ' ἂν τῷ ἡγεμόνι ἔπεσθαι, μὴ ἡμᾶς ἀγάγῃ ὅθεν οὐχ οἶόν τε ἔσται ἐξελθεῖν. XEN. An. i. 3, 17. Τίς οὐκ ἂν φεύγοι, ἵνα μὴδ' ἄκων αὐτῇ περιπέσῃ; DEM. xxv. 33. Οἶομαι ἂν ὑμᾶς μέγα ὀνῆσαι τὸ στρατεύμα, εἰ ἐπιμεληθείητε ὅπως ἀντὶ τῶν ἀπολωλότων ὥς τάχιστα στρατηγοὶ καὶ λοχαγοὶ ἀντικατασταθῶσιν. XEN. An. iii. 1, 38. Εἰ δὲ καὶ ὅπως εἰρήνῃ ἔσται φανεροὶ εἴητε ἐπιμελούμενοι. Id. Vect. v. 10 (see 180, b).

(b) The only examples of the optative here are one in Aristophanes, one in Plato, and six in Xenophon¹:—

Διὰ τοῦτ' εἰκότως βούλονται ἂν ἡμᾶς ἐξολωλέναι, ἵνα τὰς τελετὰς λάβοιεν. AR. Pac. 411. Οὐκ ἂν πω πάνν γε μέγα τι εἴη, εἰ βουκόλους . . . προσθεῖμεν, ἵνα οἱ γεωργοὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀροῦν ἔχουσιν

¹ See Weber, *Absichtssätze*, pp. 220, 221; 245-247. I have assumed that Weber's collection of examples is complete.

βούς. PLAT. Rep. 370 D. Πειρῶμην (ἀν) μὴ πρόσω ὑμῶν εἶναι, ἴνα, εἴ που καιρὸς εἴη, ἐπιφανείην. XEN. Cyr. ii. 4, 17. So Cyr. i. 6, 22; An. ii. 4, 3, iii. 1, 18 (with various readings in last two). Ἡ φυλακὴ γελοία τις ἂν φαίνοιτο, εἰ μὴ σύγε ἐπιμελοῖο ὅπως ἔξωθέν τι εἰσφέροιτο. XEN. Oecon. vii. 39. Εἰ δὲ καὶ ὅπως τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἱερὸν αὐτόνομον γένοιτο φανεροὶ εἴητε ἐπιμελούμενοι. XEN. Vect. v. 9; but in the next sentence, ὅπως εἰρήνη ἔσται (see 180, a).

181. (c) After an optative in a wish twelve examples of these clauses with the optative and ten with the subjunctive are cited from Homer and the lyric and tragic poets. These are

Τάχιστα μοι ἔνδον ἑταῖροι εἶεν, ἵν' ἐν κλισίῃ λαρὸν τετυκοίμεθα δόρπον. Od. xiv. 407. So xviii. 368, xx. 79. (Subjunctive in Il. xvi. 99, xxiv. 74; Od. iv. 735, xviii. 202.) So THEOG. 885, 1119; PIND. Py. v. 120 (?). (Subj. PIND. Nem. viii. 35.) Ἐλθοι ὅπως γένοιτο τῶνδ' ἐμοὶ λυτήριος. AESCH. Eum. 297. Γενοίμαν ἵν' ὑλᾶεν ἔπεστι πόντου πρόβλημ' ἀλίκλυστον, τὰς ἱερὰς ὅπως προσεῖποιμεν Ἀθήνας. SOPH. Aj. 1217; so Ph. 324 and Tr. 953. (Subj. SOPH. Tr. 1109.) Εἴ μοι γένοιτο φθόγγος ἐν βραχίοσι, ὥς πάνθ' ὁμαρτῇ τῶν ἔχουσιντο γυνάτων. EUR. Hec. 836; so Hipp. 732. (Subjunctives in EUR. Hel. 174, Suppl. 621, I.T. 439, Ion. 671.)

182. No case of either subjunctive or optative after an optative in a wish in prose is cited by Weber. Perhaps one may be found in DEM. xviii. 89, where Cod. Σ reads, ὧν διαμάρτοιεν, καὶ μετάσχοιεν ὧν ὑμεῖς οἱ τὰ βέλτιστα βουλόμενοι τοὺς θεοὺς αἰτεῖτε, μὴ μεταδοῖεν ὑμῖν ὧν αὐτοὶ προήρηνται, which can best be translated, *in which (hopes) may they be disappointed; and may they (rather) share the blessings for which you, who wish for the best, pray the Gods, lest they involve you in the evils which they have chosen for themselves.* Μή with the subjunctive in this sense occurs twice in Demosthenes, xix. 225, xxxviii. 26. The alternative, if we keep this reading, is to make μὴ μεταδοῖεν an independent wish, as if it were *μηδὲ μεταδοῖεν*, the usual reading.

183. In relative sentences expressing a purpose the future indicative is regularly retained after optatives and even after past tenses of the indicative (566). For exceptional cases of the optative in this construction see 573 and 574, with 134.

184. III. In indirect quotations and questions depending upon an optative which refers to the future, the indicative is the only form regularly used to represent an *indicative* of the direct discourse. *E.g.*

Οὐ γὰρ ἂν τοῦτο γ' εἴποις, ὥς ἔλαθεν. AESCHIN. ii. 151. Ἐκείνο λέγειν ἂν ἐπιχειρήσειε Λεπτίνης, ὥς αἱ λειτουργίαι εἰς πένθητας ἀνθρώπους ἔρχονται (187). DEM. xx. 18; so xvi. 4. Εἰ ἀποδεχθεῖν τίνα χρὴ ἡγείσθαι τοῦ λαοῦ. XEN. An. iii. 2, 36.

185. But in DEM. xvi. 5 we find the optative in an indirect quotation: οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο γ' ἂν εἴποιμεν, ὥς ἀνταλλάξασθαι βουλοίμεθ' ἀντιπάλους Λακεδαιμονίους ἀντὶ Θηβαίων. There are no other

readings, and we must call it an exceptional case of assimilation (*we could not say this, that we wished*, etc.) unless we emend it either by reading *βουλόμεθα* (as proposed by Madvig, *Bemerk.* p. 21) or by inserting *ἄν*. In *PLAT. Rep.* 515 D, we find in the best Mss. *τί ἂν οἷε αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν, εἴ τις αὐτῷ λέγοι ὅτι τότε μὲν ἑώρα φλυαρίας, νῦν δὲ ὀρθότερα βλέποι*; *what do you think he would say, if any one should tell him that all that time he had been seeing foolish phantoms, but that now he saw more correctly?* (Some Mss. read *βλέπει*.)

In *II. v.* 85, *Τυδείδην οὐκ ἂν γνοίης ποτέροισι μετεΐη*, the optative represents *μέτεστιν* in the direct question; but *οὐκ ἂν γνοίης* here refers to the past, meaning *you would not have known* (442).

186. IV. In indirect questions depending on an optative, the optative may represent an interrogative subjunctive (287) of the direct question. *E.g.*

Οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ἐξελθὼν ὃ τι χρῶο σαυτῷ, *if you should withdraw, you would not know what to do with yourself.* *PLAT. Crit.* 45 B. *Οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ὃ τι χρήσαιο σαυτῷ, ἀλλ' ἰλιγγιῶς ἂν καὶ χασμῷ οὐκ ἔχων ὃ τι εἴποις.* *Id. Gorg.* 486 B. The direct questions here were *τί χρῶμαι*;—*τί χρήσμαι*;—*τί εἶπω*; The subjunctive can always be retained in this construction, even after past tenses (677).

INFINITIVE AND PARTICIPLE.

187. The present, perfect, and future of the infinitive and participle, and the aorist infinitive when it is not in indirect discourse, regularly denote time which is relative to that of the leading verb. They therefore merely *transmit* the force of that verb, as primary or secondary, to the dependent clauses. *E.g.*

Βούλεται λέγειν τί τοῦτό ἐστιν, *he wishes to tell what this is.* *Ἐβούλετο λέγειν τί τοῦτο εἶη*, *he wished to tell what this was.* *Φηρὶν ἀκηκοῖναι τί ἐστιν*, *he says he has heard what it is.* *Ἐφη ἀκηκοῖναι τί εἶη*, *he said he had heard what it was.* *Φησὶ ποιήσειν ὃ τι ἂν βούλῃσθε*, *he says he will do whatever you may wish.* *Ἐφη ποιήσειν ὃ τι βούλοισθε*, *he said he would do whatever you might wish.*

Μένουσιν βουλόμενοι εἰδέναι τί ἐστι. *Ἐμμενον βουλόμενοι εἰδέναι τί εἶη.* *Μένουσιν ἀκηκοότες τί ἐστιν.* *Ἐμμενον ἀκηκοότες τί εἶη*, *they waited, having heard what it was (τί ἐστίν);.* *Μένουσιν ἀκουσόμενοι τί ἐστιν.* *Ἐμμενον ἀκουσόμενοι τί εἶη.*

Βούλεται γνῶναι τί τοῦτό ἐστιν, *he wishes to learn what this is.* *Ἐβούλετο γνῶναι τί τοῦτο εἶη*, *he wished to learn what this was.*

Οὐδενὶ ὥποτε τοῦτων δεδώκατε τὴν δωρεὰν ταύτην οὐδ' ἂν δοίητε, ἐξοῦναι τοὺς ἰδίους ἔχθροὺς ὑβρίζειν αὐτῶν ἐκάστω, ὅπότ' ἂν βούληται καὶ ὃν ἂν δύνηται τρόπον. *DEM. xxi.* 170. *Οὐθ' ὑμῖν οὔτε Θηβαίοις οὔτε Λακεδαιμονίοις οὐδεπώποτε συνεχώρηθη τοῦθ' ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ποιεῖν ὃ τι βούλοισθε*, *never was this granted you, etc., to do whatever you pleased.* *Id. ix.* 23. Here *ποιεῖν* denotes a habit,

and is followed by the optative (532); if the leading verb were συγχωρεῖται, we should have ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν βούλησθε. Compare the two subjunctives in the preceding example.

188. The present infinitive and participle representing the imperfect (without ἄν), and the perfect representing the pluperfect, are secondary tenses in themselves, without regard to the leading verb. *E.g.*

Πῶς γὰρ οἴεσθε δυσχερῶς ἀκούειν, εἴ τίς τι λέγοι; *how unwillingly do you think they heard it, when any one said anything?* DEM. vi. 20. So PLAT. Rep. 430 A. See these and other examples under 119.

For the perfect see XEN. Cyr. i. 4, 27, and THUC. v. 49, under 123.

189. The aorist infinitive in indirect discourse is a past tense in itself, and is therefore secondary. *E.g.*

Φησὶ γινῶναι τί τοῦτο εἶη, *he says that he learned what this was.*
 *Εφη γινῶναι τί τοῦτο εἶη, *he said that he had learned what this was.*

Φησὶ γὰρ ὁμολογήσαι με τοῦ κλήρου τῷ παιδί τὸ ἡμικλήριον μεταδώσειν εἰ νικήσαιμι τοὺς ἔχοντας αὐτόν (*he says I promised, μεταδώσω ἂν νικήσω*). ISAE. xi. 24. Θαλήν θράττά τις θεραπαινὶς ἀποσκῶψαι λέγεται, ὡς τὰ μὲν ἐν οὐρανῷ προθυμοῖτο εἰδέναι, τὰ δ' ἐμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ λαμβάνει αὐτόν. PLAT. Theaet. 174 A. Ἄρά σοι δοκῶ οὐ μαντικῶς ἂν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον εἰπεῖν, ὅτι Ἀγάθων θαυμαστῶς ἔροι ἐγὼ δ' ἀπορήσοιμι; Id. Symp. 198 A. In all these cases the optative depends on the aorist infinitive as a past tense.

190. The aorist participle properly refers to time past relatively to the leading verb. It is therefore secondary when the leading verb is past or present, so that the participle refers to time absolutely past; but it may be primary when the leading verb is future, if the participle refers to time absolutely future. *E.g.*

Ἵστε ἡμᾶς ἐλθόντας ἵνα τοῦτο ἴδοιμεν, *you know that we came that we might see this.*

Ψήφων δὲ δείσας μὴ δεηθείη ποτὲ
 ἵν' ἔχοι δικάζειν, αἰγυαλὸν ἔνδον τρέφει,

and once he took fright lest he might sometime lack pebbles (for votes) to enable him to be a judge, and so he keeps a beach on the premises. AR. Vesp. 109. Πρὸς ὀργὴν ἐκφέρει, μεθεῖσά μοι λέγειν ὃ χρῆξοιμι, *you rush into a passion, after you gave me leave to say what I wished (i.e. ἂν χρῆξῃς).* SOPH. El. 628.

Ὑπειπὼν τὰλλα ὅτι αὐτὸς τάκει πράξοι, ᾤχετο. THUC. i. 90. Τῇ μάστιγι τυπτόσθω πληγὰς ὑπὸ κήρυκος ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ, κηρύξαντος δὲ ἔνεκα μέλλει τύπτεσθαι, *i.e. let the crier flog him, after proclaiming (having proclaimed) for what he is to be flogged.* PLAT. Leg. 917 E.

191. The tenses of the infinitive and participle with ἄν are followed, in dependent clauses, by those constructions that would follow the finite moods which they represent, if these stood in the same position. See Chapter III.

CHAPTER III.

THE PARTICLE "AN.

192. The adverb *ἄν* (with the epic *κέ*, Doric *κά*) has two uses, which must be distinguished.

1. In one use, it denotes that the action of the verb to which it is joined is dependent upon some condition, expressed or implied. This is its force with the secondary tenses of the indicative, and with the optative, infinitive, and participle: with these it belongs strictly to the verb, to which it gives a potential force, like our *would*.

2. In its other use, it is joined regularly to *εἰ*, *if*, to relative and temporal words, and sometimes to the final particles *ὥς*, *ὅπως*, and *ὅφρα*, when any of these are followed by the subjunctive. Here, although as an adverb it qualifies the verb, it is so closely connected with the relative or particle, that it often coalesces with it, forming *εἰάν*, *ἤν*, *ἄν*, *όταν*, *όπόταν*, *εἰπιδάν*, *εἰάν* or *εἰήν* (Ionic *εἰεάν*).

These statements include only the constructions which are in good use in Attic Greek. For the epic use of *κέ* or *ἄν* with the subjunctive in a potential sense (as with the optative) see 201, 1; for *κέ* or *ἄν* with the future indicative see 196.

193. There is no word or expression in English which can be used separately to translate *ἄν*. In its first use (192, 1) we express it by the form of the verb which we use; as *ἔλθοι ἄν*, *he would go*; *ἦλθεν ἄν*, *he would have gone*. In its second use, with the subjunctive, it generally has no force that can be made perceptible in translation.

The peculiar use of *ἄν* can be understood only by a study of the various constructions in which it occurs. These are enumerated below, with references (when it is necessary) to the more full explanation of each in Chapter IV.

194. No theory of the origin of either *ἄν* or *κέ* has yet helped to explain their meaning, however valuable the discussion of the question may have been to comparative philology. It seems to be clear that *κέ* is the older particle; it occurs 621 times in Homer while *ἄν* occurs 155 times; in Pindar the two are nearly balanced; *ἄν* has a preference for negative sentences, being very often attached to the negative; *ἄν* is more emphatic, as appears indeed from its fixed accent, while *κέ* is enclitic; *κέ* is much more frequent than *ἄν* in relative clauses in Homer.¹ But, practically, it is still safe to assume that the two particles are used in substantially the same sense in all epic and lyric poetry. In Herodotus and Attic Greek only *ἄν* is used.

INDICATIVE WITH *ἄν*.

195. The present and perfect indicative are never used with *ἄν*.

This seems to occur chiefly when Plato and Aristotle use *κἂν εἰ* (= καὶ ἄν, εἰ) like καὶ εἰ, without regard to the mood of the verb which is to follow, to which *κἂν* really belongs. See PLAT. Men. 72 C, *κἂν εἰ πολλαί εἰσιν, ἐν γέ τι εἶδος ταῦτ' ὅν πάσαι ἔχουσιν*, i.e., *even if they are many, still (it would seem to follow that) they all have one and the same form*. So Rep. 579 D, Soph. 247 E. So ARISTOT. Pol. iii. 6, 1, *κἂν εἰ πλείους*, with *σκεπτόν ἐστίν*.

Examples of a different class (without *κἂν εἰ*) have now almost disappeared from our texts. One of the last relics, PLAT. Leg. 712 E, *ἐγὼ δὲ οὕτω ἵν' ἐξαίφνης ἂν ἐρωτηθεὶς ὄντως ὅπερ εἶπον, οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν*, is now simply emended by reading *ἀνερωτηθείς*.

196. The future indicative is often used with *κέ* or *ἄν* by the early poets, especially Homer. The addition of *ἄν* seems to make the future more contingent than that tense naturally is, sometimes giving it a force approaching that of the optative with *ἄν*. *E.g.*

*Ἄλλ' ἔθ', ἐγὼ δὲ κέ τοι Χαρίτων μίαν ὀπλοτεράων δώσω, ὅπνι-
εμεναι καὶ σὴν κεκληῆθαι ἄκοιτιν*, *I will give you one of the younger Graces,*
etc. Il. xiv. 267. *Καὶ κέ τις ᾧδ' ἔρξει Τρώων ὑπερμηγορέοντων*, *and*
some one will (or may) thus speak. Il. iv. 176. *Ὁ δέ κεν κεχολώ-
σεται ὃν κεν ἴκωμαι*, *and he may be angry to whom I come*. Il. i. 139.
Εἰ δ' ἄγε, τοὺς ἂν ἐγὼν ἐπιόψομαι· οἱ δὲ πιθέσθων. Il. ix. 167.
Παρ' ἔμοι γε καὶ ἄλλοι, οἳ κέ με τιμήσουσι, *others, who will honour*

¹ See Munro, *Homeric Grammar*, pp. 265-267. For Pindar, see Gildersleeve in *Am. Jour. Phil.* iii. pp. 446-456, where may be found a complete enumeration of the passages in Pindar containing either *ἄν* (30 cases) or *κέ* (33 cases).

me. II. i. 174. Εἰ δ' Ὀδυσσεὺς ἔλθοι καὶ ἵκοιτ' ἐς πατρίδα γαίαν, αἰψά κε σὺν ᾧ παιδὶ βίας ἀποτίσεται ἀνδρῶν. Od. xvii. 539. Here ἀποτίσεται κε, which may be aorist subjunctive (201, 1), is used nearly in the sense of the optative, corresponding to the optatives in the protasis.

Κέ is much more common with the future than ἄν.

197. The use of ἄν with the future indicative in Attic Greek is absolutely denied by many critics, and the more careful revision of the texts has greatly diminished the number of examples cited in support of it. Still, in several passages, even of the best prose, we must either emend the text against the Mss., or admit the construction as a rare exception. *E.g.*

Αἰγυπτίους δὲ οὐχ ὁρῶ ποία δυνάμει συμμαχῶ χρησάμενοι μάλλον ἂν κολάσεσθε τῆς νῦν σὺν ἐμοὶ οὐσης. XEN. AN. ii. 5, 13. "Ἐφη σὺν τὸν ἐρωτώμενον εἰπεῖν, οὐχ ἦκει, φάναι, οὐδ' ἂν ἦξει δεῦρο, *he said that the one who was asked replied, "He hasn't come, and he won't come this way."* PLAT. REP. 615 D. (The only other reading is ἦξει. The colloquial style here makes ἂν less objectionable; see SOPH. ANT. 390, quoted in 208.) "Ἐφη λέγων πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὥς, εἰ διαφευξοίμην, ἦδη ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ νικεῖς πάντες παντάσῃ διαφθαρήσονται. Id. AP. 29 C. Κἂν ἔτ' ἐτι φόβιον ὀψομαι αἶμα (so the Mss.). EUR. EL. 484.

See 208 and 216, on the future infinitive and participle with ἄν.

198. The most common use of ἄν with the indicative is with the secondary tenses, generally the imperfect and aorist, in the apodosis of an unfulfilled condition (410) or in a potential sense (243).

199. The imperfect and aorist indicative are sometimes used with ἄν in an iterative sense (162), which construction must not be confounded with that just mentioned (198).

SUBJUNCTIVE AND OPTATIVE WITH ἌΝ.

200. In Attic Greek ἄν is regularly used with the subjunctive in protasis and in conditional relative sentences, and sometimes in final clauses with ὥς and ὅπως, being always closely joined with the particle or the relative; but never in independent sentences. See 325, 381, and 522.

201. 1. In epic poetry, when the independent subjunctive has nearly the sense of the future indicative (284), it sometimes takes κέ or ἄν. This forms a future potential expression, nearly equivalent to the future indicative with κέ or ἄν, and sometimes approaching the optative with κέ or ἄν. *E.g.*

Εἰ δέ κε μὴ δώρῃσιν, ἐγὼ δέ κεν αὐτὸς ἔλωμαι, *and if he does not give her up, I will take her myself.* II. i. 324; see also i. 137.

See 285 and 452. For the variety of nearly equivalent future potential forms which the Homeric language presents, reduced to one in Attic Greek, see 235.

2. The epic language has *κέ* or *ἄν* with the subjunctive in the constructions of 192, 2; but its use of *κέ* or *ἄν* in conditions is less strict, and that with final particles is more free, than the Attic use of *ἄν*.

See 325-328; 450-454; 468-471; 538-541.

202. The optative with *ἄν* forms the apodosis of the less vivid future condition (like the English form with *would* or *should*), or has a potential sense. *E.g.*

Εἰ τοῦτο ποιήσειεν, ἄθλιος ἂν εἴη, *if he should do this, he would be wretched.* Ἡδέως ἂν ἐροίμην αὐτόν, *I should like to ask him.* (See 233 and 455.)

For construction of *ἄν* or *κέ* with *εἰ* or the final particles and the optative, see 460; and 329, 330, 349, 350, 351.

203. As the future optative came into common use after the future indicative with *ἄν* (196) was nearly extinct, it was never used with *ἄν*.

INFINITIVE WITH ἄν.

204. The infinitive can be used with *ἄν* in all cases in which a finite verb would have *ἄν* if it stood in its place.

This is found chiefly in indirect discourse, in which each tense of the infinitive with *ἄν* represents the *corresponding tenses* of the indicative or optative with *ἄν* in the direct form. The context must decide whether the indicative or optative is represented in each case.

205. (*Present.*) The present infinitive, which represents also the imperfect (119), when used with *ἄν*, may be equivalent either to the imperfect indicative with *ἄν* or to the present optative with *ἄν*. It can represent no other form, as no other form of these tenses has *ἄν* joined with the verb in a finite mood. *E.g.*

Φησὶν αὐτοὺς ἐλευθέρους ἂν εἶναι, εἰ τοῦτο ἔπραξαν, *he says that they would (now) be free, if they had done this* (εἶναι ἂν representing ἦσαν ἄν). Φησὶν αὐτοὺς ἐλευθέρους ἂν εἶναι, εἰ τοῦτο πράξειαν, *he says that they would (hereafter) be free, if they should do this* (εἶναι ἂν representing εἴησαν ἄν). Οἴεσθε γὰρ τὸν πατέρα οὐκ ἂν φυλάττειν καὶ τὴν τιμὴν λαμβάνειν τῶν ξύλων; *do you think he would not have taken care and have received the pay for the timber?* DEM. xlix. 35. (Here the direct discourse would be ἐφύλαττεν ἂν καὶ ἐλάμβανεν.)

Μαρτυρίῳ ἐχρῶντο, μὴ ἂν τοὺς γε ἰσοψήφους ἄκοντας, εἰ μὴ τι ἡδίκουν οἷς ἐπῆσαν, ξυστρατεύειν, *they used us as an argument, that people who had an equal vote with themselves (like us) would not be serving with them against their will, unless those whom they attacked were guilty of some wrong.* THUC. iii. 11. Οἶμαι γὰρ ἂν οὐκ ἀχαρίστως μοι ἔχειν, *for I think it would not be a thankless labour (οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι).* XEN. AN. ii. 3, 18.

206. (*Perfect.*) The perfect infinitive, which represents also the pluperfect (123), when used with *ἄν*, may be equivalent either to the pluperfect indicative with *ἄν* or to the perfect optative with *ἄν*. *E.g.*

Εἰ μὴ τὰς ἀρετὰς ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐκείνας οἱ Μαραθῶνι καὶ Σαλαμῖνι παρέσχοντο, . . . πάντα ταῦθ' ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων ἂν ἐαλωκέναι (sc. φήσειεν ἂν τις), *if those at Marathon and Salamis had not exhibited those deeds of valour in their behalf, any one would say that all these would have been captured by the barbarians.* DEM. xix. 312. (Here ἐαλωκέναι ἂν represents ἐαλώκεσαν ἄν.) Ἄλλ' οὐκ ἂν ἡγοῦμαι αὐτοὺς δίκην ἀξίαν δεδωκέναι, εἰ ἀκροασάμενοι αὐτῶν καταψηφίσαισθε, *but I do not believe they would (then) have suffered sufficient punishment, if you after hearing them should condemn them.* LYS. xxvii. 9. (Here the protasis in the optative shows that δεδωκέναι ἂν represents δεδωκότες ἂν εἶεν (103); but if the protasis were εἰ κατεψηφίσασθε, *if you had condemned them, δεδωκέναι ἂν would represent ἐδεδώκεσαν ἄν, they would have suffered.*) See also, in xxvii. 8, οὐκ ἂν ἀπολωλέναι, ἀλλὰ δίκην δεδωκέναι, representing perfect optatives with *ἄν*. Ἀνδραποδώδεις ἂν δικαίως κεκλήσθαι (ἡγήετο). XEN. MEM. i. 1, 16. (Here κεκλήσθαι ἂν represents κεκλημένοι ἂν εἶεν.)

These constructions are of course rare, as are the forms of the finite moods here represented.

207. (*Aorist.*) The aorist infinitive with *ἄν* may be equivalent either to the aorist indicative with *ἄν* or to the aorist optative with *ἄν*. *E.g.*

Οὐκ ἂν ἡγήεσθ' αὐτὸν καὶ ἐπιδραμεῖν; *do you not believe that (if this had been so) he would even have run thither?* i.e. οὐκ ἂν ἐπέδραμεν; DEM. xxvii. 56. Ἄνευ δὲ σεισμοῦ οὐκ ἂν μοι δοκεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτο ξυμβῆναι γενέσθαι (οὐκ ἂν ξυμβῆναι representing οὐκ ἂν ξυνέβη), *but unless there had been an earthquake, it does not seem to me that such a thing could by any chance have happened.* THUC. iii. 89. Τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡλπίζεν ἴσως ἂν ἐπεξέλθειν καὶ τὴν γῆν οὐκ ἂν περιιδεῖν τμηθῆναι (i.e. ἴσως ἂν ἐπεξέλθοιεν καὶ οὐκ ἂν περιίδοιεν). ID. ii. 20. Οὐδ' ἂν κρατῆσαι αὐτοὺς τῆς γῆς ἡγοῦμαι (i.e. κρατήσειαν ἄν). ID. vi. 37.

208. (*Future.*) The future infinitive with *ἄν* can be equivalent only to the Homeric construction of the future indicative with *ἄν*. But as *ἄν* is not found in Homer with the future infinitive, this construction rests chiefly on the authority of passages in Attic writers, and is subject to the same doubts and suspicions

as the future indicative with *ἄν* in those writers. (See 197.) Unless we exterminate the latter, there can be no objection to this as its representative. In the following passages it is still retained on the best MS. authority.

Νομίζοντες, εἰ ταύτην πρώτην λάβοιεν, ῥαδίως ἄν σφίσι τὰλλα προσχωρήσειν. THUC. ii. 80. (Here the direct discourse would regularly have had either the future indicative without *ἄν*, or the aorist optative with *ἄν*.) The same may be said of THUC. v. 82, νομίζων μέγιστον ἄν σφᾶς ὠφελήσειν (where one MS. reads by correction ὠφελήσαι). See also THUC. vi. 66; viii. 25 and 71; and PLAT. Crit. 53 D; Crat. 391 A. Σχολῇ ποθ' ἤξειν δεῦρ' ἄν ἐξήνχουν ἐγώ, *I declared that I should be very slow to come hither again*. SOPH. Ant. 390. (Here the colloquial style may account for ἤξειν ἄν, as for ἤξει ἄν in PLAT. Rep. 615 D, unless we take ἄν with ἐξήνχουν. See 197.) In PIND. Ol. i. 108, we have εἰ δὲ μὴ ταχὺ λίποι, ἔτι γλυκύτεραν κεν ἄλπομαι σὺν ἄρματι θοῶ κλειῖξειν.

As the future optative is never used with *ἄν* (203), this can never be represented by the future infinitive with *ἄν*.

209. The infinitive with *ἄν* is rare in the early poets, occurring but once in Homer, Il. ix. 684 (quoted under 683), and three times in Pindar, Pyth. vii. 20 (present), Pyth. iii. 110 (aorist), and Ol. i. 108 (future, quoted in 208).

210. The infinitive with *ἄν* sometimes represents an iterative imperfect or aorist indicative with *ἄν* (162). This must be carefully distinguished from the potential use. *E.g.*

Ἀκούω Λακεδαιμονίους τότε ἐμβαλόντας ἄν καὶ κακώσαντας τὴν χώραν ἀναχωρεῖν ἐπ' οἶκον πάλιν, *I hear that the Lacedaemonians at that time, after invading and ravaging the country, used to return home again*. DEM. ix. 48. (Here ἀναχωρεῖν ἄν represents ἀνεχώρουν ἄν in its iterative sense, *they used to return*.) Φασὶ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐρεπτόμενον τὰ τῶν ἐχόντων ἀνέρων οὐκ ἄν ἐξελθεῖν ἀπὸ τῆς σιπύης· τοὺς δ' ἀντιβόλεῖν ἄν ὁμοίως, *they say that, when he was feeding on men of wealth, he never would get away from the meal-tub; and they all alike used to implore him* (οὐκ ἄν ἐξῆλθεν, οἱ δὲ ἡντιβόλουν ἄν). AR. Eq. 1295.

211. The infinitive with *ἄν*, in the cases already mentioned, stands in indirect discourse after a verb of *saying* or *thinking*. Sometimes, however, it is found in other constructions, where the present or aorist infinitive (without *ἄν*) would be expected. In such cases there is an approach to the usage of indirect discourse, so far at least that the infinitive with *ἄν* has the force of the corresponding tense of the indicative or optative. *E.g.*

Τὰ δὲ ἐντὸς οὕτως ἐκαίετο, ὥστε ἡδιστα ἄν ἐς ὕδωρ ψυχρὸν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ῥίπτειν, *so that they would most gladly have thrown themselves into cold water* (ῥίπτειν ἄν here being equivalent to ἐρριπτον ἄν). THUC. ii. 49. Μιᾶς τρέφει πρὸς νυκτός, ὥστε μήτ' ἐμὲ μήτ' ἄλλον,

δοσῆς φῶς ὁρᾷ, βλάψαι ποτ' ἄν, so that you could harm (βλάβειας ἄν) neither me nor any other who beholds the light. SOPH. O.T. 374. So Tr. 669. Ἐφθασαν παρελθόντες τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων οἰκοδομίαν, ὥστε μηκέτι μήτε αὐτοὶ κωλύεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ἐκείνους τε καὶ παντάπασιν ἀπεστερηκέναι, εἰ καὶ κρατοῖεν, μὴ ἄν ἐτι σφᾶς ἀποτειχίσαι, so as to be no longer themselves obstructed by them, and so as to have deprived them absolutely of the power of ever again walling them in, even if they should be victorious. THUC. vii. 6. Ὑσόμεν τὴν νύκτα πᾶσαν· ὥστ' ἴσως βουλήσεται κἄν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ τυχεῖν ὧν μᾶλλον ἢ κρίναι κακῶς, we will vain all night long, so that perhaps he will wish to have the luck to be (that he might by chance find himself) in Egypt rather than to judge unfairly. AR. Nub. 1130. (Here τυχεῖν ἄν follows βούλομαι like the future infinitive in THUC. vi. 57: see 113.) We have ἐλπίζω followed by the infinitive and ἄν in THUC. vii. 61, τὸ τῆς τύχης κἄν μεθ' ἡμῶν ἐλπίσαντες στήναι, hoping that fortune may take sides with us (σταίῃ ἄν). See also SOPH. EL. 1482, ἀλλά μοι πάρες κἄν σμικρὸν εἰπεῖν, but permit me at least to say a little (that I might say even a little, εἴποιμι ἄν).

See the corresponding use of the future infinitive in similar expressions, where there is the same approach to indirect discourse (113).

212. Even the infinitive with the article occasionally takes ἄν, as in ANT. v. 8, τοῦτο ὑμᾶς διδάξω, οὐ τῷ φεύγειν ἄν τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον, this I will teach you, not because I would avoid your people. In SOPH. ANT. 236, τῆς ἐλπίδος τὸ μὴ παθεῖν ἄν ἄλλο, the hope that I could not suffer anything else, the construction is practically that of indirect discourse (794).

PARTICIPLE WITH ἄν.

213. When the participle is used with ἄν, each tense represents the corresponding tenses of the indicative or optative with ἄν.

The participle with ἄν is not, like the infinitive with ἄν, found chiefly in indirect discourse; but ἄν is more frequently added to an *attributive* or a *circumstantial* participle (822) to give it a potential force equivalent to that of the indicative or optative with ἄν. The participle with ἄν is not found in Homer or Pindar.

214. (*Present*.) The present participle (like the present infinitive) with ἄν represents the imperfect indicative or the present optative with ἄν. *E.g.*

Οἶδα αὐτοὺς ἐλευθέρους ἄν ὄντας, εἰ τοῦτο ἔπραξαν, I know they would (now) be free, if they had done this. Οἶδα αὐτοὺς ἐλευθέρους ἄν ὄντας, εἰ τοῦτο πράξειαν, I know they would (hereafter) be free, if they should do this. (In the former ὄντας ἄν represents ἦσαν ἄν, in the latter εἴησαν ἄν.) Τῶν λαμβανόντων δίκην ὄντες ἄν δικαίως (i.e. ἦμεν ἄν), whereas we should justly be among those who inflict punishment.

DEM. lvii. 3. "Ὅπερ ἔσχε μὴ κατὰ πόλεις αὐτὸν ἐπιπλέοντα τὴν Πελοπόννησον πορθεῖν, ἀδυνάτων ἂν ὄντων (ὑμῶν) ἐπιβοηθεῖν, *when you would have been unable to bring aid (ἀδύνατοι ἂν ἦτε)*. THUC. i. 73. Πόλλ' ἂν ἔχων ἕτερό' εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτῆς παραλείπω, *although I might be able to say many other things about it, I omit them*. DEM. xviii. 258. 'Απὸ παντὸς ἂν φέρων λόγον δικαίου μηχανήμα ποικίλον (*i.e.* ὃς ἂν φέροις), *thou who wouldst derive, etc.* SOPH. O. C. 761.

215. (Aorist.) The aorist participle with *ἄν* represents the aorist indicative or the aorist optative with *ἄν*. *E.g.*

Οὔτε ὄντα οὔτε ἂν γενόμενα λογοποιοῦσιν, *they relate things which are not real, and which never could happen (i.e. οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο)*. THUC. vi. 38. 'Ἐφ' ἡμῶν οὐ γεγονὸς οὐδ' οἶδα εἰ γενόμενον ἂν, (*a thing which has not occurred in our day, and I doubt whether it ever could occur (γένοιτο ἂν)*). PLAT. REP. 414 C. 'Αλλὰ ῥαδίως ἂν ἀφ' εθεῖς, εἰ καὶ μετρίως τι τούτων ἐποίησε, προείλετο ἀποθανεῖν, *whereas he might easily have been acquitted, etc.* XEN. MEM. iv. 4, 4. Καὶ εἰ ἀπήχθησθε ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς, εἰ ὅσμεν μὴ ἂν ἦσσαν ὑμᾶς λυπηροὺς γενομένους τοῖς ξυμμάχοις, καὶ ἀναγκασθέντας ἂν ἢ ἄρχειν, κ.τ.λ. (*i.e. οὐκ ἂν ἐγένεσθε, καὶ ἠναγκάσθητε ἂν*), *if you had become odious as we have, we are sure that you would have been no less oppressive to your allies, and that you would have been forced, etc.* THUC. i. 76. 'Ορῶν τὸ παρατεῖχσμα ἀπλοῦν ὃν καὶ, εἰ ἐπικρατήσείη τις τῆς ἀναβάσεως, ῥαδίως ἂν αὐτὸ ληφθῇν (*i.e. ῥαδίως ἂν ληφθείη*), *seeing that it would easily be taken, etc.* ID. vii. 42. So ὡς τάχ' ἂν συμβάντων, DEM. xxiii. 58 (see 918).

216. (Future.) A few cases of the future participle with *ἄν*, representing the future indicative with *ἄν*, are found in Attic writers. These rest on the same authority as those of the future indicative and the future infinitive with *ἄν* (197 and 208). *E.g.*

'Αφίετε ἢ μὴ ἀφίετε, ὡς ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποιήσοντος ἄλλα, οὐδ' εἰ μέλλω πολλάκις τεθνάναι (*i.e. οὐκ ἂν ποιήσω ἄλλα*): so all MSS. PLAT. AP. 30 B. Τοὺς ὁτιοῦν ἂν ἐκείνῳ ποιήσοντας ἀνηρηκότες ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἔσσεσθε. DEM. xix. 342. (Here most MSS., including Σ, have ποιήσοντας, but A has ποιήσαντας.) Πάλοι τις ἡδέως ἂν ὥσως ἔρωτήσων κάθηται, *many a one has long been sitting here who perhaps would be very glad to ask (so all MSS.)*. DEM. ix. 70.

217. The participle with *ἄν* can never represent a protasis, because there is no form of protasis which could be represented by a participle, where *ἄν* is separable from the conditional particle. (See 224.)

POSITION OF "Αν.

218. 1. When *ἄν* is used with the subjunctive, if it does not coalesce with the relative or particle into one word (as in *ἐάν*, *στάν*, etc.), it is generally separated from it only by such monosyllables as *μέν*, *δέ*, *τέ*, *γάρ*, *καί*, *νύ*, *πέρ*, etc., rarely *τις*.

See examples under 444 and 529.

2. In Homer and Hesiod two such words may precede *κέ*; as *εἴ περ γάρ κεν*, *εἰ γάρ νύ κε*, *εἰ γάρ τίς κε*, *ὅς μὲν γάρ κε*. This is rare with *ἄν* in prose; see DEM. iv. 45, *ὅποι μὲν γάρ ἄν*. Exceptional are *ὅποι τις ἄν*, *οἷμαι, προσθή*, DEM. ii. 14; *ὅ τι ἄλλο ἄν δοκῇ ὑμῖν*, XEN. Cyr. iv. 5, 52. The strange *καθ' ὃν μηνύη ἄν τις*, ANT. v. 38, is now corrected to *ἄν μηνύη*, but still stranger is *ὅποσον ἡ φάρνυξ ἄν ἡμῶν χανδάνη* (?) AR. Ran. 259.

219. When *ἄν* is used with the optative or indicative, it may either stand near the verb, or be attached to some other emphatic word. Particularly, it is very often placed directly after interrogatives, negatives, adverbs of *time, place*, etc., and other words which especially affect the sense of the sentence. *E.g.*

Ἄλλὰ τίς δὴ θεῶν θεραπεία εἴη ἄν ἡ ὁσιότης; PLAT. Euthyph. 13 D. *Ἄλλ' ὁμῶς τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ῥαδίως ἄν εἴποις*. Id. 14 A. *Οὐκ ἂν δὴ τόνδ' ἄνδρα μάχης ἐρύσαιο μετελθὼν, Τυδείδην, ὅς νῦν γε ἄν καὶ Διὶ πατρὶ μάχοιτο*; IL v. 456. *Πῶς ἄν τὸν αἰμυλώτατον, ἐχθρὸν ἄλλημα, τοὺς τε δισσάρχας ὀλέσσαις βασιλῆς, τέλος θάνοιμι καὶ τὸς*. SOPH. Aj. 389. *Πολλὰ καὶ ἄκων ἔδρων*. Id. O. T. 591. *Τάχιστ' ἄν τε πόλιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἐτέρους πείσαντες ἀπολέσειαν*. THUC. ii. 63.

220. 1. By a peculiar usage, *ἄν* is often separated from its verb by such verbs as *οἶμαι*, *δοκῶ*, *φημί*, *οἶδα*, etc. In such cases care must be taken to connect the *ἄν* with the verb to which it really belongs. *E.g.*

Καὶ νῦν ἡδέως ἄν μοι δοκῶ κοινωνῆσαι, and now I think I should gladly take part (*ἄν* belonging to *κοινωνῆσαι*). XEN. Cyr. viii. 7, 25. So AESCHIN. iii. 2 (end). *Οὐδ' ἄν ὑμεῖς οἴδ' ὅτι ἐπαύσασθε πολεμοῦντες*, nor would you (I am sure) have ceased fighting. DEM. vi. 29. *Πότερα γὰρ ἄν οἴεσθε ῥᾶον εἶναι*; DEM. xlix. 45. *Ἐκλέξαντα ἃ μῆτε προῆδει μηδεὶς μῆτ' ἄν ψήθη τήμερον ῥηθῆναι*, selecting what nobody knew beforehand and nobody thought would be mentioned to-day. DEM. xviii. 225. (Here *ῥηθῆναι ἄν* = *ῥηθείη ἄν*. If *ἄν* were taken with *ψήθη*, the meaning would be, *what nobody would have thought had been mentioned*.) *Τί οὖν ἄν, ἔφην, εἴη ὁ Ἔρως*; PLAT. Symp. 202 D.

2. Especially irregular are such expressions as *οὐκ οἶδα ἄν εἰ*, or *οὐκ ἄν οἶδα εἰ*, followed by an optative or indicative to which the *ἄν* belongs. *E.g.*

Οὐκ οἶδ' ἄν εἰ πείσαιμι, I do not know whether I could persuade him. EUR. Med. 941. (The more regular form would be *οὐκ οἶδα εἰ πείσαιμι ἄν*.) So ALC. 48. *Οὐκ ἄν οἶδ' εἰ δυναίμην*. PLAT. Tim. 26 B. *Οὐκ οἶδ' ἄν εἰ ἐκτισάμην παιδα τοιοῦτον*. XEN. Cyr. v. 4, 12. So *οὐκ ἄν οἶδ' ὅ τι ἄλλο εἴχον ψηφίσασθαι*, I do not know what other vote I could have given (*τί ἄλλο εἴχον ἄν ψηφίσασθαι*); DEM. xlv. 7.

221. (*Τάχ' ἄν*.) Among the words to which *ἄν* is very frequently joined is *τάχα*, perhaps (i.e. *quickly, soon*), the two forming *τάχ' ἄν*, which expression is sometimes supposed to

mean *perhaps*. But τάχ' ἄν cannot be used unless the ἄν belongs in its ordinary sense to the verb of the sentence.

Thus τάχ' ἄν γένοιτο means *it might perhaps happen*, and τάχ' ἄν ἐγένετο means *it might perhaps have happened*; but the latter can never mean *perhaps it happened*, like ὥσως ἐγένετο. Τάχα alone often means *perhaps*, as in XEN. AN. v. 2, 17. Aristotle writes τάχα and ἄν separately in the same sense as τάχ' ἄν; as τάχα δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἄν ταύτην ὑπολάβοι, ETH. NIC. i. 5, 6.

222. Ἄν never begins a sentence, or a clause before which a comma could stand. But it may directly follow a parenthetical clause, provided some part of its own clause precedes. *E.g.*

Ἄλλ' ὃ μέλ' ἄν μοι σιτίων διπλῶν ἔδει, AR. PAC. 137. So τὸ μέλλον, ἐπεὶ γένοιτ', ἄν κλύοις (or without the commas), *the future you can hear when it comes*, AESCH. AG. 250.

REPETITION OF Ἄν.

223. Ἄν is sometimes used twice, or even three times, with the *same verb*. This may be done in a long sentence, to make the conditional force felt through the whole, especially when the connexion is broken by intermediate clauses. It may also be done in order to emphasise particular words with which ἄν is joined, and to make them prominent as being affected by the contingency. *E.g.*

Ὅστ' ἄν, εἰ σθένος λάβοιμι, δηλώσαιμ' ἄν οἱ αὐτοῖς φρονῶ. SOPH. EL. 333. Οὐ τᾶν ἐλόντες αὖθις ἀνθαλοῖεν ἄν. AESCH. AG. 340. Ἄλλους γ' ἄν οὖν οἰόμεθα τὰ ἡμέτερα λαβόντας δεῖξαι ἄν μάλιστα εἴ τι μετριάζομεν. THUC. i. 76. (See 220.) Οὐτ' ἄν κελεύσαιμ', οὐτ' ἄν, εἰ θέλοις ἔτι πράσσειν, ἐμοῦ γ' ἄν ἡδέως δρώης μέτα. SOPH. ANT. 69. Λέγω καθ' ἕκαστον δοκεῖν ἄν μοι τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνδρα παρ' ἡμῶν ἐπὶ πλείστ' ἄν εἶδῃ καὶ μετὰ χαρίτων μάλιστ' ἄν εὐτραπέλως τὸ σῶμα αὐταρκες παρέχεσθαι. THUC. ii. 41. (Here ἄν is used three times, belonging to παρέχεσθαι.) Ὑμῶν δὲ ἔρημος ὦν οὐκ ἄν ἱκανὸς οἶμαι εἶναι οὐτ' ἄν φίλον ὠφελῆσαι οὐτ' ἄν ἐχθρὸν ἀλέξασθαι. XEN. AN. i. 3, 6. (Here ἄν is used three times, belonging to εἶναι.) Οὐκ ἄν ἡγήσθ' αὐτὸν κἂν ἐπιδραμεῖν; DEM. xxvii. 56.

224. A participle representing a protasis (472) is especially apt to have an emphatic ἄν near it. This, by showing that the verb is to form an apodosis, tends to point out the participle as conditional in an early part of the sentence. *E.g.*

Νομίζατε τό τε φαῖλον καὶ τὸ μέσον καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἀκριβὲς ἄν ξυγκραθὲν μάλιστ' ἄν ἰσχύειν, *believe that these, if they should be united, would be especially strong*. THUC. vi. 18. (Here ξυγκραθέν, not with ἄν, is equivalent to εἰ ξυγκραθείη.) Ἀγῶνας ἄν τίς μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ πάτερ, προειπὼν ἑκάστοις καὶ ἄθλα προτιθεῖς μάλιστ' ἄν

ποιεῖν εἴ δοκῆσθαι, it seems to me, said he, father, that if any one should proclaim contests, etc., he would cause, etc. XEN. Cyr. i. 6, 18. (Here the protasis implied in the participles is merely emphasised by ἄν, which belongs to ποιεῖν.) See also λέγοντος ἄν τινος πιστεῦσαι οἴσθαι; (i.e. εἴ τις ἔλεγεν, ἐπίστευσαν ἄν;) do you think they would have believed it, if any one had told them? DEM. vi. 20. (Here ἄν stands near λέγοντος only to point this out as the protasis to which its own verb πιστεῦσαι is the apodosis, with which ἄν is not repeated.)

225. (a) Repetition of *κέ* is rare; yet it sometimes occurs. *E.g.*

Τῷ κε μάλ' ἢ κεν ἔμεινε καὶ ἐσσύμενός περ ὁδοῖο,
ἢ κέ με τεθνηῖαν ἐνι μεγάροισιν ἔλειπεν. Od iv. 733.

(b) On the other hand, Homer sometimes joins ἄν and *κέ* in the same sentence for emphasis. *E.g.*

Καρτερὰ, ὡς οὐτ' ἄν κεν Ἀρης ὀνόσαιτο μετελθὼν
οὔτε κ' Ἀθηναίη λαοσσόος. Il. xiii. 127.

226. When an apodosis consists of several *co-ordinate* clauses with the same mood, ἄν is generally used only in the first and understood in the others, unless it is repeated for emphasis or for some other special reason. *E.g.*

Οὐδ' ἄν ἐμὲ, ἥνίκα δεῦρο ἀποπλεῖν ἐβουλόμην, κατεκώλυνεν, οὐδὲ τοιαῦτα λέγειν τούτῳ προσέταπεν, ἐξ ὧν ἤκωθ' ὑμεῖς ἐμέλλετ' ἐξίέναι. DEM. xix. 51. (Here ἄν is understood with προσέταπεν.) Οὕτω δὲ δρῶν οὐδὲν ἄν διάφορον τοῦ ἑτέρου ποιοί, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ταῦτον ἵκειν ἀμφοτέροισι. PLAT. Rep. 360 C. Οὐκοῦν ἄν, εἰ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ φῶς ἀναγκάζοι αὐτὸν βλέπειν, ἀλγεῖν τε ἄν τὰ ὅμματα καὶ φεύγειν ἀποστρεφόμενον (οἷ); Ib. 515 E. (Κἄν belongs to the infinitives; 223.) See also XEN. An. ii. 5, 14. Πάντα ἥρει ὁ Φίλιππος, πολλὰ λέγοντος ἐμοῦ καὶ θρυλοῦντος αἰεὶ, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὡς ἄν εἰς κοινὸν γνώμην ἀποφαινομένου, μετὰ ταῦτα δ' ὡς ἀγνοοῦντας διδάσκοντος, τελευτῶντος δὲ ὡς ἄν πρὸς πεπρακτότας αὐτοὺς καὶ ἀνοσιωτάτους ἀνθρώπους οὐδὲν ὑποστελλομένου. DEM. xix. 156. The clauses with ὡς represent (1) ὡς ἔλεγον ἄν εἰ ἐφαινόμην, as I should have spoken if I had been merely informing my colleagues; (2) ὡς ἔλεγον (ἄν) εἰ ἀγνοοῦντας ἐδίδασκον, as I should have spoken if I had been instructing ignorant men; (3) ὡς λέγομι ἄν, as I should speak to men who had sold themselves, etc. In the second clause, the construction remaining the same, ἄν is omitted; but in the third, where an optative is implied, ἄν reappears.

In PLAT. Rep. 398 A, we find ἄν used with two *co-ordinate* optatives, understood with a third, and repeated again with a fourth to avoid confusion with a dependent optative in a relative clause. Ἄν may be understood with an optative even in a separate sentence, if the construction is continued from a sentence in which ἄν is used with the optative; as in PLAT. Rep. 352 E: Ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἄν ἄλλω ἰδοῖς ἢ ὀφθαλμοῖς; Οὐ δῆτα. Τί δέ; ἀκούσας ἄλλῃ ἢ ὥσιν; So with *πράττοι* after γάρ, ib. 439 B.

ELLIPTICAL USES OF ἄν.

227. ἄν is sometimes used elliptically without a verb, when one can be supplied from the context. *E.g.*

Οἱ οἰκέται βέγκουσιν· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄν πρὸ τοῦ (sc. ἔπρεγκον), *the slaves are snoring; but they wouldn't have been doing so at this hour in old times.* AR. Nub. 5. Ὡς οὐτ' ἄν ἀσπῶν τῶνδ' ἄν ἐξείποιμί τω, οὐτ' ἄν τέκνοισι τοῖς ἐμοῖς (sc. ἐξείποιμι), στέργων ὅμως. SOPH. O. C. 1528. Τί ἄν δοκεῖ σοι Πρίαμος (sc. πράξαι), εἰ τάδ' ἦνυσεν; *but what think you Priam would have done if he had accomplished what you have?* AESCH. Ag. 935. Σώφρων μὲν οὐκ ἄν μάλλον, εὐτυχὴς δ' ἴσως (sc. οὖσα). EUR. Alc. 182: cf. AR. Eq. 1252. (See 483.)

So πῶς γὰρ ἄν (sc. εἴη); *how could it?* πῶς οὐκ ἄν; and similar phrases; especially ὥσπερ ἄν εἰ (also written as one word, ὥσπερανεῖ), in which the ἄν belongs to the verb that was originally understood after εἰ; as φοβούμενος ὥσπερ ἄν εἰ παῖς, *fearing like a child* (originally for φοβούμενος ὥσπερ ἄν ἐφοβεῖτο εἰ παῖς ἦν). PLAT. Gorg. 479 A. See DEM. xviii. 194: τί χρὴ ποιεῖν; ὥσπερ ἄν εἴ τις ναύκληρον πάντ' ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ πράξαντα . . . τῆς ναυαγίας αἰτιώτο, *what are we to do? (We are to do) just what a shipowner would do (ποιοῖ ἄν) if any one should blame him for the wreck of his ship, etc.* See φήσεεν ἄν, which explains the omitted verb, just afterwards.

228. Κἄν in both its meanings (as καί with the adverb ἄν, and as καί with ἄν = ἐάν) may stand without a verb. *E.g.*

Ἄλλ' ἄνδρα χρὴ δοκεῖν πεσεῖν ἄν κἄν ἀπὸ μικροῦ κακοῦ. SOPH. Aj. 1077. (Here κἄν, for καὶ ἄν, which we may express by *even* or *though it be*, belongs to πεσεῖν understood.) Ἰκανῶς οὖν τοῦτο ἔχομεν, κἄν εἰ πλεοναχῇ σκοποῖμεν; *are we then satisfied of this (and should we be so) even if we were to look at it in various ways?* PLAT. Rep. 477 A. (We must supply ἱκανῶς ἔχομεν with κἄν.) See different cases of κἄν εἰ in 195, in which a verb follows to which ἄν cannot belong.

Καὶ ὅποι τις ἄν, οἶμαι, προσθῇ κἄν μικρὰν δύναμιν, πάντ' ὠφέλει, *and, I think, wherever we add even (though it be) a little power, it all helps.* DEM. ii. 14. (Here κἄν = καὶ ἄν τις προσθῇ, *even though we add.*) Μέτρησον εἰρήνης τί μοι, κἄν πέντ' ἔτη, *measure me out some peace, even if it be only for five years (καὶ ἄν μετρήσης).* AR. Ach. 1021.

229. ἄν may be used with a relative without a verb, as it is with εἰ (in ἄν = εἰ ἄν) in the last examples (228). So in XEN. An. i. 3, 6, ὥς ἐμοῦ οὖν ἰόντος ὅπῃ ἄν καὶ ὑμεῖς, οὕτω τὴν γνώμην ἔχετε (i.e. ὅπῃ ἄν καὶ ὑμεῖς ἦτε), *be of this mind, that I shall go wherever you go.*

CHAPTER IV.

USE OF THE MOODS.

230. This chapter treats of all constructions which require any other form of the finite verb than the simple indicative in absolute assertions and direct questions (2). The infinitive and participle are included here so far as either of them is used in indirect discourse, in protasis or apodosis, and in other constructions (as with *πρίν* and *ὥστε*) in which the finite moods also are used.

231. These constructions are discussed under the following heads:—

- I. The potential optative and indicative.
- II. The imperative and subjunctive in commands, exhortations, and prohibitions.—Subjunctive and indicative with *μή* and *μή οὐ* in cautious assertions.—“*Οπως* and *ὅπως* *μή* with the independent future indicative or subjunctive.
- III. The subjunctive (like the future indicative) in independent sentences.—The interrogative subjunctive.
- IV. *Οὐ μή* with the subjunctive or future indicative.
- V. Final and object clauses after *ἵνα*, *ὥς*, *ὅπως*, *ὅφρα*, and *μή*.
- VI. Conditional sentences.
- VII. Relative and temporal sentences, including consecutive sentences with *ὥστε*, etc.
- VIII. Indirect discourse.
- IX. Causal sentences.
- X. Expressions of a wish.

SECTION I.

The Potential Optative and Indicative.

232. We find fully established in the Homeric language a use of the optative and the past tenses of the indicative with ἄν or κέ, which expresses the action of the verb as dependent on circumstances or conditions; as ἔλθοι ἄν, *he might (could or would) go*; ἦλθεν ἄν, *he might (could or would) have gone*. Such an optative or indicative is called *potential*.

I. POTENTIAL OPTATIVE.

233. It has already been seen (13) that Homer sometimes uses the optative in a weak future sense, without κέ or ἄν, to express a concession or permission. Such neutral forms seem to form a connecting link between the simple optative in wishes and the optative with ἄν, partaking to a certain extent of the nature of both. (For a full discussion of these forms and their relations, see Appendix I.) Such expressions seem to show that the early language used forms like ἔλθοιμι and ἴδοιμι in two senses, *I may go and I may see, or may I go and may I see*, corresponding to ἔλθω and ἴδω in their two Homeric senses *I shall go and I shall see* (284), or *let me go and let me see* (257).

234. The neutral optatives like Il. iv. 18 are rare even in Homer, the language having already distinguished the two meanings in sense, and marked them in most cases by external signs. The optative expressing what may happen in the future took the particle κέ or ἄν, and was negated by οὐ, denoting the relations which we express by our potential mood with *may, can, might, could, would, and should*. Thus ἔλοιμί κε ἢ κεν ἀλολήν, *I may slay or I may be slain*, Il. xxii. 253; ἀνὴρ δέ κεν οὐ τι Διὸς νόον εἰρύσσαιτο, *a man cannot contend against the will of Zeus*, Il. viii. 143.¹ On the other hand, the simple optative (without κέ or ἄν) was more and more restricted to the expression of a wish or exhortation, and was negated by μή; as μὴ γένοιτο, *may it not happen*, τίθειό μοι, *listen to me* (Od. iv. 193), as opposed to οὐκ ἄν γένοιτο, *it could not happen*. The potential forms ἔλθοιμι ἄν

¹ When the idea of *ability, possibility, or necessity* is the chief element in the expression, and is not (as above) merely auxiliary, it is expressed by a special verb like δύναμαι, δεῖ, or χρῆ. Especially, the idea of *obligation* is generally expressed by δεῖ or χρῆ with the infinitive; as τοῦδε χρῆ κλέειν, *him we must obey*, Soph. Ant. 666.

and ἴδοιμι ἂν differ from the more absolute future indicative and the old subjunctive forms ἔλθω and ἴδω, *I shall go* and *I shall see*, by expressing a future act as dependent on some future circumstances or conditions, which may be more or less distinctly implied. The freedom of the earlier language extended the use of the potential optative to present and sometimes even to past time. See 438 and 440.

235. In most cases the limiting condition involved in the potential optative is not present to the mind in any definite form, and can be expressed in English only by such words as *perchance, possibly, or probably*, or by the auxiliaries *could, would, should, might*, etc. with the vague conditions which these imply (like *if he should try, if he pleased, if he could, if what is natural should happen*, etc.) Sometimes a more general condition is implied, like *in any possible case*; as οὐκ ἂν δεχοίμην τοῦτο, *I would not accept this (on any terms)*; here the expression becomes nearly absolute, and may often be translated by our future, as οὐκ ἂν μεθείμην τοῦ θρόνου, *I will not give up the throne* (AR. Ran. 830), or (in positive sentences) by *must*, as πάντες θαυμάζουσιν ἂν τοῦτο, *all must admire this*.

The optative thus used with no conscious feeling of any definite condition, but still implying that the statement is conditioned and not absolute, is the simplest and most primitive potential optative. It is equivalent to the Latin potential subjunctive, as *credas, dicas, cernas, putes*, etc., *you may believe, say, perceive, think*, etc. The Homeric language has six forms, all expressing futurity with different degrees of absoluteness and distinctness; as ὄψομαι, ὄψομαί κε, ἴδωμαι, ἴδωμαί κε, ἰδοίμην, ἰδοίμην κε (or ἂν), containing every step from *I shall see* to *I should see*. Of these only the first and the last (with a tradition of the second) survived the Homeric period, and the others (especially the fifth) were already disappearing during that period (240), being found unnecessary as the language became settled, and as the optative with *κέ* or *ἂν* became more fixed as a future potential form.

236. In the following examples of the potential optative no definite form of condition is present to the mind:—

Ἔμοι δὲ τότ' ἂν πολλὸν κέρδιον εἴη, *but it would at that time (be likely to) profit me far more*. Il. xxii. 108. Φεύγωμεν· ἔτι γάρ κεν ἀλύξαιμεν κακὸν ἡμᾶς, *let us flee; for perchance we may still escape the evil day*. Od. x. 269. Πλησίον ἀλλήλων· καί κεν διοῖσ τεύσειας, *the rocks are close together: you might perhaps shoot an arrow across the space*. Od. xii. 102. So Od. xxiii. 125. Οὐκοῦν πόροις ἂν τήνδε δωρεάν ἔμοι; *would you then grant me this favour?* AESCH. Prom. 616. So

πάν γὰρ ἂν πύθοιό μιν, *for you can learn anything (you please) from me.* Ib. 617. Τί τόνδ' ἂν εἰποῖς ἄλλο; *what else could you say of this man?* SOPH. Ant. 646. So Ant. 552 and 652. Πολλὰς ἂν εὖροις μηχανάς, *you can find many devices.* EUR. And. 85. "Εψομαί τοι καὶ οὐκ ἂν λειφθείην, *I will follow you and in no case will I be left behind.* HDT. iv. 97. Οἱ μὲν (sc. λέγοντες) ὥς οὐδενὶ ἂν τρόπῳ ἔλθοιεν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι. THUC. vi. 35. "Ενθα πολλὴν μὲν σωφροσύνην καταμάθοι ἂν τις. XEN. An. i. 9, 3. So Mem. i. 3, 5, iii. 5, 1 and 7. Δὺς ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης, *you cannot step twice into the same river* (saying of Heraclitus). PLAT. Crat. 402 A. Οὐ μὴν ἔστι καλλίων ὁδὸς οὐδ' ἂν γένοιτο, *there is none and there could be none.* Id. Phil. 16 B; so 64 B. Ἀκούοις ἂν, *you can hear.* Id. Rep. 487 E. Δειξάτω ὥς οἱ Θετταλοὶ νῦν οὐκ ἂν ἐλεύθεροι γένοιντο ἄσμενοι, *let him show that they would not now gladly become free.* DEM. ii. 8. "Ηδέως δ' ἂν ἔγωγ' ἐροίμην Λεπτίνην, *but I would gladly ask Leptines.* Id. xx. 129. Εἰ ἡγνόησε ταῦτα, γένοιτο γὰρ ἂν καὶ τοῦτο, *if he did not know this,—and it might easily so happen.* Ib. 143. Οὐτ' ἂν οὗτος ἔχοι λέγειν οὐθ' ὑμεῖς πεισθείητε. Id. xxii. 17. Ποῖ οὖν τραποίμεθ' ἂν ἔτι; *in what other direction could we possibly turn?* PLAT. Euthyd. 290 A. Οὐκ ἂν μεθείμην τοῦ θρόνου, *I will not give up the throne.* AR. Ran. 830. So οὐκ ἂν δεχοίμην, AESCH. Eum. 228. Τίς οὐκ ἂν ἀγάσαιο τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐκείνων τῆς ἀρετῆς; *who would not admire the valour of these men?* (i.e. every one must admire their valour). DEM. xviii. 204.

Βουλοίμην ἂν, *I should like*, is used like *velim*. For ἐβουλοίμην ἂν, *vellem*, see 246.

237. The potential optative in the second person may have the force of a mild command or exhortation. *E.g.*

Σὺ μὲν κομίζεις ἂν σεαυτὸν ἢ θέλεις, *you may take yourself off whither you please* (a milder expression than κόμιζε σεαυτόν). SOPH. Ant. 444. So Ant. 1339. Κλύοις ἂν ἤδη, Φοῖβε προστάτήριε, *hear me now.* Id. El. 637. Χωροῖς ἂν ἔσω. Id. Ph. 674.

So probably II. ii. 250: τῷ οὐκ ἂν βασιλῆας ἀνὰ στόμ' ἔχων ἀγορεύοις, *therefore you must not take kings upon your tongue and talk* (or do not take, etc.)

238. Occasionally the potential optative expresses what may hereafter prove to be true or to have been true. *E.g.*

Ποῦ δὴτ' ἂν εἶεν οἱ ξένοι; *where may the strangers be?* (i.e. *where is it likely to turn out that they are?*) SOPH. El. 1450. Ἡ γὰρ ἐμὴ (sc. σοφία) φαύλη τις ἂν εἴη, *for it may turn out that my wisdom is of a mean kind.* PLAT. Symp. 175 E. Ἑλλήνων τινὰς φασι ἀπάσαι Εὐρώπην· εἴησαν δ' ἂν οἱ Κρήτες, *and these would prove to be Cretans* (or *to have been Cretans*). HDT. i. 2. Ἀἶται δὲ οὐκ ἂν πολλὰ εἴησαν, *and these (the islands) would not prove to be many.* THUC. i. 9.

This has nothing to do with the Homeric use of the optative with *κέ* or *ἂν* in a present or a past sense (438; 440). See the similar use of the subjunctive with *μή* after verbs of fearing (92).

239. The potential optative may express every grade of potentiality from the almost pure future οὐκ ἂν μεθείμην, *I will not give up (under any circumstances)*, to οὐκ ἂν δικαίως ἐς κακὸν πέσοιμι τι, *I could not justly fall into any trouble*, SOPH. Ant. 240, where δικαίως points to the substance of a limiting condition, *if justice should be done*. From this the step is but slight to such cases as οὐτε ἐσθίουσι πλεῖω ἢ δύνανται φέρειν· διαρραγεῖεν γὰρ ἂν, *they do not eat more than they can carry; for (if they should) they would burst*, XEN. Cyr. viii. 2, 21, where εἰ . . . ἐσθίοιεν is necessary to complete the sense and is clearly understood from the preceding words. A final step in the same direction is taken when the condition is actually stated as part of the sentence. As ἔλθοι ἂν means *he would go* (under some future circumstances), if these limiting circumstances are to be definitely expressed it is natural to use the corresponding form of condition, εἰ with the optative, as εἰ κελεύσεις ἔλθοι ἂν, *if you should command he would go*. The protasis is thus assimilated to the apodosis in form, as it conforms to it in sense and general character. So when a conclusion is to follow such a condition as εἰ κελεύσεις, the corresponding optative with ἂν, *i.e.* the potential optative, is naturally chosen, although nothing but regard to harmony and symmetry makes either *if you should command he will go* or *if you command he would go*, or the equivalent Greek forms, objectionable. In fact, these very forms are far more common in the more fluid Homeric language than in the fixed and regular style of Attic prose. There is, therefore, no necessary or logical bond of union between two forms like εἰ κελεύσεις and ἔλθοι ἂν. This connexion is, indeed, far more the effect of assimilation in form, as appears especially when the apodosis contains an optative in a wish; as in ὡς ἀπόλοιτο καὶ ἄλλος ὅτις τοιαῦτά γε βέξοι, *may another perish also who shall do the like* (Od. i. 47), where if ἀπολέσθω had been used we should naturally have had βέξῃ.

For examples of the optative with ἂν or κέ with a definite protasis expressed or implied in the context, see 455 and 472.

240. The use of ἂν or κέ with the potential optative had already become fixed in the Homeric language. A few cases of "neutral optatives" in Homer, which seem to show an early potential use without κέ or ἂν, have been given above (13). Besides these, a few more distinctly potential optatives without ἂν or κέ occur in Homer, but they are exceptions to the general usage even there. Such are the following:—

Οὗ τι κακώτερον ἄλλο πάθοιμι. Il. xix. 321. Τούτου γε σπομένοιο καὶ ἐκ πυρὸς αἰθομένοιο ἄμφω νοστήσασαμεν. Il. x. 246. 'Ρεῖα θεός γ' ἐθέλων ἀμείνωνας δωρήσαιο. Il. x. 556: see Od. iii. 231. Χερμάδιον λάβε, ὃ οὐ δύο γ' ἄνδρε φέροιεν. Il. v. 302: so xx. 285.

Οὐ τις πείσειε γυναῖκα. Od. xiv. 122. So also Il. vii. 48, xiv. 190, xv. 45, 197.

See, further, HES. Theog. 723 and 725; PIND. Ol. x. 21, Py. iv. 118.

241. Some cases of the optative without *ἄν* occur with the indefinite *ἔστιν* *ὅς* in Homer, and with *ἔστιν* *ὅστις*, *ἔστιν* *ὅπως*, *ἔστιν* *ὅποι*, in the Attic poets. These form a class by themselves. *E.g.*

Οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅς σῆς γε κύνας κεφαλῆς ἀπαλάλκοι. Il. xxii. 348. Οὐ γὰρ ἔην ὅς τις σφιν ἐπὶ στίχας ἠγήσαιο. Il. ii. 687. Οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως λέξαιμι τὰ ψευδῆ καλᾶ. AESCH. Ag. 620. Οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅτφ μέζονα μοῖραν νείμαιμ' ἢ σοι. Id. Prom. 292. Οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις πλὴν ἐμοῦ κείρατό νυν. Id. Cho. 172. "Ἐστ' ὅν ὅπως Ἀλκῆστις ἐς γῆρας μόλοι; EUR. Alc. 52. "Ἐσθ' ὅποι τις στείλας παραλύσαι ψυχάν; Ibid. 113.

242. On the other hand, a few other cases in the Attic poets are mere anomalies, even if we admit that the text is sound. *E.g.*

Τεῖαν, Ζεῦ, δύνασιν τίς ἀνδρῶν ὑπερβασία κατὰσχοι; *what transgression of man can check thy power?* SOPH. Ant. 605. 'Ἄλλ' ὑπέτολμον ἀνδρὸς φρόνημα τίς λέγοι; AESCH. Cho. 594. Πῶς οἶν τὰδ', ὥς εἴποι τις, ἐξημάρτανες; i.e. *as one might say*. (?) EUR. Andr. 929. Θᾶσσον ἢ λέγοι τις πῶλους ἐστήσαμεν. Id. Hipp. 1186. "Ωσπερ εἴποι τις τόπος, *as one would say* τόπος. (?) AR. Av. 180.

The cases cited from Attic prose are now generally admitted to be corrupt. See Krüger, ii. 54, 3, Anm. 8.

II. POTENTIAL INDICATIVE.

243. As the potential optative represents a future act as dependent on future circumstances (234), so the potential indicative originally represents a past act as dependent on past circumstances. Therefore, while *ἦλθεν* means *he went*, *ἦλθεν ἄν* means *he would have gone* (*under some past circumstances*). It is probable that no definite limiting circumstances were present to the mind when this form first came into use, so that *ἦλθεν ἄν* naturally signified merely that *it was likely, possible, or probable that he went* or (as we express it) that *he might have gone* or *would have been likely to go*, sometimes that *he must have gone*.

In this sense it appears as a past form of the potential optative, e.g. of *ἔλθοι ἄν* in the sense *he might perchance go* or *he would be likely to go* (in the future). The same relation appears in Latin, where *credas*, *putes*, *cernas*, *dicas*, *you would be likely to believe, think, etc.*, are transferred to past time as *crederes*, *putares*, *cerneres*, *diceres*, *you would have believed, thought, etc.*¹ Here *putet* and

¹ We are probably justified in assuming that the past meaning which here appears in *crederes*, etc. is the original meaning of the Latin imperfect subjunctive in this use, as it certainly is that of the Greek imperfect indicative with *ἄν*. See 435.

putaret are precisely equivalent to οἷοιτο ἄν, *he would be likely to think*, and ᾤετο ἄν, *he would have been likely to think*.

244. We find the potential indicative in its simplest use (last mentioned)—with no reference to any definite condition, but merely expressing past possibility, probability, or necessity—in all classes of Greek writers. *E.g.*

Οὐδ' ἄν ἔτι φράδμων περ ἀνὴρ Σαρπηδόνα δῖον ἔγνω, *no longer would even a shrewd man have known Sarpedon*. II. xvi. 638. Ὑπό κεν ταλασίφρονά περ δέος εἶλεν, *fear might have seized even a man of stout heart*. II. iv. 421. See other Homeric examples below.

Ἄλλ' ἦλθε μὲν δὴ τοῦτο τοῦνιδος τάχ' ἄν ὀργῇ βιασθὲν μᾶλλον ἢ γνώμῃ φρενῶν, *but this reproach may perhaps have come from violence of wrath, etc.* SOPH. O. T. 523. (Here τάχ' ἄν ἦλθε expresses past possibility, with no reference to any definite condition, unfulfilled or otherwise.) Θεοῖς γὰρ ἦν οὕτω φίλον τάχ' ἄν τι μνηΐουσιν εἰς γένος πάλαι, *for perchance it may have been thus pleasing to Gods who of old bore some wrath against our race*. Id. O. C. 964. (According to the common punctuation τάχ' ἄν would be taken with μνηΐουσιν, = οἱ τάχ' ἄν τι ἐμνήνιον, *who may perchance have borne some wrath*, see PLAT. Phaedr. 265 B, below; but the analogy of O. T. 523 favours the other interpretation.) Πρὸς ποῖον ἄν τόνδ' αὐτὸς οὐδυσσεὺς ἔπλει; *i.e. who might this man have been to whom Ulysses was sailing?* Id. Ph. 572. Ὁ θεασάμενος πᾶς ἄν τις ἀνὴρ ἡρώσθη δάιος εἶναι, *every man who saw this drama (the "Seven against Thebes") would have been eager to be a warrior*. AR. Ran. 1022. (This is the past form of πᾶς ἄν τις ἐρασθείη δάιος εἶναι, *every one would be eager*, having no more reference to an unfulfilled condition than the latter has.) Διέβησαν, ὥς μὲν εἰκὸς καὶ λέγεται, ἐπὶ σχεδίων, τάχα ἄν δὲ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἐσπλεύσαντες, *i.e. while they probably crossed on rafts, they may perhaps have crossed in some other way by sailing* (διέβησαν with τάχα ἄν in the latter clause meaning *they may have, or might have, perhaps crossed under other (possible) circumstances*). THUC. vi. 2. Ἐπερρώσθη δ' ἄν τις ἐκείνο ἰδὼν, *and any one would have been encouraged who saw that*. XEN. Hell. iii. 4, 18. Θάπτον ἢ ὥς τις ἄν ᾤετο, *sooner than one would have thought*. Id. An. i. 5, 8. Ἐνθα δὲ ἔγνω ἄν τις ὅσον ἄξιον εἴη τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ἄρχοντα, *there any one might have learned, etc.* Id. Cyr. vii. 1, 38. Ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ λέγοντες πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐν ᾗ ἄν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε, *talking to you at that age at which you would have been most likely to have put trust in them*. PLAT. Ap. 18 C. Ἰσως μὲν ἀληθοῦς τινος ἐπαπτόμενοι, τάχα δ' ἄν καὶ ἄλλοτε παραφερόμενοι, μυθικόν τινα ὕμνον προσεπαίσαμεν Ἐρωτα, *while perhaps we were clinging to some truth, although perchance we may have been led aside into some error* (παραφερόμενοι ἄν = παρεφερόμεθα ἄν), *we celebrated Eros in a mythical hymn*. Id. Phaedr. 265 B. Τί γὰρ καὶ βουλόμενοι μετεπέμψοιτο ἄν αὐτοῖς ἐν τούτῳ τῷ καιρῷ; *for with what wish even could you possibly have been summoning them at this time?* DEM. xviii. 24. Πῶς ἄν ὁ μὴ παρὼν μῆδ' ἐπιδημῶν ἐγὼ τί σε ἠδίκησα; *i.e. how was I*

likely to do you any wrong? Id. xxxvii. 57. Τὸν χορὸν συνέλεξα ὥσπερ ἂν ἥδιστα καὶ ἐπιτηδεύτατα ἀμφοτέροισ ἐγίγνετο, *I collected the chorus in the way which was likely to be most agreeable and convenient to both.* ANT. vi. 11.

Two Homeric examples are peculiar in their reference to time:—

Ἄλλὰ τάχιστα πείρα ὅπως κεν δὴ σὴν πατρίδα γαίαν ἴκηαι· ἢ γάρ μιν ζῶν γε κιχήσῃαι, ἢ κεν Ὀρέστης κτείνειν ὑποφθάμενος, σὺ δέ κεν τάφον ἀντιβολήσῃαι, *but strive with all speed to come to your fatherland; for either you will find him (Aegisthus) alive (and so can kill him yourself), or else Orestes may have already killed him before you come, and then you can go to his funeral.* Od. iv. 544. (Here ἢ κεν κτείνειν, by a change in the point of view, expresses what will be a past possibility at the time of the arrival of Menelaus, to which time the following optative is future.) Καὶ γὰρ Τρῳᾶς φασὶ μαχητὰς ἔμμεναι ἄνδρας, οἳ κε τάχιστα ἔκριναν μέγα νείκος, *for they say that the Trojans are men of war, who would most speedily have decided a mighty strife* (implying that they would therefore speedily decide any impending strife). Od. xviii. 261. (This was said by Ulysses *before* he went to Troy. See 249.)

245. In most cases of the past tenses of the indicative with ἂν there is at least an implied reference to some supposed circumstances different from the real ones, so that ἦλθεν ἂν commonly means *he would have gone (if something had not been as it was)*. When we speak of a past event as subject to conditions, we are apt to imply that the conditions were not fulfilled, as otherwise they would not be alluded to. This reference to an unfulfilled condition, however, does not make it necessary that the action of the potential indicative itself should be unreal, although this is generally the case. (See 412.) The unfulfilled past condition to which the potential indicative refers may be as vague and indistinct as the future condition to which the potential optative refers (235); as *if he had wished, if he had tried, if it had been possible, in any case*, and others which are implied in our auxiliaries *might, could, would, should, etc.*, but are seldom expressed by us in words. Compare οὐδὲν ἂν κακὸν ποιήσειαν, *they could do no harm* (i.e. *if they should try*), with οὐδὲν ἂν κακὸν ἐποίησαν, *they could have done no harm* (i.e. *if they had tried*). *E.g.*

Οὐ γάρ κεν δυνάμεσθα θυράων ὑψηλῶν ἀπώσασθαι λίθον, *for we could not have moved the stone from the high doorway.* Od. ix. 304. Μένουμι' ἂν· ἢ θελον δ' ἂν ἐκτὸς ὦν τυχεῖν, *I will remain; but I should have preferred to take my chance outside.* SOPH. Aj. 88. Τοῦτον τίς ἂν σοι τάνδρὸς ἀμείνων εὐρέθῃ; *who could have been found, etc.?* Ib. 119. Ἐκλυον ἂν ἐγὼ οὐδ' ἂν ἤλπισ' αὐδάν, *I heard a voice which I could never even have hoped to hear.* Id. El. 1281. Δὺ' ἐξέλεξας, οἷν ἐγὼ ἤκιστ' ἂν ἠθέλω, δλωλότοιον κλύειν. Id. Ph. 426. Κλύειν ἂν οὐδ' ἀπαξ ἐβουλόμην, *I should have wished not to hear it even once.* Ib. 1239. Οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ἔτεκεν ἂν ἡ Διὸς δάμαρ Λητὼ τοσαύτην

ἀμαθίαν, *under no circumstances would Leto have been the mother of so great ignorance*. EUR. I. T. 385. Οἰκεία πράγματ' εἰσάγων, ἐξ ὧν γ' ἂν ἐξηλεγχόμην, *by which I might have been exposed*. AR. Ran. 959. Τότε ὅψ' ἦν, καὶ τὰς χεῖρας οὐκ ἂν καθεώρων, *it was then dark, and they would not have seen the show of hands (in voting)*. XEN. Hell. i. 7, 7. Ποίων δ' ἂν ἔργων ἢ πόνων ἢ κινδύνων ἀπέστησαν; *from what acts, etc., would they have shrunk back (i.e. if they had been required of them)?* ISOC. iv. 83. Πρὸ πολλῶν μὲν ἂν χρημάτων ἐτιμωσάμεν τοσοῦτον δύνασθαι τὴν φιλοσοφίαν· ὥσως γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἡμεῖς πλείστον ἀπελείφθημεν, οὐδ' ἂν ἐλάχιστον μέρος ἀπελαύσαμεν αὐτῆς· ἐπειδὴ δ' οὐκ οὕτως ἔχει, βουλοίμην ἂν παύσασθαι τοὺς φλυαροῦντας. Id. xiii. 11. Οἱ ἐποίησαν μὲν οὐδὲν ἂν κακὸν, μὴ παθεῖν δ' ἐφυλάξαντ' ἂν ὥσως, τούτους ἐξαπατᾶν αἰρεῖσθαι, *these who could have done him no harm, but who might perhaps have guarded themselves against suffering any*. DEM. ix. 13. Τότε δ' αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμ' ἂν ἐκρίνετο ἐφ' αὐτοῦ, *but the case would then have been decided on its own merits*. Id. xviii. 224: so 101. Πῶς ἂν οὖν ὑβριστικώτερον ἄνθρωπος ἡμῖν ἐχρήσατο; Id. xix. 85. Οὐ μείζον οὐδὲν ἂν κατέλιπεν ὄνειδος. Id. xiv. 35. "Α δ' ἡμῖν δικαίως ἂν ὑπῆρχεν ἐκ τῆς εἰρήνης, ταῦτ' ἀνθ' ὧν ἀπέδοντο αὐτοὶ λογίζεσθαι· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἦν ἂν ὁμοίως ἡμῖν, ἐκεῖνα δὲ τούτοις ἂν προσῆν εἰ μὴ διὰ τούτους, *but (it is not right) to set off against what they themselves sold what would justly have been ours by the peace; but these would have been ours all the same (in any case), while the others would have been added (or would now be added) to them had it not been for these men*. Id. xix. 91. (Here ὑπῆρχεν ἂν and ἦν ἂν refer to an actual fact, the possession of certain places; the apodosis προσῆν ἂν refers to something which was prevented from becoming a fact. This passage shows the natural steps from the potential form to the apodosis. See 247.)

246. When no definite condition is understood with the potential indicative, the imperfect with ἂν regularly refers to past time, according to the older usage (435), like the aorist; as in the examples above.

The imperfect referring to present time, which is common in apodosis after Homer (410), appears in these potential expressions chiefly in a few simple phrases, especially in ἐβουλόμην ἂν, *vellem, I should wish, I should like (also I should have liked)*. Even in Homer the construction with ὥφελον and the infinitive (424), which includes a form of potential indicative (415; 416), sometimes refers to present time. *E.g.*

Ἐγὼ δ' ἐβουλόμην ἂν αὐτοὺς ἀληθῆ λέγειν· μετῆν γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἐμοὶ τούτου τάχαθ' οὐκ ἐλάχιστον μέρος. νῦν δὲ οὔτε πρὸς τὴν πόλιν αὐτοῖς τοιαῦτα ὑπάρχει οὔτε πρὸς ἐμέ, *and I should like it if they spoke the truth; for (were that so) no small part of this advantage would be mine: but this is not true of them, etc.* LYS. xii. 22. Μειδίαν, ὃν ἐβουλόμην ἂν πολλῶν ἔνεκεν ζῆν, *Midias, whom for many reasons I*

should like to have alive. AESCHIN. iii. 115. See LYCURG. 3. (For ἐβουλόμην ἄν as past, see SOPH. Ph. 1239, quoted in 245.) See also AR. Nub. 680, ἐκείνο δ' ἦν ἄν καρδόπη, Κλεωνόμην, and this would be καρδόπη, etc. For βουλοίμην ἄν, velim, see 236.

For ὦφελον and the infinitive as present in Homer, see 424.

247. It is but a slight step from the potential forms quoted in 245 and 246 to those which form the conclusion to an unfilled condition definitely implied in the context. After Homer the imperfect with ἄν may here refer to present time. *E.g.*

Ἄλλά κε κείνα μάλιστα ἰδὼν ὀλοφύραο θυμῷ, *but you would have lamented most in your heart if you had seen this* (ἰδὼν = εἰ εἶδες). OD. xi. 418. Οὐδὲ κεν αὐτὸς ἐπέκφυγε κῆρα μέλαιναν, ἀλλ' Ἥφαιστος ἔρυστο, *nor would he by himself have escaped, but Hephaestus rescued him*. IL v. 22. Ἄλλ' εἰκάσαι μὲν, ἦδύς· οὐ γὰρ ἄν κára πολυστεφῆς ὤδ' εἶρπε, *but, as it seems, he has good news; for (otherwise) he would not be coming with head thus thickly crowned*. SOPH. O. T. 83; so O. C. 125, 146. Πολλοῦ γὰρ ἄν τὰ ὄργανα ἦν ἄξια, *for instruments would be worth much (if they had this power)*. PLAT. Rep. 374 D. Ἦγετε τὴν εἰρήμην ὅμως· οὐ γὰρ ἦν ὅ τι ἄν ἐποιεῖτε, *for there was nothing that you could have done (if you had not kept the peace)*. DEM. xviii. 43. Σημεῖον δέ· οὐ γὰρ ἄν δεῦρ' ἦκον ὡς ὑμᾶς, *for (otherwise) they would not have come hither to you*. ID. xix. 58. Τότε Φιλίππῳ προδεδωκέναι πάντας ἄν ἔσχευεν αἰτίαν, *in that case she (Athens) would have had the blame of having betrayed all to Philip*. ID. xviii. 200. See other examples in 472.

248. The final step is taken when an unreal condition is expressed as part of the sentence, forming the protasis to which the potential indicative is the apodosis; as ἦλθεν ἄν εἰ ἐκέλευσα, *he would have gone if I had commanded him*. The dependent protasis, by a natural assimilation, has a past tense of the indicative corresponding to the form of the apodosis. On the other hand, when an unreal condition has been expressed, as εἰ ἐκέλευσα, the potential indicative is the natural form to state what *would have been* the result if the condition had been fulfilled. (See 390, 2; and 410.) The potential indicative does not change its essential nature by being thus made part of an unreal conditional expression, and it is not necessarily implied that its action did not take place (see 412). Although the latter is generally implied or inferred, while the reverse seldom occurs, still it is important to a true understanding of the nature of the indicative with ἄν to remember that it is not essential or necessary for it either to refer to an unreal condition or to denote in itself what is contrary to fact.

For a periphrastic form of potential indicative with ἔδει, χρῆν, etc., with the infinitive, see 415.

For the Homeric use of the present optative with $\kappa\acute{\epsilon}$ or $\delta\upsilon$ as a present potential form (like the later imperfect with $\delta\upsilon$), see 438.

For the rare Homeric optative with $\kappa\acute{\epsilon}$ in the sense of the past tenses of the indicative with $\kappa\acute{\epsilon}$ or $\delta\upsilon$, see 440.

249. From the primitive use of the past tenses of the indicative to express what *was likely to occur under past circumstances*, we may explain the iterative use of these tenses with $\delta\upsilon$ (162), which is generally thought to have no connection with the potential indicative with $\delta\upsilon$. Thus $\eta\lambda\theta\epsilon\nu\ \delta\upsilon$, meaning originally *he would have gone (under some past circumstances)*, might easily come to have a frequentative sense, *he would have gone (under all circumstances or whenever occasion offered)*, and hence to mean *he used to go*. See SOPH. PH. 443, $\delta\varsigma\ \sigma\upsilon\kappa\ \delta\upsilon\ \epsilon\iota\lambda\epsilon\tau'\ \epsilon\iota\sigma\acute{\alpha}\pi\alpha\zeta\ \epsilon\iota\pi\epsilon\iota\nu$, $\delta\pi\omicron\nu\ \mu\eta\delta\epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\phi\eta$, (Thersites) *who used never to be content to speak but once when all forbade him* (lit. *when nobody permitted him*). Originally $\sigma\upsilon\kappa\ \delta\upsilon\ \epsilon\iota\lambda\epsilon\tau\omicron$ would mean *he would not have been content (under any circumstances)*, hence *he was never content*. The optative $\acute{\epsilon}\phi\eta$ (532) shows the nature of the expression here. See the examples under 162, and the last example under 244.

This construction is not Homeric; but it is found in Herodotus and is common in Attic Greek. There is no difficulty in understanding it as an offshoot of the potential indicative, when it is seen that the latter did not involve originally any denial of its own action.

SECTION II.

The Imperative and Subjunctive in Commands, Exhortations, and Prohibitions.—Subjunctive and Indicative with $\mu\eta$ and $\mu\eta\ \sigma\upsilon$ in Cautious Assertions.— Ὅπως and $\text{ὅπως}\ \mu\eta$ with the Independent Future Indicative, etc.

IMPERATIVE IN COMMANDS, ETC.

250. The imperative is used to express a command, an exhortation, or an entreaty. *E.g.*

$\Lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon$, *speak thou*. $\Phi\epsilon\upsilon\gamma\epsilon$, *begone!* Ἐλθέτω , *let him come*. Χαιρόντων , *let them rejoice*. $\text{Ἐρχεσθον κλισίην Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος}$. II. i. 322. $\text{Ζεῦ, θεωρὸς τῶνδε πραγμάτων γενοῦ}$. AESCH. Cho. 246.

For prohibitions, i.e. negative commands, see 259 and 260.

251. The imperative is often emphasised by $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\epsilon$ or $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\epsilon\tau\epsilon$, $\phi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\epsilon$, ἔθι , $\delta\epsilon\upsilon\rho\omicron$ or $\delta\epsilon\upsilon\tau\epsilon$, *come, look here*; or by $\epsilon\iota\ \delta'\ \acute{\alpha}\gamma\epsilon$ (474). Ἄγε , $\phi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\epsilon$, and ἔθι may be singular when the imperative is plural, and in the second person when the imperative is in the third. *E.g.*

Εἴπ' ἄγε μοι καὶ τόνδε, φίλον τέκος, ὅς τις ὄδ' ἐστίν. Π. iii. 192.
 Ἄλλ' ἄγε μίμνετε πάντες, ἐκνήμιδες Ἀχαιοί. Π. ii. 331. Βάσκ' ἴθι, οἷλε δνειρε, θοὰς ἐπὶ νῆας Ἀχαιῶν. Π. ii. 8. Ἄγε δὴ ἀκούσατε. XEN. AP. 14. Ἄγετε δειπνήσατε. XEN. HELL. v. 1, 18. Φέρε' εἰπέ δὴ μοι. SOPH. ANT. 534. Φέρε δὴ μοι τόδε εἰπέ. PLAT. CRAT. 385 B. Ἴθι δὴ λέξον ἡμῖν πρῶτον τοῦτο. XEN. MEM. iii. 3, 3. Ἴθι νυν παρίστασθον. AR. RAN. 1378. Ἴθι νυν λιβανωτῶν δεῦρό τις καὶ πῦρ δότω. IB. 871. Καί μοι δεῦρο, ὦ Μέλητες, εἰπέ. PLAT. AP. 24 C. Δεῦτε, λείπετε στέγας. EUR. MED. 894.

252. The poets sometimes use the *second* person of the imperative with *πᾶς* in hasty commands. *E.g.*

Ἄκουε πᾶς, *hear, every one!* AR. THES. 372. Χώρει δεῦρο πᾶς ὑπηρέτης· τόξευε, παῖε· σφενδόνην τίς μοι δότω. ID. AV. 1186. Ἄγε δὴ σιώπα πᾶς ἀνὴρ. ID. RAN. 1125.

253. The imperative is sometimes used by the dramatists after *οἷσθ'* ὃ and similar interrogative expressions, the imperative being really the verb of the relative clause.¹ The difficulty of translating such expressions is similar to that of translating relatives and interrogatives with participles. *E.g.*

Ἄλλ' οἷσθ' ὃ δρᾶσον; τῷ σκέλει θένε τὴν πέτραν, *but do you know what you must do?—strike the rock with your leg!* AR. AV. 54. Οἷσθ' ὃ μοι σύμπραξον; *do you know what you must do for me?* EUR. HER. 451. Οἷσθά νυν ἄ μοι γενέσθω; δεσμὰ τοῖς ξένουσι πρόσθες, *do you know what must be done for me?—put bonds on the strangers.* ID. I. T. 1203. Οἷσθ' ὡς ποιήσον; *do you know how you must act?* SOPH. O. T. 543. (Compare EUR. CYC. 131, οἷσθ' οὖν ὃ δράσεις; *do you know what you are to do?*)

The English may use a relative with the imperative, as in *which do at your peril*. See HDT. i. 89, *κάτισον φυλάκους, οἳ λεγόντων ὡς ἀναγκαίως ἔχει*. So SOPH. O. C. 473.

A peculiar interrogative imperative is found in *μὴ ἐξέστω*; *is it not to be allowed?* PLAT. POLIT. 295 E; and *ἐπανερωτῶ εἰ κείσθω*, *I ask whether it is to stand*, ID. LEG. 800 E. (See 291.)

254. The imperative sometimes expresses a mere assumption, where something is supposed to be true for argument's sake. *E.g.*

Πλοῦτεῖτε γὰρ κατ' οἶκον, εἰ βούλει, μέγα, καὶ ἤ τι τύραννον σχῆμ' ἔχων, *i.e. grant that you are rich and live in tyrant's state (lit. be rich, etc.)* SOPH. ANT. 1168. Προσειπάτω τινὰ φιλικῶς ὃ τε ἄρχων καὶ ὁ ιδιώτης, *suppose that both the ruler and the private man address one in a friendly way*. XEN. HIER. viii. 3.

FIRST PERSON OF SUBJUNCTIVE AS IMPERATIVE.

255. The want of a first person in the imperative is supplied

¹ See Postgate in *Transactions of the Cambridge Philological Society*, III. 1, pp. 50-55.

by the first person of the subjunctive, which expresses both positive and negative exhortations and appeals (the negative with *μή*). Ἄγε, ἄγετε, εἰ δ' ἄγε, φέρε, ἴθι, δεῦρο, and δεῦτε (251) may precede this subjunctive; so sometimes *εἰα*, *permit*, *let*.

256. The first person plural is most common, and generally expresses an exhortation of the speaker to others to join him in doing or in not doing some act. *E.g.*

Ἴωμεν, *let us go*; μὴ ἴωμεν, *let us not go*. Οἴκαδέ περ σὺν νηυσὶ νεώμεθα, τόνδε δ' ἐώμεν, *let us sail homeward with our ships, and leave him*. Il. ii. 236. Ἄλλ' ἄγε μηκέτι ταῦτα λεγώμεθα, *but come, let us no longer talk thus*. Il. xiii. 292; so ii. 435. Ἄλλ' ἄγε δὴ καὶ νῶι μεδώμεθα θούριδος ἀλκῆς. Il. iv. 418. Εἰ δ' ἄγετ' ἀμφὶ πόλιν σὺν τεύχεσι πειρηθῶμεν. Il. xxii. 381; so 392. Δεῦτε, φίλοι, τὸν ξείνον ἐρώμεθα. Od. viii. 133. Μὴ δὴ πω λύωμεθα ἵππους, ἀλλ' ἰόντες Πάτροκλον κλαίωμεν. Il. xxiii. 7. Ἄλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ, πλέωμεν, ὁρμάσθω ταχύς. SOPH. Ph. 526. Ἐπίσχετον, μόθωμεν. Ib. 539. Φέρε δὴ διαπεράνωμεν λόγους. EUR. And. 333. Δεῦρό σου στέψω κάρα. Id. Bacch. 341. Ἐπίσχες, ἐμβάλωμεν εἰς ἄλλον λόγον. Id. El. 962. Παρώμεν τε οὖν ὥσπερ Κύρος κελεύει, ἀσκῶμεν τε δι' ὧν μάλιστα δυννησόμεθα κατέχειν ἃ δεῖ, παρέχόμεν τε ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς, κ.τ.λ. XEN. Cyr. viii. 1, 5. Μὴ ποτε φῶμεν ἔνεκα τούτων μηδὲν μάλλον ποτε ψυχὴν ἀπόλλυσθαι. PLAT. Rep. 610 B. Ἔα δὴ νῦν ἐν σοὶ σκεψώμεθα. Id. Soph. 239 B.

257. The less common first person singular is, in *affirmative* exhortations, generally preceded by a word like *ἄγε*, etc. (251), or by some other command, and the speaker appeals to himself to do something or to others for permission to do it. In *negative* appeals with *μή* the first person singular is rare and poetic; the speaker may call on others to avert some evil from himself, or he may utter a threat or a warning. *E.g.*

Ἄλλ' ἄγε δὴ τὰ χρήματ' ἀριθμήσω καὶ ἴδωμαι, *come, let me count the things and see*. Od. xiii. 215. Ἄλλ' ἄγεθ' ὑμῖν τεύχε' ἐνείκω θωρηχθῆναι. Od. xxii. 139. Θάπτε με ὅττι τάχιστα, πύλας Ἀΐδαο περήσω, *bury me as quickly as possible; let me pass the gates of Hades*. Il. xxiii. 71. Ἄλλ' ἄγε νῦν ἐπίμεινον, ἀρήια τεύχεα δύνω. Il. vi. 340. Φέρε ἀκούσω, *come, let me hear*. HDT. i. 11. Σίγα, πνοᾶς μάθω· φέρε πρὸς οἶδς βάλω. EUR. H. F. 1059. Ἐπίσχετ', αἰδῶν τῶν ἔσθωθεν ἐκμάθω. Id. Hipp. 567. Λέγε δὴ, ἴδω. PLAT. Rep. 457 C.

Μὴ σε, γέρον, κοίλῃσιν ἐγὼ παρὰ νηυσὶ κιχέω, *let me not find you at the ships!* Il. i. 26. Μὴ σευ ἀκούσω εὐχομένου. Il. xxi. 475. Ἀλλά μ' ἔκ γε τήσδε γῆς πόρθμευσον ὥς τάχιστα, μήδ' αὐτοῦ θάνω. SOPH. Tr. 801. Ὡ ξείνοι, μὴ δῆτ' ἀδικηθῶ. Id. O. C. 174.

258. In the first person (255-257) both present and aorist subjunctive are used with *μή*, the distinction of 259 applying only to the

second and third persons. In affirmative exhortations the second and third persons of the subjunctive are not regularly used, the imperative being the only recognised form. But in SOPH. PH. 300, *φέβ', ὦ τέκνον, νῦν καὶ τὸ τῆς νήσου μάθης* (if the text is sound), the positive *μάθης* seems strangely to follow the analogy of the negative *μὴ μάθης*. Nauck reads *μάθε* here. See also τὸ ψάφισμα ἀνατεθᾶ in an inscription quoted in Appendix I. p. 385.

IMPERATIVE AND SUBJUNCTIVE IN PROHIBITIONS.

259. In prohibitions, in the second and third persons, the *present* imperative or the *aorist* subjunctive is used with *μὴ* and its compounds. The distinction of tense here is solely the ordinary distinction between the present and aorist (87), and has no reference to the moods. *E.g.*

Μὴ ποιεὶ τοῦτο, do not do this (habitually), or do not go on doing this (or stop doing this); μὴ ποιήσῃς τοῦτο, (simply) do not do this. Ἐξαῦδα, μὴ κεῖθε νόψ, ἵνα εἶδομεν ἄμφω. II. i. 363. Ἀτρεΐδῃ, μὴ ψεύδε' ἐπιστάμενος σάφα εἰπεῖν. II. iv. 404. Ἀργεῖοι, μὴ πῶ τι μεθίετε θούριδος ἀλκῆς. II. iv. 234. Εἰπέ μοι εἰρομένῃς νημερτέα, μὴδ' ἐπικεύσῃς. Od. xv. 263. Ἦδῃ νῦν σῶ παιδὶ ἔπος φάο, μὴδ' ἐπῖκευθε (compare the last example). Od. xvi. 168. Τῷ νῦν μὴ μοι μάλλον ἐν ἄλγεσι θυμὸν ὀρίνῃς. II. xxiv. 568. See II. xxiv. 778. (Μὴ δὴ με ἔλωρ Δαναοῖσιν ἑόςῃς κείσθαι. II. v. 684. Κλυτὴ μὴδὲ μεγίρῃς. Od. iii. 55. Μὴ πως ἀνδράσι δυσμενέεσσιν ἔλωρ καὶ κύρμα γένησθε, *do not become prey and spoil to hostile men.* II. v. 487. Μὴ ποτε ἀπὸ πᾶσαν ὀλέσῃς ἀγλαΐην. Od. xix. 81. Ὑμεῖς δὲ τῇ γῇ τῆδε μὴ βαρὺν κότον σκήψῃσθε, μὴ θυμοῦσθε, μὴδ' ἀκαρπῖαν τεύξετε. AESCH. Eum. 800. Ὅν μὴτ' ὀκνεῖτε, μὴτ' ἀφήτ' ἔπος κακόν. SOPH. O. C. 731. Μὴ θῆσθε νόμον μῆδ' ἀλά, ἀλλὰ τοὺς βλάπτοντας ὡμὰς λύσατε. DEM. iii. 10. (Here θέσθε would not be allowed; but λύσατε, an affirmative command, is regular.) Μὴ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους δικάσητε· μὴ βοηθήσητε τῷ πεπονθότῳ δεινᾷ· μὴ εὐορκεῖτε. Id. xxi. 211. Μὴ πρίγ, παῖ, δᾶδα. AR. Nub. 614. Καὶ μῆδ' εἰς ὑπολάβῃ με βούλεσθαι λαθεῖν. Isoc. v. 93. Καὶ μῆδ' εἰς ὁἷόν σε μ' ἀγνοεῖν. Id. iv. 73.

260. The *third* person of the aorist imperative is sometimes used with *μὴ* in prohibitions; but the *second* person with *μὴ* is very rare and only poetic. *E.g.*

Μὴδ' ἢ βία σε μῆδαμῶς νικησάτω. SOPH. Aj. 1334. Μῆδέ σοι μελησάτω. AESCH. Prom. 332; so 1002. Καὶ μῆδ' εἰς ὑμῶν προσδοκησάτω ἄλλως. PLAT. Ap. 17 C.

Τῷ μὴ μοι πατέρας ποθ' ὁμοίῃ ἐνθεο τιμῇ. II. iv. 410; see Od. xxiv. 248. Μὴ πο καταδύσσο μῶλον Ἄρηος. II. xviii. 134. Μὴ ψεύσον, ὦ Ζεῦ, μὴ μ' ἔλῃς ἄνευ δορός in SOPH. Peleus, Frag. 450, is parodied in AR. Thes. 870, μὴ ψεύσον, ὦ Ζεῦ, τῆς ἐπιούσης ἐλπίδος.

INDEPENDENT SUBJUNCTIVE WITH *μή* IMPLYING FEAR (HOMERIC).

261. In the following Homeric examples the independent subjunctive with *μή* expresses apprehension, coupled with a desire to avert the object of fear, both ideas being inherent in the construction. The third person is the most common here.

Μὴ δὴ νῆας ἔλωσι καὶ οὐκέτι φευκτὰ πέλωνται, *may they not (as I fear they may) seize the ships and make it no longer possible to escape.* Il. xvi. 128. *Μὴ δὴ μοι τελέσῃσι θεοὶ κακὰ κήδεα θυμῷ*, *may the Gods not bring to pass (as I fear they may) bitter woes for my soul.* Il. xviii. 8. *Μὴ τι χολωσάμενος ῥέξῃ κακὸν νῆας Ἀχαιῶν*, *may he not (as I fear he may) in his wrath do anything to harm the sons of the Achaeans.* Il. ii. 195. *ὦ μοι ἐγὼ, μή τίς μοι ὑφαίνησιν δόλον αἵτε ἀθανάτων.* Od. v. 356. *Μὴ πῶς μ' ἐκβαίνοντα βάλη λίθακι προτὶ πέτρῃ κῦμα μέγ' ἀρπάξαν, μελέῃ δέ μοι ἔσσεται ὄρμη,* *I fear that some great wave may dash me against a solid rock, and my effort will (then) be in vain* (the expression of fear being merged in an assertion). Od. v. 415. See also Il. xxi. 563; Od. v. 467, xvii. 24, xxii. 213. *Τῶν εἴ κεν πάντων ἀντήσομεν, μὴ πολὺπικρα καὶ αἰνὰ βίας ἀποτίσσαι ἐλθών*, *i.e. I fear you may punish their violence only to our bitter grief (and may you not do this).* Od. xvi. 255. *Μὴ τι κακὸν ῥέξωσι καὶ ἡμέας ἐξελάσωσιν, ἄλλων δ' ἀφικώμεθα γαῖαν*, *may they not (as I fear) do us some harm and drive us out, and may we not come to some land of others.* Od. xvi. 381. *Μὴ μιν ἐγὼ μὲν ἴκωμαι ἰὼν, ὁ δέ μ' οὐκ ἐλέησει*, *I fear I may approach him as I come, while he will not pity me.* Il. xxii. 122 (see Od. v. 415, above). *Μὴ τοι κατὰ πάντα φάγωσιν κτήματα δασσάμενοι, σὺ δὲ τηρσίην ὀδὸν ἔλθῃς.* Od. xv. 12.

The present subjunctive occurs in Od. xv. 19, *μή τι φέρεται*, and in xvi. 87, *μή μιν κερτομέωσιν*. See also *πέλωνται* in Il. xvi. 128, above. (See 258.)

In these examples sometimes the fear itself, and sometimes the desire to avert its object, is more prominent.

262. (a) By prefixing *δεῖδω* or *φοβοῦμαι* to any of the subjunctives with *μή* in 261, we get the full construction with verbs of fearing; as *δεῖδω μή νῆας ἔλωσι*, *I fear they may seize the ships*, in which *μή ἔλωσι* represents an original construction which at first followed *δεῖδω* paratactically—*I fear: may they not seize the ships*—and afterwards became welded with it as a dependent clause. So if *δεῖδω* were removed from a sentence like *δεῖδω μή τι πάθῃσιν*, Il. xi. 470, we should have an independent clause like those quoted above. See *μή δαμάσση* and *δεῖδω μή γένωμαι*, Od. v. 467 and 473.

(b) In like manner, by prefixing other verbs than those of fearing to such clauses, the original negative final clause with *μή* is developed; as *μαχούμεθα μή νῆας ἔλωσι*, *we will fight that they*

may not seize the ships. Again, if the leading clause were removed from a sentence like αὐτοῦ μὲν ἐπὶ πύργῳ, μή παῖδ' ὀρφανικὸν θήῃς χήρην τε γυναῖκα, remain here on the tower, lest you make your child an orphan and your wife a widow, Il. vi. 431, there would remain μή . . . θήῃς, do not make, or may you not make, in the originally independent form, like the clauses with μή in 261. (See 307.)

263. (*Μὴ οὐ with the Subjunctive.*) The clause with μή expressing desire to avert an object of fear, in its original simple form as well as in the developed final construction, may refer to a negative object, and express fear that something may not happen. Here μή οὐ is used with the subjunctive, like *ne non* in Latin.

Thus μή νῆας ἔλῳσι being *may they not seize the ships*, μή οὐ νῆας ἔλῳσι would be *may they not fail to seize the ships*, implying fear that they may not seize them. Homer has one case of μή οὐ after a verb of fearing: δέιδω μή οὐ τίς τοι ὑπόσχηται τόδε ἔργον, Il. x. 39. He has several cases of μή οὐ in final clauses and one in an object clause (354). Il. i. 28, μή νύ τοι οὐ χραίσμῃ σκήπτρον καὶ στέμμα θεοῖο, is often cited as a case of independent μή οὐ, meaning *beware lest the staff and fillet of the God shall prove of no avail to you*. So Dellbrück (I. p. 119), who nevertheless quotes Il. i. 565, ἀλλ' ἀκέουσα κάθησο ἔμψ' ὃ' ἐπιπέθεο μύθῳ, μή νύ τοι οὐ χραίσμωσιν ὄσοι θεοὶ εἰσ' ἐν Ὀλύμπῳ, as containing a dependent final clause. In the two other cases of μή οὐ with the subjunctive in Homer, Il. xv. 164 (an object clause, see 354), and xxiv. 569 (final), the dependence of the clause with μή οὐ is even more obvious; and in Il. xxiv. 584 we have in μή οὐκ ἐρύσαιτο the decisive proof that this clause is felt to be dependent in the change from the subjunctive to the optative after a past tense. It is therefore more than doubtful whether μή οὐ χραίσμῃ in Il. i. 28 is not dependent on μή σε κίχῃω in vs. 26. Plato in paraphrasing this passage (Rep. 393 E) takes the clause as final and dependent (see 132). But, whether we have a case of independent μή οὐ with the subjunctive in Homer or not, there can be no doubt that this is the original form from which came the dependent final clause with μή οὐ.

264. After Homer we have the independent clause with μή in Aeschylus, Ag. 134 and 341; in Euripides we have independent μή in Alc. 315 (μή σοὺς διαφθείρῃ γάμους), Orest. 776 (μή λάβωσί σ' ἄσμενοι), H. F. 1399 (αἶμα μή σοῖς ἐξομόρξωμαι πέπλοις), and μή οὐ in Tro. 982 (μή οὐ πείσῃς σοφούς), besides Rhes. 115 (μή οὐ μόλῃς). Aristophanes, Eccl. 795, has a doubtful μή οὐ λάβῃς (Heindorf and Meineke, for Mss. λάβοις). Besides these few cases, we have in Plato three of μή with the subjunctive implying apprehension in the Homeric sense (261): Euthyd. 272 C (μή οὖν τις δνειδίσῃ), Symp. 193 B (μή μοι ὑπολάβῃ), Leg. 861 E (μή τις οἴηται).

Euripides and Herodotus are the first after Homer to use μή οὐ in dependent clauses of fear (306).

SUBJUNCTIVE WITH *μή* AND *μή οὐ* IN CAUTIOUS ASSERTIONS.

265. In Herodotus v. 79 we have ἀλλὰ μάλλον *μή οὐ* τοῦτο ἢ τὸ μαντήιον, *but I suspect rather that this may prove not to be the meaning of the oracle.* This is the first example of a construction, very common in Plato, used also by Aristotle, and found once in Demosthenes, in which *μή* with the subjunctive expresses a suspicion that something *may be* (or *may prove to be*) true, and *μή οὐ* with the subjunctive a suspicion that something *may not be* true; the former amounting to a cautious assertion, the latter to a cautious negation. Examples from Plato are:—

Μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἢ τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, *I am afraid the truth may be too rude a thing to tell.* Gorg. 462 E. Μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα σκέμματα ἢ τῶν βράδιως ἀποκτινύντων, *I suspect these may prove to be considerations for those, etc.* Crit. 48 C. Μὴ φαῦλον ἢ καὶ οὐ καθ' ὁδόν, *I think it will be bad and not in the right way* (i.e. *μή οὐ ἢ*). Crat. 425 B. Ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχῃ, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἰδῶτα τίθεσθαι (i.e. *μή ἢ*). Crat. 436 B. Ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐ τοῦτ' ἢ χαλεπὸν, θάνατον ἐκφυγεῖν, *but I suspect this may not be the hard thing, to escape death.* Ap. 39 A. Ἡμῖν μὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκεπτέον ἢ, *I am inclined to think we have nothing else to consider.* Crit. 48 C. Μὴ οὐ δέγῃ ὑπολογίσεσθαι, *I think there will be no need of taking into account, etc.* Crit. 48 D. Μὴ οὐκ ἢ διδασκτὸν ἀρετῇ, *it will probably turn out that virtue is not a thing to be taught.* Men. 94 E. Ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐχ οἱτοὶ ἡμεῖς ὠμεν, *but I think we shall not prove to be of this kind.* Symp. 194 C.¹

See also Aristotle, Eth. x. 2, 4, *μή οὐδὲν λέγωνσιν* (v. l. *λέγουσιν*), *there can hardly be anything in what they say.* (See 269.)

In DEM. i. 26 we have *μή λίαν πικρὸν εἰπεῖν ἢ*, *I am afraid it may be too harsh a thing to say.*

The present subjunctive here, as in dependent clauses of fear (92), may refer to what *may prove* true.

266. In these cautious assertions and negations, although no desire of the speaker to avert an object of fear is implied, there is always a tacit allusion to such a desire on the part of some person who is addressed or referred to, or else an ironical pretence of such a desire of the speaker himself.

267. The subjunctive with *μή* in this sense is sometimes found in dependent clauses. *E.g.*

Ὅρα μὴ ἄλλο τι τὸ γενναῖον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τοῦ σώζειν καὶ σώζεσθαι, *see to it lest (it prove true that) these may be different things, etc.* PLAT. Gorg. 512 D. The common translation, *see whether they may*

¹ Other examples in Plato are Phaed. 67 B, 69 A; Theaet. 188 D; Crat. 429 C, 432 A, 432 B, 435 C, 438 C, 440 C; Men. 89 C, 94 B; Lys. 209 A, 219 D, 220 A; Symp. 214 C; Parm. 130 D, 132 B, 134 E, 136 D; Leg. 635 E; Theag. 122 B; Amat. 137 B. See Weber (pp. 191, 192), who gives these examples in Plato, with HDT. v. 79 and DEM. i. 26, as the only cases of independent *μή* or *μή οὐ* in this peculiar sense before Aristotle.

not be different, gives the general sense, but not the construction, which is simply that of μή ἄλλο τι ἢ (265) transferred to a dependent clause.

268. In a few cases Plato has μή with the subjunctive in a cautious question with a negative answer implied. As μή ἄλλο τι ἢ τοῦτο means *this may possibly be something else*, so the question μή ἄλλο τι ἢ τοῦτο; means *can this possibly be something else?* The four examples given by Weber are:—

Μή τι ἄλλο ἢ παρὰ ταῦτα; *can there be any other besides these?* Rep. 603 C. Ἄρα μή ἄλλο τι ἢ θάνατος ἢ τοῦτο; *is it possible that death can prove to be anything but this?* Phaed. 64 C. So μή τι ἄλλο ἢ ἢ, κ.τ.λ.; Parm. 163 D. Ἀλλὰ μή ἐμὴ περιεργία ἢ καὶ τὸ ἐρωτήσασθαι σε περὶ τούτου; *but can it be that even asking you about this is inquisitiveness on my part?* Sisyph. 387 C (this can be understood positively, it may be that it is, etc.).

In XEN. Mem. iv. 2, 12, the same interrogative construction occurs with μή οὐ: μή οὐν οὐ δύνωμαι ἐγὼ τὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἔργα ἐξηγήσασθαι; *do you suspect that I shall be unable to explain the works of Justice?*

In PLAT. Phil. 12 D we have πῶς γὰρ ἡδονὴ γε ἡδονῇ μὴ οὐχ ὁμοίωτατον ἂν εἴη; *for how could one pleasure help being most like another?* Here εἴη ἂν takes the place of ἢ, and πῶς shows that the original force of μή is forgotten.

INDICATIVE WITH μή AND μή οὐ IN CAUTIOUS ASSERTIONS.

269. The present or past tenses of the indicative with μή or μή οὐ may express a similar cautious assertion or suspicion about a present or past act. As φοβοῦμαι μὴ πάσχει (or ἔπαθεν) means *I fear that he is suffering* (or *suffered*), so μὴ πάσχει or μὴ ἔπαθεν may mean *I suspect he is suffering* or *I suspect he suffered*, and μὴ οὐ πάσχει or μὴ οὐκ ἔπαθεν may mean *I suspect he does not* (or *did not*) *suffer*. (Cf. 265.) E.g.

Μὴ γὰρ τοῦτο μὲν, τὸ ζῆν ὅποσονδὴ χρόνον, τόν γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα ἑατέον ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ φιλοψυχητέον (i.e. καὶ μὴ οὐ φιλ.), *for I am of the opinion that this, merely living for a certain time, is what one who is truly a man should disregard, and that he should not be fond of life*. PLAT. Gorg. 512 D. (This passage is often strangely emended and explained.) Ἀλλ' ἄρα μὴ οὐ τοιαύτην ὑπολαμβάνεις σου τὴν μάθησιν ἔσεσθαι, *I suspect that you do not think your learning will be like this*. Id. Prot. 312 A. Ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ὡμολογήσαμεν, *but perhaps we did not do well in assenting to this*. Id. Men. 89 C. (This may be interrogative (268): *can it be that we did not do well*, etc.?)

So Aristotle, Eth. x. 1, 3, μή ποτε δὲ οὐ καλῶς λέγεται, *but it may be that this is not well said*: compare x. 2, 4, quoted in 265.

270. Apart from independent sentences with μή οὐ (263-269), this double negative occurs chiefly in ordinary clauses after verbs of fearing where the object of fear is negative (305; 365).

"Ὅπως AND ὅπως μὴ WITH THE INDEPENDENT

FUTURE INDICATIVE, ETC.

271. The Athenians developed a colloquial use of ὅπως or ὅπως μὴ with the future indicative to express either a positive exhortation or command or a prohibition. Thus ὅπως τοῦτο ἐρεῖς, *see that you say this*, is a familiar way of saying εἰπὲ τοῦτο. So ὅπως μὴ τοῦτο ἐρεῖς is equivalent to μὴ τοῦτο εἴπῃς. This expression was probably suggested and certainly encouraged by the common Attic construction of ὅπως and the future after verbs of *striving, taking care*, etc. (339); so that it is common to explain this form by an ellipsis of σκόπει in σκόπει ὅπως τοῦτο ἐρεῖς, *see to it that you say this*. But we may doubt whether any definite leading verb was ever in mind when these familiar exhortations were used (see 273).

272. The earliest example is AESCH. Prom. 68, ὅπως μὴ σαντὸν οἰκτιεῖς ποτε, *beware lest at some time you may have yourself to pity*, which conveys a warning, like μὴ σε κιχέω, Il. i. 26. In AESCH. Ag. 600, we have the first person singular with ὅπως (used like the subjunctive in 257): ὅπως δ' ἄριστα τὸν ἐμὸν αἰδοῖον πόσιν σπεύσω δέξασθαι (not mentioned by Weber). In Sophocles there is only one case, O. T. 1518, γῆς μ' ὅπως πέμψεις ἄποικον, *send me forth an exile from the land* (like πέμψον με). Five examples in Euripides are simple exhortations, as ἀλλ' ὅπως ἀνὴρ ἔσει, *but see that you are a man*, Cycl. 595; so also Cycl. 630, H. F. 504, I. T. 321, Or. 1060 (with doubtful construction): one conveys a warning, Bacch. 367, Πενθεὺς δ' ὅπως μὴ πένθος εἰσολοίσει δόμοις τοῖς σοῖσι, *beware lest Pentheus bring sorrow (πένθος) into your house*.

273. We find the greater part of the examples of 271 in the colloquial language of Aristophanes,¹ who often uses the imperative and ὅπως with the future as equivalent constructions in the same sentence. *E.g.*

Κατάθου σὺ τὰ σκεύη ταχέως, χῶπως ἐρεῖς ἐνταῦθα μηδὲν ψεῦδος, *put down the packs quickly, and tell no lies here*. Ran. 627. Ἀλλ' ἐμβὰ χῶπως ἀρεῖς τὴν Σώτειραν. Ib. 377. See also Eq. 453, 495, Eccl. 952, Ach. 955. Νῦν οὖν ὅπως σώσεις με, *so now save me*. Nub. 1177. "Ὅπως παρέσει μοι καὶ σὺ καὶ τὰ παῖδια, *be on hand, you and your children* (an invitation). Av. 131. "Ἄγε νῦν ὅπως εὐθὺς ὑφαρπάσει. Nub. 489.

274. (Examples from Prose.) "Ὅπως οὖν ἔσθε ἄνδρες ἄξιοι τῆς ἐλευθερίας, *prove yourselves men worthy of freedom*. XEN. AN. i. 7, 3.

¹ See Weber, pp. 85, 95, 113, 124, for the history of this usage. Weber cites 41 examples from Aristophanes, besides Ach. 348; 18 from Plato, whose extraordinary use of the independent sentence with μὴ has been noticed; 7 from Xenophon, 9 from Demosthenes, 2 from Lysias, and one from Isaeus.

Ὅπως μοι, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, μὴ ἔρείς ὅτι ἔστι τὰ δώδεκα δις ἕξ, *see that you do not tell me that twice six are twelve*. PLAT. Rep. 337 B: so 336 D. Φέρε δὴ ὅπως μεμνησόμεθα ταῦτα. Id. Gorg. 495 D. Ὅπως γε, ἂν τι τούτων γίγνηται, τούτους ἐπαινέσειςθε καὶ τιμήσετετε καὶ στεφανώσετε, ἐμὲ δὲ μή· καὶ μέντοι κἂν τι τῶν ἐναντίων, ὅπως τούτοις ὀργιείσθε. DEM. xix. 45. Ὅπως τοίνυν περὶ τοῦ πολέμου μηδὲν ἔρείς, *see therefore that you say nothing about the war*. Ib. 94.

One case occurs in Herodotus in iii. 142. (See also 280, below.)

275. Although the second person is naturally most common in these expressions, the first and third persons also occur. *E.g.*

Ὅπως δὲ τὸ σύμβολον λαβόντες ἔπειτα πλησίον καθεδούμεθα. AR. Eccl. 297. Οἱμοι τάλας, ὁ Ζεὺς ὅπως μὴ μ' ὀψεται, *don't let Zeus see me!* Id. Av. 1494. Καὶ ὅπως, ὥσπερ ἐρωτῶσι προθύμως, οὕτω καὶ ποιῶν ἐθελήσουσιν. DEM. viii. 38. (See also 278.)

276. Ἄγε and φέρε (251) sometimes introduce this construction. See examples above (273 and 274).

277. In a few cases the prohibition with ὅπως μή takes the form of a warning. Besides AESCH. Prom. 68 and EUR. Bacch. 367, quoted above, see XEN. Cyr. i. 3, 18, ὅπως σὺν μὴ ἀπολεί μαστιγούμενος, *look out that you are not flogged to death*. So PLAT. Prot. 313 C, quoted in 283.

278. Ὅπως μή with the future indicative or the subjunctive sometimes occurs in independent sentences implying a desire to avert something that is not desired, like μή with the subjunctive in Homer and sometimes in Attic Greek (261; 264). *E.g.*

Ὅπως μὴ αἰσχροὶ μὲν φανούμεθα ἀσθενεῖς δὲ ἐσόμεθα, *let us not appear base and be weak (as I fear we may)*. XEN. Cyr. iv. 2, 39. Ὅπως μὴ ἀναγκάσωμεν (so most Mss.) αὐτοὺς, κἂν μὴ βούλωνται, ἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι, *there is danger of our compelling them to become brave, even against their will*. Ib. iv. 1, 16. Καὶ ὅπως γε μηδὲ τὸ χωρίον ἡδέως ὀρώσιν ἔνθα κατέκανον ἡμῶν τοὺς συμμαχοὺς, *and let us not allow them even to enjoy the sight of the place where they slew our allies*. Ib. v. 4, 21. Ὅπως μὴ φήσῃ τις ἡμᾶς ἡδυνασθῆναι, *take care lest any one say of us, etc.* Id. Symp. iv. 8. Ἄλλ' ὅπως μὴ οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσομαι, προθυμούμενος δὲ γέλωτα ὀφλήσω, *but I am afraid that I shall not have the power, but that in my zeal I shall make myself ridiculous*. PLAT. Rep. 506 D. So Men. 77 A.

279. These cases (278) are analogous to those of ὅπως μή with the future indicative or the subjunctive after verbs of fearing, in place of the simple μή (370). They are also a connecting link between the subjunctive with μή in prohibitions and the rare future indicative with μή in the same sense; as ταύτην φυλάξετε τὴν πίστιν, καὶ μὴ βουλήσεσθε εἰδέναι, *hold fast to this security, and do not wish to know, etc.*, DEM. xxiii. 117 (see other examples in 70).

280. In a few cases ὅπως μή with the subjunctive expresses a cautious assertion, where the simple μή is generally used (265). *E.g.*

Καὶ ὅπως μὴ ἐν μὲν τοῖς ζωγραφήμασιν ἦ τοῦτο, *and it may be that this will prove true in the case of pictures.* PLAT. Crat. 430 D. Weber (p. 264) quotes HDT. vi. 85 for this sense: ὅκως ἐξ ὑστέρης μὴ τι ὑμῖν, ἣν ταῦτα ποιήσητε, πανώλεθρον κακὸν ἐς τὴν χώραν ἐμβάλωσι, *it is not unlikely that they will turn about and bring some fatal harm on your country*; but this can be understood like the examples in 278.

281. Ὡς ἂν σκοποῖ νῦν ἧτε τῶν εἰρημένων, *mind now and guard what I have said* (i.e. *be watchful to do it*), SOPH. Ant. 215, must be brought under this head (271). In the early stage of the Attic construction of ὅπως with the future, of which only two cases occur in Aeschylus and one in Sophocles (272), ὥς ἂν ἧτε was here used like ὅπως ἔσθε. Compare ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ὥς ἂν πραχθῇ, XEN. Hipp. ix. 2 (see 351).

282. In AR. Ach. 343 is the single case of ὅπως μή with a present tense, expressing a suspicion and apprehension concerning a present ground of fear: ἀλλ' ὅπως μὴ 'ν τοῖς τρίβωσιν ἐγκάθηνται πονεῖ λίθοι, *but I am afraid they now have stones hidden somewhere in their cloaks.* This bears the same relation to the common ὅπως μή with the future (272) that φοβοῦμαι μὴ πάσχουσιν, *I fear that they are suffering* (369, 1), bears to φοβοῦμαι μὴ πάσχωσιν, *I fear that they may suffer* (365); and the same that μὴ τοῦτο ἑατέον ἐστὶ (269) bears to μὴ σκεπτέον ἧ (265).

283. Positive independent sentences with ὅπως all have the future indicative, the regular form in dependent object clauses of this nature (339). Among the 33 independent clauses with ὅπως μή which are cited (excluding AR. Ach. 343) ten have the subjunctive, and four others have more or less Ms. support for the subjunctive. Of the ten, the two quoted in 280, and the three from Xenophon quoted in 278, are either in cautious assertions or in sentences implying fear or the averting of danger, where the subjunctive is the regular form. The other five express warning, and are quoted here:—

*Ὅπως δὲ τοῦτο μὴ διδάξης μηδένα, *but be sure that you teach this to nobody.* AR. Nub. 824. Καὶ ὅπως γε μὴ ὁ σοφιστὴς ἐξαπατήσῃ ἡμᾶς, *and do not let the sophist cheat us.* PLAT. Prot. 313 C. Ἄλλ' ὅπως μὴ τι ἡμᾶς σφήλῃ τὸ ἀεὶ τοῦτο. Id. Euthyd. 296 A. "Ὅπως μηδείᾱς σε πείσῃ, *do not let anybody persuade you*, etc. Id. Charm. 157 B. Καὶ ὅπως μὴ ποιήσῃτε ὁ πολλάκις ὑμᾶς ἐβλάψεν, *and see that you do not do what has often harmed you.* DEM. iv. 20.

Four of these subjunctives are of the σ- class, easily confounded with the future indicative, and the judgment of scholars on these has depended to a great extent upon their opinion about the admissibility of the subjunctive with ὅπως and ὅπως μή in dependent object clauses (339). This question will be discussed in 364. But it may fairly be claimed, independently of the main question, that these cases of ὅπως μὴ with the subjunctive in prohibitions are supported by the analogy of μὴ with the subjunctive in the same sense. Thus μὴ διδάξης, *do not teach*, makes ὅπως μὴ διδάξης in the same sense much more

natural than the positive ὅπως διδάξῃς would be, for which there is no such analogy and little or no Ms. authority. On this ground the examples are given above as they stand in the Mss.

SECTION III.

Subjunctive, like the Future Indicative, in Independent Sentences.—Interrogative Subjunctive.

HOMERIC SUBJUNCTIVE.

284. In the Homeric language the subjunctive (generally the aorist) may be used in independent sentences, with the force of a future indicative. The negative is οὐ. *E.g.*

Οὐ γάρ πω τοίους ἴδον ἀνέρας οὐδὲ ἴδωμαι, *for I never yet saw nor shall I ever see such men.* Il. i. 262. Ὑμῖν ἐν πάντεσσι περικλυτὰ δῶρ' ὀνομήνω, *I will enumerate the gifts before you all.* Il. ix. 121. Δύσομαι ἐς Ἀΐδαο καὶ ἐν νεκύεσσι φαείνω, *I will descend to Hades and shine among the dead (said by the Sun).* Od. xii. 383. (Here the future δύσομαι and the subjunctive φαείνω do not differ in force.) Μνήσομαι οὐδὲ λάθωμαι Ἀπόλλωνος ἑκάτοιο, *I will remember and will not forget the far-shooting Apollo.* Hymn. Ap. 1. Αὐτοῦ οἱ θάνατον μητίσομαι, οὐδέ νυ τόν γε γνωτοί τε γνωταί τε πυρὸς λελάχωσι θανόντα, *i.e. they shall not give his dead body the honour of a funeral pyre.* Il. xv. 349. Εἰ δέ κε τεθνηῶτος ἀκούσω, σῆμά τέ οἱ χεύω καὶ ἐπὶ κτέρεα κτερεῖξω, *I will raise a mound for him, and pay him funeral honours.* Od. ii. 222. Οὐ γάρ τίς με βίη γε ἐκὼν δέκοντα δίηται. Il. vii. 197. Καὶ ποτέ τις εἴπησιν, *and some one will say.* Il. vi. 459. (In vs. 462, referring to the same thing, we have ὥς ποτέ τις ἐρέει.) Οὐκ ἔσθ' οἶτος ἀνὴρ οὐδ' ἔσσεται οὐδὲ γένηται, ὅς κεν Τηλεμάχῳ σῶ νιεί χεῖρας ἐποίσει. Od. xvi. 437. Οὐδέ μιν ἀνστήσεις· πρὶν καὶ κακὸν ἄλλο πάθῃσθα, *nor will you bring him back to life; sooner will you suffer some new evil besides.* Il. xxiv. 551 (the only example of the second person).

285. This Homeric subjunctive, like the future indicative, is sometimes joined with *κέ* or *ἄν* in a potential sense. This enabled the earlier language to express an apodosis with a sense between that of the optative with *ἄν* and that of the simple future indicative, which the Attic was unable to do. (See 201 and 452.) *E.g.*

Εἰ δέ κε μὴ δώῃσιν, ἐγὼ δέ κεν αὐτὸς ἔλωμαι, *but if he does not give her up, I will take her myself.* Il. i. 324. (Here ἔλωμαι κεν has a shade of meaning between ἐλοίμην κεν, *I would take*, and αἰρήσομαι, *I*

will take, which neither Attic Greek nor English can express. See 235, end.) Τὴν μὲν πέμψω, ἐγὼ δὲ κ' ἄγω Βρισηίδα, *her I will send; but I shall take Briseis*. II. i. 184. Νῦν δ' ἄν πολλὰ πάθῃσι φίλου ἀπὸ πατρὸς ἁμαρτῶν, *but now he must suffer much*, etc. II. xxii. 505. *Ἦς ὑπεροπλίῃσι τάχ' ἂν ποτε θυμὸν ὀλέσσῃ, *by his own insolence he may perchance lose his life*. II. i. 205.

286. In the following cases the subjunctive and the optative with *κέ* or *ἂν* are contrasted:—

*Ἄλλον κ' ἐχθαίρῃσι βροτῶν, ἄλλον κε φιλοίῃ, *one mortal he (a king) will hate, and another he may love*. Od. iv. 692. Εἰ τίς σε ἴδοιτο, αὐτίκ' ἂν ἐξείποι Ἀγαμέμνονι, καὶ κεν ἀνάβλησις λύσιος νεκροῖο γένηται, *if any one should see you, he would straightway tell Agamemnon, and there might (may) be a postponement*, etc. II. xxiv. 653. Εἰ μὲν δὴ ἀντίβιον σὺν τεύχεσι πειρηθείης, οὐκ ἂν τοι χραίσμῃσι βῶς καὶ ταρφέες ἰοί. II. xi. 386. Compare ἦν χ' ὑμῖν σάφα εἶπω ὅτε πρότερός γε πυθοίμην, *(a message) which I will (would) tell you plainly so soon as I shall (should) hear it*, Od. ii. 43, with ἦν χ' ἡμῖν σάφα εἶποι ὅτε πρότερός γε πύθοιτο, ii. 31,—both referring to the same thing.

INTERROGATIVE SUBJUNCTIVE.

287. The first person of the subjunctive is used in *questions of appeal*, where the speaker asks himself or another *what he is to do*. The negative is *μή*. In Attic Greek this subjunctive is often introduced by *βούλει* or *βούλεσθε*, sometimes in poetry by *θέλεις* or *θέλετε*. *E.g.*

Εἶπω τοῦτο; *shall I say this?* or βούλει εἶπω τοῦτο; *do you wish that I should say this?* Μῆ τοῦτο ποιῶμεν (or ποιήσωμεν); *shall we not do this?* Τί εἶπω; or τί βούλεσθε εἶπω; *what shall I say? or what do you want me to say?*

Πῇ τ' ἄρ' ἐγὼ, φίλε τέκνον, ἴω; τεῦ δώμαθ' ἵκωμαι; ἢ ἰθὺς σῆς μητρὸς ἴω καὶ σοῖο δόμοιο; *whither shall I go? to whose house shall I come?* etc. Od. xv. 509. *Ἡ αὐτὸς κεύθω; φάσθαι δέ με θυμὸς ἀνώγει. Od. xxi. 194. *Ὡ Ζεῦ, τί λέξω; ποῖ φρενῶν ἔλθω, πάτερ; SOPH. O. C. 310. *Ὡμοι ἐγὼ, πᾶ βῶ; πᾶ στῶ; πᾶ κέλσω; EUR. Hec. 1056. Ποῖ τράπωμαι; ποῖ πορευθῶ; Ib. 1099. Εἶπω τι τῶν εἰωθότων, ὃ δέσποτα; *shall I make one of the regular jokes?* AR. Ran. 1. Τίνα γὰρ μάρτυρα μείζω παράσχωμαι; *i.e. how shall I bring forward a greater witness?* DEM. xix. 240. Μηδ', ἐάν τι ὀνώμαι, ἔρωμαι ὁπόσον πωλεῖ; *may I not ask, etc.?* Μηδ' ἀποκρίνωμαι οὐδ', ἂν τίς με ἐρωτᾷ νέος, ἐὰν εἰδῶ; *and may I not answer, etc.?* XEN. Mem. i. 2, 36. Μῆ ἀποκρίνωμαι, ἀλλ' ἕτερον εἶπω; PLAT. Rep. 337 B. So μὴ φῶμεν; Ib. 554 B. Μισθωσώμεθα οὐδ' κήρυκα, ἢ αὐτὸς ἀνείπω; Ib. 580 B. Μεθύνοντα ἄνδρα πάνν σφόδρα δέξεσθε συμπότην, ἢ ἀπίωμεν; *will you receive him, or shall we go away?* Id. Symp. 212 E. *Ἄρα μὴ αἰσχυνθῶμεν τὸν Περωσὺν βασιλέα μιμή-

σασθαι; shall we then be ashamed to imitate the king of the Persians? —we shall not be ashamed; shall we? XEN. Oec. iv. 4.

Ποῦ δὲ βούλει καθιζόμενοι ἀναγνῶμεν; where wilt thou that we sit down and read? PLAT. Phaedr. 228 E. (So ib. 263 E.) Βούλει οὖν ἐπισκοπῶμεν ὅπου ἡδὴ τὸ δυνατόν ἐστι; XEN. Mem. iii. 5, 1. Βούλει λάβωμαι δῆτα καὶ θίγω τί σου; SOPH. Phil. 761. Βούλεσθ' ἐπεισπείσωμεν; EUR. Hec. 1042. Θέλεις μείνωμεν αὐτοῦ ἀνακακούσωμεν γόνων; SOPH. El. 81. Τί σοι θέλεις δῆτ' εἰκάθω; Id. O. T. 650. Θέλετε θηρασώμεθα Πενθῶς Ἀγαύην μητέρ' ἐκ βακχευμάτων, χάριν τ' ἀνακτι θῶμεν; EUR. Bacch. 719. Βούλεσθε τὸ δλον πρᾶγμα ἀφῶμεν καὶ μὴ ζητῶμεν; AESCHIN. i. 73.

So with κελεύετε: Ἀλλὰ πῶς; εἶπω κελεύετε καὶ οὐκ ὀργεῖσθε; do you command me to speak, and will you not be angry? DEM. ix. 46.

In PLAT. Rep. 372 E, we find εἰ δ' αὖ βούλεσθε καὶ φλεγμαίνουσαν πόλιν θεωρήσωμεν, οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει, but if, again, you will have us examine an inflamed state, there is nothing to prevent. This shows that βούλεσθε is not parenthetical, but is felt to be the leading verb on which the subjunctive depends (see 288). In Phaed. 95 E, ἵνα μὴ τι διαφύγῃ ἡμᾶς, εἰ τέ τι βούλει προσθῆς ἢ ἀφέλῃς, the subjunctives may depend on ἵνα.

288. Εἰ βούλεσθε θεωρήσωμεν, if you wish us to examine, quoted in 287, shows that we have in βούλεσθε with the subjunctive a *parataxis* not yet developed into a leading and a dependent clause. It is probable that nothing like this was felt in the simple subjunctive as it is found in Homer. The original interrogative subjunctive is probably the interrogative form corresponding to the subjunctive in exhortations (256); ἔλθωμεν, let us go, becoming ἔλθωμεν; shall we go? (See Kühner, § 394, 5.) When βούλει and βούλεσθε were first introduced in appeals to others, the two questions were doubtless felt to be distinct; as βούλεσθε; εἶπω; do you wish? shall I speak?—which were gradually welded into one, do you wish that I speak? Compare in Latin cave facias,—visne hoc videamus? etc. No conjunction could be introduced to connect βούλει or θέλεις to the subjunctive in classic Greek, as these verbs could have only the infinitive; but in later Greek, where ἵνα could be used after θέλω, the construction was developed into θέλετε ἵνα εἶπω; do you wish me to speak? See πάντα ὅσα ἂν θέλητε ἵνα ποιῶσιν ὑμῖν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, N. T. MATTH. vii. 12. So θέλω ἵνα δῶς μοι τὴν κεφαλὴν Ἰωάννου τοῦ βαπτιστοῦ, MARC. vi. 25. These forms appear in the New Testament side by side with the old construction without ἵνα; as τί σοι θέλεις ποιήσω; what wilt thou that I should do unto thee? with the answer, ἵνα ἀναβλέψω, that I may receive my sight, LUC. xviii. 41. So βούλεσθε ὑμῖν ἀπολύσω τὸν βασιλεῦ τῶν Ἰουδαίων; IOH. xviii. 39.

From θέλετε ἵνα εἶπω; comes the modern Greek θέλετε νὰ εἶπω; will you that I speak? and probably also the common future θὰ εἶπω, I shall speak (if θά represents θέλω νά).

289. The *third* person of the subjunctive is sometimes used in these questions of appeal, but less frequently than the first, and chiefly when a speaker refers to himself by *τις*. *E.g.*

Πότερόν σέ τις, Αἰσχίνη, τῆς πόλεως ἐχθρόν ἢ ἐμὸν εἶναι φῆ; *i.e. shall we call you the city's enemy, or mine?* DEM. xviii. 124. Ἐἴτα ταῦθ' οἶτοι πεισθῶσιν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν σε ποιεῖν, καὶ τὰ τῆς σῆς πονηρίας ἔργα ἐφ' ἑαυτοὺς ἀναδέξωνται; *i.e. are these men to believe, etc.; and are they to assume, etc.?* Id. xxii. 64. Τί τις εἶναι τοῦτο φῆ; Id. xix. 88. Πῶς τίς τοι πείθεται; *how can any one obey you?* II. i. 150. Θύγατερ, ποῖ τις φροντίδος ἔλθῃ; SOPH. O. C. 170. Ποῖ τις οὖν φύγῃ; Id. Aj. 403. Πόθεν οὖν τις ταύτης ἀρξήται μάχης; PLAT. Phil. 15 D.

Πῶς οὖν ἔτ' εἴπῃς ὅτι συνέσταλμαι κακοῖς; EUR. H. F. 1417, the only case of the second person, is probably corrupt. Dindorf reads ἂν εἴποις.

290. The subjunctive is often used in the question τί πάθω; *what will become of me?* or *what harm will it do me?* literally, *what shall I undergo?* *E.g.*

Ἄν μοι ἐγὼ, τί πάθω; τί νύ μοι μήκιστα γένηται; Od. v. 465. So II. xi. 404. Τί πάθω; τί δὲ δρῶ; τί δὲ μήσωμαι; AESCH. Sept. 1057. Τί πάθω τλήμων; Id. Pers. 912; AR. Pl. 603. Τί πάθω; τί δὲ μήσωμαι; οἶμοι. SOPH. Tr. 973. Τὸ μέλλον, εἰ χρὴ, πείσομαι. τί γὰρ πάθω; *I shall suffer what is to come, if it must be; for what harm can it do me?* EUR. Ph. 895. (The difference between τί πάθω; and πάσχω in its ordinary use is here seen.) Ὁμολόγηκα. τί γὰρ πάθω; PLAT. Euthyd. 302 D. So in the plural, τί γὰρ πάθωμεν μὴ βουλομένων ὑμῶν τιμωρεῖν; HDT. iv. 118.

291. (Negative μὴ.) The negative μὴ of the interrogative subjunctive is explained by the origin of the construction (288). If ἔλθωμεν; *shall we go?* is the interrogative of ἔλθωμεν, *let us go*, then μὴ ἔλθωμεν; *shall we not go?* is the interrogative of μὴ ἔλθωμεν, *let us not go*, and implies (addressed to others) *do you wish not to have us go?* This is still more evident when βούλεσθε is prefixed to the subjunctive (288). Similar to this interrogative form of the subjunctive of exhortation is the rare interrogative imperative (also negated by μὴ); as ἂν ὁ μετὰ τέχνης γράψας ἀφίκηται, μὴ ἐξέστω δὲ ἕτερα προστάττειν; *i.e. is he not to be allowed to give other orders?* PLAT. Polit. 295 E, where μὴ ἐξέστω; is the interrogative of μὴ ἐξέστω, *let him not be allowed*, as μὴ ἔλθωμεν; (above) is that of μὴ ἔλθωμεν, *let us not go*. See also the indirect question in PLAT. Leg. 800 E, ἐπανερωτῶ πάλιν, τῶν ἐκμαγείων ταῖς ὁδαῖς εἰ πρῶτον ἐν τοῦθ' ἡμῖν ἀρέσκον κείσθω, *I ask again, whether first this is to stand approved by us as one of our models for songs*. We cannot express such an imperative precisely in English; and there is the same difficulty with οἶσθ' ὁ δρᾶσον; etc., in 253. See also ὥστε with imperative forms (602).

292. 1. When the future indicative is used in the sense of the

interrogative subjunctive (68), it may be negated by μὴ; as πῶς οὖν μῆτε ψεύσομαι φανερώς; *how then shall I escape telling an open lie?* (where there is some Ms. authority for ψεύσωμαι), DEM. xix. 320 (see Shilleto's note).

2. A similar use of μὴ is found with the potential optative (with ἄν) in questions, if the idea of *prevention* is involved in it; as τί οὖν οὐ σκοποῦμεν πῶς ἂν αὐτῶν μὴ διαμαρτάνοιμεν; *why then do we not consider how we can avoid mistaking them?* (the direct question here would differ little from πῶς μὴ διαμαρτάνωμεν;). XEN. Mem. iii. 1, 10. So πῶς ἂν τις μὴ θυμῷ λέγοι περὶ θεῶν; *how can one help being excited when he speaks of Gods?* PLAT. Leg. 887 C. Sometimes such an optative with μὴ is in a second clause, preceded by a positive question, so that the harshness of μὴ ἄν with the optative is avoided; as τί ἂν λέγοντες εἰκὺς ἢ αὐτοὶ ἀποκνοῖμεν ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἐκεῖ ξυμμάχους σκηπτόμενοι μὴ βοηθοῖμεν; i.e. *what good ground can we give for holding back ourselves, or what decent excuse can we make to our allies there for withholding our aid from them?* THUC. vi. 18. So τίνα ἂν τρόπον ἐγὼ μέγα δυναίμην καὶ μηδεὶς με ἀδικοῖ; *in what way can I have great power and prevent any one from doing me wrong?* PLAT. Gorg. 510 D. See also ISOC. v. 8, xv. 6. In DEM. xxi. 35, πότερα μὴ δῶ διὰ τοῦτο δίκην ἢ μείζω δολίη δικαίως; *shall he escape punishment for this, or would he rather deserve a still greater penalty?*—δολίη is used as if οὐκ ἂν δολίη had preceded (Schaefer inserts καὶ).

In PLAT. Phaed. 106 D is the singular expression, σχολῇ γὰρ ἂν τι ἄλλο φθορὰν μὴ δέχοιτο, εἴ γε τὸ ἀθάνατον αἰδίων ὃν φθορὰν δέξεται, *for hardly can anything else escape from admitting destruction if the immortal, which is eternal, is to admit it.* This differs from the preceding interrogative examples merely in the substitution of σχολῇ, *hardly*, for πῶς or τίνα τρόπον.

293. As οὐ cannot be used with the interrogative subjunctive, μὴ here sometimes introduces a question which expects an affirmative answer. See XEN. Mem. i. 2, 36, and PLAT. Rep. 337 B, 554 B, quoted in 287; and compare XEN. Oec. iv. 4 (ibid.), where a negative answer is expected. In PLAT. Rep. 552 E, we must read μὴ οἴωμεθα (not οἴομεθα, Herm.), *shall we not think?* as the answer must be affirmative (see Stallbaum's note).

SECTION IV.

Οὐ μὴ with the Subjunctive and the Future Indicative.

294. The subjunctive and the future indicative are used with the double negative οὐ μὴ in independent sentences, sometimes expressing a denial, like the future indicative

with οὐ, and sometimes a prohibition, like the imperative or subjunctive with μὴ. The compounds of both οὐ and μὴ can be used here as well as the simple forms.

For a discussion of the origin of this construction, and of the relation of the sentences of denial to those of prohibition, see Appendix II.

295. (Denial.) The subjunctive (usually the aorist), and sometimes the future indicative, with οὐ μὴ may have the force of an emphatic future with οὐ. Thus οὐ μὴ τοῦτο γένηται, sometimes οὐ μὴ τοῦτο γενήσεται, means *this surely will not happen*. *E.g.*

(Aor. Subj.) Καὶ τῶνδ' ἀκούσας οὗ τι μὴ ληφθῶ δόλω, *I shall not be caught by any trick*. AESCH. Sept. 38. So Sept. 199, Supp. 228. Οὐ μὴ πίθεται, *he will not obey*. SOPH. Ph. 103. Οὐ γάρ σε μὴ γνῶσι. Id. El. 42. Καὶ οὗ τι μὴ λάχωσι τοῦδε συμμάχου. Id. O. C. 450. Οὔτοι σ' Ἀχαιῶν, οἶδα, μὴ τις ὑβρίσῃ. Id. Aj. 560. 'Ο δ' οὐ πάρεστιν, οὐδὲ μὴ μόλῃ ποτέ, *but he is not here, and he never will come*. EUR. H. F. 718. Κοῦ μὴ ποθ' ἄλῳ. AR. Ach. 662. Τῶν ἦν κρατήσωμεν, οὐ μὴ τις ἡμῖν ἄλλος στρατὸς ἀντιστῇ κοτε ἀνθρώπων. HDT. vii. 53. So i. 199. Οὐ μὴ ποτε ἐσβάλωσιν. THUC. iv. 95; cf. v. 69. Οὐ μὴ σε κρύψω πρὸς ὄντινα βούλομαι ἀφικέσθαι. XEN. Cyr. vii. 3, 13. 'Ὡς οἱ Ἀρμένιοι οὐ μὴ δέξωνται τοὺς πολεμίους. Ib. iii. 2, 8 (see 296, b). 'Αν καθώμεθα οἴκοι, οὐδέποτε οὐδὲν ἡμῖν οὐ μὴ γένηται τῶν δεόντων. DEM. iv. 44; so ix. 75. Οὔτε γὰρ γίγνεται οὔτε γέγονεν οὐδὲ οὐδὲν μὴ γένηται ἀλλοίον ἦθος πρὸς ἀρετήν; *for there is not, nor has there been, nor will there ever be, etc.* PLAT. Rep. 492 E. (Here οὐδὲ μὴ γένηται seems merely more emphatic than the ordinary οὐδὲ γενήσεται.)

(Aor. Subj. 2d Pers.) Οὐ γάρ τι μᾶλλον μὴ φύγῃς τὸ μόρσιμον, *for you shall none the more escape your fate*. AESCH. Sept. 281. 'Ἄλλ' οὐ ποτ' ἐξ ἐμοῦ γε μὴ πάθῃς τόδε. SOPH. El. 1029. Οὐ μὴ ποτ' ἐς τὴν Σκύρον ἐκπλεύσῃς ἔχων. Id. Ph. 381. 'Ἄλλ' οὗ τι μὴ φύγητε λαίψηφ' ποδῖ. EUR. Hec. 1039. Κοῦχί μὴ παύσῃσθε, *you will never cease*. AR. Lys. 704.

(Pres. Subj.) 'Ἦν γὰρ ἅπαξ δύο ἢ τριῶν ἡμερῶν ὁδὸν ἀπόσχωμεν, οὐκέτι μὴ δύνηται βασιλεὺς ἡμᾶς καταλαβεῖν. XEN. An. ii. 2, 12. So οὐ μὴ δύνωνται. Id. Hier. xi. 15. Πρὸς ταῦτα κακούργει καὶ συκοφάντει, εἴ τι δύνασαι· ἀλλ' οὐ μὴ οἶός τ' εἶς, *but you will not be able*. PLAT. Rep. 341 B. Οὐ γὰρ μὴ δυνατός ᾧ. Id. Phil. 48 D. In the much-discussed passage, SOPH. O. C. 1023, ἄλλοι γὰρ οἱ σπεύδοντες, οὓς οὐ μὴ ποτε χώρας φυγόντες τῆσδ' ἐπεύχωνται θεοῖς, *for there are others in eager pursuit; and they (the captors) will never (be in a condition to) be thankful to the Gods for escaping these and getting out of this land*, the chief force is in φυγόντες, as if it were οὐ μὴ φύγωσι ὥστε ἐπεύχεσθαι θεοῖς, the present subjunctive expressing a state of thankfulness.

(*Put. Ind.*) Οὐ σοι μὴ μεθέψομαί ποτε. SOPH. EL. 1052. Οὐ τοι μὴποτέ σ' ἐκ τῶν ἐδράνων, ὦ γέρον, ἄκοντά τις ἄξει. ID. O. C. 176; so οὐκ οὖν μὴ ὁδοπορήσεις, O. C. 848. Μὰ τὸν Ἀπόλλω οὐ μὴ σ' ἐγὼ περιόψομαί πελθόντ' (i.e. περιόψομαι ἀπελθόντα). AR. Ran. 508. Τοὺς ποιηροὺς οὐ μὴ ποτε βελτίους ποιήσεται. AESCHIN. iii. 177.

296. Οὐ μὴ with the subjunctive or the future indicative can stand in various dependent sentences:—

(a) Especially in indirect discourse; as εἰ γὰρ οἶδ' σαφῶς ὅτι ταῦθ' . . . οὐ μὴ πῖλάθη. AR. Pac. 1302. So XEN. Cyr. viii. 1, 5, Hell. iv. 2, 3; PLAT. Rep. 499 B. See also THUC. v. 69. We have οὐ μὴ with the future optative after ὥς, representing the future indicative of the direct form, in SOPH. Ph. 611: τά τ' ἄλλα πάντ' ἐθέσπισεν, καὶ τὰπὶ Τροίας πέργαμ' ὥς οὐ μὴ ποτε πέρσοιεν εἰ μὴ τόνδε ἄγουιτο. (The direct discourse was οὐ μὴ ποτε πέρσετε ἐὰν μὴ τόνδε ἄγοιθε.) In a similar construction in XEN. Hell. i. 6, 32, the future indicative is retained after a past tense: εἶπεν ὅτι ἡ Σπάρτη οὐδὲν μὴ κάκιον οἰκίεῖται αὐτοῦ ἀποθανόντος. In EUR. Phoen. 1590, we have the future infinitive of indirect discourse with οὐ μὴ: εἶπε Τειρεσίας οὐ μὴ ποτε, σοῦ τήνδε γῆν οἰκοῦντος, εἰ πράξειεν πόλιν, representing οὐ μὴ εἰ πράξει πόλις.

(b) In causal sentences with ὥς; as AR. Av. 461: λέγε θαρρήσας, ὥς τὰς σπονδὰς οὐ μὴ πρότερον παραβῶμεν, *for we will not break the truce before you have spoken.* So XEN. Cyr. iii. 2, 8 (see 295).

(c) In consecutive sentences with ὥστε; as PLAT. Phaedr. 227 D: οὕτως ἐπιτεθύμῃκα ἀκοῦσαι, ὥστ', ἐὰν ποιῇ τὸν περίπατον Μέγαράδε, οὐ μὴ σου ἀπολειφθῶ.

In AESCH. Ag. 1640, τὸν δέ μὴ πειθάνορα ζεύξω βαρείαις οὔτι μὴ σειραφόρον κριθῶντα πῶλον, *and I will yoke him who is not obedient under a heavy yoke*, (and I will let him run) *by no means as a wanton colt in traces*, οὔτι μὴ belongs grammatically to ζεύξω, though its position makes it affect the following words in sense: cf. καὶ μὴν τόδ' εἰπέ μὴ παρὰ γνώμην ἐμοί, Ag. 931, where the force of μὴ falls on the words that follow it. See Paley's note on Ag. 1640 (1618).

297. (*Prohibition.*) In the dramatic poets, the second person singular of the future indicative (occasionally of the subjunctive) with οὐ μὴ may express a strong *prohibition*. Thus οὐ μὴ λαλήσεις means *you shall not prate*, or *do not prate*, being nearly equivalent to μὴ λάλει or μὴ λαλήσης. *E.g.*

ᾧ παῖ, τί θροεῖς; οὐ μὴ παρ' ὄχλῳ τάδε γηρύσει, *do not (I beg you) speak out in this way before the people.* EUR. Hipp. 213. ᾧ θύγατερ, οὐ μὴ μῦθον ἐπὶ πολλοὺς ἐρεῖς. ID. Supp. 1066. Οὐ μὴ γυναικῶν δειλὸν εἰσοίσσεις λόγον, *do not adopt the cowardly language of women.* ID. And. 757. Οὐ μὴ ἐξεγερεῖς τὸν ὕπνῳ κάτοχον κάκ-

κινήσεις κάνασθήσεις φοιτάδα δεινὴν νόσον, ὃ τέκνον, *do not wake him and arouse, etc.* SOPH. Tr. 978. (Here οὐ μὴ belongs to three verbs.) Τί ποιεῖς; οὐ μὴ καταβήσῃ, *don't come down.* AR. Vesp. 397. Ποῖος Ζεὺς; οὐ μὴ ληρήσῃς· οὐδ' ἔστι Ζεὺς, *Zeus indeed! Don't talk nonsense; there isn't any Zeus.* Id. Nub. 367. (Here all Mss. have ληρήσῃς. See Nub. 296, quoted in 298; and section 301 below.)

298. A prohibition thus begun by οὐ μὴ with the future or subjunctive may be continued by *μηδέ* with another future form. An affirmative command may be added to the prohibition by a future or an imperative with *ἀλλά* or *δέ*. *E.g.*

Οὐ μὴ καλεῖς μ', ὀνθροῦ, ἱκετεύω, *μηδὲ κατερεῖς τοῦνομα, do not call to me, I implore you, nor speak my name.* AR. Ran. 298. Οὐ μὴ προσοίσεις χεῖρα *μηδ'* ἄψει πέπλων, *do not bring your hand near me nor touch my garments.* EUR. Hipp. 606. Οὐ μὴ προσοίσεις χεῖρα, βακχεύσεις δ' ἰὼν, *μηδ'* ἐξομόρξει μωρίαν τὴν σὴν ἐμοί, *do not bring your hand near me; but go and rage, and do not wipe off your folly on me.* Id. Bacch. 343. (Here *μηδέ* continues the original prohibition as if there had been no interruption.)

Οὐ μὴ λαλήσεις, ἀλλ' ἀκολουθήσεις ἐμοί, *do not prate, but follow me.* AR. Nub. 505. Οὐ μὴ διατρίψεις, ἀλλὰ γεύσει τῆς θύρας, *do not delay, but taste of the door.* Id. Ran. 462. Οὐ μὴ φλυαρήσεις ἔχων, ὃ Ξανθία, ἀλλ' ἀράμενος οἴσεις πάλιν τὰ στρώματα. Ib. 524. Οὐ μὴ δυσμενὴς ἔσει φίλοις, παύσει δὲ θυμοῦ καὶ πάλιν στρέψεις κάρα, . . . δέξει δὲ δῶρα καὶ παραιτήσῃ πατρός, *be not inimical to friends, but cease your rage, etc.* EUR. Med. 1151. Οὐ μὴ σκώψῃς *μηδὲ ποιήσῃς* (so all the Mss.) ἅπερ οἱ τρυγοδαίμονες σδοῖ, ἀλλ' εὐφήμει, *do not scoff, nor do what these wretches do; but keep silence!* AR. Nub. 296. (Here the imperative is used precisely like the future with *ἀλλά* or *δέ* in the preceding examples.)

The clause with *μηδέ* is here a continuation of that with οὐ μὴ, οὐ belonging to both. The future in the clause with *ἀλλά* or *δέ* is like that in πάντως τοῦτο δράσεις, *by all means do this*, AR. Nub. 1352 (see 69). A single οὐ μὴ may introduce a prohibition consisting of several futures connected by *καί*, as in SOPH. Tr. 978 (quoted in 297).

299. Sometimes οὐ with the future indicative in a question implying an affirmative answer (thus equivalent to an exhortation) is followed by *μὴ* or *μηδέ* with the future in a question implying a negative answer (and thus equivalent to a prohibition). Here there is no case of οὐ μὴ. *E.g.*

Οὐ σῖγ' ἀνέξει, *μηδὲ δειλίαν ἀρεῖς*; *will you not keep silence, and not become a coward?* SOPH. Aj. 75. (Here *μὴ δειλίαν ἀρεῖς*; is an independent question, *will you be a coward? = do not be a coward.*) Οὐ θῶσον οἴσεις, *μηδ'* ἀπιστήσεις ἐμοί; *will you not extend your hand and not distrust me?* Id. Tr. 1183. Οὐκ εἶ σύ τ' οἶκος, σύ τε Κρέων κατὰ στέγας, καὶ μὴ τὸ *μηδὲν ἄλλος εἰς μέγ' οἴσεται*; Id. O. T. 637.

300. All the examples under 297 and 298 are usually printed as interrogative, in accordance with Elmsley's doctrine, stated in his note to *EUR. Med.* 1120 (1151) and in the *Quarterly Review* for June 1812. He explains οὐ μὴ λαλήσεις; as meaning *will you not stop prating?* (lit. *will you not not prate?*); and when a second clause in the future with μηδέ or ἀλλά follows, he extends the interrogative force of οὐ also to this. But this explanation requires an entirely different theory to account for οὐ μὴ in clauses of denial (295), where no question is possible. Moreover, the five examples of the second person of the subjunctive quoted under 295, taken in connection with those in 297 and 298, are sufficient to show the impossibility of separating the two constructions in explanation. One of the examples in 298 (*AR. Nub.* 296), where the imperative εὐφύμει follows in the clause with ἀλλά, seems decisive against the interrogative theory. The examples under 299 are really interrogative; but they consist practically of an exhortation followed by a prohibition (both being interrogative), and contain no construction with οὐ μὴ at all.

301. In most modern editions of the classics the subjunctive is not found in the construction of 297; and in many cases the first aorist subjunctive in -σῃς has been emended to the future, against the authority of the Mss., in conformity to Dawes's rule. (See 364.) Thus, in *AR. Nub.* 296 and 367 the Mss. have the subjunctive; and in 296, οὐ μὴ σκώψῃς could not be changed to οὐ μὴ σκώψεις, as the future of σκώπτω is σκώσομαι. Elmsley's emendation σκώψει, which is adopted by most editors, requires a greater change than should be made merely to sustain an arbitrary rule, which rests on no apparent principle. If both constructions (295 and 297) are explained on the same principle, there is no longer any reason for objecting to the subjunctive with οὐ μὴ in prohibitions; and it seems most probable that both future indicative and subjunctive were allowed in both constructions, but that the subjunctive was more common in clauses of denial, and the future in clauses of prohibition.

SECTION V.

Final and Object Clauses after "ἵνα, 'ὧς, "ὅπως, "ὅφρα, and Μή.

CLASSIFICATION.—NEGATIVES.

302. The final particles are ἵνα, ὧς, ὅπως, and (in epic and lyric poetry) ὅφρα, *that, in order that*. To these must be added μή, *lest*, which became in use a negative final particle.

303. The clauses which are introduced by these particles, all of which are sometimes called *final clauses*, may be divided into three classes:—

A. Pure final clauses, in which the end or purpose of the action of any verb may be expressed; as *ἔρχεται ἵνα τοῦτο ἴδῃ*, *he is coming that he may see this*; *ἀπέρχεται ἵνα μὴ τοῦτο ἴδῃ*, *he is departing that he may not see this*; *ἦλθεν ἵνα τοῦτο ἴδοι*, *he came that he might see this*. Here all the final particles are used, but with different frequency in various classes of writers (see 311-314).

B. Object clauses with *ὅπως* or *ὅπως μὴ* after verbs of *striving*, etc.; as *σκόπει ὅπως γενήσεται*, *see that it happens*; *σκόπει ὅπως μὴ γενήσεται*, *see that it does not happen*. These clauses express the direct object of the verb of *striving*, etc., so that they may stand in apposition to an object accusative like *τοῦτο*; as *σκόπει τοῦτο, ὅπως μὴ σε ὄψεται*, *see to this, viz., that he does not see you*. They also imply the end or purpose of the action of the leading verb, and to this extent they partake of the nature of final clauses.

C. Clauses with *μή* after verbs of *fearing*, etc.; as *φοβοῦμαι μὴ τοῦτο γένηται*, *I fear that this may happen*; *έφοβήθη μὴ τοῦτο γένοιτο*, *he feared that this might happen*. These clauses have in use become object clauses, though in their origin they are of a very different nature (262; 307).

304. Although the object clauses of class B partake slightly of the nature of final clauses, so that they sometimes allow the same construction (the subjunctive for the future indicative), still the distinction between classes A and B is very strongly marked. An object clause, as we have seen, can stand in apposition to a preceding *τοῦτο*; whereas a final clause would stand in apposition to *τούτου ἕνεκα*, as *ἔρχεται τούτου ἕνεκα, ἵνα ἡμῖν βοηθήσῃ*, *he comes for this purpose, viz., that he may assist us*. The two can be combined in one sentence; as *σπουδάζει ὅπως πλουτήσῃ, ἵνα τοὺς φίλους εὖ ποιῇ*, *he is eager to be rich, that he may benefit his friends*.

Care must be taken not to mistake the nature of an object clause with *ὅπως* when its subject is attracted by the leading verb; as *σκόπει τὴν πόλιν ὅπως σωθήσεται* for *σκόπει ὅπως ἡ πόλις σωθήσεται*, *see that the city is saved*. So also when an object clause of the active construction becomes a subject clause in the equivalent passive form; as *ἐπράττετο ὅπως συμμαχίαν εἶναι ψηφιεῖσθε*, *it was brought about that*

you should vote to have an alliance made (AESCHIN. iii. 64), which represents the active construction ἔπαρτον ὅπως ψηφιεῖσθε.

305. The regular negative after ἵνα, ὥς, ὅπως, and ὅφρα is μή; but after μή, *lest*, οὐ is used. *E.g.*

Ἀπέρχεται, ἵνα μὴ τοῦτο ἴδῃ, *he is departing that he may not see this.*
Φοβεῖται μὴ οὐ τοῦτο γένηται, *he is afraid that this may not happen.*

306. This use of μὴ οὐ (305) occurs in Homer in a few final clauses (263) and once after δεῖδω (II. x. 39). After this it is confined to clauses after verbs of fearing, with the exception of XEN. Mem. ii. 2, 14, Cyneg. vii. 10, and the peculiar μὴ οὐκ ἐπαρκέσοι in PLAT. Rep. 393 E (132). This use of οὐ after μὴ is naturally explained by the origin of the dependent clause with μὴ (262); but after μὴ had come to be felt as a conjunction and its origin was forgotten, the chief objection to μὴ . . . μὴ was probably in the sound, and we find a few cases of it where the two particles are so far apart that the repetition is not offensive. Such a case is XEN. Mem. i. 2, 7: ἐθαύμαζε δ' εἴ τις φοβοῖτο μὴ ὁ γονόμενος καλὸς κάγαθος τῷ τὰ μέγιστα εὐεργετήσαντι μὴ τὴν μεγίστην χάριν ἔξοι, where we should expect μὴ οὐχ ἔξοι. So THUC. ii. 13: ὑποτοπήσας μὴ . . . παραλίπη καὶ μὴ δηώσῃ. So in a final clause, μὴ . . . μὴ προσδέχοιτο, PLAT. Euthyd. 295 D.

DEVELOPMENT OF CLAUSES WITH ἵνα, ὥς, ὅπως, ὅφρα, AND μί.

307. The development of final clauses and of clauses with μί after verbs of fearing from an original *parataxis*, or co-ordination of two independent sentences, is especially plain in dependent negative clauses with the simple μί. Thus ἀπόστιχε, μί τι νόσησῃ Ἥρῃ, *withdraw, lest Hera notice anything* (II. i. 522), presents the form of an original paratactic expression, which would mean *withdraw:—may not (or let not) Hera notice anything*, the latter clause being like μί δὴ νῆας ἔλωσι, *may they not take the ships* (II. xvi. 128), and μί δὴ μοι τελέσωσι θεοὶ κακὰ κήδεα (II. xviii. 8). (See 261.) Such sentences as these last imply fear or anxiety lest the event may happen which μί with the subjunctive expresses a desire to avert; and in a primitive stage of the language they might naturally be preceded by a verb of fearing, to which the (still independent) subjunctive with μί would stand in the relation of an explanatory clause defining the substance of the fear. Thus δεῖδω—μί νῆας ἔλωσι would originally be two independent sentences, *I fear:—may they not take the ships*; but would in time come to be felt as a single sentence, equivalent to our *I fear that (lest) they may take the ships*. After φοβοῦμαι μί τοῦτο πάθωσιν (for example) was domesticated in the sense *I fear lest they may suffer this*, the second clause followed the ordinary course, and began to be felt as a thoroughly dependent clause; and when

the leading verb became past, the subjunctive became optative, as ἐφοβήθην μὴ τοῦτο πάθοιεν, *I feared lest they might suffer this*. When this stage is reached, all feeling of the original independence may be said to have vanished and a dependent clause is fully established. As this decisive evidence of complete dependence is constantly found in the Homeric language, we cannot suppose that such an expression as δίδωκα μὴ τι πάθωσιν (Il. x. 538) was still felt to be composed of two independent sentences, although the original paratactic form is precisely preserved. Indeed, we have no evidence that the step from parataxis to hypotaxis was taken after the Greek language had an independent existence.¹

308. It was a simple and natural step to extend the construction thus established to present and past objects of fear, although we cannot assume for the primitive language such independent indicatives with μὴ as we find later (see 269). In Homer we find δίδω μὴ θεὰ νημερτέα εἶπεν, *I fear that the Goddess spoke the truth* (Od. v. 300). This use was greatly extended in Attic Greek (see 369).

309. This simple construction of a dependent verb introduced by μὴ with no connecting conjunction remained the established form after verbs of fearing in all periods of the language; and occasional exceptions, like μὴ φοβοῦ ὡς ἀπορήσεις, *do not fear that you will be at a loss* (371), οὐ φοβεῖ ὅπως μὴ ἀνόστων πρᾶγμα τυγχάνης πράττων; (370), and οὐ φοβούμεθα ἐλασσώσεσθαι, *we are not afraid that we shall have the worst of it* (372), in place of the regular μὴ ἀπορήσης, μὴ τυγχάνης, μὴ ἐλασσωθῶμεν, only prove the rule. The original independent sentence with μὴ, expressing an object of fear which it is desired to avert, like μὴ νῆας ἔλωσι, is well established in Homer and appears occasionally in the Attic poets (261; 264). But in Plato it suddenly appears as a common construction, expressing, however, not an object of fear but an object of suspicion or surmise (265), so that μὴ with the subjunctive is a cautious expression of a direct assertion; as μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἢ τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, *I rather think the truth may be too rude to tell* (Gorg. 462 E).

310. In like manner, the simple negative form of the pure final clause, as ἀπόστιχε, μὴ τι νοήσῃ Ἥρη (quoted above), was already established in Homer, the negative μὴ serving as a connective, so that the want of a final conjunction was not felt. Here also the feeling of dependence is shown by the subjunctive becoming optative when the leading verb is past; as in φείδομαι μὴ τίς με ἴδῃ and ἐφυγον μὴ τίς με ἴδῃ. But it is obvious that

¹ See Brugmann, *Griechische Grammatik*, p. 122.

only negative purpose could be expressed by this simple form, in which μή could serve as a connective. We find, it is true, a few positive sentences in which a purpose is implied by the mere sequence of two clauses; as ἀλλ' ἄγε νῦν ἰθὺς κίε Νέστορος ἱποδάμοιο· εἶδομεν (subj.) ἦν τινα μῆτιν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι κέκευθεν, i.e. *go straightway to Nestor: let us know what counsel he buries in his breast* (Od. iii. 17), and θάπτε με ὅτι τάχιστα· πύλας Αἴδαο περήσω, *bury me as quickly as possible: let me pass the gates of Hades* (Il. xxiii. 71). But these disconnected expressions, with no particle to unite them, could never satisfy the need of a positive sentence of purpose. To supply this want, several final particles were developed, and were already in familiar use in Homer. These are ἵνα, ὥς, ὅπως, and ὅφρα, which will be discussed separately.

311. ("Ινα.) Ἴνα is the only purely final particle, having nothing of the relative character of ὥς and ὅπως, or of the temporal character of ὅφρα. Its derivation is uncertain. It appears in Homer as a fully developed final conjunction, and occasionally also in the sense of *where* (Od. ix. 136) and *whither* (Od. xix. 20). It is overshadowed in epic and lyric poetry by ὅφρα, and in tragedy by ὥς; but Aristophanes uses it in three-fourths of his final sentences, and in Plato and the orators it has almost exterminated the other final particles. As ἵνα is purely final, both in use and in feeling, it never takes ἄν or κέ, which are frequently found with the other final particles, especially with the relative ὥς.

312. (Ὡς.) 1. Ὡς is originally an adverb of manner, derived from the stem ὁ- of the relative ὅς, like οὕτως from the stem of οἶτος. As a relative it means originally *in which way, as*; as an indirect interrogative it means *how*, whence comes its use in indirect discourse (663, 2). Since purpose can be expressed by a relative pronoun, which in Homer regularly takes the subjunctive (568), as ἡγεμόν' ἐσθλὸν ὅπως σπον, ὅς κέ με κείω' ἀγάγῃ, *send me a good guide, to lead me thither* (Od. xv. 310), so can it be by the relative adverb of manner, as κρῶν' ἄνδρας κατὰ φύλα, κατὰ φρήτρας, ὥς φρήτρη φρήτρηφιν ἀρήγῃ, *divide the men in that way by which clan may help clan, etc., i.e. (so) divide them that clan may help clan, etc.* (Il. ii. 362). Here the original force of ὥς can be seen; but in Od. xvii. 75, ὅτρυνον ἐμὸν ποτὶ δῶμα γυναικάς, ὥς τοι δῶρ' ἀποπέμψω, *in order that I may send you the gifts*, the final force is as strong as if we had ἵνα ἀποπέμψω.

2. Ὡς, however, always retained so much of its original relative nature that it could take κέ or ἄν in a final sentence with the subjunctive, like other final relatives, which in Homer hardly ever omit κέ before a subjunctive (568). Compare ὅς κέ με κείω'

ἀγάγῃ (above) with the equivalent ὥς κέ με κείσ' ἀγάγῃ. The final clause thus receives a conditional form, with which it must have received originally more or less conditional force.¹ Thus an expression like πείθεο ὥς ἂν κύδος ἄρῃαι probably meant originally *obey in whatever way you may gain glory*, or *obey in some way in which you may gain glory*, ὥς ἂν ἄρῃαι being chiefly a conditional relative clause (529); but before the Homeric usage was established, the final element had so far obliterated the relative, that the conditional force of ὥς ἂν must have been greatly weakened. The expression in Homer (Il. xvi. 84) may have meant *obey that (if so be) you may gain me glory*. (See examples under 326.) The same is true of the less common use of κέ or ἂν with ὅφρα and ὅπως in Homer (327; 328). How far the original conditional force survived in the Attic ὥς ἂν and ὅπως ἂν with the subjunctive, especially in ὅπως ἂν of Attic prose, is a question which at this distant day we have hardly the power to answer, and each scholar will be guided by his own feeling as he reads the expressions. (See 326; 328; 348.) It certainly can be seen in some of Xenophon's uses of ὥς ἂν with the subjunctive; see Cyr. ii. 4, 28, and Eques. i. 16, quoted in Appendix IV.

3. Ὡς and ὥς κε with the subjunctive are used in Homer also in object clauses after verbs of *planning, considering*, etc. (341), where ὅπως with the future indicative is the regular Attic form. Ὡς (with ὥς ἂν) is by far the most common final particle in tragedy; it seldom occurs in Aristophanes and Herodotus; while in Attic prose it almost entirely disappears,² except in Xenophon, with whom it is again common, though less so than ὅπως or ἵνα. (See Weber's tables in Appendix III.)

313. ("Ὅπως.") 1. Ὅπως is related to ὥς as ὅποτε to ὅτε, being the adverb of the relative stem ὁ- and the indefinite stem πο- combined.³ Like ὥς, it is originally a relative adverb, meaning *as*; and it can always be used in this sense, as in οὕτως ὅπως

¹ See Gildersleeve in *Am. Jour. Phil.* iv. p. 422.

² Weber (p. 174) quotes two passages of Demosthenes as examples of final ὥς with the future indicative, a construction otherwise unknown in Attic prose: ὥς δὲ σαφῶς γνῶσεσθε ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω, ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐρῶ, xxiv. 146; and ὥς δὲ καταφανὲς ἔσται ὅτι πρότερον ἀναισχυνοῦντες περιεγέγοντο, ἀναγίγνωσθε τὰς μαρτυρίας, xliii. 42. But compare the common formula of the orators ὥς (or ὅτι) ἀληθῆ λέγω, λαβὲ τὴν μαρτυρίαν (or κάλει τοὺς μάρτυρας), e.g. in DEM. xxvii. 28, with the occasional full form, ἵνα εἰδῆτε ταῦτα ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω, λαβὲ τὴν μαρτυρίαν, DEM. xlv. 19; so xviii. 305. See also ὥς εἰκότα ποιοῦμεν, καὶ τὰδ' ἐνόησατε (sc. ἵνα εἰδῆτε), XEN. Hell. ii. 3, 33. This common ellipsis shows that in DEM. xliii. 42 we can easily supply a final clause like ἵνα εἰδῆτε before ὥς καταφανὲς ἔσται, *that you may know how it is to be established*, etc. In xxiv. 146 there is no need even of an ellipsis, as we can translate *how you are to know that I speak the truth, I will explain to you*.

³ See Delbrück, *Conj. u. Opt.* p. 61.

δύνανται, *thus as they can*, THUC. vii. 67. Then it is used in indirect questions, in the sense of *ὅτῳ τρόπῳ*, *how, in what way*, and is followed by the future indicative; as σκοπεῖν ὅπως ἡ πόλις σωθήσεται, *to see how the city can be saved*. So τοῖς γεγενημένοις πονηροῖς, ὅπως μὴ δώσουσι δίκην, ὅδον δείκνυσι, *he shows those who have been rascals how they can avoid suffering punishment* (= ὅτῳ τρόπῳ μὴ δώσουσι), DEM. xxiv. 106. Then, by a slight modification in sense, it may denote also the object to which the *striving*, etc., is directed; so that σκοπεῖν (or σκοπεῖν τοῦτο) ὅπως ἡ πόλις σωθήσεται may mean *to see (to this, viz.) that the city shall be saved*. Here, however, the subjunctive is sometimes allowed, as the interrogative force of ὅπως is lost sight of and its force as a final particle, *in order that*, begins to appear. From this it becomes established as a final particle, and denotes the *purpose* in ordinary final clauses. From the original force of ὅπως as a relative, used in indirect questions in the sense of *how*, we must explain its occasional use in indirect questions in the sense of *ὥς* (706).

The interrogative force of ὅπως can be seen from passages in which other interrogative words take its place in the same sense; as DEM. xvi. 19, σκοπεῖν ἐξ ὅτου τρόπου μὴ γενήσονται (φίλοι), *to see in what way they can be prevented from becoming friends*; and THUC. i. 65, ἔπρασεν ὅτῃ ὠφελία τις γενήσεται, *he negotiated to have some help come (how some help should come)*. So THUC. iv. 128, ἔπρασεν ὅτῳ τρόπῳ τάχιστα τοῖς μὲν ξυμβήσεται τῶν δὲ ἀπαλλάσσεται.¹

2. Although ὅπως is fully established in the Homeric language, both in its half-interrogative use after verbs of *planning*, etc. (341), and also in its final sense, it seldom occurs in Homer in either construction. It first becomes frequent in the Attic poets. In Thucydides and Xenophon it is the most common final particle; and in these writers, as in tragedy, its final use greatly exceeds its use in object clauses. The latter, however, far exceeds the final use in Herodotus, Plato, and the orators; but here *ὥς* has gained almost undisputed possession of the field as a final particle.

3. Ὅπως never takes *κέ* or *ἄν* in pure final clauses in Homer. Ὅπως ἄν with the subjunctive appears for the first time in final clauses in Aeschylus (328), and afterwards maintains itself vigorously by the side of the simple ὅπως. In object clauses ὅπως *κε* with the subjunctive is found in a few places in Homer, and ὅπως ἄν in a few in the Attic poets, while ὅπως ἄν in these clauses in prose is found chiefly in Plato and Xenophon (348).

314. (Ὅφρα.) The most common final particle in Homer

¹ See Madvig's *Syntax*, § 123.

is ὅφρα, which is originally a temporal particle, meaning *while* (*so long as*) and then *until*. From the last meaning the final force was naturally developed, as the idea of *until*, when it looks forward to the future, may involve that of aiming at an object to be attained, as in English *we shall fight until we are free*. Another temporal particle meaning both *while* and *until*, ἕως, is used in a final sense in a few passages of the *Odyssey* (614, 2). Both of the temporal uses of ὅφρα appear in full vigour in Homer; but its final character must have been more distinctly marked at an earlier period than that of either ὥς or ὅπως, so that it seldom took either κέ or ἄν before the subjunctive.

*Ὅφρα is found only in epic and lyric poetry.

315. (*Negative Final Clauses.*) The need of these final particles was first felt, as has been shown (310), in positive clauses of purpose, as a negative purpose could always be expressed by the simple μή, which thus became in use a conjunction. Still the final particles were as well suited to negative as to positive final clauses, and they could always be prefixed to μή, which thus was restored to its natural place as a negative adverb. Thus φεύξομαι ἵνα μή τις με ἴδῃ has the same meaning as the older φεύξομαι μή τις με ἴδῃ, *I shall flee, that no one may see me*.

The history of the Greek language shows a gradual decrease of final μή and an increase of the final particles with μή in negative final clauses.¹ The tendency in this direction was so strong that ὅπως μή sometimes took the place of μή even after verbs of *fearing*, to express the object of the fear (370), while it became the regular form after verbs of *striving*, etc., to express the object aimed at (339).

The different origin of the negative final clause (with ἵνα μή, etc.) and of the clause with μή explains the fact that, while clauses introduced by the final particles are negated by μή, those introduced by μή, *lest*, are negated by οὐ. (See 306.)

316. Finally, the Attic Greek took the last step in developing the final clause, by using the past tenses of the indicative with ἵνα, ὥς, and ὅπως to express a purpose which failed of attainment because of the failure of the action of the leading sentence; as τί μ' οὐκ ἔκτεινας, ὥς μήποτε τοῦτ' ἔδειξα; *why did you not kill me, that I might never have shown this?* (See 333.)

¹ In Homer, Hesiod, and the lyric poets we find 131 cases of simple μή and 50 of the final particles with μή; in tragedy the proportion is 76 : 59; in Aristophanes it is 8 : 55; in Herodotus, 8 : 53. In Attic prose (except in Plato and Xenophon) the simple μή in final clauses almost vanishes. Thucydides has only 4 or 5 cases; the ten orators only 4 (Demosthenes 2, Isocrates 1, Isaeus 1); Plato 24; and Xenophon 12.

A. PURE FINAL CLAUSES.

317. Pure final clauses regularly take the subjunctive if the leading verb is primary, and the optative if the leading verb is secondary. *E.g.*

Νῦν δ' ἔρχεσθ' ἐπὶ δείπνον, ἵνα ξυνάγωμεν "Αρρα. Π. ii. 381. Σοὶ δ' ὤδε μνηστήρες ὑποκρίνονται, ἵν' εἰδῆς αὐτὸς σὺ θυμῷ εἰδῶσι δὲ πάντες Ἀχαιοί. Od. ii. 111. Ἐπῶ τι δῆτα κάλλ', ἵν' ὀργίξῃ πλέον; SOPH. O. T. 364. Καὶ γὰρ βασιλεὺς αἰρεῖται, οὐχ ἵνα ἑαυτοῦ καλῶς ἐπιμελήται, ἀλλ' ἵνα καὶ οἱ ἐλόμενοι δι' αὐτὸν εἰδὲ πράττωσι. XEN. Mem. iii. 2, 3. Δοκεῖ μοι κατακαῦσαι τὰς ἀμάξας, ἵνα μὴ τὰ ζεύγη ἡμῶν στρατηγῇ. Id. An. iii. 2, 27. Πρὸς τοὺς ζῶντας, ἵνα μηδὲν ἄλλ' εἴπω, τὸν ζῶντα ἐξέταξε. DEM. xviii. 318. (Here the final clause depends on some implied expression like *I say this*.) "Ωρηνθ', ἵν' ἀθανάτοισι φόως φέροι ἥδὲ βροτοῦσιν. Od. v. 2. Φίλος ἐβούλετο εἶναι τοῖς μέγιστα δυναμένοις, ἵνα ἀδικῶν μὴ διδοίῃ δίκην. XEN. An. ii. 6, 21. Τὸ ψήφισμα τοῦτο γράφω (hist. pres.), ἵν' οὕτω γίγνοινθ' οἱ ὅρκοι, καὶ μὴ κύριος τῆς Θράκης κατασταίῃ. DEM. xviii. 27.

Βουλὴν δ' Ἀργείοις ὑποθησόμεθ', ἣ τις ὀνήσει, ὥς μὴ πάντες ὀλυνται ὀδυσσαμένοιο τεοῖο. Π. viii. 36. Διανοεῖται αὐτὴν (γέφυραν) λῦσαι, ὥς μὴ διαβῇτε, ἀλλ' ἐν μέσῳ ἀποληφθῇτε. XEN. An. ii. 4, 17. Πέφνε δ' Εὐρυτον, ὥς Αὐγέαν λάτριον μισθὸν πρᾶσσοιτο, Pind. Ol. x. (xi.) 31. Καί σ' ἐξέπεμπον, ὥς μόνῃ κλύοις. SOPH. Ant. 19. Ἐπεμψα ὥς πύθοιτο. Id. O. T. 71. Τοῦτο οὐπερ ἔνεκα φίλων ψέτο δέισθαι, ὥς συνεργοὺς ἔχοι. XEN. An. i. 9, 21.

Τὸν δὲ μνηστήρες λοχῶσιν, ὅπως ἀπὸ φύλον ὀληται ἐξ Ἰθάκης. Od. xiv. 181. Μέθες τόδ' ἄγγος νῦν, ὅπως τὸ πᾶν μάθῃς. SOPH. El. 1205. Εἰς καιρὸν ἦκεις, ὅπως τῆς δίκης ἀκούσῃς. XEN. Cyr. iii. 1, 8. Παρακαλεῖς ἰατροὺς, ὅπως μὴ ἀποθάνῃ. Id. Mem. ii. 10, 2. Οἶμαι δὲ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι, οὐχ ὅπως τοὺς αὐτοὺς χοροὺς κρίνωσιν οἱ πολῖται, οὐδ' ὅπως τοὺς αὐτοὺς αὐλητὰς ἐπαινῶσιν, οὐδ' ὅπως τοὺς αὐτοὺς ποιητὰς αἰρῶνται, οὐδ' ἵνα τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἡδῶνται, ἀλλ' ἵνα τοῖς νόμοις πείθωνται. Id. Mem. iv. 4, 16. Ἐν χεῖρεσσιν ἔθηκεν, ὅπως ἔτι πῆμα φύγοιμι. Od. xiv. 312. Ἀφικόμην, ὅπως σοῦ πρὸς δόμους ἐλθόντος εἰδὲ πράξαιμί τι. SOPH. O. T. 1005. Ἐπρεσβεῖοντο ἐγκλήματα ποιοῦμενοι, ὅπως σφίσιν ὅτι μεγίστη πρόφασις εἴη τοῦ πολεμεῖν. THUC. i. 126.

Κεφαλὴν καταεύσομαι, ὅφρα πεποιθήσῃς. Π. i. 524. "Ορσεο δὴ νῦν, ξεῖνε, πόλινδ' ἔμεν, ὅφρα σε πέμψω. Od. vi. 255. Αὐτὰρ ἐμοὶ γέρας αὐτίχ' ἑτοιμάσατ', ὅφρα μὴ οἶος Ἀργείων ἀγέραςτος ἔω. Π. i. 118. Δόμον Φερσεφόνας ἐλθέ, ὅφρ' ἰδοῖς νῦν εἴπῃς. PIND. Ol. xiv. 20. "Ως ὁ μὲν ἔνθα κατέσχετ' ἐπειγόμενός περ ὁδοῦ, ὅφρ' ἔταρον θάπτοι καὶ ἐπὶ κτέρεα κτερίσειεν. Od. iii. 284.

Ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν νῦν αὖτις ἀπόστιχε, μὴ τι νοήσῃ "Ηρῃ· ἐμοὶ δέ κε ταῦτα μελήσεται ὅφρα τελέσω. Π. i. 522. Οὐ δὴτ' αὐτὸν ἄξεις δεῦρο, μὴ τίς ἀναρπάσῃ; SOPH. Aj. 986. Λυσιτελεῖ ἔωσαι ἐν τῷ

παρόντι, μὴ καὶ τοῦτον πολέμιον προσθώμεθα. XEN. Cyr. ii. 4, 12. Λέγεται εἶπεῖν ὅτι ἀπίεσαι βούλοιο, μὴ ὁ πατήρ τι ἄχθοιο καὶ ἡ πόλις μέμφοιο. Ib. i. 4, 25. Λοῦσαι κέλετ', ὥς μὴ Πρίαμος ἴδοι υἱόν, μὴ ὁ μὲν ἀχρυνμένη κραδίῃ χόλον οὐκ ἐρύσαιοτο. II. xxiv. 582.

For the relative frequency of the final particles, see Appendix III.

318. As final clauses after past tenses express some person's previous purpose or motive, they allow the double construction of indirect discourse (667, 1); so that, instead of the optative, they can have the *mood* and *tense* which the person himself would have used in conceiving the purpose. Thus we can say either *ἦλθεν ἵνα ἴδοι*, *he came that he might see*, or *ἦλθεν ἵνα ἴδῃ*, because the person himself would have said *ἔρχομαι ἵνα ἴδω*, *I come that I may see*.

Hence the subjunctive in final clauses after past tenses is very common, in some writers even more common than the regular optative. *E.g.*

Ἐπεκλώσαντο δ' ὄλεθρον ἀνθρώποις, ἵνα ᾗσι καὶ ἐσσομένοισιν δοιδῇ. Od. viii. 579. Ἀχλὺν δ' αὖ τοι ἀπ' ὀφθαλμῶν ἔλον, ἢ πρὶν ἐπῆεν, ὄφρ' ἐν γιγνώσκῃς ἡμὲν θεὸν ἠδὲ καὶ ἄνδρα. II. v. 127. Ἀριστεὺς ἐνεβούλευεν ἐκπλεῦσαι, ὅπως ἐπὶ πλέον ὁ σίτος ἀντίσχη. THUC. i. 65. Ἦλθον πρεσβευσόμενοι, ὅπως μὴ σφίσι τὸ Ἀττικὸν (ναυτικὸν) προσγενόμενον ἐμπόδιον γένηται. Id. i. 31. Ἐχώρουν ἐκ τῶν οἰκιῶν, ὅπως μὴ κατὰ φῶς θαρσαλεωτέροις ὄσσι προσφέρωνται καὶ σφίσι ἐκ τοῦ ἴσου γίγνωνται, ἀλλ' ἡσσοὺς ὦσι. Id. ii. 3. Καὶ ἐπὶ τῇδ' ἐσέ σε οὐκ ἡγειρον, ἵνα ὥς ἡδιστα διάγῃς. PLAT. Crit. 43 B. Πλοῖα κατέκαυσεν ἵνα μὴ Κύρος διαβῇ. XEN. An. i. 4, 18. Ταῦτας ἵνα κωλύῃθ' οἱ νόμοι συνήγαγον ὑμᾶς, οὐχ ἵνα κυρίας τοῖς ἀδικοῦσι ποιῇτε. DEM. xix. 1. Καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐμνήσθην, ἵνα μὴ ταῦτά πάθητε. Id. iii. 6. (Here the purpose was conceived in the form *ἵνα μὴ ταῦτά πάθωσιν*.)

319. This principle applies also to clauses with *ὅπως* after verbs of *striving* (339) and with *μή* after verbs of *fearing*, etc. (365).

320. This is a favourite construction with certain authors, especially Thucydides, who also, on the same principle, prefers the indicative and subjunctive to the optative in ordinary indirect discourse after past tenses (670). The early poets, on the other hand, especially Homer, use it very sparingly.¹

¹ Weber, p. 243, gives a comparison of the usage of various writers, showing that the proportion of subjunctives to optatives after past tenses in pure final clauses and after verbs of fearing is as follows:—in *Homer* 35:156, *Pindar* 2:10, *Aeschylus* 2:9, *Sophocles* 2:23, *Euripides* 31:65, *Aristophanes* 13:37, *Herodotus* 86:47, *Thucydides* 168:60, *Lysias* 22:19, *Isocrates* 21:17, *Isaeus* 8:17, *Demosthenes* 40:40, *Aeschines* 13:7, *Plato* 22:79, *Xenophon* 45:265. In all writers before Aristotle 528:894. In the Attic writers and Herodotus, excluding Xenophon, the two are just equal, 441.

321. The subjunctive thus used for the optative makes the language more vivid, by introducing more nearly the original form of thought of the person whose purpose is stated. As the two forms are equally correct, we sometimes find both in the same sentence, just as we find the indicative and optative interchanged in indirect discourse (670; see 677 and 690). *E.g.*

Ἐξακοσίους λογάδας ἐξέκριναν, ὅπως τῶν τε Ἐπιπολῶν εἴησαν φύλακες καὶ, ἣν ἐς ἄλλο τι δέη, ταχὺ ξυνεστῶτες παραγίγνωνται, i.e. *they selected them, that they might be guards of Epirolae, and that they might be on hand if they should be needed for anything else.* THUC. vi. 96. Παρانیσχον δὲ φρυκτοῦς, ὅπως ἀσαφῆ τὰ σημεῖα τοῖς πολέμοις ἦ καὶ μὴ βοήθοιεν, *they raised fire-signals at the same time, in order that the enemy's signals might be unintelligible to them, and that they (the enemy) might not bring aid.* Id. iii. 22.

A common interpretation of the latter and of similar passages, that "the subjunctive mood indicates the *immediate*, and the optative the *remote* consequence of the action contained in the principal verbs, the second being a consequence of the first" (Arnold), manifestly could not apply to the first example.

322. The use of the optative for the subjunctive in final clauses after primary tenses is, on the other hand, very rare, and is to be viewed as a mere irregularity of construction. See ἀξω τῇλ' Ἰθάκης, ἵνα μοι βίστον πολλὸν ἄλφοι, Od. xvii. 250; ὅπως μαχέονται, Π. i. 344; and vii. 340, xviii. 88. So SOPH. El. 56, O. C. 11; HDT. ii. 93 (ἵνα μὴ ἀμάρτοιεν). Most of these are emended by various editors; and no good reason for the anomaly appears in any of them.

323. Sometimes the optative is properly used after a leading verb which implies a reference to the past as well as the present. *E.g.*

Τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον ὁ νόμος, ἵνα μηδὲ πευθῆναι μηδ' ἐξαπατηθῆναι γένοιτ' ἐπὶ τῷ δήμῳ. DEM. xxii. 11. (Here ἔχει implies also the past existence of the law; the idea being, *the law was made as it is, so that it might not be possible*, etc.) So DEM. xxiv. 145, 147. In DEM. iii. 34 ἵνα τοῦθ' ὑπάρχῃ depends on a past verb of *saying* to be mentally supplied. In AR. Ran. 23, τοῦτον δ' ὁχῶ, ἵνα μὴ ταλαιπωροῖτο μηδ' ἄχθος φέροι, *I am letting him ride, that he might not be distressed*, etc., the meaning of ὁχῶ goes back to the time when Dionysus first let the slave mount the ass.

324. (*Future Indicative.*) The future indicative occasionally takes the place of the subjunctive in pure final clauses. It occurs chiefly with ὅπως, very seldom with ὅφρα, ὥς, and μὴ, and never with ἵνα.¹ It has essentially the same force as the subjunctive. *E.g.*

¹ Weber cites the following cases, in addition to those given above. For ὅπως: AESCH. Cho. 265, Suppl. 449; SOPH. Aj. 698 (?); EUR. El. 835; AR. Vesp. 528, Pac. 309, 431, Lys. 1093, Thesm. 431, 653, 285 (?), Eccl. 783, 997; ANDOC. i. 89; XEN. Hipp. i. 18, Mem. ii. 1, 1 (παθεῖν ὅπως ἔσται?). In XEN. Cyr. ii. 1, 4 and 21 the Mss. vary: in Cyr. iii. 3, 42 ὅπως is probably independent. For ὅφρα: IL. viii. 110; Od. iv. 163, xvii. 6. For ὥς: EUR.

Αἰεὶ δὲ μαλακοῖσι καὶ αἰμυλίοισι λόγοισι θέλγει, ὅπως Ἰθάκης ἐπιλήσεται. Od. i. 56. Μὴ πρόσλευσσε, ἡμῶν ὅπως μὴ τὴν τύχην διαφθερεῖς. SOPH. Ph. 1068. Ἀπομυκτέον δέ σοι γ', ὅπως λήψει πιεῖν. EUR. Cycl. 561. Ἀρδῶ σ' ὅπως ἀμβλαστανεῖς. AR. Lys. 384. Ἐπ' αὐτοὺς τοὺς προλόγους σου τρέφομαι, ὅπως τὸ πρῶτον τῆς τραγωδίας μέρος πρῶτιστον βασανιῶ. AR. Ran. 1120. Προιέναι (δεῖ) τῶν τόπων ἐνθυμούμενον, ὅπως μὴ διαμαρτήσεται. XEN. Syneg. ix. 4. Χρὴ ἀναβιβάζειν ἐπὶ τὸν τροχὸν τοὺς ἀναγραφέντας, ὅπως μὴ πρότερον νύξ ἔσται πρὶν πυθέσθαι τοὺς ἀνδρας ἀπαντας. AND. i. 43.

Θάρσυνον δέ οἱ ἦτορ ἐνὶ φρεσὶν, ὄφρα καὶ Ἐκτωρ εἴσεται. Π. xvi. 242. Ὡς τί ῥέξομεν; *that we may do what?* SOPH. O. C. 1724. Ὡστ' εἰκὸς ἡμᾶς μὴ βραδύνειν ἐστὶ, μὴ καὶ τις ὄψεται χημῶν ἴσως κατεῖπη. AR. Eccl. 495. So μὴ κεχολώσεται, Π. xx. 301.

"An or κέ in Final Clauses with Subjunctive.

325. The final particles which have a relative origin, ὥς, ὅπως, and ὄφρα, sometimes have ἄν or κέ in final clauses with the subjunctive. They did this originally in their capacity as conditional relatives; and it is probable that at first κέ or ἄν with the relative gave the clause a combined final and conditional force, in which the conditional element gradually grew weaker as the relative particles came to be felt chiefly or only as final particles (312, 2). Ἰνα and μὴ never take ἄν or κέ in this way.¹

326. (Ως.) 1. Ὡς κε and ὥς ἄν are together much more common in Homer with the subjunctive than simple ὥς. Ὡς ἄν with the subjunctive is not uncommon in the Attic poets, and it occurs in Herodotus; but (like ὥς itself) it almost disappears in Attic prose. *E.g.*

Πείθεο, ὥς ἄν μοι τιμὴν μεγάλην καὶ κῦδος ἄρῃαι, obey, *that thou mayest gain for me great honour and glory.* Π. xvi. 84. Αὐτὰρ οἱ προφρῶν ὑποθήσομαι, ὥς κε μάλ' ἀσκηθῆς ἣν πατρίδα γαῖαν ἵκηται. Od. v. 143. Παῖσατε, ὥς χ' ὁ ξείνος ἐνίσπη οἴσι φίλοισιν. Od. viii. 251. Ἀλλ' ἔθι, μὴ μ' ἐρέθιζε, σαώτερος ὥς κε νέηαι, *that thou mayest go the more safely.* Π. i. 32. Προσδεόμεθα . . . συμπέμψαι ἡμῖν, ὥς ἄν μιν ἐξέλωμεν ἐκ τῆς χώρας. HDT. i. 36. Τοὺς ἐμοὺς λόγους θυμῷ βάλλ', ὥς ἄν τέρματ' ἐκμάθῃς ὁδοῦ. AESCH. Prom. 705. Ἀλλ' εἰσάσωμεν, φίλοι, ἔκηλον αὐτὸν, ὥς ἄν εἰς ὕπνον πέσῃ.

Bacch. 784. For μὴ: Od. xxiv. 544; THEOG. 1307; AR. Eccl. 488. Only four undoubted examples occur in prose.

¹ In the single case of κέ with ἵνα, Od. xii. 156, ἀλλ' ἐρέω μὲν ἐγὼν, ἵνα εἰδότες ἢ κε θάνωμεν, ἢ κεν ἀλευόμενοι θάνατον καὶ κῆρα φύγωμεν, ἵνα κε is not used like ὥς κε, etc., above, but ἵνα is followed by a potential subjunctive with κέ (285). The repetition of κέ removes the case from the class under consideration. Ἰνα in its sense of *where* may have ἄν (see SOPH. O. C. 405). Μή, *lest*, may have ἄν with the optative after verbs of fearing (368).

SOPH. Ph. 825. Καθείρξαι αὐτὸν, ὥς ἂν σκοτίον εἰρορᾷ κνέφας.
EUR. Bacch. 510. Τοντὶ λαβὼν μου τὸ σκιαδεῖον ὑπέρεχε ἄνωθεν,
ὥς ἂν μὴ μ' ὀρώσιν οἱ θεοί. AR. Av. 1508.

2. In Attic prose ὥς ἂν with the subjunctive is found only in Xenophon and in one passage of Thucydides.

The last is THUC. vi. 91 : (πέμψετε) ἄνδρα Σπαρτιάτην ἄρχοντα, ὥς ἂν τοὺς τε παρόντας ξυντάξῃ καὶ τοὺς μὴ θέλοντας προσαναγκάσῃ. See XEN. An. ii. 5, 16, ὥς δ' ἂν μάθῃς, ἀντάκουσον. So An. vi. 3, 18. See other examples of Xenophon's peculiar use of ὥς ἂν with the subjunctive in Appendix IV.

327. ("Οφρα.) "Οφρα κε and ὅφρ' ἂν have the subjunctive in a few final clauses in Homer. *E.g.*

Οἶστος νῦν σοι ἄμ' ἔψεται, ὅφρα κεν εὖδῃ σοῖσιν ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν. Od. iii. 359. Ἴομεν, ὅφρα κε θάσσοι ἐγείρομεν ὄζυν Ἀργα. Il. ii. 440. Τὸν ξείνον ἄγ' ἐς πόλιν, ὅφρ' ἂν ἐκείθι δαῖτα πτωχεύῃ. Od. xvii. 10.

For ὅφρα κε and ὅφρ' ἂν with the optative, see 329, 1.

328. ("Οπως.) "Οπως does not occur in Homer in pure final clauses with either κέ or ἂν. "Οπως ἂν final with the subjunctive appears first in Aeschylus, and remains in good use in Attic poetry and prose, being almost the only final expression found in the formal language of the Attic inscriptions. One case of ὅκως ἂν occurs in Herodotus. *E.g.*

Φύλασσε τὰν οἴκῳ καλῶς, ὅπως ἂν ἀρτίκολλα συμβαίῃ τάδε, *watch what goes on in the house, that these things may work harmoniously.* AESCH. Cho. 579 : so Prom. 824, Eum. 573, 1030, Suppl. 233. Ἴσθι πᾶν τὸ δρώμενον, ὅπως ἂν εἰδῶς ἡμῖν ἀγγείλῃς σαφῆ. SOPH. El. 40. Τοῦτ' αὐτὸ νῦν διδασχ', ὅπως ἂν ἐκμάθω. Id. O. C. 575. Οὐκ ἄπιθ', ὅπως ἂν οἱ Λάκωνες καθ' ἡσυχίαν ἀπίωσιν; AR. Lys. 1223. Ταῦτα δὲ ἐποίηε τῶνδε εἵνεκεν, ὅκως ἂν ὁ κῆρυξ ἀγγείλῃ Ἀλυσάττῃ. HDT. i. 22 (see 318). Διὰ τῆς σῆς χώρας ἄξει ἡμᾶς, ὅπως ἂν εἰδῶμεν, κ.τ.λ. XEN. Cyr. v. 2, 21. Καί φατε αὐτὸν τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ὅπως ἂν φαίνηται ὥς κάλλιστος καὶ ἄριστος. PLAT. Symp. 199 A. Ἄν γέ τις ὑποπτεύῃ ἐλεύθερα φρονήματα ἔχοντας μὴ ἐπιτρέψῃ αὐτῷ ἄρχειν, (πολέμους κινεῖ) ὅπως ἂν τούτους μετὰ προφάσεως ἀπολλύῃ, *that he may destroy them.* Id. Rep. 567 A. Εὖσεβοῦμεν καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἀσκούμεν, οὐχ ἵνα τῶν ἄλλων ἔλαττον ἔχωμεν, ἀλλ' ὅπως ἂν ὥς μετὰ πλείστον ἀγαθῶν τὸν βίον διάγωμεν. ISOCT. iii. 2 (ἵνα and ὅπως ἂν may here be compared in sense : see 312, 2). Τὴν πόλιν συνέχειν, ὅπως ἂν μίαν γνώμην ἔχωσιν ἅπαντες καὶ μὴ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἡδονὴν ποιῶσιν. DEM. xix. 298 : so xiv. 23.

Ἄν or κέ in Final Clauses with Optative.

329. 1. (Ὡς and ὅφρα in Homer and ὥς and ὅκως in Herodotus.) In Homer ὥς κε and ὥς ἂν sometimes have the optative in final

clauses after both primary and secondary tenses. *Ὅφρα κε and ὅφρ' ἄν occur each once in Homer with the optative after past tenses. Herodotus has ὥς ἄν and ὅκως ἄν with the optative after past tenses, and ὅκως ἄν once after a present tense. This optative with κέ or ἄν after primary tenses is certainly potential as well as final; and this analogy makes it difficult or impossible to take it in any other sense after secondary tenses, though here the potential force is less obvious.

(a) After primary tenses six cases occur in the Odyssey and one in Herodotus:—

*Ἀπερρίγασι νέεσθαι ὥς κ' αὐτὸς ἐεδνώσαιοτο θύγατρα, *they dread to go to him that he may settle (if he will) the bridal gifts of his daughter*, lit. *that he would settle*, etc. Od. ii. 53. Κνυζώσω δέ τοι ὄσσε, ὥς ἄν ἀεικέλιος φανείης, *I will dim your eyes, to the end that you might appear unseemly*. Od. xiii. 401. Δύο δοῦρε καλλιπέειν, ὥς ἄν ἐπιθύσαντες ἐλοιμέθα. Od. xvi. 297. Τῷ κε τάχα γνοίης φιλότητά τε πολλά τε δῶρα ἐξ ἐμεῦ, ὥς ἄν τις σε συναντόμενος μακαρίζοι, *so that one would call you blessed*. Od. xvii. 164 (= xv. 537, xix. 310). Ἥγεισθω ὀρχηθμοῖο, ὥς κέν τις φαίη γάμον ἔμμεναι ἐκτὸς ἀκοῶν, *let him lead off the dance, so that any one who should hear without would say there was a marriage*. Od. xxiii. 134. Ἰσχεσθε πτολέμον, ὥς κεν ἀναιμῶτί γε διακρινθεῖτε τάχιστα. Od. xxiv. 531.

Κελεύει σε τὸ παιδίον θεῖναι, ὅκως ἄν τάχιστα διαφθαρείη, *he bids you so expose the child that he would be likely to perish most speedily*. Hdt. i. 110.

(b) After past tenses the following cases occur¹:—

*Υε δ' ἄρα Ζεὺς συνεχὲς, ὅφρα κε θάσσον ἀλίπλοα τείχεα θείη. Il. xii. 25. Ἐώλπεν σε Φθίηνδε νέεσθαι, ὥς ἄν μοι τὸν παῖδα Σκυρόθεν ἐξαγάγοις, i.e. *I hoped for your coming, that you might perchance bring my son away from Scyros*. Il. xix. 330. Καί μιν μακρότερον καὶ πάσσονα θῆκεν ιδέσθαι, ὥς κεν Φαιήκεσσι φίλος πάντεσσι γένοιτο. Od. viii. 20. Τύμβον χεύαμεν, ὥς κεν τηλεφανὴς ἐκ ποντόφιν ἀνδράσιν εἶη. Od. xxiv. 83. Σὺ δέ με προίεις, ὅφρ' ἄν ἐλοιμήνῃ δῶρα (Bekker ἀνελοίμην). Ib. 333.

Λέγεται διώρυχα ὀρύσσειν, ὅκως ἄν τὸ στρατόπεδον ἰδρυμένον κατὰ νότον λάβοι, i.e. *he is said to have dug (119) a channel, in order that the river might flow behind the army*. Hdt. i. 75. Ταῦτα δὲ περὶ

¹ It must be confessed that there are some difficult questions concerning these optatives with κέ or ἄν in final clauses after past tenses. It may perhaps be thought that the subjunctive after ὥς κε, ὅκως ἄν, etc., has been changed to the optative after a past tense retaining κέ or ἄν without effect on the verb. Compare ὥς ἄν with the optative (613, 4; 702). Would ὅκως ἄν in Hdt. i. 22 (quoted in 328) have changed its nature if ἀγγείλῃ had been changed to ἀγγέλλειε? On the other hand, can we separate the optatives in Hdt. i. 75 and 99 (in b) from the optative in i. 110 (in a)? The potential view seems, on the whole, much the more natural; but the potential force can be expressed in English only with great difficulty, owing to the ambiguity of our auxiliaries *might*, *would*, *should*, etc.

ἔωτὸν ἐσέμνιε τῶνδε εὔνεκεν, ὅπως ἂν μὴ ὀρέοντες οἱ δῆλικες λυπεοῖατο καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοιεν, ἀλλ' ἑτεροῖός σφι δοκέοι εἶναι μὴ ὀρώσι, *in order that his companions might not be offended by seeing him and plot against him, but that he might appear to them to be of another nature when they did not see him.* Id. i. 99. Πορφύρεον εἶμα περιβαλόμενος, ὥς ἂν πυνθανόμενοι πλείστοι συνέλθοιεν. Id. i. 152. Τὸ ὕδωρ τότε ἐπήκαν, ὥς ἂν χαραδρωθεῖη ὁ χώρος, *they let in the water, in order that the country might be gullied.* Id. vii. 176. Περιέπεμπον ἔξωθεν Σκιάθου, ὥς ἂν μὴ ὀφθείησαν περιπλέουσai Εὐβοίαν. Id. viii. 7. Ἥλαυνον τοὺς ἵππους, ὥς ἂν τὸν νεκρὸν ἀνελοῖατο. Id. ix. 22. Μετακινέσθαι ἐδόκεε τότε, ὥς ἂν μὴ ἰδοῖατο οἱ Πέρσαι ἐξορμεομένους. Ib. 51.

2. Ὡς ἂν with the optative in Attic prose is found chiefly in Xenophon. It is never strictly final; but ὥς is relative or interrogative, and the optative with ἂν is potential. *E.g.*

"Ἐδοξεν αὐτῷ τοῦτο ποιῆσαι, ὥς ὅτι ἤκιστα ἂν ἐπιφθόνως σπανίως τε καὶ σεμνὸς φανείη, *he decided to do this in such a way that he might appear, etc. (i.e. in the way by which).* XEN. Cyr. vii. 5, 37. (Here the separation of ἂν from ὥς makes the potential character plainer.) Ὡς δ' ἂν καὶ οἱ πόδες εἶεν τῷ ἵππῳ κράτιστοι, εἰ μὲν τις ἔχει ῥάῳ ἄσκησιν, κ.τ.λ., *as to means by which the horse's feet could be kept strongest.* Id. Hipp. i. 16. See other examples in Appendix IV. This is the same relative use of ὥς with the potential optative which we find in DEM. vi. 3, ὥς μὲν ἂν εἴποιτε δικαίους λόγους ἄμεινον Φιλίππου παρεσκεύασθε· ὥς δὲ κωλύσαιτ' ἂν ἐκείνον πράττειν ταῦτα, παντελὺς ἀργῶς ἔχετε, *as to means by which you could make just speeches, you are better equipped than Philip; but as to steps by which you could prevent him from doing what he does, you are wholly inactive.* See also DEM. vi. 37, ὥς δ' ἂν ἐξετασθεῖη μάλιστ' ἀκριβῶς, μὴ γένοιτο, *as to any means by which the truth could be tested most thoroughly,—may this never come!*

330. Ὅπως ἂν with a final potential optative occurs once in Thucydides, four times in Xenophon, and once in Aeschylus:

Τὰς πρῶρας κατεβύρσωσαν, ὅπως ἂν ἀπολισθάνοι ἡ χεὶρ ἐπιβαλλομένη, *they covered the prows with hides, that the (iron) hand when throwing on might be likely to slip off.* THUC. vii. 65. Ἐδωκε χρήματα Ἀντακίδῃ, ὅπως ἂν, πληρωθέντος ναυτικοῦ ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι μᾶλλον τῆς εἰρήνης προσδέοιντο. XEN. Hell. iv. 8, 16. (Here πληρωθέντος ναυτικοῦ, *if a navy should be manned*, stands as protasis to προσδέοιντο ἂν.) Ὅπως δ' ἂν ὥς ἐρρωμένεστατον τὸ στράτευμα ποιήσaiτο, ἐξ ἄλλων πόλεων ἡγγυρολόγει. Ib. iv. 8, 30. Πᾶσιν ἐδίδου βοὺς τε, ὅπως ἂν θύσαντες ἐστίψιντο, καὶ ἐκπώματα. Id. Cyr. viii. 3, 33 (one Ms. omits ἂν). Τὴν λεῖαν ἀπέπεμψε διατίθεται Ἡρακλείδην, ὅπως ἂν μισθὸς γένοιτο τοῖς στρατιώταις. Id. An. vii. 4, 2 (most Mss. have ὅπως γένηται). So AESCH. Ag. 364.

In these cases the final force is equally strong with the potential.

Elliptical Constructions.

331. In colloquial Greek we often find *ἵνα τί*; *that what?*—where *τί* takes the place of a final clause, which generally appears in the answer to the question. *E.g.*

ΒΑ. *ἵνα τί*; ΠΡ. *δῆλον τουτογί· ἵνα . . . ἔχωσιν.* AR. Eccl. 719. So Nub. 1192, Pac. 409. So DEM. xix. 257: *ἵνα τί*; *ἵν' ὥς μετὰ πλείστης συγγνώμης παρ' ὑμῶν κατηγορῶ.* Just before this we have *διὰ τί*; *ἵνα μήτε ἔλεον μήτε συγγνώμης τύχῃ.* So PLAT. Ap. 26 C.

332. A final clause may stand without a leading verb expressed, when the omission can easily be supplied; as *ὅτι ἤρξα, μὴ ἀποδημῶ*; *ἵνα γε μὴ προλαβὼν χρήματα τῆς πόλεως ἢ πράξεις δρασμῷ χρήσῃ, because I held an office, may I not leave the country?* No: *that you may not take to flight, etc.* AESCHIN. iii. 21.

SECONDARY TENSES OF INDICATIVE IN FINAL CLAUSES.

333. In Attic Greek the secondary tenses of the indicative are used in final clauses with *ἵνα*, sometimes with *ὅπως* or *ὥς*, to denote that the purpose is dependent upon some unaccomplished action or unfulfilled condition, and therefore *is not* or *was not* attained.

The tenses of the indicative differ here as in conditional sentences, the imperfect (the most frequent tense) referring to present time or to continued or repeated action in past time, the aorist and pluperfect to past time (410). Thus *ἵνα τοῦτο ἐπρωττεν* means *in order that he might be doing this (but he is not doing it)*, or *that he might have been doing this (but he was not)*; *ἵνα τοῦτο ἐπραξεν* means *that he might have done this (but he did not)*; *ἵνα τοῦτο ἐπεπράχει* means *that he might have done this (but he has not)*. *E.g.*

Οὐκ ἂν ἐσχόμην, ἵν' ἡ τυφλὸς τε καὶ κλύων μηδέν, in that case I should not have forborne (to destroy my hearing), so that I might (now) be both blind and devoid of hearing (implying that really he is not so). SOPH. O. T. 1387. *Φεῦ, φεῦ, τὸ μὴ τὰ πράγματ' ἀνθρώποις ἔχειν φωνήν, ἵν' ᾗσαν μηδὲν οἱ δεινοὶ λόγοι, Alas! alas! that the facts have no voice for men, so that words of eloquence might be as nothing.* EUR. Fr. (Hipp.) 442. *Ἐβουλόμην μὲν ἕτερον ἂν τῶν ἡθάρων λέγειν τὰ βέλτισθ', ἵν' ἐκαθήμην ἡσυχος.* AR. Eccl. 151. *Ἐχρῆν εἰσκαλέσασθαι μάρτυρας πολλοὺς παρασημήνασθαι κελεύσαι τὰς διαθήκας, ἵν', εἴ τι ἐγίνετο ἀμφισβητήσιμον, ἦν εἰς τὰ γράμματα ταῦτ' ἐπανελθεῖν.* DEM. xxviii. 5. (This implies that they did not have the will thus sealed, so that it is *not now possible* to refer to it in case of dispute.) *Ἐξήτησεν ἂν με τὸν παῖδα, ἵν' εἰ μὴ παρεδίδουν μηδὲν δίκαιον λέγειν ἐδόκουν.* DEM. xxix. 17. *Ἐχρῆν αὐτοὺς τὴν προ-*

τέραν ζήτησιν ζητεῖν, ἵνα ἀπηλλάγμεθα τούτου τοῦ δημαγωγοῦ, *they ought to have made the previous investigation, in order that we might have been already freed from this demagogue (but we have not been freed from him)*. DIN. i. 10. See LYS. i. 40 and 42; ISOC. ix. 5, xviii. 51. Ἀλλὰ σέ ἐχρῆν ἡμῖν συγχωρεῖν, ἵνα συνουσία ἐγίγνετο, *but you ought to give way to us, that our conversation might not be interrupted (as it is)*. PLAT. Prot. 335 C.

Τί δῆρ' οὐκ ἔρριψ' ἐμαυτὴν τῇσδ' ἀπὸ πέτρας, ὅπως τῶν πάντων πόνων ἀπηλλάγην; *why did I not throw myself from this rock, that I might have been freed from all my toils?* AESCH. Prom. 747: so Cho. 195. See SOPH. El. 1134. Οὐκοῦν ἐχρῆν σε Πηγάσου ξεῦσαι πτερόν, ὅπως ἐφαινοῦ τοῖς θεοῖς τραγικώτερος; AR. Pac. 135.

Τί μ' οὐ λαβὼν ἔκτεινας εὐθὺς, ὥς εἰδείξα μήποτε ἐμαυτὸν ἀνθρώποις ἐνθεν ἢ γεγώς; *that I might never have shown, as I have done*. SOPH. O. T. 1391. Εἰ γάρ μ' ὑπὸ γῆν ἦκεν, ὥς μήτε θεὸς μήτε τις ἄλλος τοῖσδ' ἐπεγέθκει, *would that he had sent me under the earth, so that neither any God nor any one else should be rejoicing at these things (as they are)*. AESCH. Prom. 152. Ἔδει τὰ ἐνέχυρα τότε λαβεῖν, ὥς μῆδ' εἰ ἐβούλετο ἐδύνατο ἐξαπατάν. XEN. An. vii. 6, 23 (the only case in Xenophon).

334. This construction is the result of an assimilation, which makes more distinct the connection in thought between the two clauses. It is especially common after secondary tenses implying unfulfilled conditions and unaccomplished wishes.

335. Ἄν cannot properly be added to the indicative in this construction. In the two examples in which it is found, it would seem that the construction has slipped into an apodosis, or that copyists have been misled by the resemblance to an apodosis and inserted ἄν.

Ζῶντι ἔδει βοθεῖν, ὅπως ὅτι δικαιοτάτος ᾖ καὶ ὀσιώτατος ἔζη τε ζῶν καὶ τελευτήσας ἀτιμώρητος ἂν κακῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἐγίγνετο, *in order that he might thus live while he lives, and (so that) after death he would be (as a consequence of such a life) free from punishment (?)*. PLAT. Leg. 959 B. Τόν γε πράττοντά τι δίκαιον οὐ προσήκειν ἀπορεῖν ἀλλ' εὐθὺς λέγειν, ἵνα μᾶλλον ἂν ἐπιστεύετο ὑφ' ὑμῶν, (possibly) *that the result might be that he would be (in that case) the more trusted by you*. ISAE. xi. 6.

336. The indicative can never be used in this construction, unless the final clause refers to present or past time, and unless also it is distinctly implied that the purpose is not (or was not) attained. If the purpose is future (at the time of speaking), or if it is left uncertain whether the object is or was attained, it must be expressed in the ordinary way by the subjunctive or optative, even though it depends on one of the class of verbs mentioned above. Both constructions may occur in the same sentence. *E.g.*

Οὓς (τῶν νέων τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς) ἡμεῖς ἂν ἐφύλαττομεν ἐν ἀκροπόλει, ἵνα μηδεὶς αὐτοὺς διέφθειρεν, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκοντο εἰς τὴν ἡλι-

κίαν, χρήσιμοι γίγνοιντο ταῖς πόλεσιν, *we should guard (in that case) in the Acropolis, that no one might corrupt them (as some now corrupt them), and that when (in the future) they should become of age they might become useful to their states.* PLAT. Men. 89 B. (Here it is not implied that they never become useful, this depending partly on the future.) Ταῦτ' ἂν ἤδη λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐπεχείρουν, ἵν' εἰδῇτε πολλοῦ δεῖν ἄξιον ὄντα τυχεῖν τοῦ ψηφίσματος αὐτὸν τουτοῦ, *I should (if that were so) be now undertaking to explain this to you, that you might (after hearing me) know that he is far from deserving the honour of the proposed decree.* DEM. xxiii. 7. Καίτοι χροῖν σε ἢ τοῦτον μὴ γράφειν ἢ ἐκείνον λύνειν, οὐχ, ἵνα ὁ βούλει σὺ γένηται, πάντα συνταράξαι, *i.e. you ought not to have confused everything in order that what you want might be done.* DEM. xxiv. 44.

337. Clauses with *μή* after verbs of fearing are never thus assimilated to a preceding indicative, as there is no reference here to the attainment of a purpose.

338. A purpose can be expressed in various forms besides that of the final clause; as by the relative with the future indicative, or in Homer with the subjunctive (565; 568); by the infinitive (770) or the infinitive with *ὥστε* or *ὥς* (587, 3); by the future participle (840); by *ὑπέρ* with the genitive of the articular infinitive (802).

B. OBJECT CLAUSES WITH "Οπως AND "Οπως *μή* AFTER VERBS OF STRIVING, ETC.

339. In Attic Greek and in Herodotus, object clauses with *ὅπως* and *ὅπως μή* after verbs signifying *to strive, to plan, to care for, to effect*, regularly have the future indicative after primary tenses to express the object aimed at. The subjunctive also is used, but less frequently than the future indicative.

After secondary tenses the future optative may be used, corresponding to the future indicative after primary tenses; but generally the future indicative is retained, as the original form of the thought (319). The other tenses of the optative are sometimes used, to correspond to the same tenses of the subjunctive, or the subjunctive itself may be retained (318). *E.g.*

Ἐπιμελεῖται ὅπως (or ὅπως μή) γενήσεται or γένηται, *he takes care that it may (or may not) happen.* Ἐπεμελεῖτο ὅπως γενήσεται, γενήσοιτο, or γένοιτο, *he took care that it should happen.*

(Fut.) Τὸ μὲν καλῶς ἔχον ὅπως χρονίζον εὖ μενεῖ βουλευτέον, *we must take counsel that what is well shall continue to be well.* AESCH. Ag. 846. Διδούς δὲ τόνδε φράζ' ὅπως μηδεὶς βροτῶν κείνων πάροιθεν ἀμφιδύσεταιι χροῖ. SOPH. Tr. 604. Σοὶ δὴ μέλει χροὶ τᾶλλ' ὅπως ἔξει καλῶς. EUR. I. T. 1051. Εἰρήνη δ' ὅπως ἔσται προτιμῶσ' οὐδέν, *but that there shall be peace they care not.* AR. Ach. 26. Σοὶ μελέτω ὅκως μὴ σε ὀψεται. HDT. i. 9. "Ορα ὅκως μὴ ἀποστήσονται. Id. iii. 36. Χρὴ ὁρᾶν τοὺς Ἀργείους ὅπως σωθήσεται ἡ Πελοπόννησος. THUC. v. 27. "Ωσπερ τὸν ποιμένα δεῖ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ὅπως σῶαί τε ἔσονται αἱ ὄες καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἔξουσιν, οὕτω καὶ τὸν στρατηγὸν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖ ὅπως σῶαί τε οἱ στρατιῶται ἔσονται καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἔξουσιν, καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα στρατεύονται τοῦτο ἔσται. XEN. Mem. iii. 2, 1. Καλῶς δὲ δημαγωγῆσεις, ἣν σκοπῆς ὅπως οἱ βέλτιστοι μὲν τὰς τιμὰς ἔξουσιν, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι μηδὲν ἀδικήσονται. ISOC. ii. 16. Φρόντιζ' ὅπως μηδὲν ἀνάξιον τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης πράξεις. Ib. 37. Τί μάλιστα ἐν ἅπασιν διεσπούδασται τοῖς νόμοις; ὅπως μὴ γενήσονται οἱ περὶ ἀλλήλους φόνοι. DEM. xx. 157. Μίκραν πρόνοιαν ἔχειν ὑμῖν ὁ θεὸς τὸν νόμον δοκεῖ ὅπως κύριος ἔσται καὶ μήτε συγχυθήσεται μήτ' αὖ μεταποιηθήσεται; Id. xxiii. 62. Καλὸν τὸ παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὡς βέλτισται ἔσονται τῶν πολιτῶν αἱ ψυχαί. PLAT. Gorg. 503 A. Δεῖ εὐλαβεῖσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν ὅπως μὴ ἐγγενήσεσθον, ἂν δὲ ἐγγένησθον, ὅπως ὅτι τάχιστα ἐκτετμήσεσθον. Id. Rep. 564 C.

(Subj.) Χρὴ φυλάσσειν καὶ προκαταλαμβάνειν ὅπως μὴδ' ἐς ἐπίνοιαν τοῦτου ἴωσι. THUC. iii. 46. (Παρασκευάζεσθαι) ὅπως σὺν θεῷ ἀγωνιζώμεθα. XEN. Cyr. i. 5, 14. Οὐ γὰρ ὅπως πλείονος ἄξιως γένηται ἐπιμελεῖται, ἀλλ' ὅπως αὐτὸς ὅτι πλείστα ὥραία καρπώσεται (subj. and fut. combined). Id. Symp. viii. 25. Οὐ φυλάξουσ' ὅπως μὴ δεσπότην εὖρητε. DEM. vi. 25. "Αλλου τοῦ ἐπιμελήσει ἢ ὅπως ὅτι βέλτιστοι οἱ πολῖται ὦμεν; PLAT. Gorg. 515 B. "Ορα ὅπως μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ὁμολογῆς. Id. Crit. 49 C.

(Fut. Opt.) Ἐξὴ ὑπὸ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας ὅπως ὡς ἐλάχιστα μὲν ὀψοίτο, ἐλάχιστα δ' ἀκούσοιτο, ἐλάχιστα δ' ἔροιτο. XEN. Oec. vii. 5. (After a primary tense this would be ὅπως ὀψεται, ἀκούσεται, ἔρηται. But Cobet reads ἔροίη.) Ἐπεμελείτο ὅπως μὴ αἰτιοὶ ποτε ἔσονται. Id. Cyr. viii. 1, 43. See the examples under 130.

(Fut. Indic. after past tenses.) "Επρασσον ὅπως τὴ βοήθεια ἦξει. THUC. iii. 4. Προθυμηθέντος ἐνὸς ἐκάστου ὅπως ἡ ναὺς προέξει. Id. vi. 31. Εὐλαβεῖσθαι παρεκελεύεσθε ἀλλήλους, ὅπως μὴ λήσετε διαφθαρέντες. PLAT. Gorg. 487 D. Οὐδ' ὅπως ὀρθῇ πλεύσεται προεῖδeto, ἀλλὰ τὸ καθ' αὐτὸν ὅπως ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἔσται παρασκευάσεν. DEM. xix. 250; so xix. 316.

(Pres. or Aor. Opt.) Ἐπεμέλετο αὐτῶν, ὅπως αἰὲ ἀνδράποδα διατελοῖεν. XEN. Cyr. viii. 1, 44. Ἀπεκρίνατο, ὅτι αὐτῷ μέλοι ὅπως καλῶς ἔχοι. Id. An. i. 8, 13. Ἐμμελῆκει δὲ αὐτοῖς ὅπως ὁ ἱππαγρέτης εἰδείη οὓς δέοι πέμπειν. Id. Hell. iii. 3, 9.

(Subj. after past tenses.) Φρουρήσουσ' (ἦξαι) ὅπως Αἰγισθος ἡμᾶς μὴ λάθῃ. SOPH. El. 1402. So HDT. ii. 121. Ἐπρασσεν ὅπως

πόλεμος γένηται. THUC. i. 57. "Ἐπρασσον ὅπως ἀποστήσωσιν Ἀθηναίων τὴν πόλιν. Id. iii. 70. Ὡνεῖται παρ' αὐτῶν ὅπως μὴ ἀπίωμεν (v.l. ἀπιμεν) ἐκ Μακεδονίας, *he bribed them to effect that we should not leave Macedonia* (after historic present). DEM. xviii. 32.

340. It will thus be seen that the future indicative is the most common form in these sentences, after both primary and secondary tenses; the future optative, which is theoretically the regular form after secondary tenses, being rarely used. (See 128.)

Homeric and other early Usages.

341. In Homer, verbs signifying *to plan, to consider, and to try*, chiefly φράζομαι, βουλεύω, μερμηρίζω, and πειρῶ, have ὅπως or ὥς with the subjunctive after primary tenses, and the optative (never future) and sometimes the subjunctive (318) after secondary tenses. Κέ is almost always used here with ὥς and the subjunctive, less frequently with ὅπως (313, 3).

342. The original relative and interrogative force of ὅπως and ὥς is more apparent here than in the Attic construction of ὅπως with the future indicative, especially after verbs of *considering*; though after πειρῶ the dependent clause comes nearer the later meaning. *E.g.*

Αὐτοὶ δὲ φράζομεθ' ὅπως ὅχ' ἄριστα γένηται, *let us ourselves consider how the very best things may be done.* Od. xiii. 365. Φράζομεθ' (imperfect) Ἀργείοισιν ὅπως ὅχ' ἄριστα γένοιτο. Od. iii. 129. Φράζεσθαι ὅππως κε μνηστήρας κτείνῃς. Od. i. 295. Περιφραζόμεθα πάντες νόστον, ὅπως ἔλθῃσιν, i.e. *how he may come.* Od. i. 76. Φράζωμεσθ' ὥς κέν μιν πεπίθωμεν. Il. ix. 112. Φράσσεται ὥς κε νέηται, ἐπεὶ πολυμήχανός ἐστιν. Od. i. 205. Ἄμα πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω λεύσσει ὅπως ὅχ' ἄριστα γένηται, i.e. *he looks to see how, etc.* Il. iii. 110. Ἐνόησε θεὰ ὥς Ὀδυσσεὺς ἔγροιο. Od. vi. 112. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτον μὲν ἐβούλεσας νόον αὐτῇ, ὥς ἦ τοι κείνους Ὀδυσσεὺς ἀποτίσεται ἐλθών; Od. v. 23. Βούλεον ὅπως ὅχ' ἄριστα γένοιτο. Od. ix. 420. Ἥλθον, εἰ τινα βουλὴν εἴποι ὅπως Ἰθάκην ἐς παιπαλόεσσαν ἰκοίμην. Od. xi. 479. Μερμηρίζεν ὅπως ἀπολοίαιτο πᾶσαι νῆες. Od. ix. 554. Μερμηρίζε κατὰ φρένα ὥς Ἀχιλλῆα τιμῆσῃ (or τιμήσει), i.e. *how he might honour Achilles.* Il. ii. 3. Ἄλλ' ἄγε μῆτιν ὕφηνον ὅπως ἀποτίσομαι αὐτοῦς. Od. xiii. 386. Ὡρμηνεν ἀνὰ θυμὸν ὅπως παύσειε πόνοιο δῖον Ἀχιλλῆα. Il. xxi. 137. Μνησόμεθ' ὥς χ' ὁ ξείνος ἦν πατρίδα γαίαν ἱκῆται, μηδὲ τι μεσσηγὺς γε κακὸν καὶ πῆμα πάθῃσιν. Od. vii. 192. In Hymn. Ap. Pyth. 148 we have τεχνήσομαι ὥς κε γένηται. Πείρα ὅπως κεν δὴ σὴν πατρίδα γαίαν ἱκῆται, i.e. *try to find means by which you may go, etc.* Od. iv. 545. Πειρᾷ ὥς κε Τρῶες ὑπερφίαλοι ἀπόλωνται. Il. xxi. 459. Τοῖσι δὲ πόλλ' ἐπέτελλε πειρᾶν ὥς πε-

πίθοιεν ἀμύμονα Πηλεΐωνα. *Il. ix. 179.* In *Il. xv. 164* we have φράζεσθω μή μ' οὐδὲ ταλάσση μείναι (354).

For a full citation of the Homeric examples with ὅπως and ὥς, see Appendix III. 3.

343. The frequent addition of *κέ* to ὥς or ὅπως in Homer shows the relative origin of the construction (312, 2).

For ὅπως ἄν in Herodotus, see 350; for ὅπως ἄν in this construction in Attic writers, see 348, 349.

344. In Homer ὅπως takes the future indicative chiefly when it is merely an indirect interrogative, with no reference to purpose, as in *Il. ii. 252*, οὐδέ τί πω σάφα ἴδμεν ὅπως ἔσται τάδε ἔργα, *we do not yet even know certainly how these things are to be*; or in *Od. xiii. 376*, φράξεν ὅπως μνηστῆρσιν ἀναιδέσι χεῖρας ἐφήσεις, *consider how you will lay hands on the shameless suitors.* See *Il. ix. 251*; *Od. xx. 38.* In *Od. xx. 28* the future indicative is retained after a past tense, there being as yet no future optative (128); ἔνθα καὶ ἐνθα ἐλίσσεται μερμηρίζων ὅπως δὴ μνηστῆρσιν ἀναιδέσι χεῖρας ἐφήσει. "Ὅπως may take the future (like other tenses) as a simple relative; as in *Il. i. 136*, ὅπως ἀντάξιον ἔσται, *as shall be an equivalent.*

345. Ὅφρα has the subjunctive in an object clause in *Il. vi. 361*, ἦδη γάρ μοι θυμὸς ἐπέσσυται, ὅφρ' ἐπαμύνω Ἰρῶσσι, and the optative in *Od. iv. 463*, τίς συμφράσσοιτο βουλὰς ὅφρα μ' ἔλοις; In *Il. i. 523*, ἐμοὶ δέ κε ταῦτα μελήσεται ὅφρα τελέσσω, ὅφρα may mean *until*.

346. The single object clause of this class in Pindar is *Pyth. i. 72*, νεῦσον ἄμερον ὅφρα κατ' οἶκον ὁ Φοῖνιξ ὁ Τυρσανῶν τ' ἀλάλατος ἔχη, *grant that the Phoenician, with the Etruscan war-cry, may keep quiet at home.* (See 359.)

347. As relics of the Homeric usage we find ὥς with the subjunctive in sentences of this class in *EUR. Med. 461*, *I. T. 467*, *PLAT. Rep. 349 C*; and with the optative in *AESCH. Prom. 203* (see 353, below). Herodotus has ὥς with the future indicative in *iii. 84, 159, vii. 161* (in the last ὥς στρατηγῆσεις γλίχεται). Herodotus has ὥς ἄν with the subjunctive in *iii. 85*, μηχανῶ ὥς ἄν σχῶμεν τοῦτο τὸ γέρας, which is cited as the solitary case of ὥς ἄν in these object clauses after Homer, except in Xenophon (351). So also *AESCH. Eum. 771*, *Sept. 627*; *Solon xiii. 38.* See also *SOPH. Ant. 215* (in 281, above).

"Ὅπως ἄν in Attic Greek and Herodotus.

Ὦς and ὥς ἄν in Xenophon.

348. The Attic writers sometimes use ὅπως ἄν with the subjunctive in these object clauses. This occurs chiefly in Aristophanes, Xenophon, and Plato. *E.g.*

Σκόπει ὅπως ἄν ἀποθάνωμεν ἀνδρικώτατα, *see that we die most manfully.* *AR. Eq. 80.* Διαμηχανήσομαι ὅπως ἄν ἰστίον σαπρὸν λάβης,

I will contrive that (somehow?) you get a rotten mast. Ib. 917. So AR. Nub. 739, Eccl. 623, Ach. 1060, Eq. 926. *Μάλλον ἢ πρόσθεν εἰσῆει αὐτοὺς ὅπως ἂν καὶ ἔχοντες τι οἴκαδε ἀφίκωνται.* XEN. An. vi. 1, 17. (Here some word like ἐπιμέλεια is understood as the subject of εἰσῆει.) *Τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιμελεῖται ὅπως ἂν θηρῶσιν.* Id. Cyr. i. 2, 10. *Ἐκέλευσε τὸν Φεραῦλαν ἐπιμεληθῆναι ὅπως ἂν οὕτω γένηται αὔριον ἢ ἐξέλασις.* Ib. viii. 3, 6: so v. 5, 48. See also XEN. Cyneg. vi. 23; Eques. iv. 3. *Ἡ ἄλλον ἐφίμενοι δικάσουσιν ἢ τοῦτου, ὅπως ἂν ἔκαστοι μὴτ' ἔχωσι τάλλότρια μῆτε τῶν αὐτῶν στέρωνται;* PLAT. Rep. 433 E. *Πάντα ποιοῦντας ὅπως ἂν σφίσι τὸ πηδάλιον ἐπιτρέψῃ.* Ib. 488 C. *Ἐὰν δ' ἔλθῃ, μηχανητέον ὅπως ἂν διαφύγῃ καὶ μὴ δῶ δίκην ὁ ἐχθρός.* Id. Gorg. 481 A.

Besides the examples cited above, Weber gives fifteen of Plato, and the following: SOPH. Tr. 618; EUR. I. A. 539; ISAE. vii. 30; DEM. xvi. 17, xix. 299. He adds HDT. i. 20, where *ὅκως ἂν* is certainly final.

349. The only case of *ὅπως ἂν* with the optative in an object clause in Attic Greek, except in Xenophon (351), is PLAT. Lys. 207 E, *προθυμοῦνται ὅπως ἂν εὐδαιμονοίῃς*, which is potential and on the Xenophontic model (see 351, 2). In DEM. xxxv. 29, *ἐκελεύομεν τούτους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ὅπως ἂν ὡς τάχιστ' ἀπολάβοιμεν τὰ χρήματα*, Cod. A reads *ἀπολάβωμεν*.

350. Herodotus has *ὅκως ἂν* with the potential optative four times after past tenses. *E.g.*

Προθυμομένου δὲ Λοξίω ὅκως ἂν γένοιτο, being zealous that it might (in some way) be done. i. 91. So ii. 126, iii. 44, v. 98.

351. (*Xenophon.*) Although Xenophon generally follows the Attic usage in these object clauses (339), he yet violates this signally by having *ὡς* and *ὡς ἂν* with both subjunctive and optative, and *ὅπως ἂν* with the optative; and further by having the optative with *ὡς ἂν* and *ὅπως ἂν* after both primary and secondary tenses. He also has *ὡς* twice with the future indicative (like *ὅπως*) and once with the future optative.

1. *Ὡς* or *ὡς ἂν* with the subjunctive, *ὡς* with the future indicative, and *ὡς* with the optative, are used by Xenophon like *ὅπως* in the construction of 339. *E.g.*

Ἐπιμελοῦνται ὡς ἔχῃ οὕτως. Oec. xx. 8. (Here the regular Attic usage requires *ὅπως ἔξει*.) *Ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ὡς ἂν πραχθῇ, to take care that they shall be done.* Hipp. ix. 2. *Ἐπεμέλοντο ὡς μὴ κωλύοιντο.* Cyr. vi. 3, 2. *Ὡς δὲ καλῶς ἔξει τὰ ὑμέτερα, ἐμοὶ μελήσει.* Ib. iii. 2, 13. *Προεῖπεν ὡς μηδεὶς κινήσοιτο μηδὲ ἀν-άξοιτο.* Hell. ii. 1, 22 (see 355).

For Xenophon's regular use of *ὅπως* in all these constructions, see examples under 339. For his regular use of *ὅπως ἂν* with the subjunctive, see 348.

2. When the optative follows $\omega\varsigma \acute{\alpha}\nu$ or $\delta\pi\omega\varsigma \acute{\alpha}\nu$, it is always potential, and the original relative and interrogative force of $\omega\varsigma$ and $\delta\pi\omega\varsigma$ plainly appears. *E.g.*

$\epsilon\pi\iota\mu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\upsilon\tau\alpha\iota \omega\varsigma \acute{\alpha}\nu \beta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\tau\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\iota \epsilon\iota\delta\epsilon\iota \omicron\iota \pi\omicron\lambda\iota\tau\alpha\iota$, *they take care that the citizens may be best (to see how they might be best)*. Cyr. i. 2, 5. $\Omega\varsigma \acute{\alpha}\nu \alpha\sigma\phi\alpha\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\alpha\tau\alpha \gamma' \epsilon\iota\delta\epsilon\iota\eta\nu \epsilon\pi\omicron\iota\omicron\upsilon\nu$, *I took steps that (by which) I might know most accurately*. Ib. vi. 3, 18. $\Sigma\kappa\omicron\pi\acute{\omega} \delta\pi\omega\varsigma \acute{\alpha}\nu \omega\varsigma \rho\acute{\alpha}\sigma\tau\alpha \delta\iota\acute{\alpha}\gamma\omicron\iota\epsilon\nu$, *I am considering how they might live the easiest lives*. Symp. vii. 2. (Cf. PLAT. Lys. 207 E, quoted in 349.)

For a full enumeration of all the irregular passages of this class in Xenophon, see Appendix IV.

Negative Object Clauses.

352. None of the object clauses with $\delta\pi\omega\varsigma$ or $\omega\varsigma$ in Homer (341) are negative, except that Od. vii. 192 combines $\omega\varsigma \kappa\epsilon \acute{\iota}\kappa\eta\tau\alpha\iota$ with $\mu\eta\delta\acute{\epsilon} \tau\iota \pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\eta\sigma\iota\nu$. Negative object clauses are expressed in Homer, like most negative final clauses (315), by the simple $\mu\eta$ with the subjunctive or optative, as in Il. v. 411, $\phi\tau\alpha\acute{\zeta}\epsilon\sigma\theta\omega \mu\eta \tau\iota\varsigma \omicron\iota \acute{\alpha}\mu\epsilon\iota\nu\omicron\nu \sigma\epsilon\iota\omicron \mu\acute{\alpha}\chi\eta\tau\alpha\iota$, and Il. xv. 164, xxii. 358, Od. xvii. 595, all with $\phi\tau\alpha\acute{\zeta}\omicron\mu\alpha\iota \mu\eta$ and the subjunctive. So $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\mu\beta\lambda\epsilon\tau\omicron \tau\epsilon\iota\chi\omicron\varsigma \mu\eta \Delta\alpha\nu\alpha\omicron\iota \pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\sigma\epsilon\iota\alpha\nu$, Il. xxi. 517. These examples show a common origin with clauses after verbs of fearing, but the optative in the last example indicates that the original parataxis is no longer felt.

353. The earliest example of a negative object clause with a final particle and $\mu\eta$ is AESCH. Prom. 203, $\sigma\pi\epsilon\upsilon\delta\omicron\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$ (past) $\omega\varsigma \text{Ze}\upsilon\varsigma \mu\eta\pi\omicron\tau' \acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\epsilon\iota\nu \theta\epsilon\omega\nu$. In all the Attic writers and in Herodotus the development of the negative object clause with $\delta\pi\omega\varsigma \mu\eta$ and the future keeps pace with that of the negative final clause with $\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha \mu\eta$, etc.

354. (*M η for $\delta\pi\omega\varsigma \mu\eta$ in Object Clauses.*) Verbs of this class (339) which imply *caution*, especially $\delta\rho\omega$ and $\sigma\kappa\omicron\pi\acute{\omega}$, may have the simple $\mu\eta$ with the subjunctive (rarely with the future indicative), even in Attic prose, like ordinary verbs of fear and caution (365), as well as $\delta\pi\omega\varsigma \mu\eta$ with the future. Such verbs belong equally to the two classes B and C (303). *E.g.*

$\Sigma\kappa\omicron\pi\epsilon\iota \mu\eta \sigma\omicron\iota \pi\rho\acute{\omicron}\nu\omicron\iota \eta \tau\omicron\upsilon \theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon \phi\upsilon\lambda\alpha\kappa\tau\acute{\epsilon}\alpha$. SOPH. O. C. 1180. " $\text{O}\rho\alpha \sigma\upsilon \mu\eta \nu\upsilon\nu \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu \tau\iota\varsigma \epsilon\upsilon\chi\epsilon\rho\acute{\eta}\varsigma \pi\alpha\rho\eta\varsigma$ ". Id. Ph. 519. " $\text{O}\rho\alpha \mu\eta \pi\alpha\rho\acute{\alpha} \gamma\nu\omega\mu\eta\nu \pi\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\eta\varsigma$ ". EUR. H. F. 594. $\Sigma\kappa\omicron\pi\epsilon\iota \tau\acute{\alpha}\delta\epsilon, \mu\eta \nu\upsilon\nu \phi\upsilon\gamma\omicron\gamma\omicron\tau\epsilon\varsigma \epsilon\iota\theta'$ $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\omega\mu\epsilon\nu \upsilon\sigma\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu$. Id. And. 755. $\text{T}\eta\rho\omicron\upsilon \mu\eta \lambda\acute{\alpha}\beta\eta\varsigma \upsilon\pi\acute{\omega}\pi\iota\alpha$. AR. Vesp. 1386. " $\text{O}\rho\alpha \mu\eta \mu\acute{\alpha}\tau\eta\nu \kappa\omicron\mu\pi\omicron\varsigma \delta' \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma \omicron\delta\tau\omicron\varsigma \epsilon\iota\rho\eta\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\varsigma \eta$ ", i.e. *lest this may prove to have been spoken*, etc. HDT. vii. 103. " $\text{O}\rho\alpha \mu\eta \pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\omega\nu \acute{\epsilon}\kappa\acute{\alpha}\sigma\tau\omega \eta\mu\omega\nu \chi\epsilon\iota\rho\omega\nu \delta\epsilon\eta\sigma\epsilon\iota$ ". XEN. Cyr. iv. 1, 18. $\Sigma\kappa\omicron\pi\epsilon\iota \delta\eta \mu\eta \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\nu \acute{\epsilon}\xi\alpha\iota\tau\eta\sigma\eta\tau\alpha\iota \kappa\alpha\iota \kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\gamma\epsilon\lambda\acute{\alpha}\sigma\eta$. DEM. xxi. 151. " $\text{O}\rho\alpha \omicron\delta\nu \mu\eta \tau\iota \kappa\alpha\iota \nu\upsilon\nu \acute{\epsilon}\rho\gamma\acute{\alpha}\sigma\eta\tau\alpha\iota$ ". PLAT. Symp. 213 D. So Il. xv. 164 (see 342).

See the corresponding use of $\delta\pi\omega\varsigma \mu\eta$ for $\mu\eta$ after verbs of fearing (370).

"Ὅπως after Verbs of Asking, Commanding, etc.

355. Verbs of asking, entreating, exhorting, commanding, and forbidding, which regularly take an object infinitive, sometimes have an object clause with ὅπως or ὅπως μή in nearly or quite the same sense. *E.g.*

Διδοὺς δὲ τόνδε φράζ' ὅπως μηδεὶς βροτῶν κείνου πάροιθεν ἀμφιδύσεται χροῖ, i.e. tell him that no one shall put on the robe before himself. SOPH. Tr. 604; so Aj. 567. Λακεδαιμονίων ἐδέοντο τὸ ψήφισμ' ὅπως μεταστραφείη. AR. Ach. 536. Καὶ σ' αὐτῷ βραχὺ, ὅπως ἔσομαι σοι Φανός. Id. Eq. 1256. "Οκῶς ἐωντῶν γένηται τὸ ἔργον παρακλεινοάμενοι, ἔργου εἶχοντο προθυμότερον. HDT. ix. 102. Τὸ Πάνακτον ἐδέοντο Βοιωτοὺς (?) ὅπως παραδώσουσι Λακεδαιμονίοις. THUC. v. 36. "Ὅπως μὲν μὴ ἀποθάνῃ ἡντιβόλει καὶ ἰκέτευεν, LYS. i. 29. Παραιτεῖσθαι ὅπως αὐτῶν μὴ καταψηφίσωσθε. ANT. i. 12. Δεήσεται δ' ὑμῶν ὅπως δίκην μὴ δῶ. Ib. 23; so αἰτοῦμαι ὅπως δῶ, Ibid. Διακелеύονται ὅπως τιμωρήσεται πάντας τοὺς τοιοῦτους. PLAT. Rep. 549 E. Παραγγέλλει ὅπως μὴ ἔσονται. Ib. 415 B. "Ἐμοιγε ἀπηγόρευες ὅπως μὴ τοῦτο ἀποκρινοίμην (fut. opt.) Ib. 339 A. "Ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ ὅπως μηδὲν ἐρεῖ ὃν ἡγείται, when he is forbidden to say a word of what he believes. Ib. 337 E.

356. This is rare in Homer; but twice in the Odyssey λίσσομαι has an object clause with ὅπως:—

Λίσσεσθαι δέ μιν αὐτὸς ὅπως νημερτέα εἴπῃ, and implore him yourself to speak the truth. Od. iii. 19. (Compare the regular construction, οὐδὲ σε λίσσομαι μένειν. Il. i. 174.) Λίσσεται δ' αἰεὶ "Ἠφαιστον κλυτοεργὸν ὅπως λύσειεν Ἄρηα, he implored him to liberate Ares. Od. viii. 344.

357. Λίσσομαι with ἵνα and the subjunctive is found in Od. iii. 327: λίσσεσθαι δέ μιν αὐτὸς ἵνα νημερτὲς ἐνίσπῃ, and implore him yourself that he may speak the truth. With this we may compare DEM. xvi. 28, δηλοὶ ἔσονται οὐχ ἵνα Θεσπιαὶ κατοικισθῶσι μόνον ποιούμενοι τὴν σπουδὴν, it will be evident that they take an interest not merely in having Thespiæ established; in both cases the object clause falls into the construction of a pure final clause. This is very rare in classic Greek; but it reappears in the later language, as in the New Testament: thus ἐντολὴν καινὴν δίδωμι ὑμῖν, ἵνα ἀγαπᾶτε ἀλλήλους, a new commandment I give unto you, that ye love one another, ION. Evang. xiii. 34. So ἐδεήθην ἵνα ἐκβάλλωσιν, LUC. ix. 40. Compare the Latin, rogat ut liceat.

358. In Od. xvii. 362 we find ὦτρυν' ὡς ἄν πύρνα κατὰ μνηστῆρας ἀγείροι, she exhorted him that he should collect bread among the suitors. (See 329, 1.)

359. The singular case of ὡς with the subjunctive in Il. i. 558, τῇ σ' ὁῶ κατανεῦσαι ἐτήτυμον, ὡς Ἀχιλλῆα τιμήσῃς, δόλεσθης δὲ πολέας ἐπὶ νηυσὶν Ἀχαιῶν, i.e. I believe that you promised by your nod to honour

Achilles, etc. has the appearance of indirect discourse; but probably *κατανεύω* ὥς is used with the same feeling as *λίσσομαι* ὅπως in 356, *promising to act* here taking the same construction as *entreating to act*. See PRIND. Py. i. 72 (in 346). Ὡς, as an adverb of manner, is here clearly on its way to its use in indirect discourse. Some read *τιμήσεις* and *δλέσεις*.

360. A singular use of ὅπως and the future indicative with δέι σε in place of the regular infinitive occurs in SOPH. Aj. 556, δέι σε ὅπως δείξεις, for δέι σε δείξαι, and Ph. 54, τὴν Φιλοκτῆτου σε δέι ψυχὴν ὅπως λόγουσιν ἐκκλέψεις λέγων. So Cratinus, Fr. 108, δέι σ' ὅπως εὐδμήμονος ἀλεκτρύονος μηδὲν διοίσῃς. This would be like *δέομαι* ὅπως (355) except for the object σέ, which is like σέ in δέι σε τούτου, the ὅπως clause representing the genitive.

Object Infinitive and Indirect Questions.

361. Some verbs which regularly take an object clause with ὅπως sometimes take an object infinitive, which may have the article τοῦ or τό. (See 373 and 374.) E.g.

Ἀεὶ τινα ἐπεμέλοντο σφῶν αὐτῶν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς εἶναι, *they always took care that one of their own number should be in the offices* (where we should expect ὅπως τις ἔσται or ἔσοιτο). THUC. vi. 54. Οὐδ' ἐπεμελήθηεν τοῦ διδασκαλόν μοί τινα γενέσθαι τῶν ἐπισταμένων. XEN. Mem. iv. 2, 4. Τὸ μὲν οὖν λεκτικὸς γίγνεσθαι τοὺς συνόντας οὐκ ἔσπευδεν. Ib. iv. 3, 1. (See 793.)

362. Verbs signifying to *see* or *look out* (like σκοπῶ) may be followed by an indirect question with εἰ, *whether*; as εἰ ξυμπονήσεις καὶ ξυνεργάσει σκόπει, *see whether you will assist me*, etc. SOPH. Ant. 41.

For independent clauses with ὅπως and ὅπως μή with the future, often explained by an ellipsis of σκόπει or σκοπεῖτε, see 271-283.

Aorist Subjunctive in -σω and -σωμαι.—Dawes's Canon.

363. When an aorist subjunctive active or middle was to be used with ὅπως or ὅπως μή in any construction, the second aorist was preferred to a first aorist in -σω or -σωμαι, if both forms were in use. This preference arose from the great similarity in form between these sigmatic aorists and the future indicative (as between βουλεύσῃ and βουλεύσει, βουλεύσῃται and βουλεύσεται). This made it natural also for a writer to avoid those forms of the subjunctive which were nearly identical with the future indicative where the latter could be used as well. This of course does not apply to the first aorist subjunctive passive, which has no resemblance to the future; and there is no reason for applying it to liquid aorists like μέινω and σφάλλω.

364. The general rule laid down by Dawes more than a century ago (*Misc. Crit.* pp. 222 and 228), the so-called *Canon Daviesianus*,

which declared the first aorist subjunctive active and middle a solecism after *ὅπως μή* and *οὐ μή*, was extended by others so as to include *ὅπως* (without *μή*), and the Greek authors were thoroughly emended to conform to it. As this rule has no other foundation than the accidental circumstance just mentioned (363), it naturally fails in many cases, in some of which even emendation is impossible. In the first place, there is no reason for applying the rule to pure final clauses, in which the future indicative is exceptional (324); and here it is now generally abandoned in theory, though not always in practice. There is, therefore, no objection whatever to such sentences as these: *ὦν ἕνεκα ἐπιταθῆναι, ὅπως ἀπολαύσωμεν καὶ ὅπως γενώμεθα*, XEN. Cyr. vii. 5, 82; *ἐκκλησίαν ξυνήγαγον, ὅπως ὑπομνήσω καὶ μέμψωμαι*, THUC. ii. 60; and *τὴν ἀγορὰν ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν κομίσαι, ὅπως παρὰ τὰς ναὺς ἀριστοποιήσωνται, καὶ δι' ὀλίγον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐπιχειρώσιν*, THUC. vii. 39, in which the best Mss. have the subjunctive. Indeed, where the reading is doubtful, the subjunctive should be preferred in these cases. Secondly, in independent prohibitions with *ὅπως μή*, although the future is the regular form, there is less objection to the subjunctive (even the first aorist) than in positive commands with simple *ὅπως*, since the analogy of the common *μή ποιήσης τοῦτο*, *do not do this*, supports *ὅπως μὴ ποιήσης τοῦτο* in the same sense (283). There is no such analogy, however, to justify such a positive command as *ὅπως ποιήσης τοῦτο*, *do this*, and this form has much less manuscript authority to rest on. Thirdly, in the case of *οὐ μή*, if both constructions (denials and prohibitions) are explained on the same principle, no reason exists for excluding the subjunctive from either; and it cannot be denied that both the first and the second aorist subjunctive are amply supported by the manuscripts. (See 301.) Fourthly, in object clauses with *ὅπως* there is so great a preponderance of futures over subjunctives, that the presumption in all doubtful cases is here in favour of the future, as it is in favour of the subjunctive in pure final clauses. A much stronger case, therefore, is made out by those who (like Weber and most modern editors) change all sigmatic aorist subjunctives in *this* construction to futures. Some cases, however, resist emendation; as XEN. An. v. 6, 21, *κελεύουσι προστατεῦσαι ὅπως ἐκπλεύσῃ ἡ στρατιά*, where we cannot read *ἐκπλεύσει*, as the future is *ἐκπλεύσομαι* or *ἐκπλευσοῦμαι*. In DEM. i. 2, all Mss. except one read *παρασκενέσασθαι τὴν ταχίστην ὅπως ἐνθένδε βοηθήσητε καὶ μὴ πάθητε ταῦτόν*, and it seems very arbitrary to change *βοηθήσητε* to *βοηθήσετε* and leave *πάθητε*. But a few cases like these weigh little against the established usage of the language, and we must perhaps leave the venerable *Canon Davesianus* undisturbed in the single department of object clauses with *ὅπως*, although we may admit an occasional exception even there.

See *Transactions of the American Philological Association for 1869-70*, pp. 46-55, where this question is discussed more fully.

C. CLAUSES WITH ΜΗ AFTER VERBS OF FEARING, ETC.

365. Verbs and phrases which express or imply *fear*, *caution*, or *danger* take *μή*, *lest* or *that*, with the subjunctive if the leading verb is primary, and with the optative if the leading verb is secondary. The subjunctive can also follow secondary tenses to retain the mood in which the object of the fear originally occurred to the mind.

Μή (like Latin *ne*) denotes fear that something *may happen* which is *not desired*; *μή οὐ* (*ut = ne non*) denotes fear that something *may not happen* which is *desired*. *E.g.*

Φοβοῦμαι μή γένηται (*vereor ne accidat*), *I fear that it may happen*: φοβοῦμαι μή οὐ γένηται (*vereor ut accidat*), *I fear that it may not happen*. Δεῖδω μή θήρεσσιν ἔλωρ καὶ κύρμα γένωμαι. *Od. v. 473*. Δεῖδω μή οὐ τίς τοι ὑπόσχηται τόδε ἔργον. *Il. x. 39*. (This is the only case of *μή οὐ* in these sentences in Homer. The next that are found are *EUR. And. 626*, *El. 568*, *Phoen. 263*. See 264, above.) Οὐ φοβῆ μή σ' Ἄργος ἀποκτείνειν θέλῃ. *EUR. Or. 770*. Ποῖον ἔθνος οὐ δοκεῖ ὑπερηγήσειν φοβούμενον μή τι πάθῃ; *XEN. Cyr. i. 6, 10*. Φροντίζω μή κράτιστον ᾗ μοι σιγᾶν. *Id. Mem. iv. 2, 39*. Φυλαττόμενος μή δόξῃ μανθάνειν τι. *Ib. iv. 2, 3*. Δέδοικα μή οὐδ' ὅσιον ᾗ ἀπαγορεύειν. *PLAT. Rep. 368 B*. Τὰ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πολλὴν ἀπιστίαν παρέχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, μή ἐπειδὴν ἀπαλλαγὴ τοῦ σώματος οὐδαμῶς ἔτι ᾗ, ἀλλὰ διαφθείρηται τε καὶ ἀπολλύηται. *Id. Phaed. 70 A*. Οὐκοῦν νῦν καὶ τοῦτο κίνδυνος, μή λάβωσι προστάτας αὐτῶν τινες τούτων, *there is danger of this, that they may take, etc.* *XEN. An. vii. 7, 31*. Κίνδυνός ἐστι, μή μεταβάλωνται καὶ γένηνται μετὰ τῶν πολεμίων. *ISOC. xiv. 38*. Ὀκνῶ μή μοι ὁ Ἀνυσίας ταπεινὸς φανῇ. *PLAT. Phaedr. 257 C*. Εὐλαβοῦ δὲ μή φανῇς κακὸς γεγώς. *SOPH. Tr. 1129*. Οὐδὲν δεινοὶ ἔσονται μή βοηθέωσι ταύτῃ. *HD. vii. 235*. Ὑποπτεύομεν καὶ ὑμᾶς μή οὐ κοινοὶ ἀποβῇτε. *THUC. iii. 53*. Αἰσχυρόμενος μή φορτικῶς σκοποῦμεν. *PLAT. Theaet. 183 E*. Οἱ μῦθοι στρέφουσιν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν, μή ἀληθεὶς ᾧσι, *torment his soul with fear lest they may prove true* (92). *Id. Rep. 330 D*.

Δείσας μή πῶς οἱ ἐρυσαίατο νεκρὸν Ἀχαιοί. *Il. v. 298*. Ἄξετο γὰρ μή Νυκτὶ θοῇ ἀποθύμια ἔρδοι. *Il. xiv. 261*. Ἐγὼ γὰρ ἤμην ἐκπεληγμένη φόβῳ, μή μοι τὸ κάλλος ἄλγος ἐξεύροι ποτέ. *SOPH. Tr. 24*. Ἔδεισαν οἱ Ἕλληνες μή προσάγοιεν πρὸς τὸ κέρας καὶ αὐτοὺς κατακόψειαν. *XEN. An. i. 10, 9*. Οὐκέτι ἐπετίθετο, δεδοκότες μή ἀποτμηθεῖσαν. *Ib. iii. 4, 29*. Ἔδεισαν μή λύττα τις ὥσπερ κυσὶν ἡμῖν ἐμπεπτώκοι. *Ib. v. 7, 26*. Ὑποπτεύσας μή τὴν θυγατέρα λέγοι, ἤρετο, *having suspected that he might mention his daughter*. *Id. Cyr. v. 2, 9*. Ἡθύμησάν τινες, ἐννοοῦμενοι μή τὰ ἐπιτήδεια οὐκ ἔχοιεν ὁπόθεν λαμβάνουεν. *Id. An. iii. 5, 3*. Οὐδεὶς

γὰρ κίνδυνος ἐδόκει εἶναι μή τις ἄνω πορευομένων ἐκ τοῦ ὀπισθεν ἐπίσπῳιτο. *Ib.* iv. 1, 6.

Οἱ Φωκαῖες τὰς νήσους οὐκ ἐβούλοντο πωλεῖν, δειμαίνοντες μὴ ἐμπόριον γένωνται. *HDt.* i. 165. Τῷ γὰρ δεδιέναι μὴ λόγους ἦσους ᾧσι, τολμηρῶς πρὸς τὰ ἔργα ἐχώρουν. *THUC.* iii. 83. Περιδεῆς γενόμενος μὴ ἐπιπλεύσῃσιν αἱ νῆες. *Id.* iii. 80. Ἔδεια μὴ Τροίαν ἀθροίσῃ καὶ ξυνοικίσῃ πάλιν. *EUR. Hec.* 1138. Οἱ θεώμενοι ἐφοβούντο μὴ τι πάθῃ. *XEN. Symp.* ii. 11. Δῆλος ἦν πᾶσιν (Κύρος) ὅτι ὑπερεφοβεῖτο μὴ οἱ ὁ πάππος ἀποθάνῃ. *Id. Cyr.* i. 4, 2.

For the present subjunctive in these sentences denoting what *may* hereafter prove to be an object of fear, see 92.

366. The manner in which this complex sentence expressing fear was developed from an independent sentence like *μὴ νῆας ἔλῳσι*, *may they not seize the ships*, and a preceding verb of fearing like *δεῖδω*, the two gradually becoming one sentence, has already been explained (307). As the fear and the desire to avert the cause of fear are both implied in *μὴ* with the subjunctive, it is not strange that this expression can follow verbs like *ὄρω* and *οἶδα* which do not imply fear in themselves; as *ἐξελθὼν τις ἴδοι, μὴ δὴ σχεδὸν ᾧσι κιόντες*, *let some one go out and see that they do not approach near* (cf. *videat ne accedant*); originally, *let some one go out and look to it: may they not approach*, *Od.* xxiv. 491. *So οὐδέ τι ἴδμεν, μὴ πως καὶ διὰ νύκτα μενοινήσῃσι μάχεσθαι*, *nor do we know any way to prevent their being impelled to fight even during the night*; originally, *nor have we any knowledge: may they not be impelled to fight*, *Il.* x. 100. See also *PLAT. Phaed.* 91 D, *τὸδε ἄδελον παντὶ, μὴ πολλὰ σώματα κατατρίψασα ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ τελευταῖον αὐτὴ ἀπολλήηται*, i.e. *no one knows any security against the soul itself finally perishing*, etc. The indirect question sometimes used in translating such a clause with *μὴ*, as *whether they may not approach* or *whether they may not be impelled*, is merely an attempt to express the hesitation which the apprehension involves, as there can be, of course, no real indirect question. See especially the cases of *μὴ* with the present indicative (369, 1), which are often called interrogative. See the corresponding construction in 492.

367. (*Future Indicative.*) Sometimes, though seldom, *μὴ* has the future indicative after verbs of fearing. The examples are:—

Φρὴν ἀμύσσεται φόβῳ, μὴ πόλις πύθηται . . . καὶ τὸ Κισσίων πόλισμ' ἀντίδουπον ἄσσεται, βυσσίνους δ' ἐν πέπλοις πῆσῃ λακίς. *AESCH. Pers.* 115. Ταῦτ' οὖν φοβοῦμαι, μὴ πόσις μὲν Ἡρακλῆς ἐμὸς καλεῖται (fut.), τῆς νεωτέρας δ' ἀνὴρ. *SOPH. Tr.* 550. Δέδουκα μὴ ἄλλου τινὸς μεθέξω. *XEN. Cyr.* ii. 3, 6. Φοβοῦμαι δὲ μὴ τινὰς ἡδονὰς ἡδοναῖς εὐρήσομεν ἐναντίας. *PLAT. Phil.* 13 A. Ἀλλὰ (φοβερὸν καὶ σφαλερὸν) μὴ σφαλεῖς κείσομαι. *Id. Rep.* 451 A. (The last two examples are not given by Weber.)

For three cases of *μὴ* with the future optative after past tenses of verbs of fearing, representing the future indicative, see 131.

368. The particles *ἄν* and *κέ* are never used with *μή* and the subjunctive. But a potential optative with *ἄν* can follow *μή* after a verb expressing fear or anxiety, after both primary and secondary tenses (168). *E.g.*

Δέδοικα γὰρ μή πρὸς λέγοις ἄν τὸν πόθον τὸν ἐξ ἐμοῦ, *I fear that you might perhaps tell.* SOPH. Tr. 631. Οὔτε προσδοκία οὐδεμία (ἦν) μή ἄν ποτε οἱ πολέμοιοι ἐπιπλεύσειαν. THUC. ii. 93. Ἐκείνο ἐννοῶ μή λῖαν ἄν ταχὺ σωφρονισθείην, *lest (in that case) I should be very soon brought to my senses.* XEN. An. vi. 1, 28. Δεδιώτες μή καταλυθείη ἄν ὁ δῆμος. LYS. xiii. 51.

369. (*Present and Past Tenses of Indicative with μή.*) Verbs of fearing may refer to present or past objects. (See 308.) *Μή* can therefore be used with the present and past tenses of the indicative after these verbs.

1. *Μή* with the present indicative expresses a fear that something is now going on. *E.g.*

Δέδοικα μή πληγῶν δέει, *I am afraid that you need blows.* AR. Nub. 493. Ὅρῳμεν μή Νικίας οἶεταί τι λέγειν, *let us be cautious lest Nicias is thinking that he says something.* PLAT. Lach. 196 C. (Here οἶηται would have meant *lest Nicias may think*, in the future.) Ὅρα μή ἐκείνον κωλύει. Id. Charm. 163 A. Φοβείσθε μή δυσκολώτερόν τι νῦν διάκειμαι ἢ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν βίῳ, *you are afraid that I am now in a more peevish state of mind than I used to be in (where the subjunctive would have been future, lest I may hereafter be).* Id. Phaed. 84 E. Ἐπίσχε, ὡς ἄν προὔξερεννήσω στίβον, μή τις πολιτῶν ἐν τρίβῳ φαντάζεται, κάμοι μὲν ἔλθῃ φαῦλος ὡς δούλῳ ψόγος. EUR. Phoen. 92. (Here *μή φαντάζεται* means *lest any one is now to be seen*; and *μή ἔλθῃ*, *lest any report may come hereafter.*) Ἄλλ' εἰσόμεσθα μή τι καὶ κατάσχετον κρυφῇ καλύπτει καρδία θυμουμένη, δόμους παρασείχοντες. SOPH. Ant. 1253. (The idea is, *we shall learn the result of our anxiety lest she is concealing, etc.*¹) Κάμαντῆς περί θέλω πυθέσθαι, μή 'πὶ τοῖς πάλαι κακοῖς προσκείμενόν τι πῆμα σὴν δάκνει φρένα, and *I wish to inquire about myself, (in fear) lest, etc.* EUR. Her. 481. Ἀναξ, ἐμοί τοι, μή τι καὶ θεήλατον τοῦργον τὸδ', ἢ ξύννοια βουλευέει πάλαι. SOPH. Ant. 278. (The idea is, *my mind has long been deliberating in anxiety lest this is the work of the Gods, ἐστὶν being understood after μή.*²) Ὅρα, φυλάσσου, μή τις ἐν στίβῳ βροτῶν (sc. ἐστίν). EUR. I. T. 67.

¹ In this passage and the following, if anywhere, it would seem necessary to admit the *interrogative* force often ascribed to *μή*. But here, as elsewhere, it is plain that the dependent clause with *μή* expresses the object of an apprehension. To establish *μή* as an interrogative, meaning *whether*, *μή* should not only follow a verb like *οἶδα*, but also be followed by a clause expressing no object of apprehension, like *εἰσόμεσθα μή οἱ φίλοι ζῶσιν*, *we shall learn whether our friends are now living*; but no such example can be found in classic Greek. The use of *εἰ*, *whether*, after verbs of fearing (376) shows how the Greeks expressed an indirect question in such cases.

² That this is the correct explanation, and that we need not emend the

2. *Μή* with the perfect indicative expresses a fear that something *has already happened*. The difference between this and the perfect subjunctive is often very slight, the latter expressing rather a fear that something may hereafter prove to have happened (103). *E.g.*

Νῦν δὲ φοβοῦμεθα μὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἅμα ἡμαρτήκαμεν, *but now we fear that we have missed both at once*. THUC. iii. 53. (The perfect subjunctive here would mean *lest it may hereafter prove that we have missed*.) Δέδοικα μὴ λελήθαμεν (τὴν εἰρήνην) ἐπὶ πολλῷ ἄγοντες, *I fear that we have been unconsciously enjoying peace borrowed at high interest*. DEM. xix. 99. Φοβοῦμαι μὴ λόγους τισὶ ψευδέσιν ἐντετυχηκαμεν. PLAT. Lys. 218 D.

3. *Μή* can be used with the imperfect or the aorist indicative, to express fear that something *happened in past time*.

Δίδω μὴ δὴ πάντα θεὰ νημερτέα εἶπεν, *I fear that all that the Goddess said was true*. Od. v. 300. Ἄλλ' ὅρα μὴ παίζων ἔλεγεν, *but be careful lest he was speaking in jest*. PLAT. Theaet. 145 B.

370. ('Ὅπως μὴ for μὴ with Verbs of Fearing.) Verbs denoting fear and caution are sometimes followed by an object clause with ὅπως μὴ and the future indicative, the subjunctive, or the optative, like verbs of *striving*, etc. (339). It will be noticed that ὅπως μὴ here is exactly equivalent to μὴ in the ordinary construction, so that φοβοῦμαι ὅπως μὴ γενήσεται (or γένηται) means *I fear that it will happen* (not *I fear that it will not happen*). *E.g.*

Δέδοικ' ὅπως μὴ ἔκ τῆς σιωπῆς τῆσδ' ἀναρρήξει (Laur. ἀναρρήξη) κακὰ, *I fear that a storm of evil will burst forth from this silence*. SOPH. O. T. 1074 (the earliest example). Τοῦ δαίμονος δέδοιχ' ὅπως μὴ τεύξομαι κακοδαίμονος, *I fear that the luck that I shall get will be bad luck*. AR. Eq. 112. Εὐλαβούμενοι ὅπως μὴ οἰχήσομαι. PLAT. Phaed. 91 C. Δέδοικα ὅπως μὴ ἀνάγκη γενήσεται, *I fear that there may be a necessity*. DEM. ix. 75. Οὐ φοβεῖ ὅπως μὴ ἀνόσιον πρᾶγμα τυγχάνης πράττων; PLAT. Euthyph. 4 E. Φυλάττον ὅπως μὴ εἰς τοῦναντίον ἔλθης. XEN. Mem. iii. 6, 16. Ἡδέως ἂν (θρέψαμι τὸν ἄνδρα), εἰ μὴ φοβοίμην ὅπως μὴ ἐπ' αὐτόν με τράποιτο. Ib. ii. 9, 3. Τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις ἀντιπαρακελεύομαι μὴ καταισχνυθῆναι ὅπως μὴ δόξει μαλακὸς εἶναι, i.e. *not to be shamed into fear lest he may seem to be weak*. THUC. vi. 13.

Compare the corresponding use of μὴ for ὅπως μὴ in ordinary object clauses, especially with ὁρῶ and σκοπῶ, which belong equally to both classes, B and C. (See 354.)

371. (*Indirect Discourse with ὥς or ὅπως*.) In curious contrast

passage so as to read τοῦργον τόδ' ἦ, ξύννοια βουλευεῖ πάλαι, is suggested by the scholion: ἡ σύννοια μοι βουλεύεται καὶ οἶεται μὴ καὶ θεήλατον εἶσι τὰ πρᾶγμα. So perhaps we should read φοβεῖσθαι μὴ τι δαιμόνιον τὰ πράγματα ἐλαύνει (vulg. ἐλαύνῃ) in DEM. ix. 54 (with Cod. A). But the subjunctive in both passages might be explained on the principle of 92.

with the preceding construction with ὅπως μή for μή (370) is that by which verbs of fearing sometimes take the construction of ordinary indirect discourse. Here ὡς and even ὅπως, *that*, may introduce the object of the fear, thus taking the place of μή in the common construction. This apparently occurs only when the leading verb is negated. *E.g.*

Μὴ δείσῃς ποθ' ὡς γέλωτι τοῦμόν φαιδρὸν ὀψεται κάρα, *do not fear that she will ever see my face joyful* (= μή ἴδῃ). SOPH. EL. 1309: so 1426. Ἀνδρὸς μὴ φοβοῦ ὡς ἀπορήσεις ἄξιον, *do not fear that you will be at a loss*. XEN. CYR. v. 2, 12. (Here the direct discourse would be ἀπορήσω, *I shall be at a loss*.) Μὴ δείσητε ὡς οὐχ ἡδέως καθευδήσετε, *do not fear that you will not sleep sweetly*. ID. VI. 2, 30. (Here μὴ οὐχ would be the ordinary expression.) Οὐ τοῦτο δέδοικα, ὡς ἂν ἀκροᾷσθε αὐτῶν ἀποψηφιεῖσθε, *I have no fear of this, that you will acquit them if you hear them*. LYS. XXVII. 9. Μὴ τρέσῃς ὅπως σέ τις ἀποσπάσει βίαν, *that any one shall tear you away by force*. EUR. HER. 248. Μὴ φοβεῦ μήτε ἐμέ, ὡς σοε πειρώμενος λέγω λόγον τόνδε, μήτε γυναῖκα τὴν ἐμὴν, μή τί τοι ἐξ αὐτῆς γένηται βλάβος, *do not fear either that I am saying this to try you (ὡς λέγω), or lest any harm shall come (μὴ γένηται)*. HDT. I. 9. (Here the two constructions after φοβεῦ make the principle especially clear.)

In all these cases μή or ὅπως μή would be regular, and exactly equivalent to ὡς and ὅπως here. In the same way, we say in English *he fears lest this may happen* and *he fears that this may happen* in the same sense. In Greek we might have μὴ τρέσῃς ὅπως μή σέ τις ἀποσπάσει (370) in the same sense as μὴ τρέσῃς ὅπως σέ τις ἀποσπάσει (above).

372. (Infinitive.) The future infinitive may stand in indirect discourse after verbs of fearing, to represent a future indicative of the direct course. *E.g.*

Οὐ φοβούμεθα ἐλασώσεσθαι, *we are not afraid that we shall have the worst of it*. THUC. v. 105. (Here μή with the subjunctive would be the regular form.)

373. The present or aorist infinitive (*without μή*), not in indirect discourse, may follow verbs of fearing, to denote the *direct object* of the fear; as in English, *I fear to go*. This infinitive may have the article. *E.g.*

Φοβοῦμαι ὃν διελέγχειν σε, μὴ ὑπολάβῃς, κ.τ.λ., *I am afraid to refute you, lest you may suspect, etc.* PLAT. GORG. 457 E. Φοβήσεται ἀδικεῖν, *he will be afraid to do wrong*. XEN. CYR. viii. 7, 15. (But φοβήσεται μὴ ἀδικῆ, *he will fear that he may do wrong*.) Δεδιέναι φασκόντων Κερκυραίων ἔχειν αὐτόν. THUC. i. 136. Οὐ κατέδωσαν ἐσελθεῖν. ID. iv. 110. Πέφρικα Ἐρινὸν τελέσαι τὰς κατάρas, *I shudder at the idea of the Fury fulfilling the curses*. AESCH. SEPT. 720. (But in vs. 790, τρέω μὴ τελέσῃ means *I tremble lest she may fulfil*

them.) See also XEN. AN. i. 3; 17. Τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν οὐδεὶς φοβείται, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν φοβείται. PLAT. Gorg. 522 E.

374. Verbs of *caution* may be followed by an infinitive (with or without μή), which sometimes has the article; the infinitive or the infinitive with μή having the same meaning as a clause with μή and the subjunctive or optative. *E.g.*

Πῶς οὐκ ἄξιον αὐτὸν γε φυλάσθαι τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι; *why ought he not to guard against becoming such a man himself?* XEN. Mem. i. 5, 3. (Here γενέσθαι is equivalent to μὴ γένηται.) Φυλαττόμενος τὸ λυπήσασθαι τινα, *taking care to offend no one.* DEM. xviii. 258. Φυλάσσειν μηδένα περαιοῦσθαι, *to guard against any one's crossing over.* THUC. vii. 17. Φυλαττόμενον καὶ προορώμενον μὴ καταισχυναί ταύτην. DEM. xxv. 11. (For μὴ in this construction see 815, 1.) In THUC. vii. 77, we find the infinitive with ὥστε after φυλάσσω.

375. Κίνδυνός ἐστι, the principal expression denoting *danger*, which takes μή and a finite verb, is quite as regularly followed by the infinitive. *E.g.*

Οὐ σμικρὸς κίνδυνός ἐστιν ἐξαπατηθῆναι, *there is no little danger of their being deceived.* PLAT. Crat. 436 B.

Κινδυνεύω is regularly followed by the infinitive (747).

376. (*Indirect Questions.*) Verbs of *fearing* may be followed by an indirect question introduced by εἰ, *whether*, or by some other interrogative. Ὅπως as an interrogative here must not be confounded with ὅπως as a conjunction. *E.g.*

Οὐ δέδοικα εἰ Φίλιππος ζῇ, ἀλλ' εἰ τῆς πόλεως τέθνηκε τὸ τοὺς ἀδικούντας μισεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι, *I have no fear (on the question) whether Philip is alive; but I have fear (about this), whether our city's habit of hating and punishing evil-doers is dead.* DEM. xix. 289. Φόβος εἰ μοι ζῶσιν οὓς ἐγὼ θέλω. EUR. Her. 791. Φέρουσά σοι νέους ἤκω λόγους, φόβῳ μὲν εἴ τις δεσποτῶν αἰσθήσεται, *through fear whether any one will perceive it (where μὴ αἰσθῆται would have meant lest any one shall perceive it).* EUR. Andr. 60. See XEN. Cyr. vi. 1, 17. Φοβούνται ὅποι ποτὲ προβήσεται ἡ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δύναμις. XEN. Hell. vi. 1, 14. (The direct question would be ποῖ προβήσεται;) Τὴν θεὸν δ' ὅπως λάθω δέδοικα, *I am in fear (about the question) how I shall escape the Goddess.* EUR. I. T. 995. (The direct question was πῶς λάθω; 287.) So SOPH. Ph. 337. Ἀπορῶντες πῶς χρὴ ἀπειθεῖν, φοβούμενοι δὲ πῶς χρὴ ἀπειλοῦντι ὑπακούσαι. XEN. Cyr. iv. 5, 19.

377. (*Causal ὅτι.*) Verbs of *fearing* may be followed by ὅτι, *because*, and an ordinary causal sentence with the indicative (713). *E.g.*

Οὐκ ἄξιον διὰ τοῦτο φοβέσθαι τοὺς πολέμιους, ὅτι πολλοὶ τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες, *to fear them, because they happen to be many.* ISOC. vi. 60. Φοβουμένης τῆς μητρὸς, ὅτι τὸ χωρίον ἐπυνθάνετο νοσῶδες εἶναι. ID. xix. 22. Ὅτι δὲ πολλῶν ἄρχουσι, μὴ φοβηθῆτε, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μάλλον διὰ τοῦτο θαρρεῖτε, *do not be afraid because they rule many, etc.* XEN. Hell. iii. 5, 10. Ἐφοβεῖτο, ὅτι ὀφθήσεσθαι ἔμελλε τὰ βασιλεια οἰκοδομεῖν ἀρχόμενος, *he was afraid, because he was about*

to be seen beginning to build the palace. Id. Cyr. iii. 1, 1. Φοβούμενος τὸ κάεσθαι καὶ τὸ τέμνεσθαι, ὅτι ἀλγεινόν, *fearing them because they are painful*. PLAT. Gorg. 479 A. So THUC. vii. 67.

SECTION VI.

Conditional Sentences.

378. A conditional sentence consists of two clauses, a dependent clause containing the condition, which usually precedes and is called the *protasis*, and the leading clause containing the conclusion, which is called the *apodosis*. The protasis is regularly introduced by the particle *εἰ*, *if*, negatively *εἰ μὴ*.

379. *Αἰ* is a Doric and Aeolic form for *εἰ*, and is sometimes used in epic poetry in the forms *αἴθε* and *αἴ γάρ*, and less frequently in *αἴ κε*.¹

380. The name protasis is often restricted to clauses introduced by a particle meaning *if*. But it applies equally to all conditional relative and temporal clauses (520), and it properly includes all clauses which naturally precede their leading clauses in the order of thought, as *ἐπεὶ ᾗσθητο τοῦτο, ἀπῆλθεν*, *after he perceived this, he departed*. Such a clause may still be called a protasis, even when it follows its leading clause, provided the order of thought is not changed.

381. The adverb *ἄν* (epic *κέ* or *κέν*, Doric *κά*) is regularly joined with *εἰ* in the protasis when the verb is in the subjunctive, *εἰ* with *ἄν* (*ᾶ*) forming the compound *ἔάν*, *ἦν*, or *ᾶν* (*ᾷ*). (See 200.) The simple *εἰ* is used in the protasis with the indicative and the optative.

The same adverb *ἄν* is regularly used in the apodosis with the optative, and also with the past tenses of the indicative when non-fulfilment of the condition is implied.

382. The only Ionic contraction of *εἰ ἄν* is *ἦν*, which is used in Homer and Herodotus. The Attic Greek has *ἔάν*, *ἦν*, and *ᾶν* (*ᾷ*); but

¹ *Αἰ* for *εἰ* is usually left in Homer by editors as the Mss. give it. But Bekker (*Homerische Blätter*, pp. 61, 62) quotes Heyne with approval, who says that no human being can tell why we have *αἰ* in one place and *εἰ* in another. Bekker cites, to illustrate this, *αἴθ' οὕτως χόλον τελέσει* 'Αγαμέμνων, Il. iv. 178, and *εἴθ' ὥς τοι γούναθ' ἔποιτο*, iv. 313; also *αἴ κε θεὸς ἔκηται*, Il. v. 129, followed immediately by *ἀτὰρ εἴ κε Ἀφροδίτη ἔλθῃσ' ἐς πόλεμον*. Bekker in his last edition of Homer (1858) gives only *εἰ*, *εἴθε*, and *εἰ γάρ*, without regard to the Mss.; and he is followed by Delbrück.

άν, *if*, was probably never used by the tragedians or by Thucydides, although the Mss. have it in a few cases.

383. The negative particle of the protasis is regularly μή, that of the apodosis is ού.

384. When ού is found in a protasis, it is generally closely connected with a particular word (especially the verb), with which it forms a single negative expression; so that its negative force does not (like that of μή) affect the protasis as a whole. *E.g.*

Πάντως δήπου (οὕτως ἔχει), εἴαν τε σὺ καὶ Ἄνυτος οὐ φῆτε εἴαν τε φῆτε, *if you deny it, as well as if you admit it.* PLAT. Apol. 25 B. Εἰ τοῖς θανάοντας οὐκ ἔψ (= κωλύεις) θάπτειν, *if you forbid burying the dead.* SOPH. Aj. 1131. Εἰ μὲν οὐ πολλοὶ (= ὀλίγοι) ἦσαν, καθ' ἕκαστον ἂν περὶ τούτων ἠκούετε, *if there were only a few, etc.* LYS. xiii. 62; cf. 76. Τῶνδε μὲν οὐδὲν ἴσον ἐστὶν, εἴγε ἀφ' ἡμῶν γε τῶν ἐν μέσῳ οὐδεὶς οὐδέποτε ἀρξεται, *there is no fairness in this, if (it is the plan, that) no one is ever to begin with us.* XEN. Cyr. ii. 2, 3.

In all these cases μή could be used, even where ού seems especially proper; as in ἂν τ' ἐγὼ φῶ ἂν τε μὴ φῶ, *whether I admit or deny it*, DEM. xxi. 205. See EUR. Hipp. 995, οὐδ' ἦν σὺ μὴ φῆς. The use of μή or ού was determined by the feeling of the speaker at the moment as to the scope of his negation. The following example makes the difference between ού and μή particularly clear, ού affecting merely the verb, and μή affecting the whole clause (including the ού): εἰ μὴ Πρόξενον οὐχ ὑπεδέξαντο, ἐσώθησαν ἂν, *if it had not been that they did not receive Proxenus, they would have been saved*, DEM. xix. 74.

385. Εἰ οὐ with the indicative is sometimes found in Homer where the Attic Greek would have εἰ μὴ; as in εἰ δέ μοι οὐκ ἐπέεσσ' ἐπιτίσεται ἀλλ' ἀλογίσει, IL. xv. 162. See also IL. xx. 129; Od. ii. 274, xii. 382.

386. After verbs expressing *wonder*, *delight*, and similar emotions (494), where a protasis seems to take the place of a causal sentence, εἰ οὐ can be used, on the principle of 384, though here μὴ is more common. See examples of εἰ μὴ under 494; and for εἰ οὐ see ISOC. i. 44, μὴ θαυμάσης εἰ πολλὰ τῶν εἰρημένων οὐ πρόπει σοι. See also 387.

387. When two clauses introduced by μέν and δέ depend upon a single εἰ which precedes them both, οὐ is used even more frequently than μὴ; as such clauses have their own construction independently of the εἰ, which merely introduces each of them as a whole, not affecting the construction of particular words. *E.g.*

Δεινὸν ἂν εἴη, εἰ οἱ μὲν ἐκείνων ξίμμαχοι ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ τῇ αὐτῶν φέροντες οὐκ ἀπεροῦσιν, ἡμεῖς δ' ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτοῖ σφύεσθαι οὐκ ἄρα

δαπάνησομεν, *it would be a hard thing, if (it is a fact that) their allies will not refuse, etc. while we will not contribute.* THUC. i. 121. Εἴτ' οὐκ αἰσχρὸν, εἰ τὸ μὲν Ἀργείων πλῆθος οὐκ ἐφοβήθη τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων ἀρχὴν ὑμεῖς δὲ βάρβαρον φοβήσεσθε; *is it not then disgraceful, if (it is true that), while the Argive people did not fear, you are going to be afraid, etc.* DEM. xv. 23. See also PLAT. Phaed. 97 A; LYS. xxx. 32; ISAE. vi. 2; DEM. xxxviii. 18; AESCHIN. iii. 242.

CLASSIFICATION OF CONDITIONAL SENTENCES.

388. The most obvious natural distinction is that of (a) *present and past conditions* and (b) *future conditions*. Present and past conditions (a) are divided into two classes by distinguishing (1) those which imply nothing as to the fulfilment of the condition from (2) those which imply that the condition is not or was not fulfilled. Future conditions (b) have two classes (1, 2), distinguished by the manner in which the supposition is stated. Class 1 of present and past conditions is further distinguished on the ground of the *particular* or *general* character of the supposition, as explained below in II. (394).

389. Excluding from the class (a) 1 the present and past *general* suppositions which have a peculiar construction (395, a and b), we have—

I. Four Forms of Ordinary Conditions.

(a) PRESENT AND PAST CONDITIONS.

390. In present or past conditions, the question of fulfilment has already been decided, but we may or may not wish to imply by our form of statement how this has been decided. In Greek (as in English or Latin) we may, therefore, state such a condition in either of two ways:—

1. We may *simply state* a present or past condition, implying nothing as to its fulfilment; as *if he is (now) doing this*, εἰ τοῦτο πράσσει, —*if he was doing it*, εἰ ἔπρασσε, —*if he did it*, εἰ ἔπραξε, —*if he has (already) done it*, εἰ πέπραχε, —*if he had (already) done it (at some past time)*, εἰ ἐπεπράχευ. The apodosis here expresses simply what is (*was* or *will be*) the result of the fulfilment of the condition. Thus we may say:—

Εἰ πράσσει τοῦτο, καλῶς ἔχει, *if he is doing this, it is well*; εἰ πράσσει τοῦτο, ἡμάρτηκεν, *if he is doing this, he has erred*; εἰ πράσσει τοῦτο, καλῶς ἔξει, *if he is doing this, it will be well*. Εἰ ἔπραξε (or ἔπρασσε) τοῦτο, καλῶς ἔχει (εἶχεν, ἔσχεν, or ἔξει), *if he did this, it is (was or will be) well*. Εἰ πέπραχε τοῦτο, καλῶς ἔξει, *if*

he has done this, it will be well. So with the other tenses of the indicative in the apodosis. (See 402.)

So in Latin: *Si hoc facit, bene est; Si hoc fecit, bene erit; etc.*

2. On the other hand, we may state a present or past condition so as to imply that it is *not* or *was not* fulfilled; as *if he were (now) doing this*, εἰ τοῦτο ἔπρασσε;—*if he had done this*, εἰ τοῦτο ἔπραξε (both implying the opposite). The apodosis here expresses what *would be* (or *would have been*) the result if the condition *were* (or *had been*) fulfilled. The adverb ἄν in the apodosis distinguishes these forms from otherwise similar forms under (a) 1. Thus we may say:—

Εἰ ἔπρασσε τοῦτο, καλῶς ἄν εἶχεν, *if he were (now) doing this, it would be well; or if he had been doing this, it would have been well.*

Εἰ ἔπραξε τοῦτο, καλῶς ἄν ἔσχεν (or ἄν εἶχεν), *if he had done this, it would have been well (or it would now be well).* On the other hand, εἰ ἔπραξε τοῦτο, καλῶς ἔσχεν (without ἄν) would mean *if he did this, it was well.* (See 410.)

In Latin: *Si hoc faceret, bene esset* (present); *Si hoc fecisset, bene fuisset* (past).

391. The Greek has no form implying that a condition *is* or *was* fulfilled, and it is hardly conceivable that any language should find such a form necessary or useful.

(b) FUTURE CONDITIONS.

392. The question as to the fulfilment of a future condition is still undecided. We may state such a condition in Greek (as in English and Latin) in either of two ways:—

1. We may say *if he shall do this*, εἰ ἂν πράσῃ (or πράξῃ) τοῦτο (or, still more vividly, εἰ πράξει τοῦτο), making a distinct supposition of a future case. The apodosis expresses what *will be* the result if the condition shall be fulfilled. Thus we may say:—

Ἐὰν πράσῃ (or πράξῃ) τοῦτο, καλῶς ἔξει, *if he shall do this (or if he does this), it will be well* (sometimes also εἰ πράξει τοῦτο). (See 444 and 447.) In Latin: *Si hoc faciet (or si hoc fecerit), bene erit.*

2. We may also say *if he should do this*, εἰ πράσσοι (or πράξειε) τοῦτο, still supposing a case in the future, but less distinctly and vividly than before. The apodosis corresponds to this in form (with the addition of ἄν), and expresses what *would be* the result if the condition should be fulfilled. Thus we may say:—

Εἰ πράσσοι (or πράξειε) τοῦτο, καλῶς ἄν ἔχοι, *if he should do this, it would be well.* (See 455.) In Latin: *Si hoc faciat, bene sit.*

393. The Latin commonly employs the future indicative, *si hoc faciet* (corresponding strictly to *εἰ τοῦτο πράξει*, *if he shall do this*), or the future perfect, *si hoc fecerit*, to express the form of protasis which the Greek expresses by *ἐάν* and the subjunctive (*ἐάν τοῦτο πράσῃ* or *πράξῃ*); and it uses the form *si hoc faciat* to represent the Greek *εἰ τοῦτο πράσσοι*, *if he should do this*.

II. Present and Past General Suppositions.

394. The supposition contained in a protasis may be either *particular* or *general*.

A particular supposition refers to a *definite* act or to several definite acts, supposed to occur at some definite time (or times); as *if he (now) has this, he will give it; if he had it, he gave it; if he had had the power, he would have helped me; if he shall receive it (or if he receives it), he will give it; if he should receive it, he would give it*. So *if he always acts justly (or if he never commits injustice), I honour him; if he acted justly on all these occasions, he will be rewarded*.

A general supposition refers indefinitely to any act or acts of a given class which may be supposed to occur or to have occurred at any time; as *if ever he receives anything, he (always) gives it; if ever he received anything, he (always) gave it; if he had (on any occasion) had the power, he would (always) have helped me; if ever any one shall (or should) wish to go, he will (or would) always be permitted*. So *if he ever acts justly, I (always) honour him; if he ever acted justly, he was (always) rewarded*.

395. Although this distinction is seen in all classes of conditions, present, past, and future (as the examples show), it is only in present and past conditions which do not imply non-fulfilment (*i.e.* in those of 390, 1) that the Greek distinguishes general from particular suppositions in *construction*. Here, however, we have two classes of conditions which contain only general suppositions.

(a) When the apodosis has a verb of present time expressing a customary or repeated action, the protasis may refer (in a general way) to any act or acts of a given class which may be supposed to occur at any time within the period represented in English as present. Thus we may say:—

Ἐάν τις κλέπτῃ, κολάζεται, *if (ever) any one steals, he is (in all such cases) punished*; *ἐάν τις πράσῃ (or πράξῃ) τοιοῦτόν τι, χαλεπαίνομεν αὐτόν*, *if (ever) any one does such a thing, we are (always) angry with him*; *ἐάν τις τούτου πῖνῃ, ἀποθνήσκει*, *if any one (ever) drinks of this, he dies*. (See 462.)

(b) When the apodosis has a verb of past time expressing a customary or repeated action, the protasis may refer (in a general way) to any act or acts of a given class which may be supposed to have occurred at any time in the past. Thus we may say:—

Εἰ τις κλέπτοι, ἐκολάξετο, *if (ever) any one stole, he was (in all such cases) punished*; εἰ τις πράσσοι (or πράξει) τοιοῦτόν τι, ἐχάλεπαίνομεν αὐτῷ, *if (ever) any one did such a thing, we were (always) angry with him*; εἰ τις τούτου πίοι, ἀπέθνησκεν, *if any one (ever) drank of this, he died.* (See 462.)

396. Although the Latin sometimes agrees with the Greek in distinguishing general conditions from ordinary present and past conditions, using *si faciat* and *si faceret* in a general sense, like ἐὰν πράσῃ and εἰ πράσσοι above, it yet commonly agrees with the English in not recognising the distinction, and uses the indicative alike in both classes. Even the Greek sometimes (especially in poetry) neglects the distinction, and uses the indicative in these general conditions (467).

397. In external form the general present condition coincides with the more vivid future condition, 392, 1, as both are expressed by εἰ and the subjunctive, the form of the apodosis alone distinguishing them. But in sense there is a much closer connexion between the general present condition and the ordinary present condition expressed by εἰ and the present indicative, 390, 1, with which in most languages (and sometimes even in Greek) it coincides also in form (see 396). On the other hand, εἰ with the subjunctive in a future condition agrees substantially in sense with εἰ and the *future* indicative (447), and is never interchangeable with εἰ and the *present* indicative.

ORIGIN OF THE GREEK CONDITIONAL SENTENCE.—EARLY

COMBINATIONS OF εἰ WITH κέ OR ἄν.

398. It is impossible to discuss intelligently the origin of the conditional sentence until the etymology and original meaning of the particles εἰ, αἰ, ἄν, and κέ are determined. On these questions we have as yet little or no real knowledge. The theory of εἰ or αἰ which identifies it with the pronominal stem *sva* (σφε), Oscan *svai*, and Latin *si*, is perhaps the most common. By this the original meaning of εἰ, or rather of one of its remote ancestors in some primitive language, would be *at a certain time* (or *place*), *in a certain way*.¹ But, even on this theory, we can hardly imagine any form of εἰ as existing in the *Greek* language until the word had passed at least into the relative stage, with the force of *at which time* (or *place*), *in which way*, *under which circumstances*. It cannot be denied that the strong analogy

¹ See Delbrück, *Conj. u. Opt.*, pp. 70, 71, who terms this a "wahrscheinliche positive Vermuthung."

between conditional and relative sentences and the identity of most of their forms give great support to any theory by which the conditional sentence is explained as an outgrowth of the relative, so that the conditional relative sentence is made the original conditional construction. Thus *εἰ ᾗλθεν* might at some time have meant *in the case in which he went*, and *εἰ ἔλθῃ*, *in the case in which he shall go* (or *in case he shall go*), etc. But here we are on purely theoretical ground; and we must content ourselves practically with the fact, that in the earliest Greek known to us *εἰ* was fully established in its conditional sense, like our *if* and Latin *si*.

399. The regular types of the conditional sentence, which are given above (390-395) as they appear in Attic prose, have been mainly sifted from a rich variety of forms which are found in earlier Greek. In Homer we have all tenses of the indicative used as in Attic Greek, except that the imperfect has not yet come to express an unreal *present* condition, but is still confined to the past. The future indicative sometimes has *κέ* in protasis, and the future with *κέ* or *ἄν* can stand in apodosis. The subjunctive in protasis can have *εἴ κε* (even *εἰ ἄν*), *ἦν*, or *εἰ* alone; and it can stand in a future apodosis either alone or with *ἄν* or *κέ* (like the optative). The optative sometimes has *εἴ κε* in protasis, and occasionally stands in apodosis without *ἄν* or *κέ*. Once we find *εἴ κε* with the aorist indicative (II. xxiii. 526).

Thus, while we have in Attic prose two stereotyped forms of future conditional sentences, *ἐὰν* (*ἦν*, *ἄν*) *δῶ*, *ἐλούμαι* and *εἰ* *δοίῃ*, *ἐλοίμην* *ἄν*, we have in Homer *ἦν* *δῶ*, *εἴ κε* *δῶ*, *εἰ* *δῶ*, and *εἰ* *δοίῃ*, *εἴ κε* *δοίῃ*, in protasis; and *ἐλούμαι*, *ἐλοῦμαι* *κε*, *ἔλωμαι*, *ἔλωμαι* *κε*, and *ἐλοίμην* *κε* (or *ἄν*), rarely *ἐλοίμην* alone, in apodosis; with every variety of combination of these. (For the details and examples, see 450-454 and 460.)

400. There is a tendency in Homer to restrict the subjunctive with simple *εἰ* (without *κέ* or *ἄν*) to general conditions (468), and a similar but less decided tendency to restrict the subjunctive with conditional relatives without *κέ* or *ἄν* to the generic relative construction (538). But the general condition with *εἰ* appears in Homer in a primitive stage, compared with the corresponding relative construction, which is fully developed. Both subjunctive and optative are freely used in general relative conditions in Homer, as in Attic Greek; while in general conditions with *εἰ* the subjunctive occurs only nineteen times and the optative only once (468). On the supposition that the clause with *εἰ* is derived from the relative clause, this would appear as the ordinary process of development.

401. It is perhaps the most natural view of the various conditional expressions, *εἰ*, *εἴ* *κε*, *εἰ* *ἄν*, etc. to suppose that at some early stage the Greek had two perfectly analogous forms in future conditions, one with two subjunctives, and one with two optatives, e.g. *εἰ* *δῶ* *τοῦτο*, *ἔλωμαι* and *εἰ* *δοίῃ* *τοῦτο*, *ἐλοίμην*. The particle *κέ* would then begin to be allowed in both of these conditions and conclusions, giving to each more distinctly its force as a protasis or an apodosis.¹ It would thus be allowed to say *εἴ* *κε* *δῶ* *τοῦτο*, *ἔλωμαί* *κε* and *εἴ* *κε* *δοίῃ* *τοῦτο*, *ἐλοίμην* *κε*, both of which forms actually occur in Homer. Gradually the tendencies of the language restricted the use of *κέ* more and more to the subjunctive in protasis and the optative in apodosis, although for a time the usage was not strict. This state of transition appears in Homer, who preserves even a case of an otherwise extinct use of *εἴ* *κε* with the aorist indicative. Shortly before this stage, however, a new tendency was making itself felt, to distinguish the present general condition from the particular in form, the way being already marked out by the conditional relative sentence. As this new expression was to be distinguished from both the really present condition *εἰ* *βούλεται* and the future *εἴ* *κε* *βούληται*, the half-way form *εἰ* *βούληται* (which had nearly given place to *εἴ* *κε* *βούληται* in future conditions) came into use in the sense *if he ever wishes*.² This would soon develop a corresponding form for use after past tenses, *εἰ* *βούλοιτο*, *if he ever wished*, of which we see only the first step in Homer, II. xxiv. 768. (See 468.) It would hardly be possible to keep the two uses of *εἰ* with the subjunctive distinct in form, and in time the form with *κέ* (or *ἄν*) was established in both (381). But we see this process too in transition in Homer, where *εἴ* *κε* or some form of *εἰ* *ἄν* is used in all future conditions except nine, and has intruded itself into five of the nineteen general conditions. We must suppose a corresponding process in regard to *κέ* or *ἄν* in conditional relative clauses to have gone on before the Homeric period, with more complete results.³ In Attic Greek, except in a few poetic passages, the usage is firmly

¹ As I do not profess to have any distinct theory of the origin or the original meaning of either *κέ* or *ἄν*, I have not attempted to define their force, except so far as they emphasise what we see by usage may be implied by the sentence without their aid.

² Monro (*Hom. Gr.* p. 263) thinks "the primary use of *ἄν* or *κέ* is to show that the speaker is thinking of particular instances or occasions." If this is so, we should expect these particles to be first used in future conditions, while the later general conditions would first take the simple *εἰ*, as is here supposed.

³ See *Am. Jour. Phil.* iii. pp. 441, 442, where Gildersleeve refers to the use of *εἰ*, *δτε*, etc. with the optative in oratio obliqua, representing *εἰ* *ἄν*, *δταν*, etc. with the subjunctive in the direct form, as evidence of an old use of *εἰ*, *δτε*, etc. with the subjunctive.

established by which the subjunctive in protasis requires *ἄν* in both particular and general conditions.

I. FOUR FORMS OF ORDINARY CONDITIONAL SENTENCES.

(a) PRESENT AND PAST CONDITIONS.

1. *Simple Suppositions (chiefly Particular).*

402. When the protasis *simply states* a present or past particular supposition, implying nothing as to the fulfilment of the condition, it takes a present or past tense of the indicative with *εἰ*. Any form of the verb may stand in the apodosis to express the result if the condition is or was fulfilled. *E.g.*

Εἰ ἐβρόντησε, καὶ ἤστραψεν, if it thundered, it also lightened. (This implies no opinion of the speaker as to the reality of the thunder.) *Εἰ δ' οὕτω τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ἐμοὶ μέλλει φίλον εἶναι.* II. i. 564. *Εἰ τότε κούρος ἔα, νῦν αὐτέ με γῆρας ὀπάξει.* II. iv. 321. *Εἰ μάλα καρτερός ἐσσι, θεός που σοὶ τό γ' ἔδωκεν.* II. i. 178. *Εἰ δὲ χρὴ καὶ παρ σοφὸν ἀντιφερίζαι, ἐρέω, but if I must match myself against the wise one, I will speak.* PIND. Py. ix. 54. *Εἰ θεοὶ τι δρῶσιν αἰσχροδὸν, οὐκ εἰσὶν θεοί, if Gods do aught that is base, they are not Gods.* EUR. Bell. Fr. 294. *Εἰ ἐγὼ Φαῖδρον ἀγνοῶ, καὶ ἑμᾶντοῦ ἐπιλέλησμαι. ἄλλα γὰρ οὐδέτερά ἐστι τούτων, if I do not know Phaedrus, I have forgotten myself; but neither of these is the case.* PLAT. Phaedr. 228 A. *Εἰ μὲν (Ἀσκληπιὸς) θεοῦ ᾔην, οὐκ ᾔην αἰσχροκερδής· εἰ δ' αἰσχροκερδής, οὐκ ᾔην θεοῦ.* Id. Rep. 408 C. *Εἰ δὲ ἐκείνος ἀσθενέστερος ᾔην, ἑαυτῷ τοῦ πάθους αἰτίον ἡγήσατο.* DEM. xxiii. 54.

403. The imperative, the subjunctive in exhortations or prohibitions, the optative in wishes, the potential optative or indicative with *ἄν*, or the infinitive may stand in the apodosis. *E.g.*

Ἄλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ σοι, στεῖχε, if thou art resolved, go. SOPH. Ant. 98. (Here *ἐὰν δοκῇ* would refer to the future, while *εἰ δοκεῖ* is strictly present in its time. Cf. Ant. 76.) *Ἄλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ, πλέωμεν, ὁρμάσθω ταχύς.* Id. Ph. 526. *Εἰ μὲν ἴστε με τοιοῦτον, . . . μηδὲ φωνὴν ἀνάσχησθε.* DEM. xviii. 10. *Ἄλλ' εἴ που πτωχῶν γε θεοὶ καὶ ἐρινύες εἰσὶν, Ἀντίνοον πρὸ γάμοιο τέλος θανάτω κηχεῖν.* Od. xvii. 475. *Ἄλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ σοι ταῦθ', ἵπαί τις ἀρβύλλας λύσει τάχος, but if this pleases you, let some one quickly loose my shoes.* AESCH. Ag. 944. *Κάκιστ' ἀπολοίμην, Ξανθίαν εἰ μὴ φιλήω.* AR. Ran. 579. *Πολλὴ γὰρ ἂν εὐδαιμονία εἴη περὶ τοὺς νέους, εἰ εἰς μὲν μόνος αὐτοὺς διαφθεῖρει οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ὠφελοῦσιν.* PLAT. Ap. 25 B. See also II. vi. 128, *εἰ . . . εὐλήλουθας, οὐκ ἂν . . . μαχοίμην.* Τὸν Ὑπερίδην, εἶπερ

ἀληθῇ μου νῦν κατηγορεῖ, μᾶλλον ἂν εἰκότως ἢ τόνδ' ἐδίωκεν, *if he is now bringing true charges against me, he would have prosecuted Hyperides with much more reason than he does this man.* DEM. xviii. 223. (See 479, 2; 503.)

404. This form of condition may be used even when the supposition is notoriously contrary to fact, if the speaker does not wish to imply this by the construction; as in DEM. xviii. 12, τῶν μέντοι κατηγοριῶν, . . . εἴπερ ᾗσαν ἀληθεῖς, οὐκ ἔνι τῇ πόλει δίκην ἀξίαν λαβεῖν, *but if the charges were true (= erant, not essent), the state cannot obtain adequate satisfaction.* So in English, we can say *if three times six are twenty* as well as *if three times six were twenty*, or *if all men are liars* as well as *if all men were liars*,—from different points of view.

405. A present or past general supposition is sometimes expressed by the indicative: see examples in 467. Here the Greek neglects the distinction which it regularly makes between general and particular suppositions of this class.

406. Pindar uses these simple conditions with εἰ and the indicative more than all other forms.¹ But among his forty-eight cases are many general conditions (467), which most writers would have expressed by the subjunctive.

407. (*Future Indicative in Present Suppositions.*) Even the future indicative with εἰ may be used in a present condition, if it expresses merely a *present* intention or necessity that something shall be done hereafter; as when εἰ τοῦτο ποιήσει means *if he is (now) about to do this*, and not (as it does in an ordinary future condition) *if he shall do this (hereafter)*. *E.g.*

Ἀρε πλῆκτρον, εἰ μαχεῖ, *raise your spur, if you are going to fight.* AR. Av. 759. (Εἰ μαχεῖ in protasis commonly means *if you shall fight*, like εἰ μάχη.) Ἡ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἀνὴρ, αὕτη δ' ἀνὴρ, εἰ ταῦτ' ἀνατὶ τῆδε κείσεται κρᾶτη, *i.e. if this is to pass unpunished.* SOPH. Ant. 484. Τί διαφέρουσι τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης κακοπαθούντων, εἰ γε πεινῶσουσι καὶ διψήσουσι καὶ ῥιγώσουσι καὶ ἀγρυπνήσουσι καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα μοχθήσουσιν ἐκόντες; *how do they differ, etc., if they are to suffer hunger, thirst, etc.?* XEN. Mem. ii. 1, 17. So εἰ πόλεμος τε δαμᾷ καὶ λοιμὸς Ἀχαιοῦς, *if both war and pestilence are to lay the Achaeans low*, Il. i. 61; and εἰ διαβληθήσομαι, *if I am to be slandered*, EUR. Hec. 863. In Il. v. 715, ἥ ῥ' ἄλιον τὸν μῦθον ὑπέστημεν Μενελάω, . . . εἰ οὕτω μαινέσθαι ἔασομεν οὐδὸν Ἀργῆα, *vain is the word we pledged, if we are to permit, etc.*, the verb of the apodosis is past, showing that the condition is not future.

408. It is important to notice that a future indicative of this kind could not be changed to a subjunctive with εἰν without an entire change of sense and time. It must therefore be distinguished from the future in future conditions, where it is generally interchangeable with

¹ See *Am. Jour. Phil.* iii. p. 438.

the subjunctive (447). Here it is nearly equivalent to the periphrastic future expressed by μέλλω and the infinitive (73), in which the tense of μέλλω (as in εἰ μέλλουσι τοῦτο ποιεῖν = εἰ τοῦτο ποιήσουσιν) shows that the condition is really present and not future. So with the Latin periphrastic future, *si hoc facturus est*.

409. A present condition may be expressed by a potential optative in the protasis, and a present or past condition by a potential indicative; as εἴπερ ἄλλῃ τῇ ἀνθρώπων πειθοίμην ἄν, καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι, *if (it is true that) I would trust any one of mankind, I trust you*, PLAT. Prot. 329 B; εἰ τοῦτο ἰσχυρὸν ἦν ἄν τούτῳ τεκμήριον, κάμοι γενέσθω τεκμήριον, ὅτι, κ.τ.λ., *if (it is true that) this would have been a strong proof for him (if he had used it), so let it be a proof for me, that, etc.*, DEM. xlix. 58. (See 458, and other examples in 506.)

2. *With Supposition contrary to Fact.*

410. When the protasis states a present or past supposition, implying that the condition *is not* or *was not* fulfilled, and the apodosis expresses what *would be* (or *would have been*) the result if that condition were (or had been) fulfilled, the past tenses of the indicative are used in both protasis and apodosis, and the apodosis contains the adverb ἄν.

The imperfect here, in either protasis or apodosis, refers to present time or to an act as going on or repeated in past time, the aorist to a simple occurrence in past time, and the (rare) pluperfect to an act completed in past or present time. *E.g.*

Εἰ τοῦτο ἔπρασσε, καλῶς ἄν εἶχεν, *if he were (now) doing this, it would be well* (implying that he *is not* doing it). This may also mean *if he had been doing this, it would have been well* (implying that he *was not* doing it). The context must decide, in each case, to which time the imperfect refers. Εἰ τοῦτο ἔπραξε, καλῶς ἄν ἔσχεν, *if he had done this, it would have been well* (implying that he *did not* do it). Εἰ τοῦτο ἐπεπράχει, καλῶς ἄν εἶχεν, *if he had finished doing this (now or at any past time), it would be well* (implying either he *has not* or he *had not finished* it).

(Impf. of Present Time.) Εἰ δέ μ' ὄδ' αἰὲν λόγους ἐξήρχες, οὐκ ἄν ἦσθα λυπηρὰ κλύειν, *if you always began your talk to me in this way, you would not be offensive to listen to* (as you are). SOPH. El. 556. So El. 992, 1331, O. T. 1511; and AESCH. Sept. 662, Ag. 1395. Καὶ νῦν εἰ φοβερὸν τι ἐνωρῶμεν, πᾶν ἄν σοι προεφράζομεν, *if we saw any cause of alarm, we should tell it all to you*. HDT. i. 120. Ταῦτα οὐκ ἄν ἐδύναντο ποιεῖν, εἰ μὴ καὶ διαίτη μετρία ἐχρῶντο, *they would not be able to do this, if they did not lead an abstemious life*. XEN. Cyr. i. 2,

16. Εἴ ἴσθ' ὅτι εἴ τι ἐμοῦ ἐκήδου, οὐδενὸς ἂν οὕτω με ἀποστρεῖν ἐφυλάττου ὡς ἀξιώματος καὶ τιμῆς, *if you cared for me at all, you would take precaution, etc.* IB. v. 5, 34. Πολλὸν ἂν θαυμαστότερον ἦν, εἰ ἐτιμῶντο, *it would be much more wonderful, if they were honoured.* PLAT. REP. 489 B. Λέγουσι πάντα ἧ ἔχει· καίτοι εἰ μὴ ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήμη ἐνοῦσα, οὐκ ἂν οἰοί τ' ἦσαν τοῦτο ποιῆσειν, *they tell everything as it is: and yet if knowledge did not chance to be in them, they could not do this.* ID. PHAED. 73 A. Οὐχ οὕτω δ' ἂν προθύμως ἐπὶ τὸν πόλεμον ὑμᾶς παρεκάλουν, εἰ μὴ τὴν εἰρήνην ἐώρων ἀσυχρὰν ἐσομένην, *I should not exhort you, did I not see (as I do), etc.* ISOC. vi. 87.

(*Impf. of Past Time.*) Καὶ ταῦτ' ἂν οὐκ ἔπρασσον, εἰ μὴ μοι πικρὰς αὐτῷ τ' ἄρας ἤρατο, *and this I should never have done, had he not invoked bitter curses on myself.* SOPH. O. C. 951. Οὐκ ἂν νήσων ἐκράτει, εἰ μὴ τι καὶ ναυτικὸν εἶχεν, *he would not have been master of islands, if he had not had also some naval force (implying ναυτικὸν εἶχεν and νήσων ἐκράτει, he had a navy, for he was master of islands).* THUC. i. 9. (Ταῦτα) οὐκ ἂν προέλεγεν, εἰ μὴ ἐπίστευεν ἀληθεύσειν, *he would not have declared these things (referring to several), had he not been confident that he should speak the truth.* XEN. MEM. i. 1, 5. Εἰ ἦσαν ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ, ὡς σὺ φῆς, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ταῦτα ἔπασχον, *if they had been good men, as you say, they would never have suffered these things (referring to several cases).* PLAT. GORG. 516 E.

(*Arist. of Past Time.*) Εἰ μὴ ὀρκούς ἤρέθην, οὐκ ἂν ποτ' ἔσχον μὴ οὐ τὰδ' ἔξειπείν πατρί, *had I not been bound by oaths, I should never have refrained, etc.* EUR. HIPPOCRATES. 657. Καὶ ἴσως ἂν διὰ ταῦτ' ἀπέθανον, εἰ μὴ ἡ ἀρχὴ διὰ ταχέων κατελύθη. PLAT. AP. 32 D. Τί ποτ' ἂν ἔπαθον ὑπ' αὐτῶν, εἰ πλείω χρόνον ἐπετροπεύθην; εἰ κατελείφθην μὲν ἐνιαύσιος, ἐξ ἑτῆ δὲ προσεπετροπεύθην ὑπ' αὐτῶν, οὐδ' ἂν τὰ μικρὰ ταῦτα παρ' αὐτῶν ἀπέλαβον. DEM. XXVII. 63. Εἰ τοίνυν ὁ Φίλιππος τότε ταύτην ἔσχε τὴν γνώμην, οὐδὲν ἂν ὦν νυνὶ πεποιοῖκεν ἔπραξεν, οὐδὲ τοσαύτην ἐκτήσατο δύναμιν. ID. IV. 5.

(*Different tenses in Protasis and Apodosis.*) Εἰ μὴ ὑμεῖς ἤλθετε, ἐπορευόμεθα ἂν ἐπὶ βασιλέα, *if you had not come, we should (now) be on our way to the King.* XEN. AN. II. 1, 4. "Ὁ εἰ ἀπεκρίνω, ἱκανῶς ἂν ἦδη παρὰ σοῦ τὴν δοσότητα ἐμεμαθήκη, *if you had given this answer, I should have already learned, etc.* PLAT. EUTHYPH. 14 C. Λοιπὸν δ' ἂν ἦν ἡμῖν ἔτι περὶ τῆς πόλεως διαλεχθῆναι τῆς ἡμετέρας, εἰ μὴ προτέρα τῶν ἄλλων τὴν εἰρήνην ἐπεποίητο. (This implies ἀλλὰ τὴν εἰρήνην προτέρα πεποιήται.) ISOC. V. 56. Εἰ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος χρόνου τὰ δέοντα οἱτοὶ συνεβούλευσαν, οὐδὲν ἂν ὑμᾶς νῦν εἶδει βουλευέσθαι, *if they had given the necessary advice in time past, there would now be no need of your deliberating.* DEM. IV. 1. Τῶν ἀδικημάτων ἂν ἐμέμνητο τῶν αὐτοῦ, εἴ τι περὶ ἐμοῦ γ' ἔγραφεν. ID. XVIII. 79.

These examples show the fully developed construction, as it appears in the Attic writers and in Herodotus. For the more primitive Homeric usage, see 435 and 438.

411. This construction is equivalent to that of the Latin imperfect and pluperfect subjunctive in protasis and apodosis. With regard to the tenses, the Latin imperfect subjunctive represents the Greek imperfect indicative referring to present time, and rarely that referring to past time; while the Latin pluperfect subjunctive represents the Greek aorist and pluperfect indicative, and also most cases of the Greek imperfect referring to past time.

412. 1. It will be seen that, when this construction is used, it is usually implied not merely that the condition of the protasis is not (or was not) fulfilled but *also* that the action of the apodosis does not (or did not) take place; thus *εἰ τοῦτο εἶπον, ἐπεισθη ἄν, if I had said this, he would have been persuaded*, generally implies not merely that *I did not say this* but also that *he was not persuaded*. But this denial of the apodosis is not an essential character of the construction, as we can see if we change the apodosis to *οὐκ ἄν ἐπεισθη, he would not have been persuaded*, when it is not implied that *he really was persuaded*. We have seen that there is nothing in the nature of the potential indicative which makes a denial of its action necessary (244); and when this form is made the apodosis of an unreal condition, it simply states that something would happen (or would have happened) in a case which did not arise. Denial of the apodosis can follow as a logical inference from denial of the protasis only in the rare cases in which the unreal condition is the only one under which the action of the apodosis could have taken place, as when we say *if the moon had entered the earth's shadow, she would have been eclipsed*, where the denial of either clause carries with it by necessity the denial of the other. But if we say *if it had rained, the ground would be wet*, the denial of the protasis cuts off only one of many conditions under which the ground might be wet. Such sentences as this are, however, very common, though they are not used to prove the opposite of the apodosis (*that the ground is not wet*); but they are arguments in which the apodosis is assumed to be false (on the ground of observation or experience), and from this it is argued that the assumption of the protasis is false; that is, *since the ground is not wet* (as we can see), *it cannot have rained*, which is a good argument. This is the case in THUC. i. 9, and PLAT. Gorg. 516 E (quoted in 410, above); where it is argued that Agamemnon *had a navy* because this was a necessary condition of his ruling islands, and that certain persons were *not good men* because they suffered what they did, the facts of ruling islands and of suffering being assumed in the argument as established on independent evidence. In other cases, where it is stated that the apodosis would follow as a consequence from the fulfilment of the condition, as in SOPH. Aj. 45, *κἂν ἐξεπράξατ' εἰ κατημέλησ' ἐγώ, he would even have accomplished it, if I had been careless*, whatever negation of the apodosis is implied (here *οὐκ ἐξεπράξατο*) comes from a feeling that when the only condition under which it is stated that an action would have taken place fails, there is no reason for believing it to have taken place at all. We may doubt whether any

negation of the apodosis is implied in the *form of expression* in such cases. Certainly, in many cases in which the apodosis states a consequence which would follow from the action of an unreal protasis, this negation is assumed as already known apart from the construction; thus in SOPH. EL. 556 (quoted in 410) the apodosis means *you would not then be offensive to listen to*, and the only ground on which we mentally add *as you now are* is our knowledge of Clytaemnestra's feeling towards Electra. If the sentence were *if all men began their speeches politely, they would not be offensive*, we should not think of supplying *as they now are* without some knowledge of the facts.

2. When the sentence merely affirms or denies that one act, if it had occurred, would be accompanied by another act, and there is no necessary relation between the two acts as cause and effect, and there is no argument drawn from the admitted unreality of the conclusion to prove the opposite of the condition, no denial of the apodosis is implied in the expression, although we may know from the context or in some other way that the action of the apodosis does not (or did not) occur. Thus in PLAT. AP. 17 D, *εἰ τῷ ὄντι ξένος ἐτύγχανον ὦν, ξυνεγινώσκετε δήπου ἂν μοι εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ φωνῇ ἔλεγον*, etc., *if I were really a foreigner, you would surely pardon me if I spoke in my own dialect*, etc., it is not implied that *now you do not pardon me*. We should rather say that nothing at all is implied beyond the statement *you would pardon me in that case*. If the apodosis were *you would not be angry with me*, the impossibility of understanding *but now you are angry* would make this plainer. Again, in XEN. AN. VI. 1, 32, οὐδ' ἂν ἔγωγε ἐστασίαζον εἰ ἄλλον εἴλεσθε, *neither should I (any more than Xenophon) be quarrelsome if you had chosen another man*, nothing like *στασιάζω* is implied; on the other hand, any such implication as οὐ στασιάζω must come from the circumstances of the case, not from the form of expression. In SOPH. O. T. 220, οὐ γὰρ ἂν μακρὰν ἵχνεον αὐτός, if the protasis is *εἰ ἵχνεον αὐτός*, *if I were undertaking the search by myself (alone)*, the apodosis *I should not be very far on the track* does not imply *μακρὰν ἵχνεύω*, or anything more than the sentence states. (See 511.) Again, in SOPH. TR. 896, *εἰ παροῦσα πλησία ἔλευσσεσ ὅτ' ἔδρασε, κάρτ' ἂν ᾤκτισας*, the statement does not imply οὐκ ᾤκτισας, although this may be true.

3. Further, in concessive sentences introduced by *καὶ εἰ* or *εἰ*, *even if* or *although*, or οὐδ' *εἰ*, *not even if*, where it is stated that something would be true even in a supposed case (which does not arise), we have what amounts to a statement that the thing in question would be true in any case. Here, therefore, the action of the apodosis is distinctly affirmed; as in ISOC. XXI. 11, *Νικίας μὲν, εἰ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον εἴθωτο συκοφαντεῖν, τότε ἂν ἐπαύσατο*. *Eὐθύνοῦς δέ, καὶ εἰ μὴδὲ πώποτε διενόηθῃ ἀδικεῖν, τότε ἂν ἐπήρθη*, i.e. *N. would then have stopped, while E. would have been urged on, in any case*. So DEM. XXX. 14, and XL. 23. See PLAT. REP. 620 D, *τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν ἐπραξέ καὶ πρώτη λαχούσα* (= *καὶ εἰ πρώτη ἔλαχεν*), *it would have done the same even if it had drawn the first choice*.

413. In the unreal conditional sentence, therefore, the unreality of the supposition is always implied, and that of the apodosis is generally either assumed or implied. The implied opposite of an imperfect is always a present or imperfect, that of an aorist is an aorist, and that of a pluperfect is usually a perfect or pluperfect. Thus *εἰ ἔπρασσε*, when it means *if he were doing*, implies *ἀλλ' οὐ πρᾶσσει*, but *really he is not doing*; when it means *if he had been doing*, it implies *ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔπρασσε*, but *really he was not doing*: *εἰ μὴ ἔπραξεν*, *if he had not done*, implies *ἀλλ' ἔπραξεν*, but *really he did do*: *εἰ ἐπεποιήκει τοῦτο*, *if he had already done this*, implies either *ἀλλ' οὐ πεποιήκει*, but *really he has not done it*, or *ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐπεποιήκει*, but *really he had not done it*, according to the context. The aorist, however, is very often used here, as elsewhere, where the pluperfect would express the time intended more exactly; as in the sentence quoted in 410 from DEM. iv. 5, *οὐδὲν ἂν ὦν νυνὶ πεποιήκειν ἔπραξεν*, where the perfect *πεποιήκειν* shows that the pluperfect might have been used for *ἔπραξεν* (see 58).

414. Sometimes an aorist not referring to past time is found in the apodosis, after a protasis in the imperfect referring to the present. This occurs chiefly in Plato, and generally with *εἶπον ἂν*, *ἀπεκρινάμεην ἂν*, or a similar verb, meaning *I should at once reply*. The aorist excludes the idea of duration which the imperfect would express, and for the same reason it cannot be strictly present; in effect it does not differ much from an aorist optative with *ἂν*, the apodosis really being the result (in the case supposed) *would be* (*ἦν ἂν*) *that I should reply* (*εἰποιμι ἂν*), etc. *E.g.*

Εἰ μὲν οὖν σύ με ἡρώτας τι τῶν νῦν δὴ, εἶπον ἂν, κ.τ.λ., *if then you were asking me any one of the questions before us, I should (at once) say*, etc. PLAT. Euthyph. 12 D. "Ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐτύγχανεν ὦν ὑποδημάτων δημιουργὸς, ἀπεκρίνατο ἂν δὴ ποῦ σοι ὅτι σκυτοτόμος, *as, if he chanced to be a maker of shoes, he would answer that he was a cobbler*. Id. Gorg. 447 D. See also PLAT. Symp. 199 D, Men. 72 B, Theag. 123 B; ANT. Tetr. A. β. 13. In PLAT. Prot. 311 B, C, we have *εἰ τίς σε ἤρετο, τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω*; with the answer *εἶπον ἂν ὥς, κ.τ.λ.*, twice, referring to present time; but in D, *εἰ οὖν τις ἡμᾶς ἔροιτο* (future), followed by *τί ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκρινάμεθα*;

An example of this is found in SOPH. Ant. 755: *εἰ μὴ πατὴρ ἦσθ', εἶπον ἂν σ' οὐκ εἶ φρονεῖν*, *if you were not my father, I should say you were not right in mind*. See EUR. Alc. 125, *ἦλθεν ἂν*, i.e. (*the result would be that*) *she would return*. So Alc. 360.

APODOSIS WITHOUT ἂν.—"Εδεῖ, χρῆν, ETC. WITH THE INFINITIVE.

415. A peculiar form of potential indicative without ἂν consists of an infinitive depending on the imperfect of a verb of

obligation, propriety, or possibility, like ἔδει, χρῆν or ἐχρῆν, εἰκὸς ἦν, or προσῆκεν. This expression refers to past or present time, and generally implies a denial of the action of the infinitive. Thus ἔδει τοῦτον ἀποθανεῖν in this idiomatic use means *he ought to have perished (but did not)*; ἔδει ἡμᾶς τοῦτο ποιεῖν means *we ought to be doing this (but we are not) or we ought to have done this (but we did not do it)*. This combination contains in other words what might have been expressed substantially by a past indicative with ἂν of the verb of the infinitive, qualified by an adverb or other expression denoting obligation, propriety, or possibility: thus ἔδει τοῦτον ἀποθανεῖν is (as a construction) equivalent to οὗτος δικαίως (or ἀξίως) ἂν ἀπέθανεν, *he would justly have perished*, and εἰκὸς ἦν σε τοῦτο παθεῖν is equivalent to τοῦτο εἰκότως ἂν ἔπαθες, *you would properly have suffered this (implying οὐκ ἔπαθες)*. Strictly, the expression involves also an unreal protasis, as (in the last case) εἰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἔπαθες, which with the apodosis τοῦτο ἔπαθες ἂν appears substantially in εἰκὸς ἦν σε τοῦτο παθεῖν. (See 511.)

When the present infinitive is used, the expression is present or past; with the aorist infinitive it is always past.

416. The following imperfects may take the infinitive in this sense: ἔδει, χρῆν or ἐχρῆν, εἰκὸς ἦν, προσῆκεν, ἐνῆν, ἐξῆν, ἦν (or ἵπῆρχεν¹), *it was possible, one might*, the impersonal ἦν with adjectives or nouns expressing obligation, propriety, possibility, and similar ideas, as δίκαιον ἦν, ἄξιον ἦν, καλὸν (κάλλιον,² κρείττον,³ κράτιστον⁴) ἦν, αἰσχρὸν ἦν, προσῆκον ἦν, οὐ θαυμαστὸν ἦν,⁵ ἀσφαλέστερον ἦν,⁶ ὥσον ἦν,⁷ εὐλογον ἦν,⁸ συγγνωστὸν ἦν, οἷός τ' ἦν, ἔργον ἦν, ἦν with the verbal in -τέος,—also ἔπρεπεν, συνέφερεν,⁹ ἐλυσιτέλει,¹⁰ with other verbs of the same nature. To these must be added the expressions specially mentioned below in 424-431.

417. These are all originally expressions of past necessity, obligation, etc., involving no reference to any condition (unfulfilled or otherwise); and in this sense they may always be used, as in DEM. xix. 124, ἔδει μένειν, *he was obliged to stay (and did stay)*, and HDT. i. 8, χρῆν γὰρ Κανδαύλῃ γενέσθαι κακῶς, *for C. was doomed to fall into trouble*. It is only by idiomatic usage that the denial of the action of the infinitive comes to be implied in them, and that a past tense comes to express present time, both of which characteristics are found in Greek, Latin, and English; as ἔδει σε αὐτὸν φιλεῖν, *debebas eum colere, you ought to love him* (but

¹ See ISOC. v. 34. ² ISAE. ii. 15; ARISTOT. Eth. x. 9, 18 (p. 1181 a, 4).

³ DEM. xx. 23.

⁴ ISOC. xx. 14. ⁵ DEM. xviii. 248.

⁶ LYS. vii. 24.

⁷ ANT. v. 13.

⁸ ARISTOT. Eth. x. 9, 19 (p. 1181 a, 6).

⁹ LYS. xiii. 28.

¹⁰ DEM. lix. 112. The imperfects not included in these references will be found among the examples in 419-422. The above list could doubtless be greatly extended.

you do not), *ought* being the past of *owe*. The infinitive is felt to be negated, even when the negative belongs to the leading verb.

418. Like the potential indicative, this form of expression can either (1) be used alone, with no external protasis expressed or distinctly implied, as in *χρῆν σε ἐλθεῖν*, *you ought to have gone*; or (2) stand as apodosis to an unreal protasis, as in *εἰ ἐκέλευσε, χρῆν σε ἐλθεῖν*, *if he had commanded it, you ought to have gone*.

419. I. When these expressions are thus used alone (418), the denial of the action of the infinitive is always implied. *E.g.*

Τούσδε γὰρ μὴ ξῆν ἔδει, *for these ought not to be living (as they are)*. SOPH. Ph. 418. "Εδει μὲν τοὺς λέγοντας ἅπαντας μῆτε πρὸς ἔχθραν ποιεῖσθαι λόγον μηδένα μῆτε πρὸς χάριν, *i.e. the speakers ought not to say a word out of regard either to enmity or to favour (and yet they do so)*. DEM. viii. 1. Σιγήσας ἡνίκ' ἔδει λέγειν, *keeping silence when he ought to speak*. Id. xviii. 189: cf. xviii. 191.

Χρῆν γάρ σε μήτ' αὐτόν ποτ' εἰς Τροίαν μολεῖν, ἡμᾶς τ' ἀπείργειν, *for you ought yourself never to have gone to Troy, and you ought (now) to keep me away from it*. SOPH. Ph. 1363. See AESCH. Ag. 879, Cho. 930; SOPH. El. 1505. Θανεῖν, θανεῖν σε, πρέσβυ, χρῆν πάρος τέκνων. EUR. And. 1208. Τί ἐχρῆν με ποιεῖν; μὴ προσάγειν γράψαι (τοὺς πρέσβεις); *what ought I to have done (which I did not do)? Ought I not to have proposed (as I did) to invite the ambassadors?* DEM. xviii. 28. Ἐχρῆν μὲν οὖν καὶ δίκαιον ἦν τοὺς τὸν στέφανον οἰομένους δεῖν λαβεῖν αὐτοὺς ἀξίους ἐπιδεικνύναι τούτου, μὴ ἐμὲ κακῶς λέγειν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῦτο παρέντες ἐκεῖνο ποιοῦσιν, κ.τ.λ., *i.e. those who think they ought to receive the crown ought to show that they deserve it themselves, and not be abusing me; but since now they have neglected the former and do the latter, etc.* Id. li. 3.

Σφῶν δ', ᾧ τέκν', οὓς μὲν εἰκὸς ἦν πονεῖν τάδε, *those of you who ought to be bearing these labours*. SOPH. O. C. 342. Πρὸς τούτους τὸν ἀγῶνα καταστῆναι, οὓς εἰκὸς ἦν τῷ μὲν τεθνεῶτι τιμωροὺς γενέσθαι τῷ δ' ἐπεξιόντι βοηθοὺς, *who properly should have come forward to avenge the dead and to help the prosecutor*. ANT. i. 2. Εἰ ὑπὸ τῶν πολέμιων μὲν ἐσώθημεν, οὓς εἰκὸς ἦν διακωλύειν μὴ σφῆσεσθαι, *i.e. who would naturally have tried to prevent us from being saved*. LYS. xx. 36. See DEM. xi. 30. Καὶ μάλιστα εἰκὸς ἦν ὑμᾶς προορᾶσθαι αὐτὰ καὶ μὴ μαλακῶς, ὥσπερ νῦν, ξυμμαχεῖν. THUC. vi. 78. (The orator adds, ἀλλ οὐθ' ὑμεῖς νῦν γέ πω οὐθ' οἱ ἄλλοι ἐπὶ ταῦτα ὥρμησθε.) Μένειν γὰρ ἐξῆν τῷ κατηγοροῦντι τῶν ἄλλων, *he might have stood his ground (but really he ran away)*. DEM. iii. 17: cf. xviii. 14, xxvii. 58; LYS. xii. 31.

Τὴν διαθήκην ἠφάνικατε, ἐξ ἧς ἦν εἰδέναι περὶ πάντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν, *you have concealed the will, from which we (now) might know the truth about the whole matter*. DEM. xxviii. 10. Τῆς ἡμετέρας ἔχθρας ἡμᾶς ἐφ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν δίκαιον ἦν τὸν ἐξετασμόν ποιεῖσθαι, *i.e. we should justly settle up our quarrel by ourselves*. Id. xviii. 16: cf. 13,

where δίκαιον ἦν is understood with χρῆσθαι, *he would justly have used them*. Πράττων πολὺ βέλτιον ἢ σὲ προσήκον ἦν (sc. πράττειν), *being much better off than you deserve to be*. ID. xlv. 69. Καὶ μὴν ἄξιόν γ' ἦν ἀκοῦσαι, *indeed, it was worth your while to hear them* (ἀξίως ἂν ἠκούσατε). PLAT. Euthyd. 304 D. The person addressed had just said οὐκ οἶός τ' ἦ κατακούειν.

Ἄλλω ἔπρεπεν λέγειν ἂ λέγεις, *another would have becomingly said what you say* (ἄλλος ἂν ἔλεγε πρεπόντως). PLAT. Rep. 474 D. Τὸ δυσχερέστατον τῶν ὀνομάτων, ὃ τῶν φθονούντων ἔργον ἦν λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν προεστώτων τῆς τοιαύτης παιδείσεως, *the most disagreeable of names* (Sophist), *which the envious ought to use rather than those who stand at the head of the business in question*. ISOC. xiii. 19.

420. II. When this form is made the apodosis of an unreal condition (expressed or distinctly implied), it states that what the infinitive denotes would necessarily, properly, or possibly be done (or have been done) if the case supposed were a real one. The chief force of the apodosis here always lies in the infinitive, while the leading verb acts as an auxiliary (which we can generally express by *ought*, *might*, or *could*, or by an adverb), modifying the idea of the infinitive more or less in different cases. But when the chief stress is laid on the necessity, propriety, or possibility of the act, and not on the act itself, so that the real apodosis is in the leading verb, this takes ἂν, like any other imperfect in such an apodosis (423). In some cases, however, even when no ἂν is added, the force of the infinitive is so modified by the idea of the leading verb that the opposite of the apodosis (which is generally inferred) cannot be expressed without including both ideas (see examples in 422, 1).

421. In the following examples the infinitive represents the real apodosis, and its action is denied as when no protasis is added (419):—

Εἰ ἐπ' ἡμέας μούνοὺς ἐστρατηλάτее ὁ Πέρσης, χρῆν αὐτὸν πάντων τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεχόμενον ἵέναι οὕτω ἐπὶ τὴν ἡμετέρεην· καὶ ἂν ἐδήλου πᾶσι ὥς ἐπὶ Σκύθας ἐλαύνει, *if the Persian were making his expedition against us alone, he should leave all others and be marching directly into our country; then he would show everybody that he was marching against Scythians*. HDT. iv. 118. Δεῖν (= εἶδει) δέ, εἴπερ ἦν δυνατόν, ἀνεῖν τῶν ἄλλων αὐτὸ λέγεσθαι· νῦν δὲ ἀδύνατον. PLAT. Theaet. 202 A. Χρῆν σ', εἴπερ ἦσθα μὴ κακὸς, πείσαντά με γαρμείν γάμον τόνδ', ἀλλὰ μὴ σιγῇ φίλων, *i.e. if you were not base, you should make this marriage with my consent, and not (as you do) in secret from your friends*. EUR. Med. 586. Εἰ τινα (προῖκα) ἐδίδου, εἰκὸς ἦν καὶ τὴν δοθεῖσαν ὑπὸ τῶν παραγενέσθαι φασκόντων μαρτυρεῖσθαι, *i.e. if he had given any dowry, it would naturally have been attested by witnesses*. ISAE. iii. 28. See ID. iv. 18. Ἐμὲ εἰ μὲν ἐν ἁλλαις τισὶν ἡμέραις ἠδίκησέ τι τούτων ἰδιώτην ὄντα, ἰδίᾳ καὶ δίκην προσήκεν αὐτῷ διδόναι,

i.e. in that case he would properly have given satisfaction by a private suit (as if he had said προσηκόντως ἰδίᾳ δίκην ἂν ἐδίδου). DEM. xxi. 33; see xxxiii. 25 and 38. Οὐ γὰρ ἐνὴν μὴ παρακρουσθέντων ὑμῶν (= εἰ μὴ παρεκρούσθητε) μέιναι Φιλίππῳ, for Philip could not have remained (as he did) unless you had been deceived. ID. xix. 123. Εἰ ἦσαν ἄνδρες, ὥσπερ φασιν, ἀγαθοὶ, ὅσῳ ἀληπτότεροι ἦσαν τοῖς πέλας, τοσῶδε φανερωτέραν ἐξήν αὐτοῖς τὴν ἀρετὴν δεικνύναι, i.e. in that case they might all the more plainly manifest their virtue (which they do not do). THUC. i. 37. Εἰ ἐβούλετο δίκαιος εἶναι, ἐξήν αὐτῷ μισθῶσαι τὸν οἶκον, ἢ γῆν πριάμενος ἐκ τῶν προσιόντων τοὺς παῖδας τρέφειν, i.e. he might have let the house, or have bought land and supported the children from the income. LYS. xxxii. 23. Ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δίκῃ ἐξήν σοι φυγῆς τιμῆσασθαι, εἰ ἐβούλου. PLAT. CRIT. 52 C. (See ISOC. xvii. 29.) Πολλοῖς δόξω, ὥς οἷός τ' ὦν σε σφῆζειν εἰ ἤθελον ἀναλίσκειν χρήματα, ἀμελῆσαι, many will think that, whereas I might have saved you if I had been willing to spend money, I neglected it. IB. 44 B.

422. 1. In the following examples the idea of the infinitive is so modified by that of the leading verb, that the real apodosis (the opposite of which is implied) includes both ideas; but the chief force still remains in the infinitive, so that no ἄν is added.

Εἰ γὰρ ὑπὸ ὁδόντος τοι εἶπε τελευτήσῃν με, χρῆν δὴ σε ποιέειν τὰ ποιέεις· νῦν δὲ ὑπὸ αἰχμῆς, for if the dream had said that I was to be killed by a tooth, then you would properly do what you now do; but it really said I was to be killed by a spear. HDT. i. 39. (Here the real apodosis is not in ποιέειν alone, which is affirmed in τὰ ποιέεις, but in the combined idea you would do with propriety; and it is the opposite of this which is implied. Χρῆν ἄν, which might have been used, would throw the main force on the χρῆν, with the meaning it would be your duty to do.) Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἅπαντες ὁμολογοῦμεν Φίλιππον τῇ πόλει πολεμεῖν, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἔδει τὸν παριόντα λέγειν καὶ συμβουλεύειν ἢ ὅπως ἀσφαλέστατα αὐτὸν ἀμννόμεθα, i.e. if then we were all agreed that Philip is at war with us, the speaker ought to say nothing else and to give no other advice than this, etc. (but it is added that, as there is a difference of opinion, it is necessary, ἀνάγκη ἐστίν, to speak on another subject also). DEM. ix. 6. (This implies not he does speak, etc., but he is bound to speak, etc. *Εδει ἄν would merely have thrown the balance of force upon the necessity, whereas now it falls on the speaking and advising.) Εἰ γὰρ παρ' ἐμοὶ ἐτέθη τὸ γραμματεῖον, ἐνὴν αἰτιάσασθαι Ἀπατουρίῳ ὥς ἐγὼ ἡφάνικα τὰς συνθήκας, for if the account-book had been given me to keep, A. might possibly have charged me with putting the contract out of the way (implying that, as it was, he could not charge me with this). ID. xxxiii. 37. Εἰ μὲν ἑώρα μεταμέλον τῇ πόλει τῶν πεπραγμένων, οὐκ ἄξιον ἦν θαυμάζειν αὐτοῦ, if he had seen that the state repented of her acts, we should have no good reason for being surprised at him (implying we now have good reason for surprise, ἀξίως θαυμάζομεν). ISOC. xviii. 21.

The preceding examples confirm the reading of the best Mss. in

EUR. Med. 490, εἰ γὰρ ἦσθ' ἄπαις ἔτι, συγγνωστὸν ἦν σοι τοῦδ' ἐρασθῆναι λέχους, which may be translated, *for if you had remained still childless, you might pardonably have become enamoured of this new marriage*, the apodosis being equivalent to ἡράσθης ἂν with an adverb meaning *pardonably* (if you had done what would have been pardonable). This implies not *you were not enamoured*, but *you were not pardonably enamoured*. If no protasis had been added, συγγνωστὸν ἦν ἐρασθῆναι (in its potential sense) must have meant *you might pardonably have become enamoured (but you did not)*, and then ἂν would have been required to give the sense *it would have been pardonable (but is not so)*. The other reading, συγγνώστ' ἂν ἦν, would make the same change in the balance of force that χρῆν ἂν, ἔδει ἂν, ἐνῆν ἂν, and ἄξιον ἂν ἦν would make in the preceding examples.

2. In concessive sentences introduced by καὶ εἰ, *even if*, οὐδ' εἰ, *not even if*, or εἰ, *although*, containing unreal conditions, where the action of the apodosis is not denied but affirmed (see 412, 3), the real apodosis may be represented by an infinitive and a leading verb like ἔδει, ἔξην, etc. combined. *E.g.*

Οὐκ ἔξην αὐτῷ δικάζεσθαι περὶ τῶν τότε γεγενημένων, οὐδ' εἰ πάντα ταῦτ' ἦν πεποικώς ἃ φησιν οὗτος, *he could not maintain a suit about what was then done, even if I had really done what he says I did* (implying οὐκ ἔξεστιν αὐτῷ δικάζεσθαι, but with the chief force on δικάζεσθαι). ISOC. xviii. 19. Οὐδ' εἰ γνήσιοι ἦσαν εἰσποιητοὶ δὲ, ὥς οὗτοι ἔφασαν, οὐδ' οὕτω προσῆκεν αὐτοῖς Εὐκτῆμονος εἶναι, *not even if they were genuine sons and were afterwards adopted into another family, would they now properly belong to E.'s house* (implying *they do not properly belong there*). ISAE. vi. 44. See also HDT. vii. 56; DEM. xviii. 199, xxiii. 107.

Οὐδ' εἰ γὰρ ἦν τὸ πρᾶγμα μὴ θείλατον, ἀκάθαρτον ὑμᾶς εἰκὸς ἦν οὕτως ἔαν, *for even if the duty were not urged upon you by a God, you ought not to leave the guilt unpurged as you do*. SOPH. O. T. 255. (Here the apodosis as a whole is affirmed, although the infinitive itself, *not to leave*, is denied. So in the two following examples.) Καλὸν δ' ἦν, εἰ καὶ ἡμαρτάνομεν, τοῖσδε εἰλαί τῇ ἡμετέρα ὀργῇ, ἡμῖν δ' αἰσχρὸν (sc. ἦν) βιάσασθαι τὴν μετρώτητα, *if we had even been in the wrong, they might fairly have yielded to our wrath, while we could not have done violence to their moderation without disgrace*. THUC. i. 38. "Αξιὸν ἦν, εἰ καὶ μηδὲν αὐταῖς πρότερον ὑπῆρχεν ἀγαθόν, (ταύτας) τῆς μεγίστης δωρεάς παρὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τυχεῖν, *i.e. these cities, even if they had had no other merit to rely on, deserved to receive (ought to have received) the greatest reward from the Greeks* (which, it is said, they did not receive). ISOC. xii. 71.

423. ("Ἔδει ἂν, etc.) The examples in 421, 1 and 2, show that the common rule for distinguishing ἔδει etc. with the infinitive (without ἂν) from ἔδει ἂν etc. with the infinitive,—that the former is used when the action of the infinitive is denied, the

latter when the obligation, propriety, or possibility is denied, —often cannot be applied, though as a working rule it can be used in the great majority of cases. While there are many sentences in which either form would express the required sense, the essential distinction is, that the form without ἄν is used when the chief force of the apodosis falls on the infinitive, the leading verb being an auxiliary (see 420); but the leading verb takes ἄν when the chief force falls on the necessity, propriety, or possibility of the act, rather than on the act itself.

The following examples will illustrate the form with ἄν:—

Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐγὼ ἔτι ἐν δυνάμει ἦν τοῦ ῥαδίως πορεύεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ, οὐδὲν ἄν σε ἔδει δεῦρο ἵεναι· ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς ἄν παρὰ σέ ἦμεν· νῦν δέ σε χρὴ πυκνότερον δεῦρο ἵεναι, i.e. *in that case there would be no need (as there now is) of your coming hither.* PLAT. Rep. 328 C. Τῷ μὲν πατρὶ αὐτῆς, εἰ παῖδες ἄρρενες μὴ γέγονοντο, οὐκ ἄν ἐξῆν ἀνευ ταύτης διαθέσθαι, *her father, if he had had no male children, would not have been allowed to leave her out of his will (implying ἀλλ' ἐξῆν).* ISAE. x. 13. Εἰ οὖν παρεκαλοῦμεν ἀλλήλους ἐπὶ τὰ οἰκοδομικά, πότερον ἔδει ἂν ἡμᾶς σκέψασθαι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐξετάσαι εἰ ἐπιστάμεθα τὴν τέχνην; ἔδει ἂν ἢ οὐ; i.e. *in that case would it be needful or not to examine ourselves and inquire whether we understand the art?* PLAT. GORG. 514 A. See also DEM. iv. 1, quoted in 410.

A comparison of these examples with those in 422, 1, will show the distinction between the two forms and also the narrowness of the line which sometimes separates them.

For a discussion of χρῆν and χρῆν ἄν in DEM. xviii. 195, and of χρῆν and ἐχρῆν ἄν in LYS. xii. 32 and 48, and for other remarks on these constructions, see Appendix V.

424. 1. The imperfect ὤφελον or ὀφελλον of ὀφέλλω (Epic of ὀφείλω), *owe, debeo*, and the aorist ὤφελον or ὀφελον are sometimes used with the infinitive in Homer like χρῆν, ἔδει, etc. in the later construction (415). *E.g.*

Τιμὴν πέρ μοι ὀφελλεν Ὀλύμπιος ἐγγυαλίξαι Ζεὺς ὑψιβρέμετῃς· νῦν δ' οὐδέ με τιτθὸν ἔτισεν, i.e. *Zeus ought to have secured me honour; but now he has not honoured me even a little.* IL. i. 353. Νῦν ὀφελεν κατὰ πάντας ἀριστῆας πονέεσθαι λισσόμενος, *now ought he to be labouring among all the nobles, beseeching them.* IL. x. 117. Ἀλλ' ὤφελεν ἀθανάτοισιν εὐχέσθαι, *but he ought to have prayed to the Gods.* IL. xxiii. 546. For the reference to present time in IL. x. 117, see 246 and 734.

2. From this comes the common use of this form in expressions of a wish, in Homer and in Attic Greek; as ὤφελε Κύρος ζῆν, *would that Cyrus were living* (lit. *Cyrus ought to be living*), XEN. AN. ii. 1, 4. (See 734.)

425. Similar to this is the occasional use of ἐβουλόμην (with-

out *ἄν*) and the infinitive, to express what some one *wishes were now true* (but which is not true). *E.g.*

Ἐβουλόμην μὲν οὖν καὶ τὴν βουλὴν καὶ τὰς ἐκκλησίας ὀρθῶς διοικεῖσθαι καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἰσχύειν, *I would that both the Senate and the assemblies were rightly managed, and that the laws were in force* (implying the opposite of ὀρθῶς διοικεῖσθαι and ἰσχύειν). This is analogous to ὤφελεν εἶναι, *would that it were*, and ἔδει εἶναι, *it ought to be* (but is not). AESCHIN. iii. 2. Ἐβουλόμην μὲν οὐκ ἐρίξειν ἐνθάδε, *I would that I were not contending here* (as I am), or *I would not be contending here*. AR. Ran. 866. Ἐβουλόμην τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ λέγειν ἐξ ἴσου μοι καθεστάναι τῇ συμφορᾷ, *I would that power of speech equal to my misfortune were granted me*. ANT. v. i. Ἐβουλόμην κἀγὼ τάληθῃ πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰπεῖν δυνηθῆναι, *I would that I had found the power to tell you the truth*. ISAE. x. 1. Ἐβουλόμην μὴδ' ὑφ' ἐνὸς ἀδικεῖσθαι τῶν πολιτῶν, *I would I had not been wronged by a single one of the citizens*. Id. Frag. 4 (Scheibe): see Frag. 22.

426. Ἐβουλόμην *ἄν*, *vellem*, *I should wish* or *I should have liked*, can always be used as a potential indicative, like ἔδει *ἄν* etc. (423): see AR. Eccl. 151; AESCHIN. iii. 115. (See 246.)

427. (a) The aorist of κινδυνεύω is used with the infinitive, as a periphrasis for the verb of the infinitive with *ἄν*. *E.g.*

Ἡ πόλις ἐκινδύνευσεν πάσα διαφθαρήναι εἰ ἄνεμος ἐπεγένετο, *the city ran the risk of being utterly destroyed if a wind had arisen*. THUC. iii. 74. Εἰ μὴ ἐξεφύγομεν εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐκινδυνεύσαμεν ἀπολέσθαι, *we ran the risk of perishing had we not fled to Delphi, i.e. we should very probably have perished if we had not fled*. AESCHIN. iii. 123. For ἐκινδύνευσεν *ἄν* see (b) below.

So with κίνδυνος ἦν: as in AND. ii. 12, εἰ τότε τὰ ἐπιτήδεια μὴ εἰσήχθη, οὐ περὶ τοῦ σῶσαι τὰς Ἀθήνας ὁ κίνδυνος ἦν αὐτοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ, κ.τ.λ., *i.e. they ran a risk, in case the supplies had not then been brought in, not so much about saving Athens, as, etc.*

(b) When the chief force of the apodosis lies in ἐκινδύνευσεν, even though the meaning is not much affected by the distinction in form, *ἄν* is used (as with ἔδει etc. in 423). So in XEN. An. iv. 1, 11, εἰ πλείους συνελέγησαν, ἐκινδύνευσεν *ἄν* πολὺ διαφθαρήναι τοῦ στρατεύματος, *if more had been collected, there would have been danger of much of the army being destroyed*.

428. (a) The imperfect of μέλλω with the infinitive may express a past *intention* or *expectation* which was not realised, and so take the place of the verb of the infinitive with *ἄν*. *E.g.*

Ἡ μάλα δὴ Ἀγαμέμνωνος φθίσεσθαι κακὸν οἶτον ἔμελλον, εἰ μὴ . . . ἔειπες, *i.e. I should have perished like A. (lit. I was to have perished), if thou hadst not spoken*. Od. xiii. 383. Μέλλεν μὲν ποτε οἶκος ὄδ' ἀφνειὸς καὶ ἀμύμων ἔμμεναι· νῦν δ' ἐτέρως ἐβόλοντο θεοί, *this house was to have been rich and glorious; but now the Gods have willed it otherwise*. Od. i. 232. Οὐ συστρατεύσειν ἔμελλον, *they were*

not going to join him, or they would not have joined him (in that case). DEM. xix. 159; see xviii. 172. Ἦττον τὸ ἀδίκημα πολλῶν οὐδῶν ἔμελλε δῆλον ἔσσεσθαι, the offence would have been less plain when there were many (olive trees). LYS. vii. 24. See THUC. v. 38, μέλλοντες πρότερον, εἰ ταῦτα ἔπεισαν, πειράσεσθαι. Compare the Latin: Hoc facturi erant, nisi venisset, they were to have done this (would have done this), had he not come.¹

(b) A single case of ἄν with ἔμελλεν occurs in AND. i. 21: εἰ καὶ πατὴρ ἐβούλετο ὑπομένειν, τοὺς φίλους ἄν οἴεσθε . . . ἐπιτρέπειν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄν παραιτῆσθαι καὶ δεῖσθαι ἀπίναί ὅπου ἄν ἔμελλεν σωθῆσθαι; i.e. to depart to a place where he would have been likely to be safe. Most critics repudiate this ἄν; but it seems perfectly analogous to ἄν with ἔδει, χρῆν, etc. (423).

429. Similar is the use of ἔφην in Od. iv. 171: καὶ μιν ἔφην ἐλθόντα φίλῃσέ μεν ἐξοχὸν ἄλλων, εἰ νῶν νόστον ἔδωκεν (Ζεὺς), i.e. I intended to love him (and should have done so) had Zeus granted us a return.

430. An analogous case is LYS. xii. 60: ἀπολέσαι παρεσκευάζοντο τὴν πόλιν εἰ μὴ δι' ἀνδρας ἀγαθοὺς, they were preparing to destroy the city (and would have destroyed it) had it not been for good men.

431. A few expressions which have no dependent infinitive are practically equivalent to a potential indicative with ἄν, and so can stand as the apodosis of an unreal condition. *E.g.*

Τούτῳ δ' εἰ μὴ ὠμολόγουν ἃ οἶδος ἐβούλετο, οὐδεμία ξημία ἔνοχος ἦν, but if they had not acknowledged to him what he wanted, he was liable to no charge (i.e. he could not have been accused). LYS. vii. 37. Ὡς, εἰ μὲν τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ μὴ προσεγέγραπτο, ἔνοχος ὢν (= ἦν) τῇ ἀπαγωγῇ, assuming that, if the words ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ had not been added, he might properly have been tried by ἀπαγωγή. Id. xiii. 85. Πιστεύοντος γὰρ ἐμοῦ ἐμοὶ εἰδέναι ἃ λέγω, καλῶς εἶχεν ἡ παρὰ μνηθία, i.e. for if I trusted (= εἰ ἐπίστευον) to any knowledge of my own about what I am saying, the consolation which you offer would encourage me (lit. your consolation was good on that supposition). PLAT. Rep. 450 D. (We might have had καλὸν ἦν σε παρὰ μνηθεῖσθαι in the same sense.) Εἰ τὸ κωλύσαι τὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων κοινωνίαν ἐπεπράκειν ἐγὼ Φιλίππῳ, σοὶ τὸ μὴ σιγῆσαι λοιπὸν ἦν, in that case it remained for you not to keep silent (i.e. you should not have kept silent). DEM. xviii. 23. (The article with σιγῆσαι only slightly distinguishes this from the examples under 421.)

432. The same explanation applies to other cases in which a rhetorical omission of ἄν in apodosis is commonly assumed; as in

¹ This use of ἔμελλον with the infinitive corresponds precisely to the Sanskrit use of the past future tense in the sense of the Greek aorist indicative with ἄν. Thus "if he had said (avaksyat) this, he would have slain (ahanisyat) Indra" (Cat. Brahm. i. 6, 3¹⁰), where the two verbs are augmented past futures, meaning literally he was going to say and he was going to slay. See Whitney's Sanskrit Grammar, § 950.

EUR. Hec. 1113, εἰ δὲ μὴ Φρυγῶν πύργους πεσόντας ᾗσμεν Ἑλλήνων δορὶ, φόβον παρέσχεν οὐ μέσως ὅδε κτύπος, *but if we had not known that the Phrygian towers had fallen, this noise gave us cause for terror in earnest* (i.e. *would easily have terrified us*).

433. Occasionally a protasis takes the place of the infinitive in the construction of 419. *E.g.*

Ἐπεὶ τὸδε κέρδιον ἦεν, εἰ νόστησ' Ὀδυσσεὺς καὶ ὑπὸ τρόπος ἔκετο δῶμα, *for it had been a greater gain if Ulysses had returned* (for κέρδιον ἦεν Ὀδυσσεύα νοστήσαι). Od. xx. 331. Compare MATTH. EV. xxvi. 24, καλὸν ἦν αὐτῷ, εἰ οὐκ ἐγεννήθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖνος, *it had been good for that man if he had not been born* (for καλὸν ἦν αὐτῷ μὴ γεννηθῆναι). Εἰ δὲ ἀποφεύξεται, κρείττων ἦν ὁ ἄγων μὴ γεγενημένος (= εἰ μὴ ἐγγένητο), *but if he is acquitted, it were better that the trial had never taken place* (for κρείττων ἦν τὸν ἀγῶνα μὴ γεγενῆσθαι). AESCHIN. i. 192.

This occasional substitution of a protasis does not indicate that the infinitive in κρείττων ἦν αὐτῷ ἐλθεῖν, *he had better have gone*, was felt as a protasis. We could substitute for this English *it were better if he had gone*, but only by a change of construction.

HOMERIC PECULIARITIES.

434. In Homer the construction of the unreal conditional sentence is not completely developed. It is not improbable that in the primitive language the optative could express in a rough way both present and past unreal conditions, and in Homer the present unreal condition is still expressed only by the present optative (438).

435. The aorist indicative in Homer, both in protasis and in apodosis with αὖν or κέ, is used as in Attic Greek; but the imperfect is always past, never present.¹ *E.g.*

Καὶ νύ κε δὴ ξιφέεσσ' αὐτοσχεδὸν οὐτάζοντο, εἰ μὴ κήρυκες ἦλθον, *they would have wounded each other, had not heralds come*. Il. vii. 273. Ἐνθα κε λουγὸς ἔην καὶ ἀμήχανα ἔργα γένοντο, εἰ μὴ ἄρ' ὀξὺ νόησε πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε, *then there would have been, etc.* Il. viii. 130. So viii. 366. Καὶ νύ κε δὴ πρῶτέρω ἔτ' ἔρις γένηετ' ἀμφοτέροισιν, εἰ μὴ Ἀχιλλεύς αὐτὸς ἀνίστατο καὶ κατέρυκεν. Il. xxiii. 490. See Il. xi. 504; Od. xvi. 221, xxiv. 51.

¹ Mr. Monro (*Hom. Gr.* p. 236) doubts this statement, and refers to Od. iv. 178, καὶ κε θάμ' ἐνθάδ' ὄντες ἐμισγόμεθ', οὐδέ κεν ἡμέας ἀλλόδιέ κρινεν, as a case in which "the imperfect ἐμισγόμεθα takes in the present time, we should (from that time till now) have been meeting." It seems to me that, according to the Homeric usage, we can find no more in θάμα ἐμισγόμεθά κε than we should have had frequent meetings, and the rest comes from the context. In any case, this use is far removed from the Attic ἐπορευόμεθα ἂν ἐπὶ βασιλέα, *we should (now) be on our way to the King* (410). A nearer approach to the later use perhaps appears in Il. xxiv. 220, εἰ μὲν γάρ τις μ' ἄλλος ἐκέλευεν, *if any other (had?) commanded me*. But see Il. ii. 80.

Καί νύ κ' ἔτι πλέονας Λυκίων κτάνε διος Ὀδυσσεύς, εἰ μὴ ἄρ' ὀξὺ νόησε μέγας κορυθαίολος Ἕκτωρ, i.e. *Ulysses would have killed still more, had not Hector perceived him.* Il. v. 679. Καί νύ κεν ἦμα πάντα κατέφθιτο καὶ μὲν' ἀνδρῶν, εἰ μὴ τίς με θεῶν ὀλοφύρατο καὶ μ' ἐσάωσεν. Od. iv. 363.

But ὥφελον with the present infinitive may be present, even in Homer, both as a potential expression (424) and in wishes (734).

436. We find the imperfect referring to present time in Theognis: see vs. 905, εἰ μὲν γὰρ κατιδεῖν βίωτον τέλος ἦν, εἰκὸς ἂν ἦν. See PRIND. Nem. iv. 13.

437. In Il. xxiii. 526, εἴ κε is found with the aorist indicative in protasis, κέ apparently adding nothing to the sense:—

Εἰ δέ κ' ἔτι προτέρω γένετο δρόμος ἀμφοτέρουσιν,
Τῷ κέν μιν παρέλασσε οὐδ' ἀμφήριστον ἔθηκεν.

438. (*Optative in present unreal Conditions.*) In Homer a present unfulfilled condition is regularly expressed by the present optative with εἰ, and its apodosis (if present) by the present optative with κέ or ἂν.

The only instance of this form in both protasis and apodosis is Il. xxiii. 274, εἰ μὲν νῦν ἐπὶ ἄλλῳ ἀεθλεύοιμεν Ἀχαιοὶ, ἢ τ' ἂν ἐγὼ τὰ πρῶτα λαβὼν κλισίῃνδε φεροίμην, *if we were now contending in honour of any other (than Patroclus), I should take the first prize and bear it to my tent.* Twice we have the optative with ἂν in apodosis with the regular imperfect or aorist indicative (past) in the protasis: Il. ii. 80, εἰ μὲν τις τὸν ὄνειρον ἄλλος ἔνισπεν, ψεῦδος κεν φαίμεν καὶ νοσφίζοιμεθα μάλλον, *if any other had told the dream, we should call it a lie and rather turn away from it*; and the same apodosis after εἴ τίς μ' ἄλλος ἐκέλευεν, in Il. xxiv. 222. In Od. ii. 184, οὐκ ἂν τόσσα θεοπροπέων ἀγόρευες, οὐδέ κε Τηλέμαχον κεχολωμένον ᾧδ' ἀνιείης, we have first the imperfect with ἂν as a past apodosis, (*in that case*) *you would not have made this speech with all its divination*; and then the present optative with κέ as present, *nor would you be urging Telemachus on, as you now are*; both referring to an unfulfilled past condition, *if you had perished*, suggested by καταφθίσθαι ὥφελες in vs. 183.

439. See the corresponding use of the present optative in Homer to express an unaccomplished present wish (739). In both wishes and conditional sentences, it must be remembered, the use of the optative in its ordinary future sense is completely established in Homer. See examples in 455 and 722.

440. (*Optative in past unreal Apodosis.*) Homer has four cases of the optative with κέ (three aorist and one present) in the apodosis referring to the past, with the regular indicative in the protasis expressing a past unfulfilled condition. These are—

Καί νύ κεν ἐνθ' ἀπόλοιτο ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Αἰνείας, εἰ μὴ ἄρ' ὀξὺ νόησε Διὸς θυγάτηρ Ἀφροδίτη, *Aeneas would have perished, had not Aphrodite quickly perceived him.* Il. v. 311. Καί νύ κεν ἐνθ' ἀπόλοιτο

"*Ἀρης ἄτος πολέμοιο, εἰ μὴ Ἑριβοία Ἑρμῇ ἐξήγγειλεν.* Il. v. 388. Οὐ κε θανόντι περ ὦδ' ἀκαχοίμην, εἰ μετὰ οἷς ἐτάρῃσι δάμῃ Τρώων ἐνὶ δῆμῳ, *I should not have felt so grieved if he had perished, θανόντι (=εἰ ἔθανεν)* being further explained by εἰ . . . δάμῃ. Od. i. 236. "*Ἐνθα κε ρέα φέροι κλυτὰ τεύχεα, εἰ μὴ οἱ ἀγάσσατο Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων,* *he would easily have borne away the famous armour had not Phoebus Apollo grudged him.* Il. xvii. 70. Here ἀπόλετο, ἀκαχοίμην, and ἔφερε would be the regular forms even in Homer, corresponding to the regular protases.

441. In the transitional state of the Homeric language we see that the past tenses of the indicative had fully established themselves in the protasis of past unreal conditions, but not so thoroughly in the apodosis, where the optative occasionally occurs. In present unreal conditions, the optative alone is used in both protasis and apodosis.

442. Besides the full conditional sentences above quoted, we find in Homer many potential optatives with *κέ* or *ἄν* which seem to belong to the borderland between past and future conclusions, and are not definitely fixed in the past (like the apodosis in 440) by a past tense in the protasis.

Such are especially *φαίης κε*, as in Il. iii. 220, xv. 697, and οὐδέ κε *φαίης*, as in Il. iv. 429, xvii. 366, Od. iii. 124, Il. iii. 392. In the first four cases it seems most natural to translate them as past, *you would have said, nor would you have said*; but in the last two cases it is more natural to translate *nor would you say* (future), and so with *φαίην κεν*, Il. vi. 285. But in the fluid state of the language which allowed both ἀπόλετό κε and ἀπόλοιτό κε to mean *he would have perished*, and φέροι κε to mean both *he would carry* (fut.) and *he would have carried*, according to the protasis which was used with them, it is easy to understand how *φαίης κε* (without a protasis) might have a vague potential force, *you might perchance say*, which could be felt as either past or future as the context demanded. We must, therefore, hold that the optative with *κέ* in such cases expresses merely what *could happen*, without any limitations of time except such as are imposed by the context; and according to the limitations thus imposed we translate such optatives (with more exactness than they really possess) either as past or as future. In one case the feeling of past time is seen in the dependent verb: Il. v. 85, Τυδείδην δ' οὐκ ἄν γνοίης ποτέρῳσι μετείη, *you would not have known to what side he belonged.* (This occurs in the same book of the Iliad with both the examples of ἀπόλοιτό κε for ἀπόλετό κε.)

Other examples are the following:—

Οὐκ ἄν ἐπειτ' Ὀδυσσῆι γ' ἐρίσσειεν βροτὸς ἄλλος, *no other mortal could then vie with Ulysses* (after a past verb). Il. iii. 223. "Ἐνθ' οὐκ ἄν βρίζοντα ἴδοις Ἀγαμέμνονα δῖον. Il. iv. 223. "Ἐνθ' οὐ κεν ρέα ἵππος ἐσβαίη, περὶ δὲ μενοίνεον εἰ τελέουσιν (the connection with μενοίνεον gives ἐσβαίη a past direction). Il. xii. 58. "Ἐνθα κ' ἔπειτα καὶ ἀθάνατός περ ἐπελθὼν θηγήσαιτο ἰδὼν καὶ ταρφθεῖη φρεσὶν

ῥσιν. Od. v. 73. 'Ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἔλποιο νεώτερον ἀντιάσαντα, i.e. as you would not expect (?) a younger person to do. Od. vii. 293. Οὐδέ κεν ἱρήξ κίρκος ὁμαρτήσκειν. Od. xiii. 86. Further, compare Od. ix. 241 with Il. i. 271 and v. 303.

HOMERIC USAGES IN HERODOTUS AND IN ATTIC GREEK.

443. (a) Herodotus has a few cases of the potential optative with the same vague reference to time which has been noticed in Homer (442), and we may sometimes translate these, like those in Homer, by past expressions. *E.g.*

Τάχα δὲ ἂν καὶ οἱ ἀποδόμνοι λέγοιεν ἀπικόμενοι ἐς Σπάρτην ὡς ἀπαρεθείσαν ὑπὸ Σαμίων, and perhaps those who sold it (the cup) might come to Sparta and tell that they had been robbed of it. Hdt. i. 70 (see Stein's note). All that the optative itself seems to express is that this would be a natural story for them to tell. In vii. 214, εἰδείη μὲν γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἐὼν μὴ Μηλιεύς ταύτην τὴν ἀτραπὸν Ὀνήτης, εἰ τῇ χάρῃ πολλὰ ὁμιληκῶς εἴη, for Onetes, even if he was not a Mahian, might know this path, supposing him to have had much acquaintance with the country, the optative in protasis (expressing no condition contrary to fact) shows that εἰδείη ἂν is not felt to be past. See also vii. 180, τάχα δ' ἂν τι ἐπαύροιτο; viii. 136, τάχ' ἂν προλέγοι, might perhaps warn him; ix. 71, ταῦτα ἂν εἴποιεν, they might say this.

For εἴησαν δ' ἂν οἶτοι Κρήτες, Hdt. i. 2, and similar expressions, see 238.

(b) In EUR. Med. 568, οὐδ' ἂν σὺ φαίης εἰ σε μὴ κνίξοι λέχος, the condition seems to be present and contrary to fact, like εἰ μὴ ἔκνιεν. See also PLAT. Menex. 240 D, ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἂν τις γενόμενος γυνὴ οἶοι ἄρα ἐτύγχανον ὄντες, κ.τ.λ. Such examples are extremely rare in Attic Greek.

(b) FUTURE CONDITIONS.

1. Subjunctive or Future Indicative in Protasis with a future Apodosis.

444. When a supposed future case is stated distinctly and vividly (as *if I shall go* or *if I go* in English) the protasis generally takes the subjunctive with ἐάν, ἥν, or ἂν (ᾗ) (Epic εἴ κε or αἴ κε). The apodosis takes the future indicative or some other form expressing future time, to denote what *will be* the result if the condition of the protasis is fulfilled. *E.g.*

Ἐάν τι λάβω, δώσω σοι, *if I (shall) receive anything, I will give it to you.* Ἐάν τι λάβῃς, δός μοι, *if you receive anything, give it to me.* Εἰ δέ κεν ὡς ἔρξης καὶ τοι πεῖθωνται Ἀχαιοὶ, γνώσῃ ἔπειθ' ὅς θ' ἡγεμόνων κακὸς ὅς τέ νυ λαῶν, *but if you shall do thus and the Achaeans*

obey you, you will then learn both which of the leaders and which of the soldiers is bad. Π. ii. 364. Αἶ κ' αὐτὸν γνῶ νημερτέα πάντ' ἐνέποντα, ἔσσω μιν χλαϊνάν τε χιτῶνά τε, εἵματα καλά. Od. xvii. 549. So αἶ κ' δῶσι, Π. i. 128. Εἰ μὲν κεν Μενέλαον Ἀλέξανδρος καταπέφνη, αὐτὸς ἔπειθ' Ἑλένην ἐχέτω καὶ κτήματα πάντα, ἡμεῖς δ' ἐν νήεσσι νεώμεθα ποντοπόροισιν· εἰ δέ κ' Ἀλέξανδρον κτείνειν ξανθὸς Μενέλαος, Τρώας ἔπειθ' Ἑλένην καὶ κτήματα πάντ' ἀποδοῦναι. Π. iii. 281. Here ἐχέτω, νεώμεθα (subj. in exhortation), and ἀποδοῦναι (inf. for imperative) are in the apodosis. Αἶκα τήνος ἔλῃ κεραὺν τράγον, αἶγα τὸ λαψή. THEOC. i. 4. "Αν δέ τις ἀνθιστήται, σὺν ὑμῖν πειρασόμεθα χειροῦσθαι, if any one shall stand opposed to us, with your help we will try to overcome him. XEN. AN. vii. 3, 11. Κἂν μὴ νῦν ἐθέλωμεν ἐκεῖ πολεμεῖν αὐτῷ, ἐνθάδ' ὥς ἀναγκασθίσόμεθα τοῦτο ποιεῖν, and if we shall not now be willing to fight him there, we shall perhaps be forced to do so here. DEM. iv. 50. (Here νῦν refers to time immediately following the present: if we are not now willing would be εἰ μὴ νῦν ἐθέλομεν.) "Ην γὰρ ταῦτα καλῶς ὀρισώμεθα, ἀμεινον βουλευσόμεθα καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ISOCT. viii. 18. "Ην δέ τὴν εἰρήνην ποιησώμεθα, καὶ τοιούτους ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παρὰσχωμεν, μετὰ πολλῆς ἀσφαλείας τὴν πόλιν οἰκήσομεν. Id. viii. 20. "Εὰν οὖν ἴης νῦν, πότε ἔσει οἶκοι; XEN. Cyr. v. 3, 27. Καὶ χρῶ αὐτοῖς, ἐὰν δέη τι, and use them, if there shall be any need. Ib. v. 4, 30. "Ην μὲν πόλεμον αἰρήσθε, μηκέτι ἦκετε δεῦρο ἀνευ ὀπλων, εἰ σωφρονεῖτε· ἦν δέ εἰρήνης δοκῇτε δεῖσθαι, ἀνευ ὀπλων ἦκετε· ὥς δέ καλῶς ἔξει τὰ ὑμέτερα, ἦν φίλοι γέννησθε, ἐμοὶ μελήσει. Ib. iii. 2, 13. "Εὰν γάρ τί σε φανῶ κακὸν πεποιηκῶς, ὁμολογῶ ἀδικεῖν· ἐὰν μὲντοι μηδὲν φαίνωμαι κακὸν πεποιηκῶς μηδὲ βουληθεῖς, οὐ καὶ σὺ αὖ ὁμολογήσεις μηδὲν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; Ib. v. 5, 13. (Here ὁμολογῶ, I am ready to confess, refers to the future.) "Εὰν μὴ ἡ οἱ φιλόσοφοι βασιλεύσωσιν ἢ οἱ βασιλῆς φιλοσοφήσωσιν, οὐκ ἔστι κακῶν παῦλα ταῖς πόλεσιν, unless either the philosophers shall become kings or the kings philosophers, there is no escape from troubles for states. PLAT. Rep. 473 D. Δίδωσ' ἐκὼν κτείνειν ἑαυτὸν, ἦν τὰδε ψευσθῇ λέγων, he offers himself willingly to suffer death in case he shall be proved false in this that he says. SOPH. Ph. 1342. Μηχανητέον, ἐὰν τε χρυσίον ἥρπακῶς ἢ πολὺν, μὴ ἀποδῶ τοῦτο, ἐὰν τε θανάτου ἀξία ἡδίκικῶς ᾖ, ὥπως μὴ ἀποθανεῖται, if he shall (prove to) have stolen much gold, we must contrive that he shall not restore it; and if he shall have committed crimes deserving death, that he shall not die. PLAT. Gorg. 481 A (for the perfects see 103). "Ην σε τοῦ λοιποῦ ποτ' ἀφέλωμαι χρόνον, κάκιστ' ἀπολοίμην, i.e. may I perish, if I ever take them away. AR. Ran. 586. (See 181.)

445. It will be seen that the apodosis here (444) may consist of any future expression,—the future indicative, the imperative, the subjunctive in exhortations and prohibitions, the infinitive in any future sense, the potential optative with ἄν, or the optative in a wish. It may also contain a present indicative including a reference to the future, like *χρή* or *δεῖ* or the verbal in *τέος*, or the present

used emphatically for the future, like $\delta\mu\omicron\lambda\omicron\gamma\hat{\omega}$ above quoted (444) from XEN. Cyr. v. 5, 13, or $\pi\alpha\upsilon\lambda\acute{\alpha} \epsilon\sigma\tau\iota$ in PLAT. Rep. 473 D.

446. The English, especially the colloquial language, seldom expresses the distinction between this form of the future condition and the present condition (402). Thus modern custom allows us to use the inexact expression *if he wishes*, not merely for $\epsilon\acute{\iota} \beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$, *if he now wishes*, but also for $\epsilon\acute{\alpha}\nu \beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\eta\gamma\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$, *if he shall wish*. The sense, however, generally makes the distinction in time clear.

It is worth noting that the Authorised Version of the English New Testament never uses forms like *if he does*, *if he is*, in either future or present conditions, even when the Greek has the present indicative with $\epsilon\acute{\iota}$; but it has either the subjunctive or the future indicative in future conditions, and the subjunctive in present conditions. The Revised Version, on the other hand, admits the present indicative (as *if he is*) in present conditions, but not consistently. See LUC. xxiii. 35, $\epsilon\acute{\iota} \omicron\upsilon\theta\acute{\rho}\acute{\omicron}\varsigma \epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu \acute{\omicron} \chi\rho\iota\sigma\tau\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$, A. V. *if he be Christ*, R. V. *if this is the Christ*; but in MATTH. vi. 23, $\epsilon\acute{\iota} \omicron\upsilon\delta\acute{\nu} \tau\omicron \phi\acute{\omega}\varsigma \tau\omicron \acute{\epsilon}\nu \sigma\omicron\iota \sigma\acute{\kappa}\omicron\tau\omicron\varsigma \epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu$, both versions have *if therefore the light that is in thee be darkness*. See also Cor. ii. v. 17.

447. (*Future Indicative in Protasis*.) The future indicative with $\epsilon\acute{\iota}$ is often used in the protasis to express a future condition. This is a still stronger form of expression than the subjunctive, though it sometimes alternates with it in the same sentence. Both, however, correspond to the English *if I shall do this*, *if I do this*, etc. The future, as an emphatic form, is especially common when the condition contains a strong appeal to the feelings or a threat or warning.¹ It is thus a favourite construction with the tragedians. *E.g.*

$\text{Εἰ γὰρ Ἀχιλλεύς οἶος ἐπὶ Τρώεσσι μαχέιται, οὐδὲ μίνυνθ' ἔξουσιν ποδώκεα Πηλεΐωνα}$, *if Achilles shall fight alone against the Trojans, not even a little while will they keep back the swift son of Peleus*. Il. xx. 26. $\text{Εἰ δὲ σὺ γ' ἐς πόλεμον πωλήσῃς, ἢ τέ σ' ὀὖν ῥιγῇσιν πόλεμόν γε, καὶ εἴ χ' ἐτέρωθι πύθῃς}$, *if you shall mingle in the battle, verily do I believe you will shudder at the very name of battle, even if you hear it elsewhere (away from the war)*. Il. v. 350. $\text{Εἰ δέ μοι οὐ τίς οὖσι βοῶν ἐπιεικέ' ἀμοιβῇν, δύσσομαι εἰς Ἀἶδαο καὶ ἐν νεκύεσσι φαείνῳ}$, *but if*

¹ In "minatory and monitory conditions": see Gildersleeve in *Trans. of Am. Phil. Assoc. for 1876*, p. 13. This article contains an enumeration of all the cases of $\epsilon\acute{\alpha}\nu$ with the subjunctive in future conditions and of $\epsilon\acute{\iota}$ with the future indicative in the three tragedians. It appears that in Aeschylus there are 22 cases of the future and only 8 of the subjunctive; in Sophocles 67 futures and 55 subjunctives; in Euripides 131 futures and 177 subjunctives. If we omit the futures which are equivalent to $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\lambda\omega$ with an infinitive, for which the subjunctive could not be substituted (see 407), we have in Aeschylus 15 futures in future conditions and 8 subjunctives; in Sophocles 46 and 55; in Euripides 98 and 177. In Attic prose Thucydides and Lysias have the largest proportion of futures; but in prose, as in Aristophanes, the subjunctives always preponderate.

they do not pay me a proper requital for my cattle, I (the Sun) will descend to Hades and shine among the dead. *Od.* xii. 382. *Εἰ δὲ πρὸς τούτοις ἐτι τελευτήσῃ τὸν βίον εὖ, οὗτος ἐκείνος τὸν σὺ ζητεῖς ὀλβιος κεκλήσθαι ἄξιός ἐστι*, and if besides he shall still end his life well, he is that happy man you are seeking. *Hdt.* i. 32. *Ἄλλ' εἰ σε μάρψει ψήφος, ἀλλ' ἐρεῖς τάχα*, but if the judgment shall lay hold of you, you will soon tell another story. *Aesch. Eum.* 597. See *Prom.* 311, *Sept.* 196, *Suppl.* 472, 474, 924, *Cho.* 683. *Εἰ ταῦτα λέξεις, ἔχθαρεῖ μὲν ἐξ ἐμοῦ*. *Soph. Ant.* 93. See *Ant.* 229, 324, *O. T.* 843, 846, *O. C.* 628, *Ph.* 75, *El.* 465, 834, 1004. *Εἰ τῷδ' ἀρκέσεις, κακὸς φανεῖ*, if you aid this man, you will appear base. *Eur. Hec.* 1233. *Μὴ ζῶην, εἰ μὴ φάσγανον σπάσω*. *Id. Or.* 1147. See *Hec.* 802, *Or.* 157, 272, 1212, *Med.* 346, 352, 381. *Εἰ μὴ καθέξεις γλώσσαν, ἔσται σοι κακά*. *Eur. Aeg. Fr.* 5. *Εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτ' ἐπιδείξει, πῶς χρὴ ταύτῃ τῇ προκλήσει προσέχειν ὑμᾶς τὸν νοῦν*. *Dem.* xxvii. 52. *Εἰ δ' ὑμεῖς ἄλλο τι γνώσεσθε, ὃ μὴ γένοιτο, τίνα οἴεσθε αὐτὴν ψυχὴν ἔξιν*; but if you shall give any other judgment, etc. *Id.* xxviii. 21. (Referring to the same thing, xxvii. 67, Demosthenes had said *εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἀποφύγῃ με οὗτος, ὃ μὴ γένοιτο, τὴν ἐπωβελίαν ὀφλήσω*.) *Ἦν ἐθέλωμεν ἀποθνήσκειν ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων, εὐδοκίμησομεν· εἰ δὲ φοβησόμεθα τοὺς κινδύνους, εἰς πολλὰς ταραχὰς καταστήσομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς*. *Isoc.* vi. 107. Here what is feared is expressed by the emphatic future as a warning, while the alternative that is preferred has the subjunctive. See also *Dem.* xviii. 176, where *εἰ προαιρήσομεθ' ἡμεῖς, εἴ τι δύσκολον πέπρακται Θηβαίοις πρὸς ἡμᾶς, τοῦτον μεμνήσθαι*, if we shall prefer to remember every unpleasant thing the Thebans have ever done to us, is vividly stated by the future, as this is the course which the orator specially fears and wishes to warn the people against; while he puts his own proposition into the milder subjunctive form, *ἣν μέντοι πεισθῇτ' ἐμοὶ καὶ πρὸς τῷ σκοπεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ φιλονεικεῖν γένησθε*. See also *Isoc.* xv. 130. In other cases it is difficult to detect any distinction, as in *Dem.* xxvii. 67 and xxviii. 21 (above), and in *Hdt.* i. 71; cf. *Pl.* i. 135 and 137.

448. The future in protasis is also appropriately used when a future apodosis is implied in a past tense; as in *Soph. O. T.* 843, *εἰ λέξει τὸν αὐτὸν ἀριθμὸν, οὐκ ἐγὼ ἔκτανον*, if he shall tell the same number (it will follow that) I did not kill him. So *Eur. Med.* 1249.

449. This use of the future must be distinguished from its use in present conditions (407), where it is equivalent to μέλλω and the infinitive and cannot be interchanged with the subjunctive.

HOMERIC PECULIARITIES.

In the Homeric language the following peculiarities appear in this construction:—

450. By far the most common Homeric form with the sub-

junctive in future conditions is εἴ κε, often εἰ μὲν κε, εἰ δέ κε, etc. (218). Ἦν also is frequent, being the only Homeric contraction of εἰ ἄν. Εἰ δ' ἄν occurs in Il. iii. 288, and εἴ περ ἄν in Il. v. 224 and 232. Ἦν περ γάρ κ' ἐθέλωσιν is found in Od. xviii. 318.

451. Εἴ κε or αἴ κε is sometimes found even with the future indicative in Homer. *E.g.*

Αἴ κεν ἄνευ ἐμέθεν Ἰλίου πεφιδήσεται οὐδ' ἐθελήσει ἐκπέρσαι, ἴστω τοῦτο. Il. xv. 213. (See 196.)

452. The subjunctive with κέ is sometimes used in the apodosis instead of the future indicative, thus making the apodosis correspond in form to the protasis. *E.g.*

Εἰ δέ κε μὴ δώρσιν, ἐγὼ δέ κεν αὐτὸς ἔλωμαι, and if he do not give her up, I will take her myself. Il. i. 324 (compare i. 137). This gives a form with two subjunctives analogous to that which has the optative in both protasis and apodosis (460). See 399. (For δέ in apodosis see 512.)

For the Epic use of the future indicative with κέ or ἄν in apodosis, see 196.

453. The simple εἰ (without κέ or ἄν) is sometimes used with the subjunctive in future conditions in Homer, apparently in the same sense as εἴ κε or ἤν. *E.g.*

Εἰ περ γάρ σε κατακτάνη, οὐ σ' ἔτ' ἐγὼ γε κλαύσομαι. Il. xxii. 86. Εἰ δ' αὖ τις ράϊσι θεῶν ἐνὶ οἴνοπι πόντῳ, τλήσομαι ἐν στήθεσσι νύκτων ταλαπενθέα θυμόν. Od. v. 221. So Il. i. 341, v. 258, xii. 223, 245; Od. i. 204, i. 188, xii. 348. Only these nine cases occur, and the more common use of the simple εἰ with the subjunctive in Homer is in general suppositions (see 468).

454. 1. This Homeric use of the simple εἰ with the subjunctive in future conditions was allowed by poetic license in a few passages of the Attic drama, chiefly in tragedy, even in the dialogue. *E.g.*

Εἰ γὰρ θάνης καὶ τελευτήσας ἀφης. SOPH. Aj. 496. Δυστάλαινα τάρ' ἐγὼ, εἴ σου στερηθῶ. Id. O. C. 1443. So Ant. 887. Εἰ μὴ σ' ἐκφάγω ἐκ τῆσδε τῆς γῆς, οὐδέποτε βιώσομαι. AR. Eq. 698. So AESCH. Pers. 791; EUR. Or. 1534, I. A. 1240, εἰ πεισθῆς (Mss.); all in dialogue. In Sappho 118, 1 we have αἴ τις ἔρηται.

2. In Attic prose, this construction is extremely rare and always doubtful. The Mss., however, have it in a few passages, as THUC. vi. 21: Οὐ ναυτικῆς στρατιᾶς μόνον δεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ πολλὴν ζυμπλεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ εἰ ξυστῶσιν αἱ πόλεις φοβηθεῖσαι. (Here a few inferior Mss. read ἤν.)

2. Optative in Protasis and Apodosis.

455. When a supposed future case is stated less distinctly and vividly than the subjunctive would state it (as *if I should go* in English), the protasis takes the optative with *εἰ*. The apodosis takes the optative with *ἄν* to denote what *would be* the result if the condition of the protasis should be fulfilled. *E.g.*

Εἰ ἔλθοι, πάντ' ἄν ἴδοι, *if he should go, he would see all.* Εἴ σ' οὕτως ἐθέλοι φιλέειν κήδοιτό τε θυμῷ, τῷ κέν τις κείνων γε καὶ ἐκλεάθοιτο γάμοιο, *if she should be willing thus to love you, etc., then some of them would cease even to think of marriage.* Od. iii. 223. *Ἡ κεν γηθῆσαι Πριάμος Πριάμοιο τε παῖδες, ἄλλοι τὲ Τρῶες μέγα κεν κεχαροῖατο θυμῷ, εἰ σφῶν τάδε πάντα πνθοῖατο μαρναμένοιιν. Il. i. 255. 'Ἀλλ' εἴ μοι τι πίθοιο, τό κεν πολὺ κέρδιον εἴη. Il. vii. 28. Εἴης φορητὸς οὐκ ἄν, εἰ πρᾶσσοις καλῶς, *you would not be bearable if you should ever be in prosperity.* AESCH. Prom. 979. Οἶκος δ' αὐτὸς, εἰ φθογγὴν λάβοι, σαφέστατ' ἄν λέξειεν. Id. Ag. 37. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄν Μήδοκός με ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐπαινοίη, εἰ ἐξελαύνοιμι τοὺς εὐεργέτας. XEN. An. vii. 7, 11. Οὐδ' εἰ πάντες ἔλθοιεν Πέρσαι, πλήθει γε οὐχ ὑπερβαλοίμεθ' ἄν τοὺς πολέμιους. Id. Cyr. ii. 1; 8. Οὐ πολλὰ ἄν ἀλογία εἴη, εἰ φοβοῖτο τὸν θάνατον ὁ τοιοῦτος; PLAT. Phaed. 68 B. Εἰ δέ τις τοὺς κρατούντας τοῦ πλήθους ἐπ' ἀρετὴν προτρέψειεν, ἀμφοτέρους ἄν ὀνήσειε. ISOCH. ii. 8. Εἴ τις τῶν σοι συνόντων ἐπαρθείη ποιεῖν ἃ σὺ τυγχάνεις εὐλογῶν, πῶς οὐκ ἄν ἀθλιώτατος εἴη; Id. xi. 47. Πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἄν οἰκτρότατα πάντων ἐγὼ πεπονθὼς εἴην, εἰ ἐμὲ ψηφίσαιντο εἶναι ξένον; *how then should I not have suffered (lit. be hereafter in the condition of having suffered) the most pitiable of all things, if they should vote me a foreigner?* DEM. lvii. 44. (See 103 for other examples of the perfect optative.)

456. This form of the conditional sentence in its fully developed use, as it appears in Attic Greek, must be carefully distinguished from that of 410; the more so, as we often translate both *εἴη ἄν* and *ἦν ἄν* by the same English expression, *it would be*; although the latter implies that the supposition of the protasis is a false one, while the former implies no opinion of the speaker as to the truth of the supposition. We have seen (438-440) that the more primitive Homeric language had not yet fully separated these two constructions, and still used the optative in the apodosis of present, and sometimes of past, unreal conditions.

On the other hand, the distinction between this form and that of 444 is less marked, and it is sometimes of slight importance which of the two is used. As it is often nearly indifferent in English whether we say *if we shall go* (or *if we go*) *it will be well*, or *if we should go* *it would be well*, so may it be in Greek whether we say *εἰ ἂν ἔλθωμεν*

καλῶς ἔξει or εἰ ἔλθοιμεν καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι. In writing Greek, this distinction can generally be made by first observing the form of the apodosis in English; if that is expressed by *should* or *would*, it is to be translated by the Greek optative with ἂν; if it is expressed by *shall* or *will*, by the future indicative. Other forms of the apodosis, as the imperative, will present no difficulty. The form to be used in the protasis will then appear from the principles of the dependence of moods (170-178); the optative will require another optative with εἰ in the dependent protasis, while the future indicative or any other primary form will require a subjunctive with εἴην or a future indicative with εἴ.

457. In indirect discourse after past tenses we often find an optative in protasis, which merely represents the same tense of the subjunctive or indicative in the direct discourse. See 667, 1; 689; 694.

For the occasional omission of ἂν in an apodosis of this kind, see 240-242.

458. The potential optative with ἂν may stand in the protasis with εἰ; as in εἰ ἔλθοιμι ἂν, *supposing that I would go*, easily distinguished from εἰ ἔλθοιμι, *supposing that I should go*. Such an expression does not belong here, but is really a present condition. (See 409; 506.)

459. The future optative cannot be used in protasis or apodosis, except in indirect discourse to represent a future indicative of the direct discourse. (See 128 and 203.)

HOMERIC PECULIARITIES.

460. Εἴ κε with the optative is sometimes found in Homer, and εἴ περ ἂν occurs once.¹ This is a mark of the unsettled usage of the earlier language, in which κέ or ἂν was not yet required with the subjunctive in protasis, and was still allowed with the optative or indicative (401). It is difficult to see any essential difference between these protases with εἴ κε and those with the simple εἰ and the optative. *E.g.*

Εἰ δέ κεν Ἄργος ἰκοίμεθ' Ἀχαιικόν, οὔθαρ ἀρούρης, γαμβρός κέν μοι ᾖοι, *and if we should ever come to Achaean Argos, then he would (shall) be my son-in-law*. Il. ix. 141; cf. ix. 283, and Od. xii. 345, xix. 589. Πῶς ἂν ἐγὼ σε δέοιμι μετ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσιν, εἴ κεν Ἄρης οἴχοιτο χρέος καὶ δεσμὸν ἀλύξας. Od. viii. 352. Τῶν κέν τοι χαρίσαιο πατὴρ ἀπείρσι δῖοινα, εἴ κεν ἐμὲ ζῶν πεπύθοιτ' ἐπὶ νηυσὶν Ἀχαιῶν. Il. vi. 49. The distinction between these cases and those of 458 is obvious.

In Il. i. 60, εἴ κεν with the optative forms a subordinate protasis,

¹ See the examples in Lange, *Partikel EI*, pp. 185, 186. There are twenty-six cases of εἴ κε with the optative in Homer, and one of εἴ περ ἂν (Il. ii. 597); besides Il. v. 273 (= viii. 196) and Od. xvii. 223, mentioned in the text (461).

with a remoter and less emphatic supposition than the main protasis *εἰ* *δαμῶ* (future); *νῦν ἄμμε πάλιν πλαγχθέντας ὥς ἂν ἀπονοστήσῃεν, εἴ κεν θάνατόν γε φύγοιμεν, εἰ δὴ ὁμοῦ πόλεμος τε δαμῶ καὶ λοιμὸς Ἀχαιοῦς, now I think we shall be driven back and shall return home again—that is, supposing us to escape death—if both war and pestilence are at the same time to destroy the Achaeans.* In ll. ii. 597 we have *εἴ περ ἂν αὐταὶ Μοῦσαι ἀείδοιεν.*

These constructions are never negative.

461. In the strange protasis, *εἰ* *τούτῳ κε λάβοιμεν*, II. v. 273 and viii. 196, the separation of *εἰ* from *κέ* might compel us to recognise a potential force, *if we could (possibly) secure these*; but the difference between this and the Attic examples of *εἰ* with the potential optative and *ἄν* (458; 506), and the difficulty of seeing any difference between this and *εἰ* *τούτῳ λάβοιμεν, if we should secure these*, induced Bekker to read *εἰ* *τούτῳ γε λάβοιμεν* here, and also *τόν γ' εἴ μοι δοίης* (for *τόν κ' εἰ*) in Od. xvii. 223.

The Homeric use of the optative in present and past unreal conditional sentences has been discussed (438).

II. PRESENT AND PAST GENERAL SUPPOSITIONS.

462. In present or past general suppositions, the apodosis expresses a *customary* or *repeated* action or a *general truth* in present or past time, and the protasis refers in a general way to *any* act or acts of a given class. Here the protasis has the subjunctive with *εἰάν* after present tenses, and the optative with *εἰ* after past tenses. The apodosis has the present or imperfect indicative, or some other form which implies repetition. *E.g.*

"*Ὦν ἐγγὺς ἔλθῃ θάνατος, οὐδεὶς βούλεται θνήσκειν, if (or when) death comes near, no one is (ever) willing to die.* EUR. Alc. 671. "*Ὦν μὲν ἄδη καὶ νήφουσι, χρίωνται αὐτῷ. ἦν δὲ μὴ ἄδη, μετρίσω.* HDT. i. 133. *Διατελεῖ μισῶν, οὐκ ἦν τίς τι αὐτὸν ἀδικῇ, ἀλλ' εἰάν τινα ὑποπτεύσῃ βελτίονα ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, he continues to hate, not if any one wrongs him, but if he ever suspects that any one is better than himself.* XEN. Cyr. v. 4, 35. "*Ἄπας λόγος, ἂν ἀπῇ τὰ πράγματα, μάταιόν τι φαίνεται καὶ κενόν, all speech, if deeds are wanting, appears mere emptiness and vanity.* DEM. ii. 12. "*Ἐὰν δὲ δόξῃ τὰ δίκαια ἐγκαλεῖν καὶ ἔλθῃ τὸν δεδρακότα τοῦ φόνου, οὐδ' οὕτω κύριος γίγνεται τοῦ ἀλόγους.* Id. xxiii. 69 (so 74, 75, 76).

"*Ἀλλ' εἴ τι μὴ φέροιμεν, ὥτρυνεν φέρειν, but if we ever stopped bringing him food, he always urged us to bring it.* EUR. Alc. 755. *Εἴ τις ἀντείποι, εὐθὺς τεθνήκει, if any one objected, he was a dead man at once* (52). THUC. viii. 66. *Εἴ τινα πυνθανόιτο ὑβρίζοντα, τοῦτον ἐδικαίευν.* HDT. i. 100. *Εἴ δέ τις θορυβουμένους αἰσθο-*

το, τὸ αἴτιον τούτου σκοπῶν κατασβεννύναι τὴν ταραχὴν ἐπειράτο, *whenever he saw any making a disturbance, he always tried, etc.* XEN. Cyr. v. 3, 55. Οὐκ ἀπελείπετο ἔτι αὐτοῦ, εἰ μὴ τι ἀναγκαῖον εἴη, *he never left him, unless there was some necessity for it.* Id. Mem. iv. 2, 40. Ἦν τοῖς μὲν ὀφθαλμοῖς ἐπικουρήμα τῆς χιότος, εἰ τις μέλλαν τι ἔχων πρὸ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν πορεύοιτο, τῶν δὲ ποδῶν εἴ τις κινοῖτο. Id. An. iv. 5, 13. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ εἶδον αὐτὸν τάχιστα, συλλαβόντες ἀγούσιν ἀντικρυς ὡς ἀποκτενοῦντες, ὅπερ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπέσφαττον εἴ τινα ληστὴν ἢ κακοῦργον συλλάβοιεν, *i.e. where they had been in the habit of killing any others whom they took.* LYS. xiii. 78.

463. This optative referring to past time must be especially distinguished from the optative in ordinary protasis referring to the future (455). Εἰ and ἔάν in this construction are often almost equivalent to ὅτε or ὅταν (which are the more common expressions), and the protasis has precisely the same construction as the relative sentences of 532.

464. The present and aorist subjunctive and optative here do not differ except as explained in 87. The future optative of course is never used here (128).

465. The examples in 462 exhibit the ordinary Attic usage. In Homer we find this construction in a partially developed state: see 468.

466. The gnomic aorist (154) and other gnomic and iterative expressions (162; 163) may be used in the apodosis of these general conditions. The gnomic aorist, as a primary tense, is followed by the subjunctive. *E.g.*

Ἦν σφαλῶσιν, ὑντελπίσαντες ἄλλα ἐπλήρωσαν τὴν χρεῖαν, *if they fail, they always supply the deficiency, etc.* THUC. i. 70. Ἦν δέ τις τούτων τι παραβαίνει, ζημίαν αὐτοῖς ἐπέθεσαν, *they (always) impose a penalty upon every one who transgresses.* XEN. Cyr. i. 2, 2. Εἴ τινες ἰδοιέν πῃ τοὺς σφετέρους ἐπικρατοῦντας, ἀνεθάρσυσαν ἄν, *whenever any saw their friends in any way victorious, they would be encouraged (i.e. they were encouraged in all such cases).* THUC. vii. 71. See XEN. Mem. iv. 6, 13, quoted in 162.

467. (*Indicative.*) The indicative is sometimes found in the place of the subjunctive or optative in these general conditions, that is, these follow the construction of ordinary present and past suppositions, as in Latin and English. Here the speaker refers to one of the cases in which the event may occur, as if it were the only one,—that is, he states the *general* supposition as if it were *particular*. *E.g.*

Μοῖραι δ' ἀφίσταντ', εἰ τις ἔχθρα πέλει ὁμογόνους, αἰδῶ καλῶσαι, *the Fates stand aloof to hide their shame, if there is enmity among kindred.* PIND. Py. iv. 145; cf. OL. i. 64. (See 406.) Εἴ τις δύο ἢ καὶ πλείους

τις ἡμέρας λογίζεται, μάταιός ἐστιν, *if any one ever counts upon two or even more days, he is a fool*. SOPH. Tr. 944. Ἐλευθέρως πολιτεύομεν, οὐ δι' ὀργῆς τὸν πέλας, εἰ καθ' ἡδονὴν τι δρᾷ, ἔχοντες, *i.e. not (having a habit of) being angry with our neighbour if he ever acts as he pleases*. THUC. ii. 37. (Here the indicative δρᾷ is used as if some particular act of one neighbour, and not any act of any neighbour, were in mind.) Εἰ γάρ τις ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ τετιμημένος τολμᾷ βοηθεῖν τοῖς παράνομα γράφουσιν, καταλύει τὴν πολιτείαν ὧς ἡς τετίμηται. AESCHIN. iii. 196. Εἰ τίς τι ἐπηρώτα, ἀπεκρίνοντο, *if any one asked anything, they replied (to all such)*. THUC. vii. 10. Ἐμῖσει οὐκ εἴ τις κακὸς πάσχων ἤμυνετο, ἀλλ' εἴ τις εὐεργετούμενος ἀχάριστος φαίνεται. XEN. Ag. xi. 3. Here, without any apparent reason, the writer changes from the indicative to the optative. (See 534.)

HOMERIC AND OTHER POETIC PECULIARITIES.

468. In Homer the subjunctive appears in protasis in general suppositions (462) only nineteen times, and the optative only once. Here the subjunctive generally (in fourteen cases) has the simple εἰ (without κέ or ἄν). *E.g.*

Εἴ περ γάρ τε χόλον γε καὶ αὐτῆμαρ καταπέψῃ, ἀλλὰ γε καὶ μετόπισθεν ἔχει κότον, ὅφρα τελέσῃ, *for even if he swallows his wrath for the day, still he keeps his anger hereafter, until he accomplishes its object*. IL. i. 81. Τῶν οὐ τι μετατρέπομ' οὐδ' ἀλεγίζω, εἴ τ' ἐπὶ δεξιῇ ὦσι, εἴ τ' ἐπ' ἀριστερά, *I do not heed them nor care for them, whether they go to the right or to the left*. IL. xii. 238. So IL. iv. 262, x. 225, xi. 116, xvi. 263, xxi. 576, xxii. 191 (the last four in similes); Od. i. 167, vii. 204, xii. 96, xiv. 373, xvi. 98 (= 116).

"Ἦν ποτε δασμὸς ἱκνῆται, σοὶ τὸ γέρας πολὺ μείζον, *if ever a division comes, your prize is always much greater*. IL. i. 166. So Od. xi. 159, ἦν μὴ τις ἔχῃ. Besides these two cases of ἦν, Homer has two of εἴ κε, IL. xi. 391, xii. 302; and one of εἴ περ ἄν, IL. iii. 25 (five in all).

The single case of εἰ with the optative in a past general condition in Homer is IL. xxiv. 768: ἀλλ' εἴ τίς με καὶ ἄλλος ἐνίπτοι, ἀλλὰ σὺ τὸν γε κατέρυκες, *but if any other upbraided me, you (always) restrained him*.

469. Pindar has only eight cases of the subjunctive in protasis. These all have general suppositions and all have the simple εἰ;¹ as πολλοὶ δὲ μέμνανται, καλὸν εἴ τι ποναθῇ, *but many remember it if a noble work is done*, OL. vi. 11.

470. The other lyric and elegiac poets show no preference for the simple εἰ. The following cases may be cited: CALL. i. 13 εἰ ᾗ (but ᾗν

¹ *Ann. Jour. Phil.* iii. p. 443. The examples are OL. vi. 11; Pyth. iv. 266, 273 (perhaps also 263); Nem. vii. 11, ix. 46; Isth. iii. 58, iv. 12; Frag. 171 (Böckh), 5. The references to the other poets in 470 and 471 do not profess to be complete.

in 17); TYRT. xii. 35 εἰ φύγη (but ἦν xi. 16); SOL. iv. 30 εἰ ἦ? (but ἦν xii. 1, xiii. 29); THEOG. 121, 122 εἰ λελήθῃ . . . ἔχῃ, and 321 εἰ ὀπάσσω (but ἦν 93, 186, 379, 697, 929, 932, 1355, 1356, 1385); all (both εἰ and ἦν) in general conditions. See SIM. AMORG. vii. 15, 69, 97 (ἦν).

471. In the Attic poets we find a few cases of the simple εἰ in general conditions. *E.g.*

Ἄλλ' ἄνδρα, κεί τις ἦ σοφὸς, τὸ μανθάνειν πόλλ' αἰσχρὸν οὐδὲν καὶ τὸ μὴ τείνειν ἄγαν. SOPH. ANT. 710. So AJ. 521; O. T. 198, 874; O. C. 509; AESCH. Supp. 91, Eum. 234.

For the simple εἰ in future conditions, see 453; 454. For the probable relation of εἰ to εἴ κε, ἦν, εἰάν, etc., see 401.

PECULIAR FORMS OF CONDITIONAL SENTENCES.

Substitution and Ellipsis in Protasis.—Protasis without a Verb.

472. Often the protasis is not expressed in its regular form with εἰ or εἰάν, but is contained in a participle, or implied in an adverb like οὕτως or δικαίως, in a preposition with its case, or in some other form of expression. When a participle represents the protasis (841), its *tense* is always that in which the verb itself would have stood in the indicative, subjunctive, or optative. The present (as usual) includes the imperfect, and the perfect includes the pluperfect. *E.g.*

Τοῦτο ποιούντες εἰ πράξουσιν (i.e. εἰάν ποιῶσιν), *if they (shall) do this, they will prosper.* Τοῦτο ποιήσαντες εἰ πράξουσιν (i.e. εἰάν ποιήσωσιν). Τοῦτο ποιούντες εἰ ἂν πράττοιεν (i.e. εἰ ποιοῖεν), *if they should do this, they would prosper.* Τοῦτο ποιήσαντες εἰ ἂν πράττοιεν (i.e. εἰ ποιήσαιεν). Τοῦτο ποιούντες εἰ ἂν ἔπραττον (i.e. εἰ ἐποίουν), *if they were doing this (or if they had been doing this), they would be in prosperity.* Τοῦτο ποιήσαντες εἰ ἂν ἔπραττον (i.e. εἰ ἐποίησαν), *if they had done this, they would be in prosperity.*

Πῶς δῆτα δίκης οὐσης ὁ Ζεὺς οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν τὸν πατέρ' αὐτοῦ δῆσας; i.e. *how is it that Zeus has not been destroyed, if Justice exists?* AR. NUB. 904. (Here δίκης οὐσης represents εἰ δίκη ἐστίν.) Ἄλλ' εἰσόμεσθα δόμους παραστείχοντες (εἰάν παραστείχωμεν), *but we shall know, if we enter the house.* SOPH. ANT. 1255. Σὺ δὲ κλύων εἴσει τάχα (εἰάν κλύῃς), *but you will soon know, if you listen.* AR. AV. 1390. So μὴ μαθὼν, *unless I learn*, for εἰάν μὴ μάθω, NUB. 792. Καί κεν τοῦτ' ἐθέλωμι Διὸς γε διδόντος ἀρέσθαι (Διὸς δίδοντος = εἰ Ζεὺς διδοίη), *and this I should like to obtain, if Zeus would only give it.* OD. I. 390. Τοιαυτὰ τῶν γυναιξὶ συνναίων ἔχouis (εἰ συνναίους), *such things would you suffer, if you should live with women.* AESCH. SEPT. 195. Οὐδ' ἂν σιωπήσαιμι τήν ἄτην ὀρῶν στείχουσιν ἀσπίσιν (i.e. εἰ ὀρώην). SOPH. ANT. 185. Ἀθηναίων δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο παθόντων, *displeasure* ἂν

τὴν δύναμιν εἰκάσθαι (οἶμαι), *but if the Athenians should ever suffer this* (παθόντων = εἰ πάθουσι), *I think it would be inferred that their power was twice as great.* THUC. i. 10. (Here only the context shows that παθόντων does not represent εἰ ἔπαθον, *if they had ever suffered*.) Πρὶν γενέσθαι ἠπίστησεν ἂν τις ἀκούσας (i.e. εἰ ἤκουσεν), *before it happened, any one would have disbelieved such a thing if he had heard it.* THUC. vii. 28. Οὐ γὰρ ἂν μεταπίθην ὑμᾶς ἐξήτει μὴ τοιαύτης οὐδὲς τῆς ὑπαρχούσης ὑπολήψεως, *for he would not be seeking to change your minds, if such were not the prevailing opinion* (i.e. εἰ μὴ τοιαύτη ἦν). DEM. xviii. 228. Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως ταῦτ' ἂν, ἐκεῖνα προειρηκώς, ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνὴρ μὴ διαφθαρεὶς ἐτόλμησεν εἰπεῖν; *is it possible then that the same man, after saying that, would have dared to say this unless he had been corrupted* (εἰ μὴ διεφθάρη)? Id. xix. 308. Μὴ κατηγορήσαντος Αἰσχίνου μηδὲν ἔξω τῆς γραφῆς οὐδ' ἂν ἐγὼ λόγον οὐδένα ἐποιοῦμην ἕτερον (εἰ μὴ κατηγορήσεν). Id. xviii. 34. Τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν ἔπραξε καὶ πρώτη λαχούσα (i.e. εἰ πρώτη ἔλαχεν), *it (the soul) would have done the same, even if it had had the first choice by the lot.* PLAT. Rep. 620 D. Μαρμῶν δ' ἂν αἰτήσαντος ἡκόν σοι φέρων ἂν ἄρτον, *and if you ever asked for something to eat, I used to come bringing you bread.* AR. Nub. 1383. (Here αἰτήσαντος represents εἰ αἰτήσεας in a general supposition, 462. For ἦκον ἂν see 162.)

Οὔτε ἐσθίουσι πλείω ἢ δύνανται φέρειν, διαρραγεῖεν γὰρ ἂν· οὐτ' ἀμφιέννυνται πλείω ἢ δύνανται φέρειν, ἀποπνιγεῖεν γὰρ ἂν, *they do not eat more than they can bear, for (if they should) they would burst, etc.* XEN. Cyr. viii. 2, 21. Αὐτοὶ ἂν ἐπορεύθησαν ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι· τὰ δ' ὑποζύγια οὐκ ἦν ἄλλη ἢ ταύτῃ ἐκβῆναι, *they would have gone themselves where the others went; but the animals could not go otherwise than as they did.* Id. An. iv. 2, 10. So ἦ γὰρ ἂν λωβήσαιο, II. i. 232.

Ἡμῖν δ' ἐξ πολλῆς ἂν περιουσίας νεῶν μόλις τοῦτο ὑπῆρχε καὶ μὴ ἀναγκαζομένοις, ὥσπερ νῦν, πάσαις φυλάσσειν, *but we should hardly have this advantage if we had a great superiority in number of ships* (= εἰ πολλὴν περιουσίαν εἶχομεν) *and if we were not compelled* (εἰ μὴ ἠναγκαζόμεθα), *as we are, to use our whole fleet in guarding.* THUC. vii. 13. Τὸ μὲν ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ πολλὰκις ἂν διελύθησαν, *if it had depended on him, they often would have been disbanded.* ISOC. iv. 142. Διὰ γε ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς πάλαι ἂν ἀπολώλειτε, *if it had depended on yourselves, you would long ago have been ruined.* DEM. xviii. 49. (So sometimes καθ' ὑμᾶς.) Πάλαι γὰρ ἂν ἔνεκά γε ψηφισμάτων ἐδεδώκει δίκην, *for, if decrees were of any avail, he would long ago have suffered punishment.* Id. iii. 14. (Here the protasis is implied in ἔνεκα ψηφισμάτων.) Οὕτω γὰρ οὐκέτι τοῦ λοιποῦ πάσχομεν ἂν κακῶς, *for in that case we should no longer suffer.* Id. iv. 15. So ὡς οὕτω περιγενόμενος ἂν, XEN. An. i. 1, 10. Οὐδ' ἂν δικάίως ἐς κακὸν πέσοιμί τι. SOPH. Ant. 240.

In such cases the form of the apodosis generally shows what form of protasis is implied. When the apodosis is itself expressed by an infinitive or participle (479), as in THUC. i. 10 (above), the form of the protasis is shown only by the general sense of the passage.

473. The future participle is not used to represent the future indicative in future conditions (447); it may, however, represent the future in *present* conditions (407), where it is equivalent to μέλλω and the infinitive; as in DEM. xxiv. 189, *μὴ περὶ τούτων ὑμῶν οἰσόντων τὴν ψήφον, τί δὲ ταῦτα λέγοντα ἐνοχλεῖν με νυνί*; *if you are not to give your vote about this, μὴ οἰσόντων* representing *εἰ μὴ οὔσιν τε = εἰ μὴ μέλλετε φέρειν*. The present and aorist participles, when they represent the present and aorist subjunctive, express future conditions, thus making the future participle unnecessary. The aorist participle in protasis can always represent an aorist subjunctive in the sense explained in 90.

474. The verb of the protasis is suppressed in the Homeric *εἰ δ' ἄγε, come now!* This is commonly explained by an ellipsis of *βούλει, if you will, come now!* But it is probable that no definite verb was in the speaker's mind in such expressions, even when we find it necessary to supply one. *E.g.*

Εἰ δ' ἄγε, τοι κεφαλῇ κατανεύσομαι, come now! I will nod my assent to thee. II. i. 524. *Εἰ δ' ἄγε μὴν, πείρησαι, ἵνα γνῶσι καὶ οἶδε, well! come now, try it.* II. i. 302. *Εἰ μὲν δὴ θεός ἐστι θεοῖο τε ἔκλυες αὐδῆς, εἰ δ' ἄγε μοι καὶ κείνον διζυρὸν κατάλεξον* (the apodosis being introduced by *εἰ δ' ἄγε, come now, tell me*). Od. iv. 831.

475. (Ὡς εἰ.) There is a probably unconscious suppression of the verb of the protasis when *ὥς εἰ* or *ὥς εἴ τε* is used in comparisons (especially in Homer) with a noun or adjective or with a participle. *E.g.*

Τῶν νέες ὡκεῖαι ὥς εἰ περὶν ἡὲ νόημα, their ships are swift as (if) a wing or thought. Od. vii. 36. *Ὡς μ' ἀσύφηλον ἔρεξεν Ἀτρεΐδης ὥς εἴ τιν' ἀτίμητον μετανάστην, for the son of Atreus insulted me like (i.e. as if he were insulting) some despised wanderer.* II. ix. 648. *Ἐπλέομεν βορέῃ ἀνέμῳ ῥηιδίως ὥς εἴ τε κατὰ ῥόον, we sailed on with the north-east wind easily, as if (we were sailing) down stream.* Od. xiv. 253. In all these cases no definite verb was in mind after *εἰ*, but the addition of *εἰ* to *ὥς* shows that a conditional force was felt (at least originally) in addition to the comparison; and this is the only difference between these examples and those with the simple *ὥς* or *ὥς τε*, as *ἑστῆκεν ὥς τις τε λέων, he stood like a lion*.¹ In Attic poetry we find *μάτηρ ὥσεί τις πιστά, like some faithful mother*, SOPH. El. 234; and *πτύσας ὥσεί τε δυσμένῃ, spurning her as an enemy*, ANT. 653. With Od. vii. 36 compare Hymn. Ap. Py. 8, *πρὸς Ὀλυμπον ὥστε νόημα εἶσι*, and 270, *ἐπὶ νῆα νόημ' ὥς ἄλτο πέτεσθαι*.

¹ See Lange, *Partikel EI*, p. 234. Lange is at great pains to show that there is no ellipsis here, or indeed in any cases of *εἰ* without a verb like *εἰ περ ἀνάγκη, if necessary*. By "ellipsis" we often mean merely what one language finds it necessary to supply to translate an idiom of another. There are few ellipses of which a speaker is really conscious when he uses them. In this sense, it seems to me that, whenever we use *if* without a verb, there is at least a suppression (if not an ellipsis) of a verb.

Ὁλοφύρζυμενοι ὥς εἰ θανατόνδε κιώντα, *bewailing him as if going to his death* (in full as *if they were bewailing him going*), for which we say (changing the construction) as *if he were going*. II. xxiv. 328. See also II. xvi. 192, v. 374. Ἀμφὶ δὲ καπνὸς γίγνεται ἐξ αὐτῆς ὥς εἰ πυρὸς αἰθομένοιο, i.e. *the smoke rises from it (the fountain) as if (it rose) from a blazing fire*. II. xxii. 150. So Od. xix. 39. What seems like a more natural construction with ὥς εἰ or ὥς εἴ τε is that of the optative with the apodosis suppressed (485).

In all these cases there is also a suppression of the verb of the apodosis (see 485).

For the participle in such expressions see 867-869.

476. (Εἰ μὴ.) Εἰ μὴ is used without a verb in various expressions to introduce an exception.

1. With nouns and adjectives. *E.g.*

Τίς γάρ τοι Ἀχαιῶν ἄλλος ὁμοῖος, εἰ μὴ Πάτροκλος; *who is like to you, except (unless it be) Patroclus?* II. xvii. 475. See II. xviii. 192, xxiii. 792; Od. xii. 325, xvii. 383. Such expressions are like the simple εἰ τό γ' ἄμεινον, *if this is better*, II. i. 116; εἰ ἐτέον περ, xiv. 125; εἰ περ ἀνάγκη, xxiv. 667.

2. With participles. *E.g.*

Εἰ μὴ κρεμάσας τὸ νόημα, i.e. *I could never have done it, except by suspending thought*. AR. Nub. 229. So οὐδέν ποτ' εἰ μὴ ξυνθανουμένην, AESCH. Ag. 1139; εἰ μὴ καταδύσαντες, THUC. vii. 38; ἐὰν μὴ τῆς ἀδείας δοθείσης, DEM. xxiv. 46.

3. In the expression εἰ μὴ διὰ τοῦτο (or τοῦτον). *E.g.*

Καὶ εἰ μὴ διὰ τὸν πρύτανιν, ἐνέπεσεν ἄν, *and, had it not been for the Prytanis, he would have been thrown in*. PLAT. Gorg. 516 E. (Compare διὰ γε ὑμᾶς, DEM. xviii. 49, quoted in 472.) Οὐ γὰρ ὥς εἰ μὴ διὰ Λακεδαιμονίους, οὐδ' ὥς εἰ μὴ Πρὸξενον οὐχ ὑπεδέξαντο, οὐδ' ὥς εἰ μὴ δι' Ἡγήσιππον, οὐδ' ὥς εἰ μὴ διὰ τὸ καὶ τὸ, ἐσώθησαν ἂν οἱ Φωκεῖς, οὐχ οὕτω τότε ἀπήγγειλεν, *for he did not then report that if it had not been for the Lacedaemonians, or if they had not refused to receive Proxenus, or if it had not been for Hegesippus, or if it had not been for this and that, the Phocians would have been saved*. DEM. xix. 74.

4. In the rare expression εἰ μὴ εἰ, *except if, except in case that*. *E.g.*

Ὁ χρηματιστικὸς τὴν τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι ἡδονὴν ἢ τὴν τοῦ μαθάνειν οὐδενὸς ἀξίαν φήσει εἶναι, εἰ μὴ εἴ τι αὐτῶν ἀργύριον ποιεῖ, *the money-maker will say that the pleasure of receiving honour or that of learning is not worth anything, unless (it is worth something) in case either of them produces money*. PLAT. Rep. 581 D. In Prot. 351 C, ἐγὼ γὰρ λέγω, καθ' ὃ ἡδέα ἐστίν, ἅρα κατὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀγαθὰ, μὴ εἴ τι ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀποβήσεται ἄλλο;—*for I ask this: so far as they are pleasant, are they not just so far good, without taking into account any other result (i.e. other than their pleasantness) which may come from them?*—μὴ is not a mistake for εἰ μὴ, but it seems to imply a conditional participle like

ὑπολογιζόμενος (though no precise word can be supplied), very much as μή ὅτι and μή ὅπως imply a verb of *saying* (707). The meaning clearly is, *Are not things good just so far as they are pleasant, if we take no account of any other (i.e. unpleasant) element in them?* This sense would hardly be found in the emended reading εἰ μή τι. In THUC. i. 17 the Cod. Vat. reads εἰ μή τι, although εἰ μή εἴ τι can be understood as in PLAT. Rep. 581 D (above).

477. Equivalent to εἰ μή εἰ (476, 4) is πλὴν εἰ, *except if* or *unless*, in which πλὴν represents the apodosis. *E.g.*

Οὐδὲ τὰ ὀνόματα οἶόν τε αὐτῶν εἰδέναι, πλὴν εἴ τις κομωδιοποιὸς τυγχάνει ὦν, *it is not possible to know even their names, except in case one happens to be a comedian.* PLAT. Ap. 18 C.

478. In *alternatives*, εἰ δὲ μή, *otherwise*, regularly introduces the latter clause, even when the former clause is negative. Εἰ δὲ μή is much more common here than εἰ δὲ μή, even when εἰ μὲν with the subjunctive precedes. The formula εἰ δὲ μή was fixed in the sense of *otherwise, in the other case*, and no definite form of the verb was in mind.

Πρὸς ταῦτα μὴ τύπτ'· εἰ δὲ μή, σαντόν ποτ' αἰτιάσει, *therefore do not beat me; but if you do, you will have yourself to blame for it.* AR. Nub. 1433. Εἰ μὴ θανοῦμαι γ'· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ λείψω ποτέ, *if I do not die (I will leave the place); otherwise (if I die) I shall never leave it.* EUR. And. 254. See SOPH. Tr. 587. Πόλεμον οὐκ εἶων ποιεῖν· εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀναγκασθήσονται ἔφασαν φίλους ποιεῖσθαι οὓς οὐ βούλονται, *they said that otherwise (εἰ δὲ μή) they should be obliged, etc.* THUC. i. 28. Εἶπον (Πανσανίᾳ) τοῦ κήρυκος μὴ λείπεσθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, πόλεμον αὐτῷ Σπαρτιάτας προαγορεύειν, *they ordered him not to be left behind by the herald: and if he should be (εἰ δὲ μή), (they told him) that the Spartans declared war against him.* Id. i. 131. Μὴ ποιήσης ταῦτα· εἰ δὲ μή, αἰτίαν ἔξεις. XEN. An. vii. 1, 8. Ἐὰν μὲν τι ὑμῖν δοκῶ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, ξινομολογήσατε· εἰ δὲ μή, παντὶ λόγῳ ἀντιτείνετε. PLAT. Phaed. 91 C. So εἰ μὲν πείσητε, . . . εἰ δὲ μή, κ.τ.λ., DEM. ix. 71.

Εἰ δέ alone is sometimes used for εἰ δὲ μή; as in PLAT. Symp. 212 C, εἰ μὲν βούλει, . . . εἰ δέ. So εἰ δ' οὖν (sc. μή), SOPH. Ant. 722, EUR. Hipp. 508.

The potential optative and indicative with ἄν, so far as they are apodoses, might be classed here; but these have higher claims to be treated as independent sentences. See Chapter IV., Section I.

Substitution and Ellipsis in Apodosis.

479. The apodosis, in any of its forms, may be expressed by an infinitive or participle, if the structure of the sentence requires it.

1. It may be expressed by the infinitive or participle in indirect discourse, each tense representing its own tenses of the indicative or optative, the present including the imperfect, and the perfect the pluperfect. If the finite verb in the apodosis would have taken *ἄν*, this particle is used with the infinitive or participle. *E.g.*

‘*Ἡγοῦμαι, εἰ τοῦτο ποιεῖτε, πάντα καλῶς ἔχειν, I believe that, if you are doing this, all is well. Ἡγοῦμαι, ἐὰν τοῦτο ποιήτε, πάντα καλῶς ἔξειν, I believe that, if you (shall) do this, all will be well. Ἡγοῦμαι, εἰ τοῦτο ποιούτε, πάντα καλῶς ἂν ἔχειν, I believe that, if you should do this, all would be well. Ἡγοῦμαι, εἰ τοῦτο ἐποιήσατε, πάντα καλῶς ἂν ἔχειν, I believe that, if you had done this, all would now be (or would have been) well. Οἶδα ὑμᾶς, ἐὰν τοῦτο ποιήτε, εὖ πράζοντας, I know that, if you do this, you will prosper.*

Πῶς γὰρ οἴεσθε δυσχερῶς ἀκούειν Ὀλυμβίους, εἰ τίς τι λέγει κατὰ Φιλίππου κατ’ ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους; how unwillingly do you think the O. heard it, if any one said anything against Philip in those times? DEM. vi. 20. (Here ἀκούειν represents the imperfect ἤκουον, and εἰ λέγει is a general supposition, 462.)

For examples of each tense of the infinitive and participle, see 689. For the use of each tense of the infinitive or participle with *ἄν* and examples, see 204-208 ; 213-216.

2. It may be expressed by the infinitive in any of its various constructions out of indirect discourse, especially by one depending on a verb of *wishing, commanding, advising, preparing, etc.*, from which the infinitive receives a future meaning. Such an infinitive is a common form of future apodosis with a protasis in the subjunctive or indicative. *E.g.*

Βούλεται ἐλθεῖν ἐὰν τοῦτο γένηται, he wishes to go if this shall be done. Παρασκευαζόμεθα ἀπελθεῖν ἢν δυνώμεθα, we are preparing to depart if we shall be able. Κελεύει σε ἀπελθεῖν εἰ βούλει, he bids you depart if you please. (See 403 and 445.)

3. The apodosis may be expressed in an attributive or circumstantial participle. *E.g.*

‘*Ραδίως ἂν ἀφεθεῖς εἰ καὶ μετρίως τι τούτων ἐποίησε, προεἴλετο ἀποθανεῖν, whereas he might easily have been acquitted (ἀφείθη ἂν), if he had done any of these things even in a moderate degree, he chose to die. XEN. Mem. iv. 4, 4. Σκέμματα τῶν ῥαδίως ἀποκτινύντων καὶ ἀναβισκομένων γ’ ἂν, εἰ οἳοί τε ἦσαν, considerations for those who readily put men to death, and who would bring them to life again too if they could. PLAT. Crit. 48 C. (Ἀναβισκομένων ἂν = ἀνεβίσκοντο ἂν.) Ὡς οὓς τ’ ὦν σε σῶξιν εἰ ἤθελον ἀναλίσκειν χρήματα, whereas I might have saved you if I had been willing to spend money. Ib. 44 B.*

480. A verbal noun may take the place of an apodosis. *E.g.*

‘*Ὡς ὄντ’ ἀναστητήρα Καδμείων χθονὸς εἰ μὴ θεῶν τις ἔμποδῶν*

ἔσται δορί, *as one who would have laid waste (= ἀνέστησεν ἄν) the Cadmeans' land, if some one of the Gods had not stood in the way of his spear.* AESCH. Sept. 1015.

481. Other forms in which an apodosis may appear, as a final clause, need no discussion. (See 445.)

In indirect discourse, after past tenses, an optative in the apodosis often represents an original indicative or subjunctive. (See 15 and 457.)

482. The apodosis is sometimes omitted, when some such expression as *it is well* or *it will be done* can be supplied, or when some other apodosis is at once suggested by the context. *E.g.*

Ἄλλ' εἰ μὲν δώσουσι γέρας μεγάθυμοι Ἀχαιοὶ, ἄρσαντες κατὰ θυμὸν, ὅπως ἀντάξιον ἔσται, — εἰ δέ κε μὴ δώσωσιν, ἐγὼ δέ κεν αὐτὸς ἔλωμαι, *if they give me a prize,—well; but if they do not, I shall take one for myself.* Il. i. 135. (Here we must understand something like εὖ ἔξει, *it will be well*, after ἔσται.) Εἴ περ γάρ κ' ἐθέλῃσιν Ὀλύμπιος ἀστεροπητῆς ἐξ ἐδέων στυφελίξαι.—ὁ γὰρ πολλὸν φέρτατός ἐστιν. Il. i. 580. (Here we must understand *he can do it* after the protasis. The following γάρ refers to this suppressed apodosis.) Εἰ μὲν ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἱκανῶς διδάσκω οὓους δεῖ πρὸς ἀλλήλους εἶναι.—εἰ δέ μὴ, καὶ παρὰ τῶν προγεγεννημένων μανθάνετε. XEN. Cyr. viii. 7, 24.

Ξεῖνοι πατρώοι εὐχόμεθ' εἶναι, εἴ περ τε γέροντ' εἶρηαι ἐπελθὼν Λαέρτην, *we boast that we are friends by inheritance, (as you may know) if you go and ask Laertes.* Od. i. 187. Προσηγορεύθης ἡ Διὸς κλεινὴ δάμαρ μέλλονσ' ἔσεσθ', εἴ τῶνδε προσσάινει σέ τι. AESCH. Prom. 834.

483. Sometimes the adverb ἄν, without a verb expressed, represents an apodosis in the indicative or optative, when the verb can easily be supplied. *E.g.*

Οἱ οἰκέται ῥέγκουσιν· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄν πρὸ τοῦ (sc. οὕτως ἔρρεγκον), *but they would not have been snoring at this late hour in old times.* AR. Nub. 5. (See 227.) So πῶς γὰρ ἄν; (sc. εἴη), *how could it be?*

484. In ὥσπερ ἄν εἰ with a noun, as ὥσπερ ἄν εἰ παῖς, *like a child*, there is originally a suppression of the verbs of both protasis and apodosis (227; 485); but in use the expression hardly differs from ὥσπερ. (See 868-870.)

485. (Ὡς εἰ and ὥσπερ εἰ.) There is an unconscious suppression of the verb of the apodosis when ὥς εἰ, ὥς εἴ τε, and ὥσπερ εἰ are used in similes and comparisons. *E.g.*

Λαοὶ ἔπονθ', ὥς εἴ τε μετὰ κτίλον ἔσπετο μῆλα, *the hosts followed as if sheep followed a ram.* Il. xiii. 492. (No definite verb is understood here, either with ὥς in Greek or with *as* in English, but the origin of the expression is the same in both.) Φιάλαν ὥς εἴ τις δωρήσεται. PIND. Ol. vii. 1. Καὶ με φίλησ' ὥς εἴ τε πατήρ δν παῖδα φιλήσῃ. Il. ix. 481. Οἱ δ' ἄρ' ὕσαν ὥς εἴ τε πυρὶ χθὼν πᾶσα νέμοιτο, *i.e. their march was as if the whole land should flame with fire* (originally

as it would be if, etc.) II. ii. 780. Βῆ δ' ἔμην, πάντοσε χεῖρ' ὀρέγων ὥς εἰ πτωχὸς πάλαι εἴη, *holding out his hand as if he had long been a beggar* (438). Od. xvii. 366. For other optatives with ὥς εἰ, see II. xi. 467, xxii. 410; Od. ix. 314, x. 416, 420.

"Ὡςπερ εἰ παρεστέατες, as if you had dwelt near by. AESCH. Ag. 1201. "Ὅμοια ὥςπερ εἰ τις πολλὰ ἐσθίων μηδέποτε ἐμπίπλατο, *just as if one should eat much and never be filled*. XEN. Symp. iv. 37.

There is the same suppression of the apodosis in the examples in 475, where the protasis also is wanting with ὥς εἰ and similar expressions.

Apodosis contained in the Protasis.

486. A protasis may depend on a verb which is not its apodosis, the real apodosis being so distinctly implied in the form of expression that it need not be stated separately.

487. 1. This is found especially in Homer, where εἴ κε (αἰ κε) or ἤν (without an expressed apodosis) often seems to have the force of *in the hope that*; as in πατὺρς ἐμοῦ κλέος μετέρχομαι, ἤν ποῦ ἀκούσω, *I am going to seek tidings of my father, if I shall chance to hear of him*, i.e. *that I may hear of him if perchance I shall*, or *in the hope that I shall hear of him* (Od. iii. 83). Here the protasis carries with it its own apodosis, which consists of an implied idea of *purpose*.¹ The whole sentence (both protasis and apodosis) is thus condensed into the protasis; but the apodosis is always felt in the implied idea of purpose or desire which is inherent in the idiom. As we have seen (312, 2) that final clauses with ἄν or κέ and the subjunctive originally included both a conditional relative clause and a final sentence, so here we have both a conditional and a final force included under a single conditional form; and this double force is felt also in the English translation, *if haply, in the hope that, in case that*, etc. *E.g.*

Αὐτὰρ σοὶ πυκνῶς ὑποθήσομεθ', αἰ κε πίθηαι, *but we will make you a wise suggestion, for you to obey it if you will*. II. xxi. 293. (Here the protasis αἰ κε πίθηαι with its implied apodosis seems like πείθοι' ἄν εἰ πείθοι', *you can obey if you please*, AESCH. Ag. 1049, and χαίρουτ' ἄν εἰ χαίρουτ', Ib. 1394.) So II. i. 207, 420, xi. 791, xxiii. 82; Od. i. 279. Πέμψω δ' ἐς Σπάρτην . . . νόστον πενυόμενον πατὺρς φίλου, ἤν ποῦ ἀκούσῃ, ἥδ' ἵνα μιν κλέος ἔχῃσιν, *I will send him to Sparta, to ask about his father's return, in hope that he may hear of it, and in order that glory may possess him*. Od. i. 93. (Here the

¹ The English translation of certain conditional clauses in the New Testament which have this peculiar construction preserves the sense of purpose or desire with the original form of protasis. Thus, *that they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him and find him*, Acts xvii. 27; and *he came (to the fig tree), if haply he might find anything thereon*, MARK xi. 13.

added final clause shows the distinction between this and the protasis *ἦν που ἀκούσῃ*.) So Od. i. 281, ii. 216, 360, iii. 83. *Εἰπέ μοι, αἶ κέ ποθι γνῶω τοιοῦτον ἔοντα*, *if haply I may recognise him*. Od. xiv. 118. *Βάλλ' οὕτως, αἶ κέν τι φόως Δαναοῖσι γένηαι*, *if haply you may become* (i.e. *in hope that you may become*), etc. Il. viii. 282. So Il. xi. 797, 799, xiii. 236, xiv. 78, xvi. 39, 41 (cf. 84), xvii. 121, 692, xviii. 199. *Καί οἱ ὑποσχέσθαι δυοκαίδεκα βούς ἱερευσέμεν, αἶ κ' ἐλεῖσθι ἄστυ, . . . αἶ κεν Τυδεὸς νῦν ἀπόσχη Ἰλίου ἱρῆς*, *let her promise to sacrifice twelve oxen (to Athena), in hope that she may pity the city, . . . if haply she may keep the son of Tydeus from sacred Ilios*, etc. Il. vi. 93. (For *αἶ κεν ἀπόσχη* Aristarchus read *ὥς κεν*.) *Εὐφημησαί τε κέλευσθε, ὄφρα Διὶ Κρονίδῃ ἀρήσομεθ', αἶ κ' ἐλεῖσθι*, *in order that we may pray to Zeus to pity us if he will (if haply he shall pity us)*. Il. ix. 171. So Il. vi. 281, 309, xvii. 245, xxii. 419, xxiv. 116, 301, 357; Od. xiii. 182. See also *εἶ κέν πως βούλεται λοιγὸν ἀμύναι*, Il. i. 66. *Πατρόκλῳ ἔφεπε κρατερῶνυχας ἵππους, αἶ κέν πῶς μιν ἔλῃς, δῶν δέ τοι εὖχος Ἀπόλλων*. Il. xvi. 724. So Il. xv. 297; Od. xxii. 76. *Δεῦρ' ἰκόμεθ', αἶ κέ ποθι Ζεὺς ἐξοπίσω περ παῖσιν οἴξιος*. Od. iv. 34. So Od. i. 379, ii. 144, xii. 215, xvii. 51, 60, xxii. 252. *Ἐκτορος ὄρωμεν κρατερὸν μένος, ἦν τινα που Δαναῶν προκαλέσεται*. Il. vii. 39. *Ὑψόσε δ' αὐγὴ γίγνεται αἰσσοῦσα περικτιόνεσσι ἰδέσθαι, αἶ κέν πως σὺν νησὶν ἀρῆς ἀλκτῆρες ἴκωνται*. Il. xviii. 211. *Εἰ δέ κ' ἔτι προτέρω παρανήξομαι, ἦν που ἐφεύρω ἡμόνας, δεῖδω, κ.τ.λ.*, *but if I shall swim on still further, to find a shore if haply I may, I fear*, etc. Od. v. 417. (Here *ἦν που ἐφεύρω* depends on an ordinary protasis, which, however, is not its apodosis.) *Ἄλλ' ἄγετ', αἶ κέν πως θωρήσομεν νῆας Ἀχαιῶν*, i.e. *let us arm them if we can*. Il. ii. 72 (so 83). *Σκέπτεο νῦν, αἶ κέ ἴδῃαι ζῶν ἔτ' Ἀντίλοχον*, *if haply you may see*. Il. xvii. 652. *Σφ' οἴκῳ δῶρον ποτιδέγμενος, αἶ κέ πόρῃσιν*, *expecting a gift, if haply he shall give one* (i.e. *in hope that he will give one*). Od. ii. 186. So Od. xv. 312. *Ἄλλ' οὐ γάρ σ' ἐθέλω βαλεῖν τοιοῦτον ἔοντα λάθρῃ ὀπιτεύσας, ἀλλ' ἀμφοδὸν, εἶ κέ τύχωμι*, *if haply I may hit you*. Il. vii. 242. *Νῦν αὖτ' ἐγχείῃ πειρήσομαι, αἶ κέ τύχωμι*, *I will try with my spear, if haply I may hit you*. Il. v. 279. *Ὡς δτε τις τροχὸν κεραμεὺς πειρήσεται, αἶ κέ θέῃσιν*, i.e. *tries a wheel, in case it will run* (i.e. *to let it run if it will*). Il. xviii. 600. (The analogy of the two preceding examples shows that there is no indirect question.)

Παρέξο καὶ λαβὲ γούνων, αἶ κέν πως ἐθέλῃσιν ἐπὶ Τρῳέσσιν ἀρῆσαι, i.e. *clasp his knees in the hope that he will aid the Trojans (that he may aid them in case he will)*. Il. i. 407. So Il. vii. 394, x. 55, xiii. 743, xviii. 457; Od. iii. 92, iv. 322. For these last examples, see 490, 2.

For *αἶ κέ* in the common text of Homer, here as elsewhere, Bekker and Delbrück write *εἶ κέ* (see footnote to 379).

2. In alternatives with two opposite suppositions, this construction implies that the subject is ready for either result, though the former is hoped for or expected. *E.g.*

Ἴθυσ φέρεται μένει, ἦν τινα πέφνη ἀνδρῶν ἢ αὐτὸς φθίεται πρώτῳ ἐν ὁμίλῳ, i.e. *he (a lion) rushes on, ready to slay or to perish*. Il. xx. 172. In Od. xxiv. 216, the common text has πατρός πειρήσομαι, αἶ κε (or εἰ κε) μὲ ἐπιγνώῃ . . . ἥέ κεν ἀγνοῶσι, *I will try my father (ready for either result), in case he shall recognise me or shall not know me* (where κέν alone in the second clause is very strange). But La Roche reads ἦ κέ μὲ ἐπιγνώῃ, as an indirect question, one Ms. having ἦ κε: see also Od. xviii. 265. Ἐπιγνώῃ is Hermann's conjecture for ἐπιγνοίῃ or γνοίῃ.

488. The optative with εἰ (rarely εἴ κε) is sometimes used in Homer like the subjunctive after primary tenses in sentences of this class. It is also very common after past tenses, representing a subjunctive of the original form, though occasionally the subjunctive is retained in indirect discourse (696). *E.g.*

Ἄλλ' ἔτι τὸν δούστηνον δίομαι, εἴ ποθεν ἔλθων ἀνδρῶν μνηστήρων σκέδασιν κατὰ δώματα θείῃ, *but I am still expecting the poor man, if haply he should come and scatter the suitors*. Od. xx. 224. So Od. ii. 351. Ἀλλά τις εἴη Ἀγαμέμνονι, εἰ πλείονας παρὰ ναυφιν ἐποτρύνειε νέεσθαι, *let some one go to A., in hope that he may exhort, etc.* Od. xiv. 496. See also 491, below.

Βούλετον ὅπως ὅχ' ἄριστα γένοιτο, εἴ τιν' ἐταίρουσιν θανάτου λύσιν εὐροίμην, i.e. *if haply I might find some escape*. Od. ix. 420. Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ οὐ πιθόμην, ὅφρ' αὐτόν τε ἴδοιμι καὶ εἴ μοι ξείνια δοίῃ, *but I disobeyed them, in order that I might see him (the Cyclops) and in hope that he would show me hospitality*. Od. ix. 228. (The final clause and the protasis are here again clearly distinguished: see Od. i. 93 under 487, 1.) Πολλὰ δέ τ' ἄγκέ' ἐπῆλθε μετ' ἀνέρος ἔχνι' ἐρευνῶν, εἴ ποθεν ἐξεύροι. Il. xviii. 321. Πειρήθη δὲ ἐν αὐτοῦ ἐν ἔντεσι, εἰ οἱ ἐφαρμόσσειε καὶ ἐντρέχοι ἄγλαα γυῖα, i.e. *he tried himself in his armour, eager for it to fit him and for his limbs to play freely in it (if haply it should fit him, etc.)*. Il. xix. 384. (See the cases of the subjunctive after πειρώμαι in 487, 1. Here there is no indirect question, for Achilles can have no real doubt about the fit.) Ἐν δὲ πίθοι οἴνοιο ἔστασαν, εἴ ποτ' Ὀδυσσεὺς οἴκαδε νοστήσειε, i.e. *the casks of wine were waiting for the return of Ulysses*. Od. ii. 340. Ἦστο κάτω ὁρώων, ποτιδέγμενος εἴ τί μιν εἴποι, i.e. *he sat looking down, waiting for Penelope to speak*. Od. xxiii. 91. Τόδ' ἠνώγει εἰπεῖν ἔπος, εἴ κ' ἐθέλῃτε παύσασθαι πολέμου, *he bade me say this word, if haply you might be willing to stop the war*. Il. vii. 394. (This appears in vs. 387 as εἴ κε γένοιτο, and the direct form of the command in vs. 375 is εἴ κ' ἐθέλωσιν.) In Il. xiv. 163-165 we have εἰ πως ἱμείραιτο . . . τῷ δὲ χεῦρ after a past tense. Νῆχε παρέξ, εἴ που ἐφεύροι ἡμόνας. Od. v. 439. (Compare vs. 417, εἰ δέ κε παρανήξομαι, ἦν που ἐφεύρω, under 487, 1.)

See also Il. ii. 97, iii. 450, iv. 88, x. 19, xii. 122, 333, xiii. 807, xx. 464, xxiii. 40; Od. i. 115, iv. 317, ix. 267, 317, 418, x. 147, xi. 479, 628, xii. 334, xiv. 460, xxii. 91, 381.

489. This construction (487; 488) with both subjunctive and

optative is found also in Attic Greek and in Herodotus, but with less variety of expression, and at the same time with some extension of the usage. Especially to be noticed are the protases depending on verbs like βούλομαι and θέλω in Herodotus. *E.g.*

Θήβας ἡμᾶς πέμψον, ἐάν πως διακωλύσωμεν ἰόντα φόνον τοῖσιν ὁμαῖμοις, *send us to Thebes, to prevent, if haply we may*, etc. SOPH. O. C. 1769. Τῆς ἐμῆς γνώμης ἄκουσον, ἣν τί σοι δοκῶ λέγειν, *hear my judgment, in the hope that you may think there is something in what I say*. EUR. H. F. 278. Ἐδέοντο τοῦ Ἀρισταγόρεω, εἰ κως αὐτοῖσι παρᾶσχοι δύναμιν τινα καὶ κατέλθοιεν ἐς τὴν ἐωτῶν, *they besought A., if in any way he might supply them with an armed force and they might be restored to their own land (to do this)*. HDT. v. 30. Φρονήσαντες εἰ κως ἐν γένοιτο τὸ Ἑλληνικόν, *having it at heart that, if it were in any way possible, the Hellenic race should be made one*. Id. vii. 145. Βουλομένην εἰ κως ἀμφότεροι γενοίατο βασιλείες, i.e. *wishing that both might be made kings, if in any way this could be done*. Id. vi. 52. Ἐβουλεύετο θέλων εἰ κως τούτους πρώτους ἔλοι. Id. ix. 14. Πρόθυμοι ἦσαν ἐπιχειρεῖν (sc. τῇσι νηυσὶ), εἰ κως ἔλοιεν αὐτάς. Id. viii. 6. Πέμψαντες παρ' Ἀθηναίους πρέσβεις, εἰ πως πείσειαν μὴ σφῶν περὶ νεωτερίζειν μηδέν, *to persuade them if they might*, etc. THUC. i. 58. Πορευόμενοι ἐς τὴν Ἀσίαν ὡς βασιλέα, εἰ πως πείσειαν αὐτόν, followed by βουλόμενοι πείσασθαι αὐτόν, εἰ δύναιντο, *στρατεῦσαι, in nearly the same sense*. Id. ii. 67. Πυνθανόμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐς τὴν Καμάρναν πρεσβεύεσθαι, εἰ πως προσαγάγουντο αὐτούς, *that they went on an embassy to C., to bring the town over if they could*. Id. vi. 75. (Compare ἐς Ἀκράγαντα Σικανὸν ἀπέστειλαν, ὅπως ὑπαγάγουντο τὴν πόλιν εἰ δύναιτο, vii. 46. This might have been εἰ πως ὑπαγάγουντο τὴν πόλιν, and in vi. 75 we might have had ὅπως προσαγάγουντο αὐτούς εἰ δύναντο, with nearly the same force, but with different constructions.) See v. 4, εἰ πως . . . διασώσειαν. Ἰκέται πρὸς σέ δευρ' ἀφίγμεθα, εἰ τινα πόλιν φράσειας ἡμῖν εὖρον, *we have come hither to you as suppliants, in the hope that you might tell us of some city soft as a fleece (to have you tell us, if perchance you might do so)*. AR. AV. 120. Ἄκουσον καὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐάν σοι ταῦτα δοκῇ, *listen to me too, in the hope that you may think the same (in case the same shall seem true to you)*. PLAT. REP. 358 B: so 434 A. Ὅρα οὖν καὶ προθυμοῦ κατιδεῖν, ἐάν πως πρότερος ἐμοῦ ἴδῃς καὶ ἐμοὶ φράσῃς, i.e. *for the chance that you may see it first and tell me*. Ib. 432 C: so 618 C, Theaet. 192 C, Soph. 226 C. See also XEN. AN. II. 1, 8, ἂν τι δύνωνται, and AR. NUB. 535. On this principle we must explain AR. RAN. 339, οὐκουν ἀτρέμ' ἔξεις, ἣν τι καὶ χοροδῆς λάβῃς, *will you not keep quiet then, in the hope of getting some sausage too (i.e. to have some sausage if you chance to get any)?*

490. 1. The apodosis may, further, be suggested by the context, even by the protasis itself, without implying that the protasis expresses a purpose or desire of the leading subject. This gives rise to a variety of constructions. *E.g.*

Κτανεῖν ἐμοὶ νῦν ἔδοσαν, εἴτε μὴ κτανὼν θέλωμι ἄγεσθαι πάλιν ἐς

Ἀργεῖαν χθόνα, *they gave her (Helen) to me to slay, or, in case I should prefer not to slay her but to carry her back to the land of Argos (for me to do this)*. EUR. Τρο. 874. Ἦν (τὴν ξυμμαχίαν) γε οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς φίλοις ἐποιήσασθε, τῶν δὲ ἐχθρῶν ἦν τις ἐφ' ὑμᾶς ἤ, i.e. *you made it (to use) in case any of your enemies should come against you*. THUC. vi. 79. Πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, εἰ ἐπιβοηθοῖεν, ἐχώρουν, *they marched towards the city, (to be ready) in case the citizens should rush out*. Id. vi. 100. Τάλλα, ἦν ἔτι ναυμαχεῖν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τολμήσωσι, παρσκευάζοντο, *they made other preparations, (to be ready) in case the Athenians should venture on further sea-fights*. Id. vii. 59. Κήρυγμα ποιοῦνται . . . τῶν νησιωτῶν εἰ τις βούλεται ἐπ' ἐλευθερίᾳ ὡς σφᾶς ἀπιέναι, *they make proclamation, in case any of the islanders wishes to come over to them with promise of freedom (for him to do so)*. Id. vii. 82. Οὐδεμία βλάβη τῶν πρὸς τὰς πόλεις διαπομπῶν ἔς τε κατασκοπὴν καὶ ἣν τι ἄλλο φαίνεται ἐπιτήδειον, *there is no harm in the envoys whom we have sent to the various cities, partly for inquiry, and also in case any other advantage may appear (to secure this), i.e. to secure any other advantage that may appear*. Id. vi. 41. So καὶ εἰ τινα πρὸς ἄλλον δέοι, Id. v. 37. Ἀρὸς ποιοῦνται, εἰ τις ἐπικηρυκεῖται Πέρσαις, *they invoke curses, if any one (i.e. to fall on any one who) sends heralds to the Persians*. ISOC. iv. 157. Φιλοτιμείσθαι μὴδ' ἐνὶ ἐφ' ἄλλῃ ἢ ἐπὶ χρημάτων κτήσει καὶ ἐάν τι ἄλλο εἰς τοῦτο φέρῃ, i.e. *for anything else that may lead to this*. PLAT. Rep. 553 D. See ARISTOT. Eth. x. 9, 2: ἔχειν (τὴν ἀρετὴν) καὶ χρῆσθαι πειρατέον, ἢ εἰ πως ἄλλως ἀγαθοὶ γινόμεθα, *we must try to possess and employ virtue, or if there is any other means of becoming virtuous (to use this)*.

2. In the Homeric examples in which the protasis consists of an infinitive depending on ἐθέλω (487, 1, end), the apodosis is suggested by the infinitive rather than by ἐθέλω. This shows that αἶ κ' ἐθέλῃσι *in itself* has no final force. See also Od. xxii. 381, πάτηνεν δ' Ὀδυσσεὺς κατ' ἑὸν δόμον, εἰ τις ἔτ' ἀνδρῶν ζωὸς ὑποκλοπέοιτο ἀλύσκων κῆρα μέλαιναν, *he peered through his house, in case any man might still be alive and hiding himself (i.e. to find any such man)*, where no desire or hope is implied, and the construction is like that of THUC. vi. 100 (above).

In PLAT. Rep. 327 C, οὐκοῦν ἔτι ἐλλείπεται τὸ ἦν πείσωμεν ὑμᾶς ὡς χρὴ ἡμᾶς ἀφεῖναι; the subject of ἐλλείπεται is a protasis introduced by τό, into which the apodosis has been wholly absorbed. The construction is, *is there not still left the supposition of our persuading you that you must let us go?* But the meaning is, *is it not left for us to persuade you that you must let us go, if we can* (i.e. πείσαι ἦν πείσωμεν)? This is an important example for explaining this whole class of sentences (486-490). The cases in 490 make it plain that the final force often ascribed to εἰ or ἦν comes from the suppression of an apodosis containing the idea of purpose or desire, since the same form of protasis which is sometimes called final has no final force when a slightly different apodosis is implied (as in THUC. vi. 79, 100, vii. 59).

491. Sometimes a clause with εἴ κε or ἤν (rarely εἰ) and the subjunctive, or with εἴ κε or εἰ and the optative, in Homer is the object of οἶδα, εἶδον, or a verb of *saying*, expressing in a conditional form a result which is hoped for or desired. These clauses have the appearance of indirect questions; but the analogy of the preceding examples (487-490) shows that all are based on the same idiom,—a protasis which involves its own apodosis so that it would be useless to express the latter separately. The examples are these:—

Τίς οἶδ' εἴ κε καὶ αὐτὸς ἰὼν κούλῃς ἐπὶ νηὸς τῇλε φίλων ἀπόληται, *who knows the chances that he too may perish, etc. ? or who knows the chances of his perishing, etc., if haply he may ?* Od. ii. 332. (We may translate colloquially: *who knows ? supposing he too shall perish ?*) Τίς οἶδ' εἴ κ' Ἀχιλεὺς φθόγῃ ἐμῷ ὑπὸ δουρὶ τυπεῖς ἀπὸ θυμὸν ὀλέσσαι; *who knows the chances that Achilles may first be struck (the chances of his being first struck, if haply he shall be) ?* Il. xvi. 860. (We should naturally express this by a different construction, *whether he may not be first struck*.) Τίς οἶδ' εἴ κέν οἱ σὺν δαίμονι θυμὸν ὀρίνω παρειπῶν; *who knows the chances of my rousing his spirit by persuasion, if haply I shall do so ?* Il. xv. 403. In Il. xi. 792 we have Nestor's advice to Patroclus, τίς οἶδ' εἴ κέν οἱ σὺν δαίμονι θυμὸν ὀρίναις παρειπῶν; *who knows the chances that you could rouse his spirit by persuasion ? (ὀρίναις κε being potential)*. Οὐ μὲν οἶδ' εἰ αὖτε κακορραφίης ἀλεγεινῆς πρώτη ἐπαύρηαι καὶ σε πληγῇσιν ἱμάσσω, *I am not sure of the chances of your being the first to enjoy your own device, etc., i.e. I am not so sure that you may not be the first to enjoy it, if it shall so chance*. Il. xv. 16. Ζεὺς γάρ που τό γε οἶδε καὶ ἀθάνατοι θεοὶ ἄλλοι, εἴ κέ μιν ἀγγείλαιμι ἰδῶν, ἐπὶ πολλὰ δ' ἀλήθην, *Zeus and the other immortals (alone) know this, the chance of my bringing news of him, if haply I have seen him and so might do this*. Od. xiv. 119. Εἰ δ' ἄγε δῆ μοι τοῦτο, θεᾶ, νημερτὲς ἐνίσπες, εἴ πως τὴν ὀλοὴν μὲν ὑπεκπροφύγοιμι Χάρυβδιν, τὴν δέ κ' ἀμυναίμην ὅτε μοι σίνοιτο γ' ἐταίρους, *i.e. tell me this without fault, the chance of my escaping Charybdis if haply I should do this, and of my then keeping Scylla off if I could (lit. tell me this, supposing I should escape Charybdis and could then keep Scylla off)*. Od. xii. 112 (this translation supposes κ' to be potential, affecting only ἀμυναίμην).

Ἦ μένετε Τρώας σχεδὸν ἐλθέμεν, ὅφρα ἴδῃτ' αἶ κ' ὕμιν ὑπέρσχη χεῖρα Κρονίων; *are you waiting for the Trojans to come near, that you may see the chances of the son of Cronos holding his hand over you ?—or that you may see him hold his hand over you, if haply he may do this ?* Il. iv. 247. (We might say, *is it that you may see it,—supposing the son of Cronos to hold his hand over you ?*) Τῶν σ' αἴτις μνήσω, ἢ ἀπολλήξῃς ἀπατάων, ὅφρ' ἴδῃς ἥν τοι χραιίσμη φιλότῃς τε καὶ εὐνή, *i.e. that you may see the chances of your device availing you, or that you may see it if perchance your device shall avail you*. Il. xv. 31.

See also Il. xx. 435, ἀλλ' ἦ τοι μὲν ταῦτα θεῶν ἐν γούνασι κείται,

αἴ κέ σε χειρότερός περ ἔων ἀπὸ θυμὸν ἔλωμαι, i.e. *this rests with the Gods, for me to take your life away, weaker though I am, if perchance I may*. The conditional construction is more obvious here than in Il. iv. 247 and xv. 31; but in all three we naturally fall into an indirect question when we attempt to express the thought in English.

492. A comparison of these peculiar conditional constructions (491) expressing hope or desire with clauses with μή expressing anxiety and desire to prevent a result, both depending on οἶδα or εἶδον, is suggestive. With Od. ii. 332 and Il. xvi. 860 (in 491) compare Il. x. 100, οὐδέ τι ἴδμεν, μή πως καὶ διὰ νύκτα μενοινήσωσι μάχεσθαι, *nor do we know any way to prevent their being impelled, etc.*, and PLAT. Phaed. 91 D (quoted in 366); and with Il. iv. 247 and xv. 31 (491) compare Od. xxiv. 491, ἴδοι μὴ δὴ σχεδὸν ὄσι κίοντες (366). This comparison shows that εἰδέναι (or ἰδεῖν) εἰ κε τοῦτο γένηται means *to know (or see) the chances of gaining this* (object of desire); while εἰδέναι (or ἰδεῖν) μὴ τοῦτο γένηται means *to know (or see) some way to prevent this* (object of fear). The idea of desire or anxiety belongs to the dependent clause, and not at all to the leading verb.

493. These Homeric expressions (491), in which nearly all the force is in the protasis, so that the apodosis is not only suppressed but hardly felt at all, helps to show how the particle εἰ came to be an indirect interrogative, in the sense of *whether*. But in Attic Greek, where the interrogative use is fully established, only the simple εἰ (never ἦν or ἔάν) can mean *whether*, even when the verb is subjunctive (680).

Εἰ AFTER EXPRESSIONS OF WONDER, INDIGNATION, ETC.

494. After many expressions of *wonder, delight, contentment, indignation, disappointment, pity*, and similar emotions, a protasis with εἰ may be used to express the object of the emotion. When the supposition of the protasis is present or past, a causal sentence would generally seem more natural. Such expressions are especially θαυμάζω, αἰσχύνομαι, ἀγαπῶ, ἀγανακτῶ, and δεινόν ἐστιν. *E.g.*

Θαυμάζω δ' ἔγωγε εἰ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν μήτ' ἐνθυμείται μήτ' ὀργίζεται, ὀρών, κ.τ.λ., *I wonder that no one of you is either concerned or angry, when he sees, etc.* (lit. *if no one is either concerned or angry, I wonder*). DEM. iv. 43. Ἄλλ' ἐκεῖνο θαυμάζω, εἰ Λακεδαιμονίους μὲν ποτε ἀντήρατε, νυνὶ δ' ὀκνεῖτε ἐξίέναι καὶ μέλλετε εἰσφέρειν, *but I wonder at this, that you once opposed the Lacedaemonians, but now are unwilling, etc.* Id. ii. 24. (The literal meaning is, *if (it is true that) you once opposed, etc., then I wonder*.) Οὐκ ἀγαπᾷ εἰ μὴ δίκην δέδωκεν, ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ καὶ χρυσὸν στεφάνῳ στεφανωθήσεται ἀγανακτεῖ, *he is not content if he has not been punished; but if he is not also to be crowned with a*

golden crown, he is indignant. AESCHIN. iii. 147. Καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγανακτῶ, εἰ οὕτως ἂν νοῶ μὴ οἶός τ' εἰμὶ εἰπεῖν, *I am indignant that (or if) I am not able, etc.* PLAT. Lach. 194 A. Οὐ δὴ θαυμαστόν ἐστιν, εἰ στρατεούμενος καὶ πονῶν ἐκείνος αὐτὸς ὑμῶν μελλόντων καὶ ψηφίζομένων καὶ πυνθανομένων περιγίγνεται, *it is no wonder that he gets the advantage of you, etc.* DEM. ii. 23. Μηδὲ μέντοι τοῦτο μείον δόξητε ἔχειν, εἰ οἱ Κυρεῖοι πρόσθεν σὺν ἡμῖν ταπτόμενοι νῦν ἀφελήκασι, i.e. *do not be discontented, if (or that) the Cyraeans have now withdrawn.* XEN. An. iii. 2, 17. Αἰνῶ σε, εἰ κτενεῖς δάμαρτα σὴν. EUR. Tro. 890.

Δεινὸν ἂν εἴη πρῆγμα, εἰ Σάκας μὲν δούλους ἔχομεν, Ἕλληνας δὲ οὐ τιμωρησόμεθα. HDT. vii. 9. Αἰσχρόν ἐστιν, εἰ ἐγὼ μὲν τὰ ἔργα ὑπέμεινα, ὑμεῖς δὲ μηδὲ τοὺς λόγους ἀνέξεσθε. DEM. xviii. 160. Δεινὸν ἂν εἴη, εἰ οἱ μὲν ἐκείνων ξύμμαχοι οὐκ ἀπεροῦσιν, ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ἄρα παυνήσομεν. THUC. i. 121. Τέρας λέγεις, εἰ . . . οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο λαθεῖν. PLAT. Men. 91 D (see 506). Δεινὸν εἰ οἱ αὐτοὶ μάρτυρες τοῦτοις μὲν ἂν μαρτυροῦντες πιστοὶ ἦσαν, ἔμοι δὲ μαρτυροῦντες ἀπιστοὶ ἔσονται, *it is hard that the same witnesses testifying for them would have been trustworthy, and testifying for me are to be untrustworthy.* ANT. vi. 29. See AESCHIN. i. 85.

In all the preceding examples the protasis belongs under 402, the futures expressing present suppositions (407). For εἰ οὐ see 386 and 387, with examples.

495. The same construction is sometimes used when the leading verb is past. *E.g.*

Κατεμέμεφτο αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς σὺν αὐτῷ, εἰ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀκμάζειν μᾶλλον ἑαυτῶν ἐδόκουν. XEN. Cyr. iv. 3, 3. But generally such sentences are affected by the principle of indirect discourse, and have either the optative or the form of the direct discourse: see XEN. Cyr. ii. 2, 3, ἡχθέσθην εἰ τι μείον δοκοῖεν ἔχειν (where δοκοῦσι might have been used). See EUR. Med. 931, εἰσῆλθέ μ' οἶκτος, εἰ γενήσεται, and XEN. An. i. 4, 7, ᾗ κτερον εἰ ἀλώσουιντο. For such sentences see 697.

496. These expressions may also be followed by ὅτι and a causal sentence, as in PLAT. Theaet. 142 A, ἐθαύμαζον ὅτι οὐχ οἶός τ' ἦ εὐρεῖν. The construction with εἰ gives a milder or more polite form of expression, putting the object of the wonder etc. into the form of a supposition, instead of stating it as a fact as we should do in English. They may also be followed by protases expressing ordinary conditions, which have nothing peculiar: see ISOC. xv. 17, ἀγαπητὸν (sc. ἐστίν) ἦν ἐκλαβεῖν δυνηθῶσι τὸ δίκαιον, *they must be content if they are able* (cf. xix. 20); and PLAT. Prot. 315 E, DEM. ii. 23 (εἰ περιῆμεν).

497. This construction must not be mistaken for that in which εἰ is used in the sense of *whether*, to introduce an indirect question; as ἠρώτων εἰ ἦλθεν, *I asked whether he had come.*

MIXED CONSTRUCTIONS.

498. The forms of protasis and apodosis which are contained in the classification above (388-397) include by far the greater number of the examples found in the classic authors. Many cases remain, however, in which the protasis and apodosis do not belong to the same form. Especially, the great wealth of conditional expressions which the Homeric language exhibits in both protasis and apodosis (399) allowed great variety of combination; and the early poets used much greater freedom in these sentences than suited the more exact style of Attic prose.

I. Optative in Protasis, with Future or Present Indicative or an equivalent form in Apodosis.

499. (a) In the earlier language a protasis with the optative is not infrequently followed by an apodosis with the future indicative or imperative or (in Homer) with the subjunctive. The subjunctive or future indicative in Homer may also take *κέ* or *άν* (452). *E.g.*

Εἴ τίς μοι ἀνὴρ ἄμ' ἔποιτο καὶ ἄλλος, μᾶλλον θαλπωρὴ καὶ θαρσαλεώτερον ἔσται, *if any other man should follow with me, there will be more comfort and greater courage.* IL. x. 222. (The want of symmetry in the Greek is here precisely what it is in the English; and *εἴ* ἄν is no more required in the apodosis than *would be* is, though both are the conventional forms.) See IL. ix. 388, and xxiii. 893, πρόωμεν, εἰ ἐθέλοις. Τόν γ' εἴ πως σὺ δύναιο λοχρησάμενος λελαβέσθαι, ὅς κέν τοι εἴπησι δόδν, *he will tell you, etc.* Od. iv. 388. See IL. xi. 386, εἰ πειρηθείης, οὐκ ἄν τοι χραίσμῃσι βίος; and IL. ii. 488, xx. 100, Od. xvii. 539. Εἰ δὲ δαίμων γενέθλιος ἔρποι, Διὶ τοῦτ' Ἐνναλίῳ τ' ἐκδῶσομεν πρῶσσειν. PIND. OL. xiii. 105.¹ So in an old curse, εἴ τις τάδε παραβαίνοι, ἐναγῆς ἔστω, AESCHIN. iii. 110. See SOPH. O. T. 851, εἴ τι κάκτρεποιτο, οὐτοί τόν γε Λαίου φόνον φανεί δικαίως ὀρθόν.

500. (b) A present indicative in the apodosis with an optative in the protasis is sometimes merely an emphatic future expression. *E.g.*

Πάντ' ἔχεις, εἴ σε τούτων μοῖρ' ἐφίκοιτο καλῶν, *you have the whole, should a share of these glories fall to your lot.* PIND. Isth. iv. (v.) 14. So καιρὸν εἰ φθέγξαι, μείων ἔπεται μῶμος ἀνθρώπων, *i.e. should you speak seasonably, you are sure to be followed by less censure of men,* PY. i. 81. In THUC. ii. 39 we have καίτοι εἰ βαθυμία μᾶλλον ἢ πόνων μελέτῃ ἐθέλοισμεν κινδυνεύειν, περιγίγνεται ἡμῖν, κ.τ.λ.,

¹ For the cases in Pindar here and in 500 and 501, see *Am. Jour. Phil.* iii. p. 444.

and now supposing that we should choose to meet dangers with a light heart rather than with laborious training, we secure the advantage, etc. This sentence is loosely jointed, like the others which have this combination; the condition is stated as a remotely supposed case, in the vague future form, but the apodosis, *we at once gain this advantage, etc.*, is adapted to a present supposition. The optative is generally emended to *ἐθέλομεν*, although it is one of the best attested words in Thucydides, being in the best Mss. and also being quoted by Dion. Hal. as a faulty expression. The criticism of Dionysius (*de Thuc. Idiom.* 12, 1) is instructive: *ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἐθέλομεν ῥῆμα τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐστὶ χρόνου δηλωτικόν, τὸ δὲ περιγίγνεται τοῦ παρόντος· ἀκόλουθον δ' ἂν ᾔην εἰ συνέβηκε τῷ ἐθέλομεν τὸ περιέσται, i.e. the future expression εἰ ἐθέλομεν should have a future form like περιέσται to correspond to it.*

In DEM. xviii. 21, *εἰ γὰρ εἶναι τι δοκοίη τὰ μάλιστα ἐν τούτοις ἀδίκημα, οὐδὲν ἐστὶ δήπου πρὸς ἐμέ*, the apodosis refers to the real protasis *if there is any apparent fault*.

501. (c) In most cases, however, the present indicative in the apodosis precedes, containing a general statement, and the optative adds a remote future condition where we should expect a general present supposition. *E.g.*

Οὐ μοι θέμις ἔστω, οὐδ' εἰ κακίων σέθεν ἔλθοι, ξεῖνον ἀτιμῆσαι, *it is not right for me—even supposing a more wretched man than you should come—to dishonour a stranger.* Od. xiv. 56. Θαρσαλέος γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ἐν πάσιν ἀμείνων ἐργοισιν τελέθει, εἰ καὶ ποθεν ἄλλοθεν ἔλθοι. Od. vii. 51. So v. 484, viii. 138; Il. ix. 318. Οὐτ' οὖν ἀγγελίῃ ἐτι πείθομαι, εἰ ποθεν ἔλθοι, οὔτε θεοπροπίης ἐμπαύσομαι, ἦν τινα μήτηρ ἐξερήγεται, *neither do I any longer put trust in reports—should any one come—nor do I regard any divination which my mother may ask.* Od. i. 414. (Here the remoteness of the supposition in *εἰ ἔλθοι* is contrasted with the greater vividness of that expressed in *ἐξερήγεται*). Δεινὸν τ', εἴ κ' ἐφ' ἄμαξαν ὑπέρβιον ἄχθος αἰέρας ἄξονα καυκάξαις τὰ δὲ φόρτ' ἀμαυρωθείη, *it is hard, . . . supposing you should break your axle and your load should perish.* Hes. Op. 692. Κέρδος δὲ φίλτατον, ἐκόντος εἴ τις ἐκ δόμων φέροι, *it is the dearest gain, if one should bring it from the house of a willing giver.* PIND. Py. viii. 13. See 1sth. ii. 33. So SOPH. Ant. 1032.

In most of these examples a general supposition with the subjunctive (or present indicative) in the protasis would have agreed more closely with the thought. If the protasis had preceded, so as to determine the character of the sentence, the apodosis would naturally have had the optative with *κέ* or *ἂν*, or some future form (as in the cases under a).

502. (d) The optative in protasis sometimes depends on the present of a verb of *obligation, propriety, or possibility* with an infinitive, the two forming an expression that is nearly equivalent in sense to an optative with *ἂν*. *E.g.*

Εἰ γὰρ εἴησαν δύο τινὲς ἐναντίοι νόμοι, οὐκ ἀμφοτέροις ἐνὶ δήπουν ψηφίσασθαι, *for if there should be two laws opposed to each other, you could not surely vote for both.* DEM. xxiv. 35. This is analogous to the apodosis formed by ἔδει, χρῆν, ἐνῆν, etc., with the infinitive (415). There, for example, ἐνῆν αὐτῷ ἐλθεῖν, *he could have gone*, is nearly equivalent to ἦλθεν ἄν, and here ἐνεστὶν αὐτῷ ἐλθεῖν, *he could go*, is nearly equivalent to ἔλθοι ἄν. This use of the optative is more common in the corresponding relative conditional sentences (555).

II. Indicative or Subjunctive in Protasis, with Potential Optative or Indicative in Apodosis.

503. (a) A present or past tense of the indicative in the protasis with a potential optative or indicative (with ἄν) in the apodosis is a perfectly natural combination, each clause having its proper force. *E.g.*

Εἰ δέ τις ἀθανάτων γε κατ' οὐρανοῦ εἰλήλουθας, οὐκ ἄν ἔγωγε θεοῖσιν ἐπουρανίοισι μαχοίμην, *but if thou art one of the immortals come from heaven, I would not fight against the Gods of heaven.* Π. vi. 128. Πολλὴ γὰρ ἄν εὐδαιμονία εἴη περὶ τοὺς νέους, εἰ εἰς μὲν μόνους αὐτοὺς διαφθείρει, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ὠφελοῦσιν, *for there would (naturally) be great happiness, etc.* PLAT. AP. 25 B. Εἴ τι θέσφατον πατρὶ χρησμοῖσιν ἰκνεῖθ', ὥστε πρὸς παῖδων θανεῖν, πῶς ἄν δικαίως τοῦτ' ὀνειδίξοις ἐμοί; *if a divine decree came to my father through oracles that he was to die by his sons' hands, how can you justly reproach me with this?* SOPH. O. C. 969; so 974-977. "Ὡστ' εἴ μοι καὶ μέσους ἡγοῦμενοι μᾶλλον ἐτέρων προσεῖναι αὐτὰ πολεμεῖν ἐπέισθητε, οὐκ ἄν εἰκότως νῦν τοῦ γε ἀδικεῖν αἰτίαν φεροίμην, *if you were persuaded to make war by thinking, etc., I should not now justly be charged with injustice.* THUC. ii. 60. Εἰ γὰρ οὗτοι ὀρθῶς ἀπέστησαν, ὑμεῖς ἄν οὐ χρεῶν ἄρχοιτε, *for if these had a right to secede, it would follow that your dominion is unjust.* Id. iii. 40: see vi. 92, and DEM. xxi. 37. Καίτοι τότε τὸν Ὑπερείδην, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ μου νῦν κατηγορεῖ, μᾶλλον ἄν εἰκότως ἢ τόνδ' ἐδίωκεν, *and yet, if he is now making true charges against me, he would then have prosecuted Hypereides with much more reason than (he now has for prosecuting) this man.* DEM. xviii. 223. Εἰ γὰρ γυναῖκες εἰς τὸδ' ἥξουσιν θράσους, . . . παρ' οὐδὲν αὐταῖς ἦν ἄν ὀλλύναι πόσεις, *for if women are to come to this height of audacity* (407) *it would be as nothing for them to slay their husbands.* EUR. OR. 566. Τοῦτο, εἰ καὶ τὰλλα πάντα ἀποστεροῦσιν, ἀποδοῦναι προσήκεν, *even if they steal all the rest, they ought to have restored this* (415). DEM. xxvii. 37.

504. (b) An unreal condition in the indicative followed by a potential optative seldom occurs and is not a strictly logical combination. *E.g.*

Εἰ τοῦτ' ἐπεχέιرون λέγειν, οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅστις οὐκ ἄν εἰκότως

ἐπιτιμήσειέ μοι, *if I were undertaking to say this, (the result would be that) every one would censure me with reason.* DEM. xviii. 206. (Here many Mss. and Dion. Hal. p. 1054 read ἐπετίμησε, the ordinary form in such an apodosis.) See [LYS.] xv. 8.

505. (c) When a subjunctive or a future indicative in protasis has a potential optative in the apodosis, there is sometimes a distinct potential force in the apodosis (as in 503), and sometimes the optative with ἂν is merely a softened expression for the future indicative (235). *E.g.*

Εἰ μὲν κεν πατὴρ βίον καὶ νόστον ἀκούσω, ἢ τ' ἂν τρυχόμενός περ ἔτι τλαίην ἐνιαυτόν, *if I hear of my father's life and return, wasted as I am, I can still endure it for a year.* OD. ii. 218. (See the next verses, 220-223, εἰ δέ κε τεθνεώτος ἀκούσω, with future forms in the apodosis. See also the corresponding verses, OD. i. 287-292.) 'Αλλ' ἔτι μὲν κε καὶ ὥς κακὰ περ πάσχοντες ἰκοισθε, αἱ κ' ἐθέλης σὸν θυμὸν ἐρυκακέειν, *but still even so, though suffering evils, you may come home, if you will curb your passion.* OD. xi. 104; so xi. 110 and xii. 137. See Π. xxi. 556. Εἰ δέ κεν ὄψ' ἀρόσης, τόδε κέν τοι φάρμακον εἶη, *but if you plough late, this may be your remedy.* HES. OP. 485; so 665. 'Αλλ' ἦν ἐφῆς μοι, . . . λέξαιμ' ἂν ὀρθῶς, *i.e. I would fain speak.* SOPH. EL. 554. So O. T. 216, Phil. 1259; EUR. HEL. 1085. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν πολλὰ γέφυραι ᾧσιν, ἔχοιμεν ἂν ὅποι φυγόντες ἡμεῖς σωθῶμεν, *for not even if there are (shall be) many bridges, could we (in the case supposed) find a place to fly to and be safe.* XEN. AN. ii. 4, 19.

Εἰ γὰρ τι λέξεις ᾧ χολώσεται στρατὸς, οὗτ' ἂν ταφείη παῖς ὄδ' οὗτ' οἶκον τύχοι, *for if you say anything by which the army shall be made angry, this child cannot be buried or find pity.* EUR. TRO. 730; see Suppl. 603, Cycl. 474. Φρούριον εἰ ποιήσονται, τῆς μὲν γῆς βλάπτειν ἂν τι μέρος, οὐ μέντοι ἰκανόν γε ἔσται κωλύειν ἡμᾶς, κ.τ.λ., *if they (shall) build a fort, they might perhaps injure some part of our land; but it will not be sufficient to prevent us, etc.* THUC. i. 142.

In the following examples the optative with ἂν seems to form a future apodosis to the future protasis; though in some of them it may be thought to be potential:—

Εἰ δέ κεν εὐπλοῖην δῶη κλυτὸς εἰνοσίγαιος, ἡματί κεν τριτάτῃ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἰκοίμην, *i.e. on the third day I shall arrive.* Π. ix. 362. (The reference to this in PLAT. CRIT. 44 B shows that ἰκοίμην ἂν is a mere future.) See Π. xiii. 377, xvii. 38; OD. xxi. 114. 'Αδικοίημεν ἂν εἰ μὴ ἀποδώσω, *I should be guilty of wrong, should I (shall I) not restore her.* EUR. HEL. 1010. See ION. 374, Suppl. 520, I. A. 1189, Cycl. 198. "Ἦν οὖν μάθης μοι τὸν οἶκον τοῦτον λόγον, οὐκ ἂν ἀποδοίην οὐδ' ἂν ὀβολὸν οὐδενί, *if you (shall) learn this cheating reason for me, I will not (or I would not) pay even an obol to any one.* AR. NUB. 116. Καὶ οὕτως ἂν δεινότατα πάντων πάθοιεν, εἰ οἱτοὶ δρόψηφοι κατ' ἐκείνων τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοῖς τριάκοντα γενήσονται. LYS. xiii. 94. (Here we should expect εἰ γένοιτο.) Τῶν ἀποπα-

τάτων μέντ' ἂν εἴη, εἰ, ἂ νῦν ἄνοιαν ὀφλισκάνων ὁμῶς ἐκλαλεῖ, ταῦτα δυνήθεις μὴ πράξει. DEM. i. 26.

III. Potential Optative or Indicative (with ἂν) in the Protasis.

506. A potential optative (with ἂν) in the protasis may express a present condition, and a potential indicative (with ἂν) a present or past condition. *E.g.*

Εἰ μὴδὲ δοῦλον ἀκρατῇ δεξαίμεθ' ἂν, πῶς οὐκ ἄξιον αὐτόν γε φυλάσασθαι τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι; *if we would not take even a slave who was intemperate, how can it be other than fitting to guard oneself against becoming so?* XEN. MEM. i. 5, 3. Καὶ ἐγὼ, εἴπερ ἄλλῃ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πειθοίμην ἂν, καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι, *and I, if I would trust any man, trust you.* PLAT. PROT. 329 B. Οὗτοι παντελῶς, οὐδ' εἰ μὴ ποιήσaiτ' ἂν τοῦτο ὡς ἐγώ γ' εἶμι δεῖν, εὐκαταφρόνητόν ἐστιν, *this (preparation) is not wholly to be despised, even if you would not do this as I say you ought.* DEM. iv. 18. Notice the difference between this supposition that you would not do this if you could (i.e. οὐκ ἂν ποιήσαιτε τοῦτο) and the ordinary εἰ μὴ ποιήσαιτε τοῦτο, *supposing you not to do this.*

Εἰ τοίνυν τοῦτο ἰσχυρὸν ἦν ἂν τούτῳ τεκμήριον, κάμοι γενέσθω τεκμήριον, κ.τ.λ., *if then this would have been a strong proof for him (sc. had he had it), so let it be also a proof for me, etc.* DEM. xlix. 58. Εἰ μὴ διὰ τὸ τοῦτους βούλεσθαι σῶσαι, ἐξώλης ἀπολοίμην καὶ προώλης εἰ προσλαβὼν γ' ἂν ἀργύριον πάντῃ πολὺ μετὰ τούτων ἐπρέσβευσα, *had it not been for my wish to save these (captives), may I perish utterly and before my day if I would have gone on an embassy with these men even for very high pay.* DEM. xix. 172. (Here the protasis to which the apodosis ἀπολοίμην refers is really the whole expression εἰ . . . ἐπρέσβευσα ἂν εἰ μὴ . . . σῶσαι, *if I would have gone except to save these, ἐπρέσβευσα ἂν* in the protasis being itself the apodosis to εἰ μὴ . . . σῶσαι.) In DEM. xviii. 101, καὶ τίς οὐκ ἂν ἀπέκτεινέ με δικαίως, εἴ τι τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τῇ πόλει καλῶν λόγῳ μόνον καταισχύναι ἐπεχείρησ' ἂν;—*if we retain the final ἂν (strongly supported by Mss.), we must translate if (it is true that) I would (under any circumstances) have undertaken, etc., and not simply if I had undertaken (εἰ ἐπεχείρησα).* (See 557.)

507. It is obvious that such forms (506) express simple present or past conditions, the real protasis always being *if it is (or WAS) the case that something would now be (or would have been), or if it is the case that something would hereafter be under certain circumstances.* (See 409.)

IV. Irregular Combinations.—Present or Past with Future in one Protasis.

508. In a few irregular constructions, which are only cases

of *anacoluthon*, the speaker adapts his apodosis to a form of protasis different from that which he has actually used. *E.g.*

Ἐγὼ μὲν ἂν, εἰ ἔχοιμι, ὥς τάχιστα ὅπλα ἐποιούμην πᾶσι Πέρσαις. XEN. Cyr. ii. 1, 9. (Here ἐποιούμην ἂν is used as if εἰ εἶχον, *if I were able*, had preceded. We should expect ποιοίμην ἂν, which is found in one Ms.) Εἰ οὖν εἶδεν ὅτι θεάται αὐτοὺς, ἔντο ἂν ἐπὶ τοὺς πόνοὺς . . . καὶ κατεργάζοιντο ἂν αὐτήν, *if then they knew that she (virtue) sees them, they would rush into labours and would secure her*. XEN. Cyn. xii. 22. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἰς γυναῖκα σωφρονεστέραν ξίφος μεθείμεν, δυσκλεῆς ἂν ᾖν φόνος. EUR. Or. 1132. (Here we should expect εἴη.)

509. The same protasis may have one verb in the indicative referring to present or past time, and another in the optative referring to the future. *E.g.*

Ἐγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἂν εἶην εἰργασμένος, εἰ, ὅτε μὲν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔτατον, τότε μὲν ἔμενον, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν, *I should therefore (prove to) have behaved outrageously, if when the state authorities stationed me I stood my ground, but (if) now when God stations me I should desert my post*. PLAT. Ap. 28 E. (Here the supposed combination of the two acts is the future condition to which the future apodosis refers.) Ἐπεύχομαι πᾶσι τοῦτοις, εἰ ἀληθῆ πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἴποιμι καὶ εἶπον καὶ τότ' εὐθὺς ἐν τῷ δήμῳ, εὐτυχίαν μοι δοῦναι, *i.e. if I should speak the truth and if I did speak it then, etc.* DEM. xviii. 141. Εἰ δὲ μήτ' ἔστι μήτε ἦν μήτε ἂν εἰπείν ἔχοι μηδεὶς μηδὲπω καὶ τήμερον, τί τὸν σύμβουλον ἐχρῆν ποιεῖν; *but if there neither is nor was (any such thing), and if no man yet even at this day could possibly tell of any, what ought the statesman to have done?* Ib. 190.

V. Several Protases in one Sentence.

510. Two or more protases, not co-ordinate, may belong to the same sentence; but one always contains the leading condition, to which the rest of the sentence (including the other conditions) is the conclusion. Here several protases may belong to one apodosis; or the leading condition may be followed by two subordinate conditions, each with its own apodosis. *E.g.*

Καὶ γὰρ ἂν οὗτός τι πάθῃ, ταχέως ὑμεῖς ἕτερον Φίλιππον ποιήσετε, ἄνπερ οὕτω προσέχητε τοῖς πράγμασι τὸν νοῦν, *for if anything shall happen to this Philip, you will soon create another if this is your way of attending to the business*. DEM. iv. 11. So xviii. 195, 217 (two cases in each). Εἰ δ' ἡμεν νέοι δις καὶ γέροντες, εἴ τις ἐξημάρτανε, διπλοῦ βίου λαχόντες ἐξωρθούμεθ' ἂν, *if we were twice young and twice old, in case any one of us was in fault we should secure a double life and set ourselves right*. EUR. Supp. 1084. See AR. Ran. 1449. Εἰ ξένος ἐτύχανον ὦν, ξυνεγινώσκετε δήπου ἂν μοι εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ ἔλεγον ἐν οἷσπερ ἐτεθράμμην, *i.e.*

if I were a foreigner, you would pardon me if I spoke in my own dialect, etc. PLAT. AP. 17 D. Εἰ τίς σε ἀνέροιτο τοῦτο, τί ἐστι σχῆμα; εἰ αὐτῷ εἶπες ὅτι στρογγυλότης, εἰ σοι εἶπεν ἄπερ ἐγώ, εἶπες δῆπον ἂν ὅτι σχῆμά τι. Id. MEN. 74 B.

Εἰ μὲν περὶ καινοῦ τινος πράγματος προυτίθετο λέγειν, ἐπισχὼν ἂν ἔως οἱ πλείστοι τῶν εἰωθότων γνώμην ἀπεφάναντο, εἰ μὲν ἤρεσκε τί μοι τῶν ὑπὸ τούτων ῥηθέντων, ἡσυχίαν ἂν ἤγον, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τότε ἂν αὐτὸς ἐπειρώμην ἃ γινώσκω λέγειν, i.e. *if the subject of debate were new, I should have waited for others to speak; and then, if I liked anything that was said, I should keep quiet, and if not, I should try to say something myself.* DEM. iv. 1; see also xxxiii. 25.

511. It will be noticed that when the leading condition is unreal (as in EUR. Supp. 1084, PLAT. AP. 17 D, and DEM. iv. 1, above), this makes all subordinate past or present conditions also unreal, so far as the supposed case is concerned, without regard to their own nature. Thus, in DEM. iv. 1 and xxxiii. 25 we have two directly opposite suppositions both stated as contrary to fact, which could not be unless the leading supposition had made the whole state of things supposed in the sentence unreal like itself. It is obvious, therefore, that such a subordinate condition may refer to a case which is not *in itself* unreal, although it is part of a supposition which as a whole is unreal. This can be seen more easily in English. We can say, *if he had been an Athenian, he would have been laughed at if he had talked as he did*; but we are far from implying that the latter supposition (the subordinate one) is contrary to fact, although it would be expressed in Greek by εἰ ἔλεγεν. Still it is part of a supposed unreal state of things. This explains an apparent inconsistency in respect to sentences like εἰκὸς ἦν σε τοῦτο παθεῖν, *you ought properly to have suffered this*, when the opposite of the infinitive is implied (415), the expression being practically equivalent (as a conditional form) to τοῦτο ἔπαθες ἂν εἰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἔπαθες. As τοῦτο and τὸ εἰκὸς are here identical, the apodosis is denied in the denial of the protasis. But if a new unreal protasis is added, the opposite of the infinitive is not necessarily implied (see 422, 1); and if we add a concessive protasis and say καὶ εἰ μὴδὲν ἠδίκησας, εἰκὸς ἦν σε τοῦτο παθεῖν, *even if you had done nothing unjust, you ought (still) to have suffered this*, τοῦτο generally represents what actually took place (see 422, 2). Here a new chief protasis has come in and changed the whole relation of the apodosis to the sentence. This offers a satisfactory explanation of the apparent anomaly in SOPH. O. T. 221, οὐ γὰρ ἂν μακρὰν ἔχνευον αὐτὸς, μὴ οὐκ ἔχων τι σύμβολον, where μὴ οὐκ ἔχων is obviously equivalent to the condition εἰ μὴ εἶχον, while there is yet no such opposite implied as *but I have a clue*. The chief condition lies in the emphatic αὐτός, which is especially forcible after ξένος μὲν and ξένος δέ, and involves εἰ μόνος ἔχνευον. The meaning is, *for I should not be very far on the track, if I were attempting to trace it alone without a clue*. Thus *without a clue* becomes part of the unreal supposition without being itself contrary to fact, while μὴ in μὴ οὐκ

indefinite.) Λέγω ἃ οὐκ ἄγνοῶ, *I am saying that of which I am not ignorant.*

Ἄλλ' ὅτε δὴ ῥ' ἐκ τοῦτο δωδεκάτῃ γένητ' ἥως, καὶ τότε δὴ πρὸς Ὀλυμπον ἴσαν θεοὶ αἰὲν ἑόντες, *but when now the twelfth day from that came, etc.* II. i. 493. Τίς ἔσθ' ὁ χῶρος δῆτ', ἐν ᾧ βεβήκαμεν. SOPH. O. C. 52. Ἔως ἐστὶ καιρὸς, ἀντιλάβεσθε τῶν πραγμάτων, *i.e. now, while there is an opportunity, etc.* DEM. i. 20. (If the exhortation were future, he would say ἕως ἂν ᾗ καιρὸς, *so long as there shall be an opportunity.*) Ὁ δὲ ἀναβὰς, ἕως μὲν βάσιμα ἦν, ἐπὶ τοῦ ἵππου ἦγεν· ἐπὶ δὲ ἄβατα ἦν, καταλιπὼν τὸν ἵππον ἔσπευδε περὶ. XEN. AN. iii. 4, 49. So II. i. 193, εἰς ὥρμαινε. Οἵπερ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων τὸ πλεόν τῆς αἰτίας ἔξομεν, οἳτοι καὶ καθ' ἡσυχίαν τι αὐτῶν προΐδωμεν, *we who are to bear the greater part of the blame, etc.* THUC. i. 83. Ὅθεν δ' οὖν ῥᾶστα μαθήσεσθε περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐντεῦθεν ὑμᾶς καὶ ἐγὼ πρῶτον πειράσομαι διδάσκειν. DEM. xxvii. 3. (Here ἐντεῦθεν refers to the point at which he intends to begin.) Ἡ δὴ λοίγια ἔργ', ὅτε μ' ἐχθοδοπῆσαι ἐφήσεις Ἥρη, ὅτ' ἂν μ' ἐρέθῃσιν ὀνειδείους ἐπέεσσιν, *surely there will be sad work, when you shall impel me, etc.* II. i. 518. (Here ὅτε refers to some time conceived as definite; whereas ὅτ' ἂν ἐρέθῃσιν, *when (if ever) she shall provoke me*, is indefinite; see 530.) Νῦξ δ' ἔσται ὅτε δὴ στυγερὸς γάμος ἀντιβολήσῃ οὐλομένης ἐμέθεν, τῆς τε Ζεὺς ὄλβον ἀπηύρα. Od. xviii. 272. (The time is conceived as definite.) Τηνικαῦτα, ὅτε οὐδ' ὅ τι χρὴ ποιεῖν ἔξετε, *then, when you will not even be able to do what you ought.* DEM. xix. 262.

Ἀρξομαι δ' ἐντεῦθεν ὅθεν καὶ ὑμεῖς ῥᾶστ' ἂν μάθοιτε κἀγὼ τάχιστ' ἂν διδάξαιμι. DEM. xxix. 5. (With the potential optative compare the future indicative in DEM. xxvii. 3, above.) Νῦν δὲ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐποίησεν, ἐν ᾧ τὸν δῆμον ἐτίμησεν ἂν, *but he did not do this, in which he might have honoured the people.* Id. xxi. 69. Εἰς καλὸν ὑμῖν Ἄνυτος ὅδε παρεκαθέζετο, ᾧ μεταδῶμεν τῆς ζητήσεως. PLAT. MEN. 89 E (subjunctive in exhortation). Οὐκ οὖν ἄξιον τοῖς τῶν κατηγορῶν λόγοις πιστεῦσαι μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ἔργοις καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ, ὃν ὑμεῖς σαφέστατον ἔλεγχον τοῦ ἀληθοῦς νομίζατε. LYS. xix. 61. (Here the imperative νομίζατε is used in a sort of exclamation after ὃν, where ordinarily δεῖ νομίσαι would be used. See 253.) Ἄν γὰρ ἀποφύγῃ με οἶτος, ὃ μὴ γένοιτο, τὴν ἐπωβελίαν ὀφλήσω. DEM. xxvii. 67 (optative in wish).

So in μέμνηται ὅτε and similar expressions. *E.g.*

Οὐ μέμνη ὅτε τ' ἐκρέμω ὑψοθεν; *do you not remember (the time) when you hung aloft?* II. xv. 18. Εἰ μέμνησαι ὅτ' ἐγὼ σοὶ ἀπεκρινάμην. PLAT. MEN. 79 D. Οἶσθ' ὅτε ἐφάνη. EUR. HEC. 112. (See 913.)

B. RELATIVE WITH INDEFINITE ANTECEDENT.—CONDITIONAL RELATIVE.

520. A relative with an *indefinite* antecedent gives a

conditional force to the clause in which it stands, and is called a *conditional relative*. The conditional relative clause stands in the relation of a protasis to the antecedent clause, which is its apodosis (380). The negative particle is *μή*.

Thus, when we say ἃ νομίζει ταῦτα λέγει, *he is saying what he (actually) thinks*, or ἃ ἐνόμιζε ταῦτα ἔλεγεν, *he was saying what he thought*, the actions of νομίζει and ἐνόμιζε are stated as actual facts, occurring at definite times; but when we say ἃ ἂν νομίσῃ (ταῦτα) λέγει, *he (always) says whatever he thinks*, or ἃ νομίζοι (ταῦτα) ἔλεγεν, *he (always) said whatever he happened to be thinking*, νομίσῃ and νομίζοι do not state any such definite facts, but rather what some one *may think* (or *may have thought*) on any occasion on which he may speak or may have spoken. So, when we say ἃ νομίζει ταῦτα λέξει, *he will say what he (now) thinks*, νομίζει denotes a fact; but when we say ἃ ἂν νομίσῃ λέξει, *he will say whatever he happens to be (then) thinking*, νομίσῃ denotes a supposed future case. Again,—to take the case in which the distinction is most liable to be overlooked,—when we say ἃ οὐκ οἶδα οὐκ οἶμαι εἰδέναι, *what I do not know, I do not think that I know*, οὐκ οἶδα, as before, denotes a simple fact, and its object ἃ has a definite antecedent; but when Socrates says ἃ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἶμαι εἰδέναι, the meaning is *whatever I do not know* (i.e. *if there is anything which I do not know*), *I do not even think that I know it*. In sentences like this, unless a negative is used (518), it is often difficult to decide whether the antecedent is definite or indefinite: thus ἃ οἶδα οἶμαι εἰδέναι may mean either *what I (actually) know, I think that I know*, or *whatever I know (if there is anything which I know), I think that I know it*.

521. The analogy of these indefinite relative clauses to conditional sentences will be seen at once. The following examples will make this clearer:—

"Ο τι βούλεται δώσω, *I will give him whatever he (now) wishes*.
Εἴ τι βούλεται, δώσω, *if he wishes anything, I will give it*. (402.)

"Ο τι ἐβούλετο ἔδωκα ἂν, *I should have given him whatever he had wished*. "Ο τι μὴ ἐγένετο οὐκ ἂν εἶπον, *I should not have told what had not happened*. Εἴ τι ἐβούλετο, ἔδωκα ἂν, *if he had wished anything, I should have given it*. Εἴ τι μὴ ἐγένετο, οὐκ ἂν εἶπον, *I should not have told anything if it had not happened*. (410.)

"Ο τι ἂν βούληται, δώσω, *I will give him whatever he shall wish*.
Ἐάν τι βούληται, δώσω, *if he shall wish anything, I will give it*. (444.)

"Ο τι βούλοιο δοίην ἂν, *I should give him whatever he might wish*.
Εἴ τι βούλοιο, δοίην ἂν, *if he should wish anything, I should give it*. (455.)

"Ο τι ἂν βούληται δίδωμι, *I (always) give him whatever he wishes.*
 "Ο τι βούλοιτο ἔδιδουν, *I always gave him whatever he wished.* Ἐάν
 τι βούληται, δίδωμι, *if he ever wishes anything, I (always) give it.*
 Εἴ τι βούλοιτο, ἔδιδουν, *if he ever wished anything, I (always) gave it.*
 (462.)

522. The particle ἄν (Epic κέ) is regularly joined with all relative words when they are followed by the subjunctive.

With ὅτε, ὁπότε, ἐπεί, and ἐπειδή, ἄν forms ὅταν, ὁπότεν, ἐπὶ ἄν or ἐπὴν (Ionic ἐπεάν), and ἐπειδάν. In Homer, where κέ is generally used for ἄν, we have ὅτε κε, ἐπεί κε, etc. (like εἴ κε), also ὅτ' ἄν, where in Attic we have ὅταν, ὁπότεν, ἐπειδάν. Ἐπὴν, however, occurs often, and ἐπεὶ ἄν once, in Homer. Both ἐπὴν and ἐπὶ ἄν are rare in Attic.

523. The classification of common conditional sentences, with four classes of ordinary conditions and two of general conditions, given in 388-395, applies equally to conditional relative sentences.

I. FOUR FORMS OF ORDINARY CONDITIONAL RELATIVE SENTENCES.

524. The conditional relative sentence has *four* forms, two of *present* and *past* (525 and 528) and two of *future* conditions (529 and 531), which correspond to the four forms of ordinary protasis.

(a) PRESENT AND PAST CONDITIONS.

525. When the relative clause simply states a present or past supposition, implying nothing as to the fulfilment of the condition, the verb is in one of the present or past tenses of the indicative. The antecedent clause can have any form of the verb, like an ordinary apodosis. (See 402.)
E.g.

"Α μὴ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἶμαι εἶδέναι (like εἴ τινα μὴ οἶδα). PLAT. Ap. 21 D. (See 520.) Χρήσθων ὃ τι βούλονται, *let them deal with me as they please* (i.e. εἴ τι βούλονται). AR. Nub. 439. Ἐπίσταμαι ὅρᾶν θ' ἃ δεῖ με, κοῦχ ὅρᾶν ἃ μὴ πρόπει, *I know how to see anything which I ought to see, and not to see anything which I ought not.* EUR. Iro, Fr. 417. ("Α δεῖ is nearly equivalent to εἴ τινα δεῖ, and ἃ μὴ πρόπει to εἴ τινα μὴ πρόπει.) Τοὺς πλείστους ἐνθαπερ ἔπεισον ἐκάστους ἔθαψαν οὓς δὲ μὴ εὕρισκον, κενotáφιον αὐτοῖς ἐποίησαν, i.e. *they raised a cenotaph for any of them whom they did not find* (like εἴ τινας μὴ εὕρισκον). XEN. An. vi. 4, 9. Τί γάρ; ὅστις δαπανηρὸς ὢν μὴ αὐτάρκης ἐστίν, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ τῶν πλησίων δεῖται, καὶ λαμβάνων μὴ δύναται ἀποδιδόναι, μὴ

λαμβάνων δὲ τὸν μὴ δίδοντα μισεῖ, οὐ δοκεῖ σοι καὶ οὗτος χαλεπὸς φίλος εἶναι; (i.e. *surprising a case, εἰ τις . . . μὴ αὐτάρκης ἐστίν, κ.τ.λ.*). *Id. Mem. ii. 6, 2.* So ἥτις μηδαμοῦ ξυμμαχεῖ, *THUC. i. 35.* "Ἄ γάρ τις μὴ προσεδόκησεν, οὐδὲ φυλάσθαι ἐγχωρεῖ, *for there is no opportunity even to guard against what we did not expect (like εἰ τινα μὴ προσεδόκησέ τις).* *ANT. v. 19.* Εἰς τὰ πλοῖα τοὺς τε ἀσθενούντας ἐνεβίβασαν καὶ τῶν σκευῶν ὅσα μὴ ἀνάγκη ἦν ἔχειν (like εἰ τινα τῶν σκευῶν μὴ ἀνάγκη ἦν ἔχειν), i.e. *any which they did not need.* *XEN. AN. v. 3, 1.* Ἀνθρώπους διέφθειρὲν (ἢ θάλασσα) ὅσοι μὴ ἐδύναντο φθῆναι πρὸς τὰ μετέωρα ἀναδραμόντες, i.e. *if any were unable to escape soon enough to the high land, so many the sea destroyed.* *THUC. iii. 89.* Οἷς μὲν αἴρεις γεγένηται τᾶλλα εὐτυχοῦσι, πολλῇ ἄνοια πολεμήσαι· εἰ δ' ἀναγκαῖον ἦν, κ.τ.λ., *for any who have had the choice given them, while they are prosperous in other respects, it is great folly to go to war (i.e. εἰ τισιν αἴρεις γεγένηται).* *Id. ii. 61.* Πάντες ἴσμεν Χαβρίαν οὔτε τύπτονται οὐθ' ἀρπάζοντα τὸν στέφανον οὐθ' ὅλως προσιώνθ' ὅποι μὴ προσῆκεν αὐτῷ, nor going anywhere at all where it was not lawful for him (i.e. εἰ ποῖ μὴ προσῆκεν). *DEM. xxi. 64.* Πῶς οὖν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς φίλοι ἐσονται, οἱ μῆτε ἀπόντες ποθεινοὶ ἀλλήλοις μῆτε παρόντες χρεῖαν αὐτῶν ἔχουσι; (i.e. εἰ μὴ ἔχουσι). *PLAT. Lys. 215 B.* Νικῆς δ' ὅ τι πᾶσιν ὑμῖν μέλλει συνοίσειν (i.e. εἰ τι μέλλει), *may any plan prevail which will benefit you all.* *DEM. iv. 51.*

526. Care must be taken here (as in conditional sentences) not to include in this class general suppositions which require the subjunctive or optative (532). On the other hand, the examples falling under 534, in which the indicative is allowed, might properly be placed here, as they state a general supposition as if it were a particular one.

527. A conditional relative clause (like a clause with εἰ, 407) may take the future indicative to express a *present* intention or necessity. *E.g.*

Ἐν τούτῳ κεκωλύσθαι ἑδόκει ἐκάστῳ τὰ πράγματα ᾧ μὴ τις αὐτὸς παρέσται, *each man felt that all progress was at an end in any affair in which he was not personally to take part.* *THUC. ii. 8.* The direct form was ἐν τούτῳ κεκώλυται (51; 122) ᾧ μὴ παρέσομαι. Οὐ δὲ ἀληθείας τις ἀτυχῆσει, ποτὲ τούτου ἐπιστημῶν ἔσται; *but if one is to miss the truth of anything, will he ever understand it?* *PLAT. Theaet. 186 C.* So probably *XEN. Cyr. i. 5, 13,* ὅ τι γὰρ μὴ τοιοῦτον ἀποβήσεται παρ' ὑμῶν, εἰς ἐμὲ τὸ ἐλλεῖπον ἔσται, i.e. *if there is to be any failure on your part to come up to my expectations, the loss will fall on me.*

This is the only form of conditional relative sentence that regularly takes the future indicative. (See 530.)

528. When a relative clause expresses a present or past condition, implying that it *is not* or *was not* fulfilled (like a protasis of the form 410), the verb is in a past tense of the indicative.

The antecedent clause generally has a past tense of the indicative with *ἄν*; but it may have a past tense of the indicative in an unreal condition, in an unaccomplished wish, or in a final clause. *E.g.*

"Α μὴ ἐβούλετο δοῦναι, οὐκ ἂν ἔδωκεν, *he would not have given what he had not wished to give* (i.e. εἴ τινα μὴ ἐβούλετο δοῦναι, οὐκ ἂν ἔδωκεν). Ὅπότερον τούτων ἐποίησεν, οὐδενὸς ἂν ἦττον Ἀθηναίων πλουσίῳ ἦσαν, *whichever of these he had done (he did neither), they would be as rich as any of the Athenians*. LYS. xxxii. 23. Οὔτε γὰρ ἂν αὐτοὶ ἐπεχειροῦμεν πράττειν ἂ μὴ ἠπιστάμεθα, οὔτε τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπετρέπομεν ὧν ἤρχομεν ἄλλο τι πράττειν ἢ ὁ τι πράττοντες ὁρθῶς ἐμελλον πράξειν· τούτο δ' ἦν ἂν οὐ ἐπιστήμην εἶχον, *for (if that were so) we should not be undertaking (as we are) to do things which we did not understand, nor should we permit any others whom we were ruling to do anything else than what they were likely to do properly; and this would be whatever they had knowledge of*. PLAT. CHARM. 171 E. (Here ἂ μὴ ἠπιστάμεθα = εἴ τινα μὴ ἠπιστάμεθα, *if there were any things which we did not know*,—ὧν ἤρχομεν = εἴ τιναν ἤρχομεν,—ὁ τι ἐμελλον = εἴ τι ἐμελλον,—and ὁ ἐπιστήμην εἶχον = εἴ τινος εἶχον. It is implied that none of the cases here supposed ever actually arose. Ὡς περ τοίνυν ἄλλων τινῶν τεττάρων, εἰ ἔν τι ἐζητοῦμεν αὐτῶν ἐν ὄψωιν, ὅποτε πρῶτον ἐκείνο ἔγνωμεν, ἱκανῶς ἂν εἶχεν ἡμῖν, εἰ δὲ τὰ τρία πρότερον ἐγνωρίσαμεν, αὐτῷ ἂν τούτῳ ἐγνωρίστο τὸ ζητούμενον. PLAT. REP. 428 A. (Here the antithesis of ὅποτε πρῶτον ἐκείνο ἔγνωμεν, *in (whatever) case we had recognised this first*, and εἰ τὰ τρία πρότερον ἐγνωρίσαμεν, *if we had recognised the three sooner*, makes the force of the relative especially clear.) Ἐβασάνιζον ἂν μέχρι οὐ αὐτοῖς ἐδόκει, *they would have questioned them (under torture) so long as they pleased*. DEM. liii. 25. Εἰ δὲ οἴκοι εἶχον ἕκαστοι τὰς δίκας, τούτους ἂν ἀπώλλυσαν οἵτινες φίλοι μάλιστα ἦσαν Ἀθηναίων τῷ δήμῳ, *if each had their trials at home, they would ruin any who were especially friendly, etc*. XEN. REP. ATH. i. 16. (Here οἵτινες ἦσαν, = εἴ τινες ἦσαν, forms a second protasis to the apodosis ἀπώλλυσαν ἂν. See 511.) Καὶ ὁπηνίκα ἐφαίνετο ταῦτα πεποιηκώς, ὥμολογεῖτ' ἂν ἡ κατηγορία τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῦ, *and if he ever appeared to have done this, his form of accusation would agree with his acts*. DEM. xviii. 14.

Εἰ ξένος ἐτύγχανον ὧν, ξυνεγινώσκετε δήπου ἂν μοι εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ ἔλεγον ἐν οἷς περ ἔτεθράμμην, *if I happened to be a foreigner, you would surely pardon me, if I were (now) addressing you in both the language and the manner in which I had been brought up*. PLAT. AP. 17 D. Ὡς δὴ ἐγὼ γ' ὄφελον μάκαρός νύ τευ ἔμμεναι υἱὸς ἀνέρος, ὃν κτεάτεσσιν ἐοῖς ἐπὶ γῆρας ἔτετμεν, *O that I were the son of some fortunate man, whom old age had found upon his own estate* (i.e. *if old age had found any such man, would that I had been his son*). OD. i. 217. So IL. vi. 348 and 351.

So when the relative sentence depends on a past indicative in a final clause (333): as in DEM. xxiii. 48, ταῦτά γε δήπου προσήκε

γράφαι, ἵνα ὅτω ποτὲ τοῦργον ἐπράχθη, τούτῳ τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων ὑπῆρχε δίκαια, *he ought to have written it in this way, in order that any one by whom the deed had been done might have his rights according to the laws.* (This implies that the law was not so written, so that the case supposed in ὅτω ἐπράχθη never arose.) So DEM. liii. 24, ἵν' ἀκούσαντες ἐκ τούτων ἐψηφίσασθε ὁποῖόν τι ὑμῖν ἐδόκει, *that you might have voted whatever seemed good to you.*

All examples of this form fall equally well under the general rule for assimilation (559).

(b) FUTURE CONDITIONS.

529. (*Subjunctive.*) When the relative clause expresses a future condition of the more vivid form (like a protasis of the form 444), and the verb of the antecedent clause also refers to the future, the relative is joined with *ἄν* (or *κέ*) and takes the subjunctive. *E.g.*

Τάων ἦν κ' ἐθέλωμι φίλην ποιήσωμ' ἀκοῖτιν (like εἰ κέ τινα ἐθέλωμι), *whomsoever of these I may wish I shall make my wife.* IL ix. 397. Ἐκ γὰρ Ὀρέστῳ τίσις ἔσσεται Ἀτρεΐδῳ, ὁππότ' ἂν ἡβήσῃ τε καὶ ἥς ἰμείρεται αἰῆς, i.e. *vengeance will come from Orestes, when he shall grow up, etc.* (like εἰάν ποτε ἡβήσῃ). OD. i. 40. Τότε δ' αὖτε μαχήσεται, ὁππότε κέν μιν θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσιν ἀνώγῃ καὶ θεὸς ὄρσῃ. IL ix. 702. Ἀλλ' ἄγεθ', ὥς ἂν ἐγὼν εἴπω, πειθώμεθα πάντες, *let us obey as I may direct, i.e. if I give any direction (εἰάν πως εἴπω), let us obey it.* IL ii. 139. Ἡμεῖς αὖτ' ἀλόχους τε φίλας καὶ νήπια τέκνα ἄξομεν ἐν νήεσιν, ἐπὶ πόλιέθρον ἔλωμεν, *when we shall have taken the city.* IL iv. 238. So εὔτ' ἂν πίπτωσιν, IL i. 242. Οὐκοῦν, ὅταν δὴ μὴ σθένω, πεπαύσομαι, *therefore, when I shall have no more strength, I will cease.* SOPH. ANT. 91. Ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴν περὶ τοῦ γένους εἴπω, τότε ἐρῶ, *I will speak of this, when I shall have spoken about my birth.* DEM. lvii. 16. (See 90.) Ἐπειδὴν διαπράξωμαι ἃ δέομαι, ἤξω. XEN. AN. ii. 3, 29. Τίνα οἴεσθε αὐτὴν ψυχὴν ἔξειν, ὅταν ἐμὲ ἴδῃ τῶν πατρῶων ἀπεστερημένον; *what feelings do you think she will have, when (or if at any time) she shall see me, etc.?* DEM. xxviii. 21. Τούτων δὲ Ἀθηναίους φημὶ δεῖν εἶναι πεντακοσίους, ἐξ ἧς ἂν τινος ὑμῖν ἡλικίας καλῶς ἔχειν δοκῇ, *from whatever age it shall seem good to you to take them (i.e. if from any particular age, etc.)* ID. iv. 21. Τῶν πραγμάτων τοὺς βουλευομένους (ἡγείσθαι δεῖ), ἵνα ἃ ἂν ἐκείνοις δοκῇ ταῦτα πράττηται, *in order that whatever shall seem good to them shall be done.* IB. 39. Οὐ μοι φόβον μέλαθρον ἐλπίς ἐμπατεῖν, ὥς ἂν αἰθρῇ πῦρ ἐφ' ἐστίας ἐμῆς Αἰγισθος, *so long as Aegisthus shall kindle fire upon my hearth.* AESCH. AG. 1434.

530. The future indicative is very rarely used in conditional relative clauses, as it is in common protasis (447), in the place of the subjunctive; as it would generally be ambiguous, appearing as if the ante-

cedent were definite. Some cases of ὅσος with the future, as ὅσοι βουλήσονται, THUC. i. 22, are perhaps exceptions. (See 527.)

531. (Optative.) When the relative clause expresses a future condition of the less vivid form (like a protasis of the form 455), and the antecedent clause contains an optative referring to the future, the relative takes the optative (without ἄν).

The optative in the antecedent clause may be in an apodosis with ἄν, in a protasis, in an expression of a wish, or in a final clause. *E.g.*

Μάλα κεν θρασυκάρδιος εἴη, ὃς τότε γηθήσειεν ἰδὼν πόνον οὐδ' ἀκάχοιτο (i.e. εἴ τις γηθήσειε, μάλα κεν' θρασυκάρδιος εἴη), any one who should then rejoice would be very stout-hearted. II. xiii. 343. Βουλοίμην κ' ἐπάουρος εἶναι θητευέμεν ἄλλῳ . . . ᾧ μὴ βίσιος πολλὸς εἴη, I should wish to be a serf attached to the soil, serving another man who had not much to live on. Od. xi. 489. Ζητὸς οὐκ ἂν ἄσπον ἰκοίμην, ὅτε μὴ αὐτὸς γε κελεύοι, unless he should himself bid me. II. xiv. 247. So II. vi. 329 and 521; and ὅστις καλέσειε, AR. Nub. 1250. Οὐκ ἂν οὖν θρέψαις ἄνδρα, ὅστις ἐθέλοι τε καὶ δύναιτο σοῦ ἀπερύκειν τοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας ἀδικεῖν σε; would you not support any man who should be both willing and able, etc.? XEN. Mem. ii. 9, 2. Πεινῶν φάγοι ἂν ὁπότε βούλοιτο, when he is hungry, he would eat whenever he might wish (like εἴ ποτε βούλοιτο). Ib. ii. 1, 18. So i. 5, 4; i. 7, 3; iv. 2, 20. Πῶς οὖν ἂν εἰδείης περὶ τούτου τοῦ πράγματος οὐ παντάπασιν ἀπειρος εἴης; how then could you know about that thing of which you had no experience at all? PLAT. Men. 92 C. Ἄρ' ἂν ἡγοῖο ταῦτα σὰ εἶναι, ἃ σοι ἐξείη καὶ ἀποδόσθαι καὶ δοῦναι καὶ θῆσαι ὅψι βούλοιο θεῶν; Id. Euthyd. 302 A. Τί ἂν παθεῖν (δύναιτο), ὃ μὴ καὶ ὑφ' αὐτοῦ πάθοι; (i.e. εἴ μὴ πάθοι). Id. Lys. 214 E. Ὁ δὲ μὴ ἀγαπήῃ, οὐδ' ἂν φιλοῖ (i.e. εἴ τι μὴ ἀγαπήῃ, οὐδ' ἂν φιλοῖ τοῦτο). Ib. 215 B. Ἰδίαν ἕκαστος ἂν κατασκευῇ κατὰ κελεύειν, ἥτις ἕκαστον ἀρέσκοι. Id. Rep. 557 B. Ὅσφ δὲ πρεσβύτερος γίγνοιτο, μᾶλλον αἰεὶ ἀσπάξοιτο ἂν (χρήματα), the older he should grow, the more he would always cling to it (i.e. εἴ τι πρεσβύτερος γίγνοιτο, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἀσπάξοιτο ἄν). Ib. 549 B. So 412 D. Φήσομεν μηδέποτε μηδὲν ἂν μείζον μὴδὲ ἔλαττον γενέσθαι, ὥς ἴσον εἴη αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ, so long as it should remain equal to itself. Id. Theaet. 155 A.

Εἰ δὲ βούλοιο τῶν φίλων τινὰ προτρέψασθαι ὁπότε ἀποδημοίης ἐπιμελίσθαι τῶν σῶν, τί ἂν ποιήης; XEN. Mem. ii. 3, 12. Εἰκότως ἂν καὶ παρὰ θεῶν πρακτικώτερος εἴη, ὅστις μὴ ὁπότε ἐν ἀπόροις εἴη τότε κολακεύοι, ἀλλ' ὅτε τὰ ἄριστα πράττοι τότε μάλιστα τῶν θεῶν μεμνῆτο. Id. Cyr. i. 6, 3. Ὡς ἀπόλοιο καὶ ἄλλος, ὃ τις τοιαῦτά γε ῥέξοι, O that any other man might likewise perish who should do the like (i.e. εἴ τις τοιαῦτα ῥέξοι). Od. i. 47. Εἰ γάρ μιν θανάτοι

δυσηχέος ὧδε δυναίμην νόσφιν ἀποκρύψαι, ὅτε μιν μόρος αἰνὸς ἰκάνοι. *Il.* xviii. 464. Δῶρα θεῶν ἔχοι, ὅττι διδοῖεν, *may he have gifts of the Gods, whatever they may give.* *Od.* xviii. 142. Ἐγίγνωσκε δεῖν τοὺς ὑπηρέτας τοῦτο ἀσκέειν, ὡς πάντα νομίζοιεν πρέπειν αὐτοῖς πράττειν ὅσα ὁ ἄρχων προστάττοι. *XEN. Cyr.* ii. 1, 31.

For *κέ* or *άν* in these relative sentences in Homer, see 542. All these examples fall also under the general rule for assimilation (558).

II. GENERAL CONDITIONAL RELATIVE SENTENCES.

532. A conditional relative sentence may express a *general* supposition, when the verb of the antecedent clause denotes a customary or repeated action or a general truth, while the relative clause refers in a general way to *any* act or acts of a given class. Here the subjunctive with *ὅς* *άν*, *όταν*, etc., follows primary tenses, and the optative (without *άν*) follows secondary tenses. (See 462.) *E.g.*

Ἐχθρὸς γάρ μοι κείνος ὁμῶς Ἀΐδαο πύλῃσιν, ὃς χ' ἕτερον μὲν κεύθῃ ἐνὶ φρεσὶν, ἄλλο δὲ εἶπῃ, *for that man (i.e. any man) is hated by me like the very gates of Hades, who conceals one thing in his mind and speaks another.* *Il.* ix. 312. Νεμεσώμαί γε μὲν οὐδὲν κλαίειν ὃς κε θάνῃσι βροτῶν καὶ πότμον ἐνίσπῃ, *I am never at all indignant at weeping for any mortal who may die, etc.* *Od.* iv. 195. Οἶνος, ὃς τε καὶ ἄλλους βλάπτει, ὃς ἂν μιν χάνδον ἔλῃ μῆδ' αἴσιμα πίνῃ. *Od.* xxi. 293. Καὶ γὰρ συμμαχεῖν τοῦτοις ἐθέλουσιν ἅπαντες, οὓς ἂν ὁρώσι παρεσκευασμένους, *for all men are (always) willing to be allies to those whom they see prepared.* *DEM.* iv. 6. Καίπερ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐν ᾧ μὲν ἂν πολεμῶσι, τὸν παρόντα (πόλεμον) αἰὲ μέγιστον κρινόντων, *although men always consider the present war the greatest, so long as they are engaged in it.* *THUC.* i. 21. Πορεύονται τε γὰρ αἱ ἀγέλαι ἢ ἂν αὐτὰς εὐθύνωσι, ὅν οἱ νομεῖς, νέμονται τε χωρία ἐφ' ὅποια ἂν αὐτὰς ἐφιῶσιν, ἀπέχονται τε ὧν ἂν αὐτὰς ἀπείργωσι· καὶ τοῖς καρποῖς ἕως τοὺς νομέας χρῆσθαι οὕτως ὅπως ἂν αὐτοὶ βούλωνται· ἀνθρώποι δὲ ἐπ' οὐδένας μᾶλλον συνίστανται ἢ ἐπὶ τοῦτους οὓς ἂν αἰσθωνται ἄρχειν αὐτῶν ἐπιχειροῦντας. *XEN. Cyr.* i. 1, 2. Νομίζω προστάτου ἔργον εἶναι οἷον δεῖ, ὃς ἂν ὁρῶν τοὺς φίλους ἐξαπατωμένους μὴ ἐπιτρέπῃ, *i.e. such as one ought always to be, who, etc.* *Id. Hell.* ii. 3, 51. Καταφρόνησις δὲ (ἐγγίγνεται), ὃς ἂν καὶ γνώμῃ πιστεύῃ τῶν ἐναντίων προέχειν, ὃ ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει. *THUC.* ii. 62. (Here the *ὃ* refers to all that precedes, as a definite antecedent.)

Οὐ μὲν γὰρ μείζον κλέος ἀνέρος, ὅφρα κ' ἔρσιν, ἢ ὅ τι ποσσὶν τε ρέσῃ καὶ χερσίν. *Od.* viii. 147. (Ὅφρα κ' ἔρσιν, *so long as he lives.*) (Θεοὺς) παρατρωπῶσ' ἀνθρώποι λισσόμενοι, ὅτε κέν τις ὑπερβῇ καὶ ἀμάρτη. *Il.* ix. 500. Ἡμισυ γάρ τ' ἀρετῆς ἀποαίνυνται εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς ἀνέρος, εὐτ' ἂν μιν κατὰ δούλιον ἡμᾶρ ἔλῃσιν. *Od.* xvii. 322. Φιλέει δὲ κως προσημαίνειν, εὐτ' ἂν μέλλῃ μεγάλα κακὰ ἢ πόλις ἡ

ἔθνεϊ ἔσσεσθαι. HDT. vi. 27. Φεύγουσι γάρ τοι χοῖ θρασεῖς, ὅταν πέλας ἦδῃ τὸν Ἀῖδον εἰσορώσι τοῦ βίου. SOPH. ANT. 580. Ἡνίκ' ἂν δ' οἴκοι γένωνται, δρώσιν οὐκ ἀνασχετά. AR. PAC. 1179. Ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἡ ἐκφορὰ ᾗ, λάρνακας ἄγουσιν ἄμαξαι. THUC. ii. 34. Ἐπειδὰν δὲ κρύψωσι γῇ, ἀνὴρ ἡρημένος ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως, ὃς ἂν γνώμῃ τε δοκῇ μὴ ἀξύνετος εἶναι, λέγει ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἔπαινον τὸν πρέποντα. Ibid. Ἐως ἂν σφίζῃται τὸ σκάφος, τότε χρή προθύμους εἶναι· ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἡ θάλαττα ὑπέροσχῃ, μάταιος ἡ σπουδὴ. DEM. ix. 69. So ἔστ' ἂν δείσωσιν, XEN. MEM. iii. 5, 6.

"Ον δ' αὖ δῆμον ἄνδρα ἴδοι βόωντά τ' ἐφεύροι, τὸν σκῆπτρῳ ἐλάσασκεν, *whatever man of the people he saw and found brawling, he drove him with his sceptre.* II. ii. 198; see ii. 188. Οὐ τίνα γὰρ τίσκεον ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων, οὐ κακὸν οὐδὲ μὲν ἐσθλὸν, ὃ τίς σφεας εἰσαφίκοιτο, i.e. *they were never in the habit of honouring any one who came to them.* Od. xxii. 414. "Οτε μὲν σκιρτῶεν, . . . θεόν. II. xx. 226; so 228. See Od. xx. 138. Καὶ οὓς μὲν ἴδοι εὐτάκτως καὶ σιωπῇ ἰόντας, προσελαύνων αὐτοῖς τίνες τε εἶεν ἡρώτα, καὶ ἐπεὶ πύθοιτο ἐπῆναι. XEN. CYR. v. 3, 55. (Here ἡρώτα and ἐπῆναι denote the *habit* of Cyrus.) Καὶ τοὺς μὲν Ἀθηναίους ἡὔξετο τὸ ναυτικὸν ἀπὸ τῆς δαπάνης ἣν ἐκεῖνοι ξυμφέρουεν, αὐτοὶ δὲ, ὅποτε ἀποσταλεῖν, ἀπαράσκευοι καὶ ἄπειροι ἐς τὸν πόλεμον καθίσταντο, *and the Athenian navy continued to increase from the money which these contributed (pres.), and they, whenever they revolted (aor.), always found themselves unprepared and inexperienced for war.* THUC. i. 99.

Ἐπὶ Μοῖριος βασιλέως, ὅκως ἔλθοι ὁ ποταμὸς ἐπ' ὀκτῷ πῆχους, ἄρδσκε Αἶγυπτον τὴν ἔνερθε Μέμφιος, i.e. *whenever the river rose.* HDT. ii. 13. Τὸν δὲ χοῦν τὸν ἐκφορεόμενον, ὅκως γένοιτο νύξ, ἐς τὸν Τίγριν ἐξεφόρεον, i.e. *they carried it away every night.* Id. ii. 150. Οἱ δὲ (Κάρες), ὅκως Μίνως δέοιτο, ἐπλήρουν οἱ τὰς νέας. Id. i. 171. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀνοιχθεῖη, εἰσήμεν παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη, i.e. *each morning, when the prison was opened, etc.* PLAT. PHAED. 59 D. "Οτε ἔξω τοῦ δεινοῦ γένοιεντο, πολλοὶ αὐτὸν ἀπέλειπον, *many used to leave him when they were out of danger.* XEN. AN. ii. 6, 12. (If ἐγένοντο had been used, the whole sentence would refer to a particular case.)

533. The gnomic aorist and the other gnomic and iterative tenses (154-164) can be used in the antecedent clause of these general propositions. The gnomic aorist, as usual, is a primary tense, and is followed by the subjunctive (171). *E.g.*

"Ος κε θεοῖς ἐπιπείθεται, μάλα τ' ἔκλυον αὐτοῦ, *whoever obeys the Gods, to him they are ready to listen* (ἐκλυον is aoristic). II. i. 218. "Οταν τις ὥσπερ οὗτος ἰσχύσῃ, ἡ πρώτη πρόφασις ἅπαντα ἀνεχαίτισε καὶ διέλυσε. DEM. ii. 9. "Οπότε προσβλέψει τις τινος τῶν ἐν ταῖς τάξεσι, εἶπεν ἂν, ὦ ἄνδρες, κ.τ.λ., i.e. *he used to say, etc.* XEN. CYR. vii. 1, 10. Οὐτ' ἄλλοτε πώποτε πρὸς χάριν εἰλόμην λέγειν, ὃ τι ἂν μὴ καὶ συνοίσειν πεπεισμένος ὦ, *I have never on other occasions preferred to say anything to please which I have not been convinced would also be for your advantage.* DEM. iv. 51. (Here εἰλόμην has a sense

approaching that of the gnomic aorist, and is followed by a subjunctive. See 156.)

Homeric examples of relatives with *κέ* or *άν* and the subjunctive in general conditions are here included with the others, because this construction is fixed in the Homeric usage. In the greater number of general relative conditions which have the subjunctive, however, Homer uses the relative without *κέ* or *άν*, as he prefers the simple *εί* in the corresponding conditional sentences (468). See examples in 538.

534. (*Indicative.*) The indicative is sometimes used instead of the subjunctive and optative in relative sentences of this class. (See 467.) Here one of the cases in which the event may occur is referred to as if it were the only one. This use of the indicative occurs especially after the indefinite relative *ὅστις*; as the idea of indefiniteness, which is usually expressed by the subjunctive or optative, is here sufficiently expressed by the relative itself. *E.g.*

Ἐχθρὸς γάρ μοι κείνος ὁμῶς Ἀίδαο πόλῃσιν
Γίγνεται, ὃς πενίῃ εἰκὼν ἀπατήλῃα βάζει. *Od.* xiv. 156.

Compare this with *Il.* ix. 312, the first example under 532.

Ἐμοὶ γὰρ ὅστις πᾶσαν εὐθύνων πόλιν
Μὴ τῶν ἀρίστων ἄπτεται βουλευμάτων,
Ἄλλ' ἐκ φόβου του γλῶσσαν ἐγκλείσας ἔχει,
Κάκιστος εἶναι νῦν τε καὶ πάλαι δοκεῖ
Καὶ μείζον' ὅστις ἀντὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ πάτρας
Φίλον νομίζει, τοῦτον οὐδαμοῦ λέγω. *SOPH.* *Ant.* 178.

(Here we might have had *ὃς άν* . . . *μὴ* ἄπτηται, ἀλλ' . . . ἔχῃ, and *ὃς άν* νομίζει, without any essential difference in meaning.)

Οἷτινες πρὸς τὰς ξυμφορὰς γνώμῃ μὲν ἤκιστα λυποῦνται, ἔργῳ δὲ μάλιστα ἀντέχουσιν, οὗτοι καὶ πόλεων καὶ ἰδιωτῶν κράτιστοί εἰσιν. *THUC.* ii. 64. So in the same chapter, *ὅστις* λαμβάνει. "Ὅστις δ' ἀφικνεῖτο τῶν παρὰ βασιλέως πρὸς αὐτὸν, πάντας οὕτω διατιθεῖς ἀπεπέμπετο, *whoever came to him, he always sent away, etc.* *XEN.* *An.* i. 1, 5. "Ὅπου δὲ χιλὸς σπάνιος πᾶν εἶη, αὐτὸς δ' ἐδύνατο παρασκευάσασθαι, διαπέμπων ἐκέλευε τοὺς φίλους ἵπποις ἐμβάλλειν τοῦτον. *Ib.* i. 9, 27. (In the last two examples there is some *Ms.* authority for the more regular *ἀφικνοῖτο* and *δύνατο*.)

535. This use of the indicative (534) is rare in temporal sentences. See, however, the following:—

Περὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἀδικούντων, ὅτε δικάζονται, δεῖ παρὰ τῶν κατηγορῶν πυνθέσθαι. *LYS.* xxii. 22. Εἶχον μαχαίριον, ᾧ ἔσφατον ὦν κρατεῖν δύναντο, καὶ ἀποτέμνοντες ἂν τὰς κεφαλὰς ἔχοντες ἐπορεύοντο, ὅποτε οἱ πολέμιοι αὐτοὺς ὄψεσθαι ἔμελλον. *XEN.* *An.* iv. 7, 16. So ὅποτε ἀφίστατο, *ib.* 6, 27.

All these examples fall under the first class of conditional relative sentences (525).

536. The Greek generally uses the indicative in relative clauses

depending on general negative sentences, where in Latin a subjunctive is more common. A general negation is really particular. *E.g.*

Παρ' ἐμοί δὲ οὐδεὶς μισθοφορεῖ, ὅστις μὴ ἱκανὸς ἐστὶν ἴσα πονεῖν ἐμοί, i.e. *no one who is not able (no one unless he is able), nemo qui non possit*. XEN. Hell. vi. 1, 5. Οὐδεὶς γὰρ οὐδενὶ ὠργίζετο ὅστις μὴ ᾤετο ἀπολεισθαι, *for no one was angry with any one who did not think that he was about to perish* (i.e. εἰ μὴ ᾤετο). Ib. vii. 4, 37. Οὐδαμοῦ πάποθ', ὅποι προεβευτὴς ἐπέμφθη ὑφ' ὑμῶν ἐγώ, ἡττηθεὶς ἀπὸ ἁλλοῦ τῶν παρὰ Φιλίππου πρέσβων, *nowhere, whither I was sent as ambassador, did I ever come off worsted by Philip's ambassadors*. DEM. xviii. 244. Here the leading sentence is particular, *on no single occasion was I worsted*, so that ἐπέμφθη is regular; if the nearly equivalent universal affirmative *on every occasion I proved superior* had been intended, we should have had πεμφθείην. See xviii. 45, προὔλεγον καὶ διεμαρτυρόμην καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν αἰὲ καὶ ὅποι πεμφθείην; and the following in 244, ἐν οἷς κρατηθεῖεν οἱ πρέσβεις αὐτοῦ τῷ λόγῳ, ταῦτα τοῖς ὅπλοις ἐπιὼν κατεστρέφετο. Notice the imperfects in the two affirmative examples, and the aorist in the preceding negative example.

537. 1. The indicative is generally used in Greek (as in Latin) in parenthetical relative clauses, like ὃ τι ποτ' ἐστίν, *whatever it is* (quidquid est), ὅστις ποτ' ἐστίν (or ἔσται), etc. *E.g.*

Ζεὺς, ὅστις ποτ' ἐστίν, εἰ τόδ' αὐτῷ φίλον κεκλημένῳ, τοῦτό νυν προσεinnέπω, *Zeus, whoever he may be, etc.* AESCH. Ag. 160. Δουλεύομεν θεοῖς, ὃ τι ποτ' εἰσὶν θεοί. EUR. Or. 418. Ἡμῖν γε κρέσσον . . . δουλείην ὑπομένειν ἢ τις ἐσται, *but it is better for us to submit to slavery, whatever it may be*. HDT. vi. 12. So ὃ τι δὴ κοτὲ ἐσσι, vii. 16.

2. But ὅστις in such expressions can have the construction of an ordinary conditional relative, so that in future and general conditions it may take the subjunctive. *E.g.*

Ἄλλ' ὃ προσαφάμενος αὐτῶν, ὅστις ἂν ᾖ, λόγον παρέχει, *but each one who has to do with them, whoever he may be, gives his own account of them*. AESCHIN. i. 127. Ἄλλ' ὑφ' ὑμῶν ἔδει κεχειροτονημένον εἶναι τοῦτον, ὅστις ἂν ᾖ, *but this officer ought always to be elected by you, whoever he may be*. DEM. iv. 27. See THEOG. 964.

Homeric and other Poetic Peculiarities in Conditional Relative Sentences.

SUBJUNCTIVE WITHOUT ΚΕ OR ἂν.

538. In general conditions which take the subjunctive, Homer commonly uses the relatives without *κέ* or *ἂν*. This corresponds to his preference for the simple *εἰ* in general conditions (468); but relative clauses of this class are much more frequent with him than the clauses with *εἰ*. *E.g.*

"Ὅττι μάλ' οὐ δηναῖδς ὅς ἀθανάτοισι μάχεται. II. v. 407. Ἀνθρώπους ἐφορᾷ, καὶ τίνονται ὅς τις ἀμάρτη. Od. xiii. 214. Ζεὺς δ' αὐτὸς νέμει ὄλβον Ὀλύμπιος ἀνθρώποισιν, ἐσθλοῖς ἦδ' ἐκακοῖσιν, ὅπως ἐθέλῃσιν, ἐκάστω. Od. vi. 188. Οὐ μὴν σοὶ ποτε ἴσον ἔχω γέρας, ὅππῃς Ἀχαιοὶ Τρώων ἐκπέρσωσ' εὐναϊόμενον πολοῖέθρον. II. i. 163. So also II. i. 554, iii. 109, xiv. 81; Od. viii. 546, xviii. 134. Here the meaning is essentially the same as when *κέ* or *ἄν* is added, as in the examples under 532. The greater development of the general relative condition in Homer, especially in the use of the optative, compared with the less developed general condition with *εἰ*, has already been noticed (17; 400; 468).

539. The relative (like *εἰ*) is sometimes found in Homer without *κέ* or *ἄν* in future conditions. *E.g.*

Γῆμασθ' ὅς τις ἄριστος ἀνὴρ καὶ πλεῖστα πόρρησιν, (tell her) to marry whoever may be the best man and may offer the most. Od. xx. 335. But in vs. 342, referring to the same thing, we have γῆμασθ' ᾧ κ' ἐθέλῃ, to marry whom she may please. Πείθεο δ' ὡς . . . ἐν φρεσὶ θείῳ. II. xvi. 83; so Od. vi. 189. Οὐ μὴν γάρ ποτέ φησι κακὸν πείσεσθαι ὀπίσω, ὅφρ' ἀρετὴν παρέχῃσι θεοὶ καὶ γούνατ' ὀρώρη, he says he shall never suffer evil hereafter, so long as the Gods shall supply valour, etc. Od. xviii. 132. So II. xiii. 234.

540. Ἄν may sometimes be omitted in relative conditions with the subjunctive in lyric, elegiac, and dramatic poetry, as in Homer, chiefly, in general conditions. A few examples occur in Herodotus; and even in Attic prose exceptional cases are occasionally found in the manuscripts. (See 469-471.) *E.g.*

Μέγα τοι κλέος αἰεὶ, φτίνι σὸν γέρας ἔσπητ' ἀγλαόν, great always is his glory, whom thy illustrious honour (Olympia) follows. PIND. Ol. viii. 10. So Ol. iii. 11, Nem. ix. 44. Πάντας ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω ἐκὼν ὅστις ἔρδῃ μηδὲν αἰσχρόν. SIMON. v. 20 (but ὅς ἂν μὴ κακὸς ᾗ in the same ode). See TYRT. xii. 34; SOL. xiii. 9 and 55, xxvii. 3; SIMON. lviii. 5, lxxxv. 7 (ὅφρα . . . ἔχῃ, but ὅταν ᾗ in vs. 10).

Γέροντα δ' ὀρθοῦν φλαῦρον, ὅς νέος πέσῃ. SOPH. O. C. 395. Τῶν δὲ πημονῶν μάλιστα λυποῦσ' αἱ φανῶσ' αὐθαίρετοι. Id. O. T. 1231. So AESCH. Sept. 257, Eum. 211, 661, and probably 618 (ὁ μὴ κλειύσῃ, for Mss. κλεῦσει, after εἰπον denoting a habit). Τοῖσι γὰρ μήτε ἀστυα μήτε τέχνη ἐκτισμένα, . . . κῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴησαν οὗτοι ἄμαχοι; HDT. iv. 46. So i. 216, ii. 85, iv. 66. Ἐπιχώραιον ὃν ἡμῖν οὐ μὲν βραχεῖς ἀρκῶσι μὴ πολλοῖς χρῆσθαι, it being our national habit not to use many words where few suffice. THUC. iv. 17. (Here οὐ μὲν . . . πολλοῖς make five feet of an iambic trimeter, and the words are probably quoted from some poet. See Classen's note. The sentence continues, πλείοσι δὲ ἐν ᾧ ἂν καιρὸς ᾗ, κ.τ.λ.) See also PLAT. Leg. 737 B, οὗς ᾗ καὶ ὅσοις μετῇ. In SOPH. El. 225, ὅφρα ἔχῃ is particular.

541. In the lyric and elegiac poets, as in Homer, the form with *ἄν* or *κέ* was in good use in these sentences. See PIND. Py. i. 100 (ὅς ἂν

ἐγκύρῳ, v. 65 (οἷς ἂν ἐθέλῃ); MIMN. ii. 9, iii. 1 (ἐπὶ ἂν παραμείψεται); SOL. xiii. 75; THEOGN. 405, 406 (ἂ μὲν ἦ κακὰ, . . . ἂ δ' ἂν ἦ χρήσιμα). (For ordinary protasis see 469 and 470.) In the dramatists the relative with ἂν is completely established with the subjunctive as the regular form (like ἐάν, etc.) in both general and particular conditions. (See 471.)

RELATIVE WITH *κέ* OR *ἂν* AND THE OPTATIVE IN CONDITIONS.

542. In Homer the conditional relative (like *εἰ*) sometimes takes *κέ* or *ἂν* with the optative, the particle apparently not affecting the sense. *E.g.*

Ἡ δέ κ' ἔπειτα γήμαιθ' ὅς κεν πλεῖστα πόροι καὶ μόρσιμος ἔλθοι, and she then would marry whoever might give the most gifts, etc. Od. xxi. 161. Ὡς κε . . . δοῖν ᾧ κ' ἐθέλοι, that he might give her to whomsoever he pleased. Od. ii. 54. In these two cases ὅς πόροι and ᾧ ἐθέλοι would be the common expressions. In Od. iv. 600, however, δῶρον δ' ὅττι κέ μοι δοίης, κειμήλιον ἔστω, whatever gift you might choose to give me, etc., may be potential. Νῦν γάρ χ' Ἑκτορ' ἔλοις, ἐπεὶ ἂν μάλα τοι σχέδον ἔλθοι. Il. ix. 304. Ὡς τὸ καταβρόξειεν ἐπὶ κρητῆρι μιγείῃ, οὐ κεν ἐφημέριός γε βάλοι κατὰ δάκρυ παρειῶν, whoever should drink this when it was mingled in the bowl, would let no tear fall down his cheeks on that day. Od. iv. 222. So ἐπὶ . . . εἴην, Il. xxiv. 227.

One case occurs of ὅτε κε with the optative in a general relative sentence of past time: ἐπευθόμεθα . . . ὅτε κέν τιν' ἐπιζάφελος χόλος ἴκοι, Il. ix. 525.

HOMERIC SIMILES WITH Ὡς ETC.

543. In Homer similes and comparisons may be expressed by the subjunctive with ὥς ὅτε (rarely ὥς ὅποτε), as *when*, sometimes by ὥς or ὥς τε, as. Except in a few cases of ὥς ὅτ' ἂν, neither ἂν nor *κέ* is found in these expressions.

544. With ὥς ὅτε or ὥς ὅποτε the subjunctive clearly expresses a general condition, and the meaning is as *happens when*, etc. *E.g.*

Ὡς δ' ὅτε κινήσῃ Ζέφυρος βαθὺν λήμον ἑλθὼν,
λάβρος ἐπαγίζων, ἐπὶ τ' ἡμῶν ἀσταχέουσιν,
ὥς τῶν πᾶσ' ἀγορῇ κινήθη,

and as (happens) when the west wind comes and moves a deep grain field, and it bores with its ears, so was their whole assembly moved. Il. ii. 147.

Ὡς δ' ὅτ' ὀπωρινὸς Βορέης φορέῃσιν ἀκάνθας
ἄμ πεδίον, πυκινὰ δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλησιν ἔχονται,
ὥς τὴν ἄμ πέλαγος ἄνεμοι φέρον ἐνθα καὶ ἐνθα. Od. v. 328.

See Il. v. 597, vi. 506, viii. 338; Od. ix. 391, xix. 518; for ὥς ὅποτε, Od. iv. 335, xvii. 126.

ὥς δ' ὅτ' ἂν ἀστράπτῃ πόσις Ἥρης ἠυκόμοιο, ὥς πυκνὴ ἐν στήθεσσι ἀνεστενάχῃ Ἀγαμέμνων. Il. x. 5. So Il. xi. 269, xv. 170; Od. v. 394, xxii. 468.

545. With ὥς or ὥς τε the conditional force of the subjunctive is not so obvious, especially as it depends directly on the verb of the antecedent clause, which is always particular and generally past. Here we should expect the present indicative, which sometimes occurs (548). We may suppose that the analogy of the far more frequent clauses with ὥς ὅτε (544)¹ caused the same construction to be used also in these, in which the meaning is clearly the same. *E.g.*

ὥς δὲ γυνὴ κλαίῃσι φίλον πόσιν ἀμφιπεσοῦσα,
ὥς τε εἰς πρόσθεν πόλιος λαὸν τε πέσσειν,
ὥς Ὀδυσσεὺς ἐλεεινὸν ὑπ' ὀφρύσι δάκρυον εἵβεν,

i.e. *Ulysses wept as a wife weeps, etc.* Od. viii. 523.

ὥς δὲ λέων ἐν βοῦσι θορῶν ἐξ αὐχένα ἄξῃ πόρτιος ἢ βοῶς, . . .
ὥς τοὺς ἀμφοτέρους ἐξ ἵππων Τυδεὺς υἱὸς βῆσε, and as a lion leaps among the cattle and breaks the neck of a heifer or an ox, so did the son of Tydeus dismount them both from their chariot. Il. v. 161. So Il. ix. 323, x. 183, 485; Od. v. 368.

546. In all the cases of ὥς τε the pronominal article οἱ or τοὺς precedes, referring to the subject or object of the antecedent clause. *E.g.*

Οἱ δ', ὥς τ' ἀμνητῆρες ἐναντίοι ἀλλήλοισιν ὄγμον ἐλαύνωσιν, ὥς Τρῶες καὶ Ἀχαιοὶ ἐπ' ἀλλήλοισι θορόντες δύνουν, and they,—as reapers against each other drive their swaths,—so did Trojans and Achaeans leap upon each other and destroy. Il. xi. 67. So Il. xii. 167, xv. 323; Od. xxii. 302.

547. When a simile has been introduced by the subjunctive with ὥς or ὥς ὅτε, it may be continued by verbs in the present indicative, which seem to be independent of the original construction. Even the aorist indicative may be used to add vividness to the description. *E.g.*

ὥς δ' ὅτε τίς τ' ἐλέφαντα γυνὴ φοῖνικι μῆνην
Μηρονὶς ἢ Κείρα, παρήμιον ἔμμεναι ἵππῳ·
κεῖται δ' ἐν θαλάμῳ, πολέες τέ μιν ἡρήσαντο
ἱππῆς φορέειν· βασιλῆι δὲ κεῖται ἀγαλμα·
τοιοῖ τοι, Μενέλαε, μιάμβην αἵματι μηροῖ. Il. iv. 141.
ὥς δ' ὅτ' ἀφ' ὑψηλῆς κορυφῆς ὄρεος μέγαλοιο
κινήσῃ πυκινὴν νεφέλην στεροπυγερέτα Ζεὺς·
ἐκ τ' ἔφανε πᾶσαι σκοπιαί καὶ πρόωνες ἄκροι
καὶ νᾶπαι οὐρανόθεν δ' ὑπερράγῃ ἄσπετος αἰθήρ·
ὥς Δαναοὶ νηῶν μὲν ἀπωσάμενοι δῆμιον πῦρ
τυτθὸν ἀνίπνευσαν πολέμου δ' οὐ γίγνετ' ἔρωή. Il. xvi. 296.

¹ Delbrück, *Conj. u. Opt.* pp. 161, 162, cites 63 cases of this construction (49 in the Iliad, 14 in the Odyssey), of which 35 have ὥς ὅτε, 10 ὥς ὅτ' ἂν, 3 ὥς ὅποτε, 8 ὥς, and 7 ὥς τε.

‘Ως δ’ ὅτε καπνὸς ἰὼν εἰς οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἵκηται
 ἄσπετος αἰθομένοιο, θεῶν δέ ἐ μῆνις ἀνῆκεν,
 πᾶσι δ’ ἔθηκε πόνον, πολλοῖσι δὲ κῆδ’ ἐφῆκεν,
 ὥς Ἀχιλεὺς Τρῶεσσι πόνον καὶ κῆδ’ ἔθηκεν. Π. xxi. 522.

548. Sometimes the first clause of the simile has the present or aorist indicative. *E.g.*

‘Ως δ’ ἀναμαίμαει βαθέ’ ἄγκεα θεσπιδαῖς πῦρ, ὥς ὃ γε πάντη
 θῦνε. Π. xx. 490. ‘Ως δ’ ὅποτε πλήθων ποταμὸς πεδίοιενδε κάτεισιν,
 πολλὰς δὲ δρυὺς ἐσφέρειται, ὥς ἔφενεν. Π. xi. 492. “Ἦριπε δ’ ὥς ὅτε
 τις δρυὺς ἦριπεν, and he fell as when an oak falls (once fell). Π. xiii. 389.
 ‘Ως δ’ ὅτε τίς τε δράκοντα ἰδὼν παλινόροσος ἀπέστη. Π. iii. 33 : so
 ὥς τε λέων ἐχάρη, iii. 23.

549. Another form of Homeric simile consists of ὥς with a noun, followed by a relative with the subjunctive, which may be followed by an indicative as in 547. *E.g.*

‘Ο δ’ ἐν κονίῃσι χαμαὶ πέσεν, αἰγυριος ὧς,
 ἣ ρά τ’ ἐν εἰαμενῇ ἔλεος μεγάλοιο πεφύκη
 λείη, ἀτὰρ τέ οἱ ὄξοι ἐπ’ ἀκροτάτῃ πεφύασιν.
 τὴν μὲν θ’ ἄρματοπηγὸς ἀνὴρ αἰθωνι σιδήρῳ
 ἐξέταμ’, ὄφρα ἔτν κάμψῃ περικαλλεῖ δίφρῳ.
 ἣ μὲν τ’ ἀζομένη κείται ποταμοῖο παρ’ ὄχθας.
 τοῖον ἄρ’ Ἀνθεμίδην Σιμοείσιον ἐξενάριξεν
 Αἴας διογενῆς. Π. iv. 482.

For ὥς εἰ or ὥς εἴ τε with the optative in Homeric similes, see 485.

“Ο τι μὴ and ὅσον μὴ without a Verb.

550. “Ο τι μὴ and ὅσον μὴ, like εἰ μὴ (476), are used in the sense of *except, unless*, with no verb expressed. *E.g.*

“Ο τι γὰρ μὴ Ἀθῆναι, ἦν οὐδὲν ἄλλο πόλισμα λόγιμον, for *except Athens (what was not Athens) there was no (Ionic) city of any account*. HDt. i. 143. So i. 18, οὐδαμοὶ ὅ τι μὴ Χίοι μῦνοι. Οὐ γὰρ ἦν κρήνη, ὅ τι μὴ μία ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἀκροπόλει, for *there was no spring, except one on the very citadel*. THUC. iv. 26 : so iv. 94, vii. 42. Οἷτ’ ἐπὶ θεωρίαν ἐξήλθες ὅ τι μὴ ἅπαξ εἰς Ἴσθμόν, οὔτε ἄλλοσε οὐδαμῶσε εἰ μὴ ποι σπραπευόμενος. PLAT. Crit. 52 B. So Phaed. 67 A, Rep. 405 C.

Ἴσθι γὰρ δοκῶν ἐμοὶ καὶ ξυμφντεῦσαι τοῦργον εἰργάσθαι θ’, ὅσον μὴ χερσὶ καίνων, i.e. *and to have done the deed too, except so far as you did not slay with your own hands*. SOPH. O. T. 346.

551. Homer once has ὅ τι μὴ or ὅτε μὴ in the same sense : οὐ τέ τω σπένδεσκε θεῶν ὅ τι μὴ Διὶ πατρί, i.e. *except to Zeus (ὅ τι μὴ = εἰ μὴ)*, II. xvi. 227. Here Lange (p. 161) reads ὅτε μὴ.

Special Forms of Antecedent Clause.

552. A conditional relative clause (like a protasis with *εἰ*) may depend on an infinitive or participle (with or without *ὥν*), on a final clause, on a protasis, or on a verbal noun representing the antecedent clause (or apodosis). *E.g.*

See DEM. xxi. 64 (quoted in 525); PLAT. Ap. 17 D, DEM. xxiii. 48 (quoted in 528); AESCH. Ag. 1434, DEM. iv. 21 and 39, xxviii. 21 (quoted in 529); PLAT. Euthyd. 302 A, Theaet. 155 A, XEN. Mem. ii. 3, 12, Cyr. i. 6, 3, ii. 1, 31 (quoted in 531). 'Ορῶ σοι τούτων δεῆσον ὅταν ἐπιθυμήσης φιλίαν πρὸς τινος ποιεῖσθαι. XEN. Mem. ii. 6, 29.

Καὶ ἐμὲ δεῖ ἀπὸ ἀλλάχθαι κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας, ἐπειδὴ τὸ περὶ τοῦ Πρωταγόρου λόγου τέλος σχοίη, i.e. *I ought to be released according to what we agreed to do when the discussion of the doctrine of Protagoras should come to an end.* PLAT. Theaet. 183 C.

553. After past verbs of *waiting* or *expecting* in Homer ὁπότε with the optative sometimes has the meaning of *until*, like *ἕως*. *E.g.*

Οἱ δ' ἔατ' . . . ποτιδέγμενοι ὁππότε ἄρ' ἔλθοι Ἰδαῖος, *and they sat waiting until (for the time when) Idaeus should come.* Il. vii. 414. So iv. 334, ix. 191, xviii. 524. (See 698.)

Mixed Conditional Constructions.

554. The relative with the optative sometimes depends on a present or future tense. This occurs chiefly in Homer, and arises from the slight distinction between the subjunctive and optative in such sentences. *E.g.*

Αἰπύ οἱ ἐσσεύεται νῆας ἐνιπρῆσαι, ὅτε μὴ αὐτός γε Κρονίων ἐμβάλοι αἰθόμενον δαλὸν νήεσσι, *it will be a hard task for him to fire the ships, unless the son of Kronos should himself hurl a flaming brand upon the ships.* Il. xiii. 317. (Regularly ὅτε κε μὴ ἐμβάλη, *unless he shall hurl.*) So Od. xix. 510. Καὶ δ' ἄλλῃ νεμεσῶ ἢ τις τοιαῦτα γε ῥέξει, *and I am angry with any other woman who says (should say) the like.* Od. vi. 286. (This resembles the loosely jointed examples in 500.)

Τοιοῦτῳ δὲ ἔουκας, ἐπεὶ λούσαιτο φάγοι τε, εὐδέμεναι μαλακῶς, *and you seem like such a man as would sleep comfortably (like one likely to sleep comfortably) after he had washed and eaten.* Od. xxiv. 254. (This resembles the examples in 555.)

The optative regularly follows an optative in a wish (177).

555. In Attic Greek an optative in the relative clause sometimes depends on a verb of *obligation*, *propriety*, *possibility*, etc., with an infinitive, the two forming an expression nearly equivalent

to an optative with *ἄν*, which would be expected in their place. (See 502.) *E.g.*

Ἄλλ' ὃν πόλις στήσειε, τοῦδε χρή κλύειν, *we should obey any one whom the state might appoint (if the state should appoint any one, we ought to obey him)*. SOPH. Ant. 666. (Χρή κλύειν is followed by the optative from its nearness to *δικαίως ἄν κλύοι τις*.) Ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν αὐτὸν λέγειν ἃ μὴ σαφῶς εἰδείη φείδεσθαι δεῖ, i.e. *we ought to abstain*, etc.; like *φείδοιτο ἄν τις*. XEN. Cyr. i. 6, 19. Οὓς δὲ ποιήσασθαι τις βούλοιοτο συνεργούς προθύμους, τούτους παντάπασιν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀγαθοῖς θηρατέον εἶναι (θηρατέον εἶναι = *θηρᾶν δεῖν*). Ib. ii. 4, 10. Ὑπερορᾶν οὐ δυνατόν ὑμῶν ἀνδρὶ ὃς εἰδείη κυρίους ὄντας ὃ τι βούλεσθε αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι. Id. Hell. vii. 3, 7. So Ib. iii. 4, 18. Σωφρόνων ἐστὶ μὴδὲ εἰ μικρὰ τὰ διαφέροντα εἴη πόλεμον ἀναρρεῖσθαι. Ib. vi. 3, 5. So after πολλὸν ῥῶν (ἐστὶ), Ib. vi. 5; 52. Σωφρόνων ἐστίν, εἰ μὴ ἀδικοῖντο, ἥσυχάζειν, i.e. *it is proper for prudent men*, etc. THUC. i. 120. Ἀποδοτέον οὐδ' ὁπωστίουν τότε, ὅποτε τις μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοῖ. PLAT. Rep. 332 A.

556. An indicative or subjunctive in the relative clause may depend on a potential optative (with *ἄν*), sometimes when the potential force is felt in the apodosis, and sometimes when the optative with *ἄν* is treated as a primary tense from its nearness to the future indicative. *E.g.*

Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τὸ νοσεῖν, ὅταν ἀγαθοῦ τιнос αἷτια γίγνηται, ἀγαθὰ ἄν εἴη, *therefore, both health and disease, when they prove to be the causes of any good, would naturally be good things*. XEN. Mem. iv. 2, 32; so ii. 2, 3. Ὅταν δὲ τις θεῶν βλάβητι, δύναιτ' ἄν οὐδ' ἄν ἰσχύων φυγεῖν, *when one of the Gods does mischief, not even a strong man could escape*. SOPH. El. 696. Ὡστ' ἀποφύγοις ἄν ἦντιν' ἄν βούλῃ δίκην, *so that you can (could) get off in any suit you please*. AR. Nub. 1151. Οἵτινες τοῖς μὲν ἴσοις μὴ εἴκουσι, τοῖς δὲ κρείσσοσι καλῶς προσφέρονται, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἥσσους μέτριοι εἰσι, πλείστ' ἄν ὀρθοῖντο. THUC. v. 111. Ὁ δὲ μὴδὲν κακὸν ποιεῖ, οὐδ' ἄν τιнос εἴη κακοῦ αἷτιον; *and what does no harm could not be the cause of any harm at all, could it?* PLAT. Rep. 379 B. Ἐγὼ δὲ ταύτην μὲν τὴν εἰρήνην, ἕως ἄν εἰς Ἀθηναίων λείπηται, οὐδέποτ' ἄν συμβουλευσάμην ποιήσασθαι τῇ πόλει, *I would never advise the city to make this peace, so long as a single Athenian shall be left*. DEM. xix. 14. (Here ἕως λείπεται, *so long as one should be left*, would be more regular.) Ὅταν δ' ἀφανίσας τις τὰκριβὲς λόγῳ ἑξαπατᾶν πειράται, πῶς ἄν δικαίως πιστεύοιτο; Id. xxxiii. 36. (See 178.)

557. A conditional relative clause may contain a potential optative or indicative (with *ἄν*), which has its proper meaning. *E.g.*

Ἐξ ὧν ἄν τις εὖ λέγων διαβάλλοι, ἐκ τούτων αὐτοὺς πείσεσθαι (ἔφη), *he said that they would form their opinion upon any slanders which any good speaker might chance to utter*. THUC. vii. 48. Ὅντιν' ἄν ὑμεῖς

εἰς ταύτην τὴν τάξιν κατεστήσατε, οὗτος τῶν ἴσων αἴτιος ἦν ἂν κακῶν ὅσωνπερ καὶ οὗτος, *any one soever whom you might have appointed to this post would have been the cause of as great calamities as this man has been.* DEM. xix. 29. (Without ἂν, ὅντινα κατεστήσατε would be equivalent to εἰ τινα ἄλλον κατεστήσατε, *if you had appointed any one else (which you did not do).* With ἂν, it is a potential indicative.)

See 506, and for the optative with *κέ* in conditional relative sentences in Homer (probably not potential), see 542.

Assimilation in Conditional Relative Clauses.

558. When a conditional relative clause *referring to the future* depends on a subjunctive or optative referring to the future, it regularly takes by assimilation the same mood with its leading verb. The leading verb may be in a protasis or apodosis, in another conditional relative clause, in an expression of a wish, or in a final clause. *E.g.*

Ἐάν τινες οἱ ἂν δύνωνται τοῦτο ποιῶσι, καλῶς ἔξει, *if any who shall be able do this, it will be well.* Εἴ τινες οἱ δύναιτο τοῦτο ποιῶν, καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι, *if any who should be able should do this, it would be well.* Εἴθε πάντες οἱ δύναιτο τοῦτο ποιῶν, *O that all who may be able would do this.* (Here the principle of assimilation makes οἱ δύναιτο after an optative preferable to οἱ ἂν δύνωνται, which would express the same idea.) Τεθναίην ὅτε μοι μηκέτι ταῦτα μέλοι, *may I die when these are no longer my delight.* ΜΙΜΝ. i. 2. So in Latin: Si absurde canat is qui se haberi velit musicum, turpior sit.—Sic injurias fortunæ quas ferre nequeas defugiendo relinquis.

For examples see 529 and 531.

559. When a conditional relative clause depends on a past tense of the indicative implying the non-fulfilment of a condition, it regularly takes a past tense of the indicative by *assimilation*. The leading verb may be in a protasis or apodosis, in another conditional relative clause, in an expression of a wish, or in a final clause. *E.g.*

Εἴ τινες οἱ ἐδύναντο τοῦτο ἔπραξαν, καλῶς ἂν ἔσχεν, *if any who had been able had done this, it would have been well.* Εἴθε πάντες οἱ ἐδύναντο τοῦτο ἔπραξαν, *O that all who had been able had done this.* So in Latin: Nam si solos eos diceres miseros quibus moriendum esset, neminem tu quidem eorum qui viverent exciperes.

For examples see 528.

560. It will be seen that this principle of assimilation accounts for the unreal indicative and the optative in conditional relative sentences, which have been already explained by the analogy of the forms of protasis. (See 528 and 531.) In fact, wherever this assimilation occurs, the relative clause stands as a protasis to its antecedent clause.

Occasionally this principle is disregarded, so that a subjunctive depends on an optative (178).

For the influence of assimilation in determining the mood of a dependent sentence, see 176.

561. The indicative in the construction of 525, referring simply to the present or past, cannot be affected by assimilation, as this would change its time. *E.g.*

‘Υμεῖς δ’ ἐλοισθε ὃ τι καὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ ᾧ πανσι συνοίσειν ὑμῖν μέλλει, and may you choose what is likely to benefit the state and all of you. DEM. iii. 36. Compare this with DEM. ix. 76, ὃ τι δ’ ὑμῖν δόξειε (so Σ originally), τοῦτ’, ὃ πάντες θεοὶ, συνενέγκοι, whatever you may decide, may this be for our good.

In SOPH. ANT. 373, ὅς τὰδ’ ἔρδοι would belong here; but ὅς τὰδ’ ἔρδοι (Laur.), = εἴ τις τὰδ’ ἔρδοι, falls under 558.

562. The principle of 558 and 559 applies only to conditional relative clauses. If the relative refers to a definite antecedent, there can be no assimilation, and the indicative or any other construction required by the sense is used. *E.g.*

Εἰ τῶν πολιτῶν οἷσι νῦν πιστεύομεν, τοῦτοισι ἀπιστήσοιμεν, οἷς δ’ οὐ χρῶμεθα, τοῦτοισι χρῆσάμεσθ’, ὥσως σωθῆμεν ἂν. AR. Ran. 1446. Εἴθ’ ἦσθα δυνατὸς δρᾶν ὅσον πρόθυμος εἶ, O that thou couldst do as much as thou art eager to do. EUR. Her. 731. (With ἦσθα for εἶ the meaning would be as much as thou wert (or mightest be) eager to do.)

563. Conditional relative clauses depending on a subjunctive or optative in a general supposition (462; 532) are generally assimilated to the subjunctive or optative; but sometimes they take the indicative (534). *E.g.*

Οὐδ’, ἐπεὶ δὲ ὦν ἂν πρίηται κύριος γένηται, τῷ προδότῃ συμβούλῳ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐτι χρῆται. DEM. xviii. 47. See PLAT. Rep. 508 C and D (reading ὦν ὁ ἥλιος καταλάμπει); Charm. 164 B. Ὅ δὲ τότε μάλιστα ἔχαιρεν, ὁπότε τάχιστα τυχόντας ὦν δέοιντο ἀποπέμποι. XEN. Ag. ix. 2.

Αἰτία μὲν γάρ ἐστιν, ὅταν τις ψιλᾷ χρῆσάμενος λόγῳ μὴ παράσχηται πίστιν ὦν λέγει, ἔλεγχος δὲ, ὅταν ὦν ἂν εἴπῃ τις καὶ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὁμοῦ διείξῃ. DEM. xxii. 22. (Here ὦν λέγει and ὦν ἂν εἴπῃ are nearly equivalent.) Ἐκάλει δὲ καὶ ἐτίμα ὁπότε τινὰς ἴδοι τοιοῦτον ποιήσαντας ὁ πάντας ἐβούλετο ποιεῖν. XEN. Cyr. ii. 1, 30. (Here βούλετο for ἐβούλετο would correspond to δέοιντο in Ag. ix. 2, above.)

Δέ in the Antecedent Clause.

564. The conjunction δέ sometimes introduces the clause on which a relative depends. Its force here is the same as in apodosis (512). *E.g.*

Οἷη περ φύλλων γενεή, τοίη δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν. IL. vi. 146. Ἐπεὶ

τε ὁ πόλεμος κατέστη, ὁ δὲ φαίνεται καὶ ἐν τούτῳ προγνοὺς τὴν δύναμιν; and *when the war broke out, (then) he appears, etc.* THUC. ii. 65. Μέχρι μὲν οὖν οἱ τοξόται εἶχον τε τὰ βέλη αὐτοῖς καὶ οἰοί τε ἦσαν χρῆσθαι, οἱ δὲ ἀντεῖχον, so long as their archers both had their arrows and were able to use them, they held out. Id. iii. 98. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀφικόμενοι μάχῃ ἐκράτησαν . . . φαίνονται δὲ οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα πάσῃ τῇ δυνάμει χρησάμενοι. Id. i. 11. Ὡςπερ οἱ ὀπλίται, οὕτω δὲ καὶ οἱ πελτασταί. XEN. Cyr. viii. 5, 12.

FINAL RELATIVE CLAUSES EXPRESSING PURPOSE.

565. (*Future Indicative.*) In Attic Greek a relative with the future indicative often expresses a purpose, like a final clause. Its negative is μή. *E.g.*

Πρεσβείαν δὲ πέμπειν, ἥτις ταῦτ' ἐρεῖ καὶ παρέσται τοῖς πράγμασιν, and to send an embassy to say these things, and to be present at the transaction. DEM. i. 2. Φημὶ δὴ δεῖν ἡμᾶς πρὸς Θετταλοὺς πρεσβείαν πέμπειν, ἣ τοὺς μὲν διδάξει ταῦτα, τοὺς δὲ παροξυνεῖ. Id. ii. 11. Ἔδοξε τῷ δήμῳ τριάκοντα ἄνδρας ἐλέσθαι, οἱ τοὺς πατρίους νόμους ξυγγραψούσι, καθ' οὓς πολιτεύσουσι, the people voted to choose thirty men, to compile the ancestral laws by which they were to govern. XEN. Hell. ii. 3, 2. Εἴσω δὲ πέμψαι (ἐκέλευσε) τινὰς, οἵτινες αὐτῷ τὰ ἔνδον ἰδόντες ἀπαγγελοῦσιν. XEN. Cyr. v. 2, 3. Ναυτικὸν παρεσκεύαζον ὅ τι πέμψουσιν ἐς τὴν Λέσβον, καὶ ναύαρχον προσέταξαν Ἀλκίδαν, ὃς ἐμελλεν ἐπιπλεῖσθαι. THUC. iii. 16. See DEM. xxi. 109. Οὐ γὰρ ἔστι μοι χρήματα, ὁπόθεν ἐκτίσω, for I have no money to pay the fine with. PLAT. Ap. 37 C.

Ῥιψὼν με γῆς ἐκ τῆσδε, ὅπου θνητῶν φανοῦμαι μηδενὸς προσήγορος. SOPH. O. T. 1437; so 1412. Μέλλουσι γὰρ σ' ἐνταῦθα πέμψειν, ἔνθα μή ποθ' ἡλίου φέγγος προσόψει, ᾧσα δ' ὑμνήσεις κακά, they are to send you where you shall never behold the sun's light (to some place, that there you may never behold, etc.). Id. El. 379. So Aj. 659; Tr. 800.

566. The antecedent of the relative in this construction may be either definite or indefinite; but the negative is always μή because of the final force. The future indicative is regularly retained after past tenses, as in object clauses with ὅπως (340); but see 573 and 574.

567. A past purpose may be expressed by the imperfect of μέλλω. See 76; and THUC. iii. 16, quoted in 565.

568. (*Subjunctive and Optative in Homer.*) In Homer these final relative clauses have the subjunctive (generally with κέ) after primary tenses, and the present or aorist optative (without κέ) after secondary tenses. *E.g.*

Καὶ ἄμ' ἡγεμόν' ἐσθλὸν ὄπασσον, ὃς κέ με κείσ' ἀγάγη, and also send a good guide, who shall lead me thither (to lead me thither). Od. xv. 310.

Αὐτὸς νῦν ὄνομ' εὔρεο, ὃ τι κε θῆται παιδὸς παιδὶ φίλῳ, *find a name to give the child*. Od. xix. 403. Τέον οὐνομα εἶπε, ἵνα τοι δῶ ξείνιον. ϕ κε σὺ χαίρης. Od. ix. 355. Αὐτίκα μάντις ἐλείσεται, ὅς κέν τοι εἴπῃσιν ὁδόν. Od. x. 538. Ἐλκος δ' ἡτῆρ ἐπιμάσσεται, ἥδ' ἐπιθήσει φάρμαχ', ἃ κεν παύσῃσι μελαινῶν ὀδυνῶν. Il. iv. 191. Ἄλλ' ἄγετε, κλητοὺς ὀτρύνομεν, οἳ κε τάχιστα ἔλθωσ' ἐς κλισίην Πηληϊάδew Ἀχιλῆος. Il. ix. 165. Ἐκδοτε, καὶ τιμὴν ἀποτινέμεν ἦν τιν' εἰκεν, ἥ τε καὶ ἐσσομένοισι μετ' ἀνθρώποισι πέληται. Il. iii. 459: this verse (also in iii. 287) and Od. xviii. 336 are probably the only cases of the subjunctive without *κέ* in these sentences.

Ἀγγελον ἦκαν, ὃς ἀγγείλειε γυναικί, *they sent a messenger to tell the woman*. Od. xv. 458. Πάπτηνεν δ' ἀνὰ πύργον Ἀχαιῶν, εἴ τιν' ἴδοιτο ἡγεμόνων, ὃς τίς οἱ ἀρὴν ἐτάροισιν ἀμύναι. Il. xii. 333. This optative is rare.

569. The earlier Greek here agrees with the Latin in using the subjunctive and optative, while the Attic adopts a new construction with the future indicative.

570. The future indicative occurs in Od. xiv. 333, ὦμοσε νῆα κατειρύνθαι καὶ ἐπαρτέας ἔμμεν ἑταίρους, οἳ δὴ μιν πῆμψουσι φίλῳ ἐς πατρίδα γαίαν. The potential optative with *κέ* may take the place of a future form; as οὐδέ οἱ ἄλλοι εἴσ', οἳ κεν κατὰ δῆμον ἀλάσκοιεν κακότητα, Od. iv. 166. So τῶν κ' ἐπιβαίῃν, Il. v. 192 (cf. xxii. 348). In none of the Homeric examples of this construction is the relative clause negative.

571. A final force is seen in a few Homeric temporal clauses with ὅτε (ὅτ' ἂν, ὅτε κε) or ὁπότε with the subjunctive, which are chiefly expressions of emphatic prediction:—

Ἔσσοται ἡμῶν ὅτ' ἂν ποτ' ὀλώλῃ Ἴλιος ἱρὴ, Ζεὺς δέ σφιν αὐτὸς ἐπισσεύεισιν ἐρεμνὴν αἰγίδα πάσιν, *a day shall come when sacred Ilios shall fall (i.e. a day for the fall of Ilios) and when Zeus shall shake his terrible aegis before them all*. Il. iv. 164; so vi. 448. See Il. viii. 373, xxi. 111. See Monro, *Hom. Gr.* p. 209.

572. 1. In Attic Greek the subjunctive is not used in final relative sentences as it is in Homer (568). A few expressions like *ἔχει ὃ τι εἴπῃ*, *he has something to say*, follow the analogy of οὐκ ἔχει ὃ τι εἴπῃ, *he knows not what to say*, which contains an indirect question (677). *E.g.*

Τοιοῦτον ἔθος παρέδσαν, ὥστε ἑκατέρους ἔχειν ἐφ' οἷς φιλοτιμηθῶσιν, *that both may have things in which they may glory*. Isoc. iv. 44. (Here there is really no indirect question, for the meaning is not *that they may know in what they are to glory*.) Οὐδὲν ἔτι διώσει αὐτῷ, ἐὰν μόνον ἔχῃ ὅτῳ διαλέγεται, *if only he shall have some one to talk with*. PLAT. Symp. 194 D. Τοῖς μέλλονσιν ἕξειν ὃ τι εἰσφέρωσιν. XEN. Oec. vii. 20. Compare ἀπορεῖς ὃ τι λέγῃς and εὐπορεῖς ὃ τι λέγῃς in the same sentence, PLAT. Ion. 536 B.

2. The subjunctive and optative may be used with a deliberative force, even when the relative has an antecedent, provided the leading clause expresses doubt or perplexity. *E.g.*

Οὐ γὰρ ἄλλον οἶδ' ὅτῳ λέγω. SOPH. Ph. 938. Οὐκ ἔχω σόφισμ' ὅτῳ πημονῆς ἀπαλλαγῶ. AESCH. Pr. 470. Οὐδένα εἶχον ὅστις ἐπιστολὰς πέμψειε. EUR. I. T. 588. So ἱκανοὺς οἷς δῶ, XEN. An. i. 7, 7 (cf. 677). See SOPH. Ph. 281.

573. The present or aorist optative occurs rarely in Attic with a final sense, where there is no deliberative force. *E.g.*

Κρύψας' ἐαυτὴν ἔνθα μή τις εἰσίδοι, βρυχάτο. SOPH. Tr. 903. So ὅστις λάκοι, AR. Ran. 97. See PLAT. Rep. 398 B and 578 E.

For the constructions of 572 and 573 see Appendix VI (p. 411).

574. The future optative also occasionally occurs, as the natural correlative of the regular future indicative, which is generally retained after past tenses (566). *E.g.*

*Ἐφευγον ἔνθα μήποτ' ὀψοίμην ὀνείδη τελοῦμενα, *I fled to (some place) where I might never see the disgrace accomplished.* SOPH. O. T. 796. Ἐσκόπει ὅπως ἔσοιτο αὐτῷ ὅστις ζῶντα γηροτροφήσοι καὶ τελευτήσαντα θάψοι αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ νομιζόμενα αὐτῷ ποιήσοι. ISAE. ii. 10. Αἰρεθέντες ἐφ' ὅτε ξυγγράψαι νόμους, καθ' οὓσιν αὖτε πολιτεύουσιντο, *having been chosen with the condition that they should compile laws, by which they were to govern.* XEN. Hell. ii. 3, 11. (See Ib. ii. 3, 2, quoted in 565, where καθ' οὓς πολιτεύουσιν is used in the same sense.)

CONSECUTIVE RELATIVE CLAUSES EXPRESSING RESULT.—

CAUSAL RELATIVE.

575. (*Indicative, with negative οὐ.*) The relative with any tense of the indicative can be used to denote a *result*, in the sense of ὥστε with the indicative (582). The negative here is οὐ. This occurs chiefly after negative clauses, or interrogatives implying a negative. *E.g.*

Τίς οὕτω μαίνεται ὅστις οὐ βούλεται σοι φίλος εἶναι; *who is so mad that he does not wish to be your friend?* XEN. An. ii. 5, 12. (Here ὥστε οὐ βούλεται might be used.) Ἀκούσας τοιαυτῷ ἃ τὸν τοῦδ' οὐ ποτ' εὐφρανεῖ βίον. SOPH. O. C. 1352. So HDT. vii. 46. Τίς οὕτως εὐήθης ἐστὶν ὑμῶν, ὅστις ἀγνοεῖ τὸν ἐκείθεν πόλεμον δεῦρο ἦξοντα, ἂν ἀμελήσωμεν; i.e. *who of you is so simple that he does not know, etc.?* DEM. i. 15. (Here ὥστε ἀγνοεῖ might be used.) Τίς οὕτω πόρρω τῶν πολιτικῶν ἦν πραγμάτων, ὅστις οὐκ ἐγγὺς ἦνα γκάσθη γενέσθαι τῶν συμφορῶν; ISOC. iv. 113. Τίς οὕτως ῥάθυμός ἐστιν, ὅστις οὐ μετασχεῖν βουλήσεται ταύτης τῆς στρατείας; Id. iv. 185.

So also with the potential optative; as οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο οὕτως ἀδαμάντινος, ὃς ἂν μένειεν ἐν τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ, *no one would ever become so adamant that he would remain firm in justice.* PLAT. Rep. 360 B.

576. (*Future or Present Indicative, with negative μή.*) The relative with the future (sometimes the present) indicative may denote a result which is *aimed at*, in the same general sense as ὥστε with present or aorist infinitive (582), but with more exactness (577). The negative is μή. *E.g.*

Εὔχετο μηδεμίαν οἱ συντυχίην τοιαύτην γενέσθαι, ἣ μιν παύσει καταστρέψασθαι τὴν Εὐρώπην, i.e. *no such occurrence as to prevent him from subjugating Europe*. HDT. vii. 54. (We might have ὥστε μιν παῦσαι. Compare εἰς τοσαύτην ἦλθε μεταβολὴν ὥσθ' ἀπάσης τῆς Ἀσίας γενέσθαι δεσπότης, ISOC. v. 66.) Ἀνόητον ἐπὶ τοιούτους ἵεναι ὧν κρατήσας μὴ κατασχήσει τις, *it is absurd to attack men of such a kind that if we overcome them we shall not hold them*. THUC. vi. 11. (Here ὥστε μὴ κατασχέειν, *so as not to hold them*, could express only the general sense of the construction.) Ὁ γράφων ἰδία τι Χαριδίμῳ τοιοῦτον ὃ μὴ πᾶσι καὶ ὑμῖν ἔσται. DEM. xxiii. 86. Τοιαυτ' ἀπαγγελοῦσι ἐξ ὧν μὴδ' ἂν ὀτιοῦν ἢ κινήθῃσονται. Id. xix. 324. Τίς οὐκ ἂν δέξαιτο τοιαύτης πολιτείας μετέχειν, ἐν ᾗ μὴ διαλήσει χρηστὸς ὧν; ISOC. iii. 16. Οὐδὲ τοιαῦτα λέγειν (πρέπει) ἐξ ὧν ὁ βίος μὴδὲν ἐπιδώσει τῶν πεισθέντων. Id. iv. 189. Τοιαῦτα ζητήσεις λέγειν ἐξ ὧν μήτε αὐτὸς χεῖρων εἶναι δόξεις μήτε τοὺς μιμουμένους λυμανεῖ. Id. xi. 49. Βουλευθεὶς τοιοῦτον μνημεῖον καταλιπεῖν, ὃ μὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεώς ἐστιν (= ὥστε μὴ εἶναι). Id. iv. 89.

577. The construction of ὥστε after τοιοῦτος (584), which best corresponds to this relative expression, is not common, as οὕτως is the natural antecedent of ὥστε, while τοιοῦτος is naturally followed by οἶος or ὅς. The relative clause with the future is a much more definite expression, with its power of designating time, number, and person, than the infinitive. (See THUC. vi. 11, under 576.) Τοιοῦτος may also be followed by οἶος and the infinitive (759).

578. Ὅπως as a relative is sometimes used in this construction in a way which illustrates its use as a final particle. (See 313.) *E.g.*

Ποίεις δὲ οὕτω ὅπως τῶν σῶν ἐνδεήσει μὴδὲν, *and act so that there shall be nothing wanting on your part; lit. act in that way by which, etc.* HDT. vii. 18. Τὸ οὕτως ἐπίστασθαι ἀνθρώπων ἄλλων προστατεύειν ὅπως ἔξουσιν πάντα τὰ ἐπιτήδεια, . . . τοῦτο θαυμαστὸν ἐφαίνετο, i.e. *in such a way that they should have, etc.* XEN. Cyr. i. 6, 7. So Cyr. ii. 4, 31.

579. (Optative.) The relative in this consecutive construction does not take the subjunctive. The optative occurs occasionally depending upon another optative. We find the future optative in PLAT. Rep. 416 C, φαίη ἂν τις δεῖν καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις καὶ τὴν ἄλλην οὐσίαν τοιαύτην αὐτοῖς παρασκευάσασθαι, ἥτις μήτε τοὺς φύλακας ὥς ἀρίστους εἶναι παῦσοι αὐτοὺς, κακοργεῖν τε μὴ ἐπαροῖ περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας, with which compare 415 E, τοιαύτας οἷας χειμῶνός τε στέγειν καὶ θέρουσι ἱκανὰς εἶναι. The aorist occurs in DEM. vi. 8, τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πόλει οὐδὲν ἂν ἐνδείξαιτο τοσοῦτον οὐδὲ ποιήσειεν, ἢ φ' οὐ πεισθέντες τινας Ἑλλήνων ἐκείνῳ προείσθε, i.e. *nothing so great as to persuade you to sacrifice any of the Greeks to him (= ὥστε ὑμᾶς πεισθέντας προέσθαι)*. The practical difference between the pure optative here and the potential προείσθε ἂν, like ὅς ἂν μείνειεν in PLAT. Rep. 360 B (quoted in 575), is slight; but it would be seen if we had ὥστε προέσθαι here (*so great as to make you sacrifice*) and ὥστε μείνειεν ἂν there (*so firm that he would remain*).

580. The relative may have a causal signification, being equivalent to *ὅτι*, *because*, and a personal pronoun or demonstrative word. The verb is generally in the indicative, as in ordinary causal sentences (713); but it may be in the potential optative or potential indicative. The negative is *οὐ*; but when the relative clause is conditional as well as causal, the negative is *μή*. *E.g.*

Θαυμαστὸν ποιεῖς, ὃς ἡμῖν οὐδὲν δίδως, *you do a strange thing in giving us nothing* (like *ὅτι σὺ οὐδὲν δίδως*). XEN. Mem. ii. 7, 13. Δόξας ἀμαθία εἶναι, ὃς . . . ἐκέλευε, *believing him to be unlearned, because he commanded*, etc. HDT. i. 33. Τὴν μητέρα (ἐμακάριζον), οἷων τέκνων ἐκύρησε (like *ὅτι τοίων*). Id. i. 31. Εὐδαίμων ἐφαίνετο, ὥς ἀδεῶς καὶ γενναίως ἐτελεύτα, *i.e. because he died so fearlessly and nobly* (ὥς being equivalent to *ὅτι οὕτως*). PLAT. Phaed. 58 E.

Ταλαίπωρος εἶ, ᾧ μήτε θεοὶ πατρῷοί εἰσι μήθ' ἱερά, *you are wretched, since you have no ancestral Gods (if you really have none)*, etc. Id. Euthyd. 302 B. Πῶς ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐμοῦ καταγινώσκοιτε, ᾧ τὸ παράπαν πρὸς τούτον μηδὲν συμβύλαιόν ἐστιν; *i.e. since I have no contract at all with this man (or if I have no contract)*. DEM. xxxiii. 34. Ὅπου τοίνυν μηδεὶς τετόλμηκε τῶν οἰκείων τούτῳ μαρτυρῆσαι, πῶς οὐκ εἰκός ἐστιν ὑμᾶς ἡγείσθαι με τᾷ ληθῇ λέγειν; *whereas then (or if then) no one has dared*, etc. Id. xlix. 38. So IV. 26. Ὅποτε αἱ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς συνθῆκαι ἡφανίσθησαν ἕτεραί δὲ μὴ ἐγράφησαν, πῶς ὀρθῶς ἂν ἐμοὶ δικάζοιτο, καθ' ὃ μὴ ἔχει παρασχέσθαι συνθήκας; *whereas the original agreement disappeared and the other was never written, how can he justly go to law with me, when (or if) he cannot bring forward any agreement against me?* Id. xxxiii. 30. So SOPH. O. T. 817, 1335, O. C. 1680, ANT. 696, PH. 178, 255; AR. Ran. 1459; HDT. i. 71 (τοῖσί γε μὴ ἐστι μηδέν); THUC. iv. 126 (οἳ γε μηδὲ . . . ἤκετε). The potential imperfect occurs in ANT. v. 66, μὴ τοίνυν ἐμοὶ νείμῃτε τὸ ἄπορον τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ μὴδ' ἂν αὐτοὶ εὐπορεῖτε, *do not then bring upon me this perplexity, in which you yourselves would not know what to do* (half causal, half conditional).

581. In the last examples with *μή*, the causal and the conditional forces are united, but in English we can express only one of them. Thus ᾧ μήτε θεοὶ πατρῷοί εἰσι, besides its causal force, implies a condition; so that we might translate equally well *if (as it appears) you have no ancestral Gods, you are wretched*. The same combination of cause and condition is seen in the Latin *siquidem*.

CONSECUTIVE CLAUSES WITH ὥστε OR ὡς AND WITH ἐφ' ᾧ OR ἐφ' ᾧτε.¹

582. A consecutive clause expresses a consequence, that

¹ See Gildersleeve in *Am. Jour. Phil.* vii. pp. 161-175; and Seume, *De Sententiis Consecutivis Graecis*, Göttingen, 1883.

is, the effect or result (actual or potential) of something that is stated in the leading clause. Such a clause is introduced by some relative word, generally by ὥστε, *so as, so that*. (See 575.) The consequence may be either one which the action of the leading verb aims at and *tends* to produce, or one which that action actually *does* produce. This is the fundamental distinction between ὥστε with the infinitive (with μή for its negative) and ὥστε with the indicative (with οὐ for its negative). *Eg.*

Πάν ποιούσιν ὥστε δίκην μὴ δίδόναι, *they do everything in such a way as (i.e. so as) not to suffer punishment, i.e. they aim, in all they do, at not being punished; it is not, however, implied that they actually escape.* PLAT. Gorg. 479 C. On the other hand, πάν ποιούσιν ὥστε δίκην οὐ δίδόασιν would mean *they do everything in such a way that (i.e. so that) they are not punished.*

583. Though this illustrates the fundamental distinction in thought on which the distinction in form is based, there are many examples in which ὥστε with the infinitive and ὥστε with the indicative seem to amount to essentially the same thing, although the processes by which the meaning is expressed in the two constructions are essentially different. Thus we can say οὕτως ἐστὶ δεινὸς ὥστε δίκην μὴ δίδόναι, *he is so skilful as not to be punished*, and also οὕτως ἐστὶ δεινὸς ὥστε δίκην οὐ δίδωσιν, *he is so skilful that he is not punished*; and though we should receive the same impression from both statements, so that both might be made of the same man under the same circumstances, yet the two constructions (one stating a *tendency* and the other a *fact*) are very different, and they seemed far more so to a Greek than they do to us.

584. ὥστε is properly a relative particle of comparison, meaning *as*. Its correlative *so* may be expressed in a demonstrative like οὕτως, or implied; as οὕτως ἐστὶ δεινὸς ὥστε σε πείσαι, *he is so skilful as to persuade you*, or ἡ πόλις τετείχισται ὥστε ἱκανὴ εἶναι σφῆξιν τοὺς ἐνοικοῦντας, *the city is walled so as to be able to keep its inhabitants safe*. (See τοιοῦτους καὶ οὕτω τρέφειν κόνας ὥστε ἐπιχερῆσαι, PLAT. Rep. 416 A; and compare τοιοῦτος οἶος with the infinitive in 759.) These expressions in Greek state no more than *he has the skill to persuade you* and *the city has walls enough to be able, etc.*; the further ideas that *he does persuade* and *the city is able* are inferences, which are strongly suggested and generally felt when the expressions are used, but they do not lie in the words. When the Greek wishes to express these facts definitely and not to leave them to inference, it uses the indicative with

ᾧστε; as οὕτως ἐστὶ δεινὸς ᾧστε σε πείθει, *he is so skilful that he persuades you*, or ἡ πόλις τετείχισται ᾧστε ἰκανὴ ἐστιν. But here the use of a finite verb compels the writer to make his expression more definite than it was before; for, whereas ᾧστε πείσαι and ᾧστε ἰκανὴ εἶναι meant only (so) as to persuade and (so) as to be able, without limiting the expressions to past, present, or future time, he cannot use a tense of the indicative without fixing its time, that is, without making a definite statement. So long as the infinitive has no subject and can be translated by our simple infinitive (as above), we can generally express its force without putting into our translation more than we find in the Greek; the formal distinction between *so skilful as to persuade* and *so skilful that he persuades* being apparent even when we mean substantially the same by both. When the clause with ᾧστε is negative, a marked distinction appears in Greek to show the different point of view taken in the two expressions, and we have ᾧστε μὴ πείσαι and ᾧστε οὐ πείθει. This is of course lost in English with our single negative. But when the infinitive has a subject, it must be translated by a finite verb in some definite tense, number, and person, that is, by a statement and not by a mere expression of tendency, although the force of the infinitive in Greek is the same as before. Thus we generally translate σχολάζεις, ᾧστε θαυμάζεις ἐμέ (EUR. Hec. 730), *you delay, so that I am astonished*, as if it were ᾧστε θαυμάζω ἐγώ, simply because we cannot use our infinitive with a subject expressed. If, however, we substitute an equivalent form which avoids this difficulty, like *so as to astonish me*, we see that there is really no such definite character in ᾧστε θαυμάζεις ἐμέ as we impose upon it, and that it no more expresses a statement than ᾧστε σε πείσαι (above) does. The same difficulty of translating the Greek infinitive with its subject has done much to obscure the force of the tenses of the articular infinitive and of the infinitive with αἰν. (See also 603.)

In many uses of the infinitive with ᾧστε it is not even inferred that the result towards which the infinitive expresses a tendency is actually reached. Thus, in clauses with ᾧστε expressing a purpose or a condition, and where the infinitive is generally used without ᾧστε, we cannot substitute the indicative for the infinitive (see the examples under 587, 2 and 3, and 588).¹

¹ Shilleto (in the Appendix to his edition of *Demosthenes de Falsa Legatione*) thus illustrates the distinction between ᾧστε οὐκ ἐβούλετο and ᾧστε μὴ βούλεσθαι. "The difference seems simply to be this: οὕτως ἀφρων ἦν ᾧστε οὐκ ἐβούλετο, *he was so foolish that he did not wish* (expressive of the real result or consequence); οὕτως ἀφρων ἦν ᾧστε μὴ βούλεσθαι, *he was so foolish as not to wish* (expressive of the natural consequence). . . . Now it is obvious that an energetic speaker, wishing to express that the result (was not only of a

585. In Homer ὥστε (or rather ὥς τε) is found, with two exceptions (589), only in the sense of *as*, like ὥσπερ. See its use in similes, as ὥς τε λέων ἐχάρη, Il. iii. 23. The τε here is like that commonly added to relatives in Homer (as in ὅς τε) and to ἐπεὶ in Herodotus. The Attic poets are the first to use ὥστε freely with the infinitive. In Sophocles we first find ὥστε with the finite moods; this seems to have arisen from a desire to express definitely the accomplishment of the result, which the infinitive expressed only by inference.

586. Ὡς, originally of the same meaning with ὥς τε, was seldom used in consecutive sentences except in certain authors. (See 608.)

“Ὡστε WITH THE INFINITIVE.

587. “Ὡστε with the infinitive, with a demonstrative expressed or implied, means *so as*; but when the infinitive has a subject which must be expressed in English, we are generally obliged to translate the particle with its antecedent by *so that*. The expression properly means only that one action or state is of such a nature as to be followed by another as a consequence, but it is often implied also, apart from the words, that the second action or state actually does follow.

1. The consequence may be simply a result which a previous act tends to produce. *E.g.*

Ἀμφὶ δὲ κυκλοῦντο πᾶσαν νῆσον, ὥστ' ἀμυχανεῖν ὅποι τράποιντο, *and they encircled the whole island, so that they (the Persians) knew not whither to turn* (i.e. *so as to perplex the Persians, etc.*) AESCH. Pers. 457. Τόσονδε μισεῖν ὥστε τὴν δίκην πατεῖν, *to hate so violently as to trample on justice*. SOPH. Aj. 1335; so 1325. Σὺ δὲ σχολάζεις, ὥστε θαυμάζειν ἐμέ, *but you delay, so that I am astonished* (see 584). EUR. Hec. 730. Πάντας οὕτω διατιθεῖς ἀπεπέμπετο ὥστε αὐτῷ μᾶλλον φίλους εἶναι ἢ τῷ βασιλεῖ. XEN. An. i. 1, 5. Δυσκολία καὶ μανία πολλάκις εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν ἐμπίπτουσιν οὕτως ὥστε καὶ τὰς ἐπισημίας ἐκβάλλειν. Id. Mem. iii. 12, 6. Ἦν πεπαιδευμένος οὕτως ὥστε πᾶν μικρὰ κεκτημένος πᾶν ῥαδίως ἔχειν ἀρκοῦντα, *he had been so educated as very easily to have enough, although he possessed very little*. Ib. i. 2, 1. Φύναι δὲ ὁ Κῦρος λέγεται φιλοτιμώτατος, ὥστε πάντα μὲν πόνον ἀνατλήναι πάντα δὲ κίνδυνον ὑπομεῖναι. Id. Cyr. i. 2, 1. Ἀπέχρη γὰρ ἂν τοῖς γνωσθεῖσιν ἐμμένειν, ὥστε μηδεμίαν ἡμῖν εἶναι πρὸς τοῦτον

nature to follow, but) actually did follow, would employ the *indicative*: whereas in ordinary and unimpassioned language the *infinitive* would imply all that was necessary, *the natural consequence supposing the real.*”

διαφοράν, *for we should be content to abide by the decision so as to have no difference with him.* DEM. xxvii. 1. Πολλὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχω ἀρκοῦντως εἶναι, ὥστε ὑμᾶς μὴτ' ἀπολειφθῆναι τῶν πραγμάτων μὴτ' ἀγνοῆσαι. κ.τ.λ. Id. xxvii. 2. Τοιοῦτον ἔθος ἡμῶν παρέδωκεν, ὥστε σπεισμένους συνελθεῖν ἐς ταῦτόν. ISOC. iv. 43. So iv. 42. Εἰ τοιοῦτον εἴη ἡ σοφία, ὥστ' ἐκ τοῦ πληρεστέρου εἰς τὸν κενώτερον ῥεῖν ἡμῶν, *of such a nature as to flow.* PLAT. Symp. 175 D.

Πείσομαι γὰρ οὐ τοσοῦτον οὐδὲν ὥστε μὴ οὐ καλῶς θανεῖν, *for I shall suffer nothing so terrible as to prevent me from dying gloriously.* SOPH. Ant. 96. (For μὴ οὐ see 815, 2.)

2. The consequence may have the form of a stipulation, condition, or limitation. *E.g.*

Ποιοῦνται ὁμολογίαν πρὸς Πάχητα, ὥστε Ἀθηναῖοις ἐξεῖναι βουλευσὶν περὶ τῶν Μυτιληναίων, *they make a treaty with Paches, to the effect that the Athenians shall be permitted, etc.* THUC. iii. 28. Ἀναστῆσας αὐτοὺς ὥστε μὴ ἀδικῆσαι, *having removed them on condition of doing them no harm.* Ibid. So i. 29, vii. 83. So Id. iii. 114, ξυμμαχίαν ἐποιήσαντο ἐπὶ τοῖσδε, ὥστε μὴ στρατεύειν. Ἐξὼν αὐτοῖς τῶν λοιπῶν ἀρχεῖν Ἑλλήνων, ὥστ' αὐτοὺς ὑπακούειν βασιλεῖ, *it being in their power to rule the rest of the Greeks, on condition that they should themselves serve the King.* DEM. vi. 11.

3. The consequence may be aimed at as a *purpose*, the consecutive clause becoming also final. *E.g.*

Πᾶν ποιοῦσιν, ὥστε δίκην μὴ διδόναι, *they do everything in such a way as not to suffer punishment, i.e. that they may not suffer.* PLAT. Gorg. 479 C. (Here ἵνα μὴ with the subjunctive might be used, but it would express only the *final* element.) Ἐβουλήθησαν Ἐλευσίνα ἐξιδιώσασθαι, ὥστε εἶναι σφίσι καταφυγὴν εἰ δεῖσκει, *they wished to appropriate Eleusis, so that they might have a refuge if they should need it.* XEN. Hell. ii. 4, 8. Μηχαναὶ πολλαὶ εἰσιν, ὥστε διαφεύγειν θάνατον, *there are many devices for escaping death.* PLAT. Ap. 39 A. (Here we might have ὅπως διαφευγείται τις.) Μηχανὰς εὕρησμεν, ὥστ' ἐς τὸ πᾶν σε τῶνδ' ἀπαλλάξαι πόνων, *we will find devices to free you, etc. (= ὅπως σε ἀπαλλάξομεν).* AESCH. Eum. 82.

588. The infinitive with ὥστε sometimes follows verbs of *wishing, commanding, etc.*, which regularly take a simple infinitive of the object (746), less frequently verbs which take an infinitive of the subject (745); and sometimes adjectives and nouns which regularly take the simple infinitive (758). *E.g.*

Κύπρις γὰρ ἠθέλ' ὥστε γίγνεσθαι τάδε, *for the Cyprian Goddess wished this to be done, i.e. had (such) a wish (as) that this should be done.* EUR. Hipp. 1327. Δικαιῶν ὥστ' ἐμοῦ κλύειν λόγους, *asking that he (Polynices) should hear my words (to the effect that he should hear).* SOPH. O. C. 1350. Τοὺς στρατηγοὺς τῶν πόλεων ἐδίδασκεν ὥστε δόντα χρήματα αὐτὸν πείσαι, *he instructed him to give money and persuade the generals.* THUC. viii. 45. Τὸ μὲν δύναισθαι, ὦ Φαῖδρε, ὥστε

ἀγωνιστὴν τέλεον γενέσθαι, *the ability to become a finished disputer* (i.e. *having such power as to become*). PLAT. Phaedr. 269 D. Ἐλθόντες πρὸς αὐτοὺς πείθουσιν ὥστε μετὰ σφῶν Ἀργεὶ ἐπιχειρήσαι. THUC. iii. 102. (In the same chapter, πείθει Ἀκαρνάνας βοηθήσαι Ναυπάκτῳ.) Ἐπεισαν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ὥστε ἐξαγαγεῖν ἐκ Πύλου Μεσσηνίους. Id. v. 35. Ψηφισάμενοι αὐτοὶ πῶτοι ὥστε πάσῃ προθυμίᾳ ἀμύνειν, *having voted to defend them*, etc. Id. vi. 88. Εἰς ἀνάγκην καθέσταμεν ὥστε κινδυνεύειν. ISOC. vi. 51. (See 749.) So δύναμιν ὥστε ἐγγενέσθαι, *power to grow up in it*, PLAT. Rep. 433 B. Εἴ τι θεόφατον πατρὶ χρησμοῖσιν ἰκνεῖθ', ὥστε πρὸς παίδων θανεῖν, i.e. *if my father was warned by oracles that he should perish by his children's hands*. SOPH. O. C. 969.

Πάνυ μοι ἐμέλυσεν ὥστε εἰδέναι, *it concerned me very much to know*. XEN. Cyr. vi. 3, 19. Ἀδύνατον ὑμῖν ὥστε Πρωταγόρου τοῦδε σοφώτερόν τινα ἐλέσθαι, *it is impossible for you to choose any one wiser than Protagoras here* (you have not such power as to choose). PLAT. Prot. 338 C. So XEN. Mem. i. 3, 6. Ξυνέβη εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν μάχην ὥστε πέλουμο μὲν μηδὲν ἔτι ἁψασθαι μηδετέρους, πρὸς δὲ τὴν εἰρήνην μᾶλλον τὴν γνώμην εἶχον. THUC. v. 14. (Here the construction changes suddenly to the indicative in εἶχον.) Ἄρ' ἔστιν ὥστε κάγγυθεν θεῶν λαβεῖν; *is it possible for me to have a sight of it near by?* SOPH. Ph. 656.

Πῶς γάρ τις ἱκανὸς γένοιτ' ἂν ὥστε αἰὲ προστάττειν τὸ προσήκον; *for how could one become capable of always giving the proper command (so capable as)?* PLAT. Polit. 295 A. Πότερα παῖδες εἰσι φρονιμώτεροι ὥστε μαθεῖν τὰ φραζόμενα ἢ ἄνδρες; i.e. *are they wiser than men in learning*, etc.? XEN. Cyr. iv. 3, 11. Νέοι ὥστε τοσοῦτο πρᾶγμα διελέσθαι, *too young to decide*. PLAT. Prot. 314 B. So γέρων ὥστε σ' ὠφελεῖν, EUR. Andr. 80. Ψυχρόν (ἔστι τὸ ὕδωρ) ὥστε λούσασθαι, *the water is too cold to bathe in*. XEN. Mem. iii. 13, 3. (Cf. λούσασθαι ψυχρότερον and θερμότερον πιεῖν, in the same section.)

In many of these cases it seems impossible to believe that ὥστε added anything to the sense, even as it was felt by the Greeks. The expressions were probably stereotyped in usage, and their origin was forgotten. Indeed, ὥστε and ὥς (608) sometimes seem to have no more meaning than our *to* with the infinitive, which in some cases we can use or omit at pleasure, though with some change of sense, as in *I dare say* and *I dare to say*. Compare *I command you to go* and *I bid you go*. The examples show that there is hardly a construction in which the simple infinitive was used where ὥστε is not occasionally prefixed to it. It is important here to remember that ὥστε means only *as* (or, including the antecedent, *so as*); never *so that*, except in the construction with the finite moods, although this is often a necessary makeshift in our translation.

For ὥστε or ὥς with the infinitive after the comparative and ἢ, see 764 (b).

589. ("Ὡς τε in Homer.) The only two Homeric examples of ὥστε (ὥς τε) with the infinitive are Il. ix. 42, εἰ δὲ σοὶ αὐτῷ θυμὸς

ἐπέσονται ὥς τε νέεσθαι, ἔρχο, but if your own mind is eagerly set upon returning, go; and Od. xvii. 20, οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ σταθμοῖσι μένειν ἔτι τηλικός εἰμι, ὥς τ' ἐπιτελαμένῳ σημάτωντι πάντα πιθέσθαι, for I am no longer of a fit age to abide at the sheepfolds, (and there) to obey in everything a master's command (this comes under 587, 2, above). These cases seem to show that the usage was already established; although Lehrs (*de Aristarchi Stud. Hom.* p. 157) proposes to expunge ὥς τε in both. In HES. Op. 43 we have ῥηιδίως γάρ κεν καὶ ἐπ' ἡματι ἐργάσασαι, ὥς τέ σε κείς (= καὶ εἰς) ἐνιαυτὸν ἔχειν καὶ ἀεργὸν ὄντα, i.e. so as to have enough for a year, even without working.

590. (*Tenses.*) The tenses of the infinitive most frequently used with ὥστε are the present and aorist, with their usual distinction (87). See the examples above.

The perfect is sometimes used to express completion or decisiveness of the action (109; 110). *E.g.*

Νεωστὶ ἀπὸ νόσου βραχὺ τι λεωφήκαμεν, ὥστε καὶ χρήμασι καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν ἠϋξήσθαι, i.e. we have recovered a little, so as to have increased. THUC. vi. 12. Λόγων καὶ βουλευμάτων κοινωνῶν ἂν σε ποιοῖντο, ὥστε μὴδὲ ἓν σε λεληθέναι ὧν βουλόμεθα εἰδέναι, so that not a single one of the things we wish to know should have escaped you. XEN. Cyr. vi. 1, 40. Τοιαῦτα πολιτεύματα ἐλέσθαι (ἐμοὶ ὑπὴρξεν) ὥστε πολλάκις ἐστεφανώσθαι, καὶ μὴδὲ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἐπιχειρεῖν λέγειν, κ.τ.λ., so as often to have been crowned (perfect), and so as not even to have my enemies undertake (present) to say, etc. DEM. xviii. 257. See Id. xxiii. 68; LYS. xxxii. 27; ISOC. iii. 32, iv. 45; ISAE. x. 1; and the examples quoted in 109 and 110.

591. 1. The future infinitive with ὥστε is common only when it depends on an infinitive in indirect discourse and represents a future indicative of the direct form: so εἰς τοῦτ' ἀναιδείας αὐτὸν ἦξειν ἀκούω, ὥστε Λακεδαιμονίων κατηγορήσειν, DEM. xix. 72. So LYS. v. 2. See other examples under 594.

2. Elsewhere it is rare and perhaps doubtful. In DEM. xxix. 5 and xxx. 5, ὥσθ' ὑμᾶς ἅπαντας εἴσεσθαι is found in all MSS., and it is no more objectionable than other exceptional uses of the future, as that after βούλομαι and δέομαι (see 113), or than ὥστε with the infinitive with ἂν not in indirect discourse (211; 592). In DEM. xvi. 4 we have, ἔστι τοίνυν ἓν τινι τοιούτῳ καιρῷ τὰ πράγματα νῦν, . . . ὥστε Θηβαίοις μὲν ἀσθενεῖς γενέσθαι, Λακεδαιμονίου δ', εἰ ποιήσονται τὴν Ἀρκαδίαν ὑφ' ἑαυτοῖς, πάλιν ἰσχυροὺς γενήσεσθαι, the change of time making the change of tense natural.

In THUC. iii. 34 we have, προκαλεσάμενος ἐς λόγους Ἰππίαν, ὥστε, ἢ μὴδὲν ἀρέσκον λέγει, πάλιν αὐτὸν καταστήσειν ἐς τὸ τεῖχος σῶν καὶ ὑγιᾶ, on the condition that, if his proposals should not be satisfactory, he would restore H. to the fort safe and sound. Here καταστήσειν represents καταστήσω in the words of Paches; but the future is still exceptional in its use (see 113). In THUC. i. 29, iii. 28 (two passages) and 114,

vii. 83, where there was the same ground for the future, we find the present or aorist infinitive with ὥστε.

592. The infinitive with ἄν (not in indirect discourse) can follow ὥστε to express a consequence in a potential form, corresponding to the potential optative or indicative. *E.g.*

Ἀποτετειχισμένοι ἂν ἦσαν, ὥστε μὴδ' εἰ μετέπεμψαν ἔτι ὁμοίως ἂν αὐτοὺς ὠφελεῖν, *they would have been already walled in, so that, even if they had sent for them, it would not any longer have been of as much use to them.* THUC. vii. 42. Τῶν οἰκείων μοι πραγμάτων τοιούτων συμβεβηκότων ὥστε ὑμᾶς ἂν ἀκούσαντας ἐλέησαι, *such as would make you pity me if you should hear them.* DEM. I. 59. Ἀποληφθέντος, ὥστε μὴ ἂν δύνασθαι ἐπανελθεῖν οἴκαδε, *so that he would not be able to return.* Id. viii. 35. See also the examples under 211, and the cases of indirect discourse with ὥστε ἂν under 594. (The translation of the infinitive here is necessarily inexact. See 584.)

593. Herodotus often writes οὕτω ὥστε together, οὕτω referring to the whole leading sentence, and not (as it generally does) to a single word or expression. *E.g.*

Ἀπέδρη ἐς Τεγέην, τὰς μὲν νίκτας πορευόμενος, τὰς δὲ ἡμέρας καταδύνων ἐς ὕλην, οὕτω ὥστε τρίτῃ εὐφρόνῃ γενέσθαι ἐν Τεγέῃ, *he escaped to Tegea, travelling by night and hiding in the woods by day, (in such wise) as on the third night to arrive at Tegea.* HD. ix. 37. So iii. 105, viii. 27, ix. 61, 73.

For the same usage before a finite verb, see 601 (end).

594. ("Ὡστε with Infinitive in Indirect Discourse. "Ὡστε οὐ.") When a clause with ὥστε depends on an infinitive in indirect discourse, and is itself a part of the quotation, its verb representing a finite mood of the direct form, it regularly has the infinitive, in the tense of the direct discourse, even when on other grounds a finite verb would seem more natural. Here the future infinitive and the infinitive with ἄν may be used, as in other indirect discourse (135; 204). The negative οὐ of the direct form is generally retained with such an infinitive. *E.g.*

Ἔφασαν τοὺς στρατιώτας εἰς τοῦτο τρυφῆς ἐλθεῖν ὥστ' οὐκ ἐθέλειν πίνειν εἰ μὴ ἀνθοσμίας εἴη (they said εἰς τοῦτο τρυφῆς ἦλθον ὥστε οὐκ ἤθελον πίνειν), *they said that the soldiers became so fastidious that they would not drink any wine unless it had a strong bouquet.* XEN. Hell. vi. 2, 6. Ὑμᾶς εἰδέναι ἡγοῦμαι τοῖσιν οὕτω σκαῶν εἶναι ὥστε οὐ δύνασθαι μαθεῖν τὰ λεγόμενα. LYS. x. 15. Οὕτω δὲ ἀτόπους τινας ἐν τῇ πόλει εἶναι ὥστε οὐκ αἰσχύνεσθαι λοιδوروμένους αὐτῷ (i.e. οὕτως ἀτοποι ὥστε οὐκ αἰσχύνονται). DEM. xix. 308. So xviii. 283, xix. 152. Εἶναι δὲ πολλοὺς ἄλλους (sc. ἔφη), οὓς βούλεσθαι κοινωνεῖν τῆς συντάξεως, ὥστε οὔτε χρημάτων οὔτε στρατιωτῶν ἐσεσθαι ἀπορίαν (i.e. ἄλλοι εἰσὶν, οὓς βούλομαι (see 755) κοινωνεῖν, ὥστε οὐκ ἔσται ἀπορία). AESCH. N. iii. 96: so i. 174. Τοσοῦτον φρονήσαι φῆς αὐτοὺς ὥστε οὐχ ἡγήσασθαι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀξίους εἶναι ζῆν, κ.τ.λ.

(i.e. τοσοῦτον ἐφρόνησαν ὥστε οὐχ ἡγήσαντο). ISOC. xii. 255. Εἶναι δὲ (sc. λέγεται) ταχυτήτα οὐδενὶ ἐτέρῳ ὅμοιον, οὕτω ὥστε, εἰ μὴ προλαμβάνειν τοὺς Ἴνδους τῆς ὁδοῦ ἐν ᾧ τοὺς μύρμηκας συλλέγεσθαι, οὐδένα ἂν σφειῶν ἀποσφύξεισθαι (i.e. εἰ μὴ προλαμβάνοιεν τῆς ὁδοῦ ἐν ᾧ συλλέγοντο, οὐδεὶς ἂν ἀποσφύζοιτο). HDT. iii. 105 (see 755): so i. 189. Τοιαῦτα ἐνομίζετο τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῷ εἶναι, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ποθ' ἐτέρας ἐπιθυμήσαι πολιτείας (i.e. οὐκ ἂν ἐπιθυμήσειε). LYS. xviii. 6: so xxi. 18. See also THUC. v. 40, viii. 76; ISAE. iii. 39, xi. 27; PLAT. Ap. 26 D, Euthyd. 305 C, Leg. 806 A, Alcib. ii. 143 D.

595. Ὡστε μὴ, however, as the ordinary form with the infinitive, may be used in indirect discourse (594), even with the future infinitive or the infinitive with ἄν. *E.g.*

Τηλικαῦτην ἡγεῖσθαι πόλιν οἰκεῖν τὸ μέγεθος, ὥστε μὴδ' ἂν ὀτιοῦν ᾧ δεινὸν πείσεσθαι. DEM. ix. 67. Ὡμην οὕτως ἐμφανῆς εἶναι τοῖς ἀλαζονενομένοις πολεμῶν, ὥστε μὴδέν' ἂν ποτε γεέσθαι πιστὸν τῶν λεγόντων. ISOC. xii. 20: so xii. 144. In ISAE. iii. 51, ὥστε μὴδὲ ἐκδοῦναι would have been the same in the direct form.

596. Cases of ὥστε with a finite verb in indirect discourse are rare, but sometimes occur; as οἴομαί σ' ἀναπέσειν, ὥστε γε οὐδὲν ἀντρεῖς, AR. Nub. 1342. So EUR. Tro. 973; PLAT. Leg. 692 D.

597. 1. Occasionally ὥστε οὐ with the infinitive represents a finite mood with οὐ of direct discourse, even when there is no preceding infinitive to assimilate it (as there is in all the cases in 594). *E.g.*

Ἐννοησάτω ὅτι οὕτως ἤδη τότε πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας ᾔην ὥστ', εἰ καὶ μὴ τότε, οὐκ ἂν πολλῷ ὕστερον τελευτῆσαι τὸν βίον, *let him reflect that he (Socrates) was then already so far advanced in life that he would have ended his days not much later, etc.* (i.e. οὐκ ἂν πολλῷ ὕστερον ἐτελεύτησεν). XEN. Mem. iv. 8, 1. (Seume classes this with the cases in 597, 2 because of οὐ πολλῷ. But the infinitive depends directly on a clause with ὅτι in indirect discourse.) So in ARISTOT. Pol. ii. 9, 17: λέγουσι ὡς μετεδίδοσαν τῆς πολιτείας, ὥστ' οὐ γίνεσθαι τότε τὴν ὀλιγανθρωπίαν.

2. Sometimes οὐ is found with ὥστε and the infinitive when the negative belongs to a single word, as in οὐ πολλοί for ὀλίγοι. See ISOC. viii. 107: οὕτω κακῶς προὔστησαν τῶν πραγμάτων ὥστ' ἡμᾶς οὐ πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν ὕστερον πάλιν ἐπιπολάσαι. So ISAE. ix. 17.

598. In a few cases, however, ὥστε οὐ is found with the infinitive where none of the preceding explanations (594; 597) will apply. Such are the following:—

Ὡστ' οὔτε νυκτὸς ὕπνον οὔτ' ἐξ ἡμέρας ἐμέ στεγάζειν ἡδὺν, ἀλλ' ὁ προστατῶν χρόνος διηγέ μ' αἰὲν ὡς θανουμένην, *so that neither by night nor by day did sweet sleep spread her wings over me.* SOPH. El. 780. (Here there is an easy transition from the infinitive to the following indicative.) Οὐ μακρὰν γὰρ πειχέων περιπτυχαί, ὥστ' οὐχ ἅπαντά σ' εἶδέναι τὰ δρώμενα, *not so large that you do not know all* (i.e. the city is so small, that you know all) that is done. EUR. Ph. 1357. Ὡστ' οὐδ'

ἔχον γε τειχέων εἶναι σαφές, *yes; so that not even a trace of the walls is to be seen.* Id. Hel. 107. Νῦν δὲ περιέστηκεν εἰς τοῦτο, ὥστε τὸν ἰδίᾳ κινδυνεύοντα οὐ φιλόπολιν ἀλλὰ φιλοπράγμονα δοκεῖν εἶναι. LITURG. 3. Οὐδ' αὖ οὕτως ἄπορος ἦν οὐδ' ἄφιλος ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν ἐξευρεῖν τὸν ἀπογράψοντα, *not, moreover, was I so helpless or friendless that I could not find one to bring an ἀπογραφὴ (οὐκ ἂν ἐξεύρομι).* DEM. liii. 1. Οὕτω δ' ἀρχαίως εἶχον, μᾶλλον δὲ πολιτικῶς, ὥστε οὐδὲ χρημάτων ὠνεῖσθαι παρ' οὐδενὸς οὐδέν. Id. ix. 48. (This may be explained as oratio obliqua, on the ground of ἀκούω and the infinitive in the preceding clause. But I agree with Senne in thinking this connection too remote to account for ὥστε οὐ. Here there is neither an assimilating infinitive, as in the examples in 594, nor a leading clause with ὅτι or ὡς, as in those in 597, 1. In fact, ὥστε οὐ gives the only ground for calling the clause with εἶχον indirect discourse.)

599. The examples in 598 have one common character: in all of them the thought could be expressed equally well by ὥστε with the infinitive or ὥστε with a finite verb, for even in EUR. Ph. 1357 and DEM. liii. 1 a fact rather than a mere tendency is expressed. We can, therefore, easily suppose a mixture of two constructions by which, for example in EUR. Hel. 107, instead of ὥστε μὴ εἶναι or ὥστε οὐκ ἔστιν, either of which would express the sense, we have ὥστε οὐκ εἶναι.¹ This occasional confusion would be made easier by familiarity with ὥστε οὐ and the infinitive in indirect discourse.

600. In a few cases ὥστε seems to be omitted, even when its antecedent is expressed; as in AESCH. Ag. 478, τίς ᾧδε παιδὸς ἢ φρενῶν κεκομμένος, φλογὸς παραγγέλμασιν νέοις πυρωθέντα καρδίαν ἐπειτ' ἀλλαγὰ λόγου καρεῖν; *who is so childish, etc., (as) to be inflamed in heart, etc., and then to suffer from a change of report?* See also HDT. iii. 12, οὕτω ἰσχυραὶ, μόγις ἂν λίθῳ παύσας διαρρήξειας, *so strong, you could hardly break them with a stone.*

"Ωστε WITH THE FINITE MOODS.

601. "Ωστε with the indicative means properly *so that*, and expresses the actual result of the action of the leading verb. *E.g.*

¹ The explanation of ὥστε οὐ with the infinitive on the ground of oratio obliqua was first made, I believe, by Shilleto in the Appendix to his *Demosthenes de Falsa Legatione* (1844). It is also given by Madvig (*Synt.* § 205, *Anm.* 3), who confines ὥστε οὐ to clauses depending on the infinitive of oratio obliqua after verbs like φημί, οἶμαι, etc. (*i.e.* like the examples in 594). Shilleto's faith in his own explanation was somewhat shaken by finding that four of the passages quoted in 598 could not be brought under his canon. Under the influence of Shilleto's essay, I originally suggested the mixture of two equivalent constructions given above, as applicable to all cases of ὥστε οὐ, not appreciating the wide influence of the principle of oratio obliqua upon the construction.

Οὕτως ἀγνωμόνως ἔχετε, ὥστε ἐλπίζετε αὐτὰ χρηστὰ γενήσεσθαι, κ.τ.λ.; *are you so senseless that you expect, etc.*? DEM. ii. 26. (Here ὥστε ἐλπίζειν, *so senseless as to expect*, would express the senselessness of expecting, without necessarily implying that you do expect.) Βέβηκεν, ὥστε πᾶν ἐν ἡσυχῳ, πάτερ, ἔξεστι φωνεῖν, *he has gone, so that we can say everything in quiet*. SOPH. O. C. 82. So PH. 75, EL. 1204. Οὕτως ἡμῖν δοκεῖ παντὺς ἄξια εἶναι, ὥστε πάντες τὸ καταλιπεῖν αὐτὰ μάλιστα φεύγομεν, *so that we all especially avoid, etc.* XEN. Mem. ii. 2, 3. Οὐχ ἦκεν· ὥσθ' οἱ Ἕλληνες ἐφρόντιζον. Id. An. ii. 3, 25. Εἰς τοῦτ' ἀπληστίας ἦλθον, ὥστ' οὐκ ἐξήρκεσεν αὐτοῖς ἔχειν τὴν κατὰ γῆν ἀρχήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν κατὰ θάλατταν δύναμιν οὕτως ἐπεθύμησαν λαβεῖν, ὥστε τοὺς συμμάχους τοὺς ἡμετέρους ἀφίστασαν. ISOC. xii. 103. Ταῦτα πεποιήκα ἀκόντων Ἀθηναίων, ὥστ', εἴπερ εὖ φρονεῖτε, τοίτους μὲν ἐχθροὺς ὑπολήψεσθε, ἐμοὶ δὲ πιστεύετε. DEM. xviii. 40. Οὕτως ἐναργές ἐστι, ὥσθ' εὐρήσετε. AESCHIN. i. 128. "Ὡστ' ἐὰν τέτταρας μόνον πόλεις πείσης, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολλῶν κακῶν ἀπαλλάξεις. ISOC. v. 31. (Examples like ὥστ' . . . πιστεύετε in DEM. xviii. 40 might be punctuated in this way.)

So οὕτω ὥστε in Herodotus (see 593); as ἐς πᾶν κακοῦ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, οὕτω ὥστε ἀνάστατοι ἐγίνοντο, vii. 118.

602. As ὥστε in this construction has no effect upon the mood of its verb, it may have any construction that would be allowed in an independent sentence. It may thus take a potential optative or indicative with ἄν, a prohibitory subjunctive, an imperative, or an interrogative. *E.g.*

"Ὡστ' οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸν γνωρίσαιμ' ἂν εἰσιδὼν. EUR. Or. 379. Παθὼν μὲν ἀντέδρων, ὥστ', εἰ φρονῶν ἔπρασσον, οὐδ' ἂν ᾤδ' ἐγὶ γνόνην κακός. SOPH. O. C. 271. "Ὡστ', εἰ μακρὰ ἡ περίοδος, μὴ θαυμάσης. PLAT. Phaedr. 274 A. Θνητὸς δ' Ὀρέστης· ὥστε μὴ λῖαν στένε. SOPH. EL. 1172. "Ὡστε πόθεν ἴσασιν; *so how do they know?* DEM. xxix. 47. So οὐ μή and the subjunctive (296); οὕτως ἐπιτεθύμηκα ἀκοῦσαι, ὥστε . . . οὐ μή σου ἀπολειφθῶ, PLAT. Phaedr. 227 D (see 296, above).

603. Occasionally there is a change from the infinitive to a finite verb in a sentence after ὥστε, with a corresponding change in meaning; as in THUC. iii. 21, ὥστε πάροδον μὴ εἶναι παρὰ πύργον, ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτῶν μέσων διήεσαν, *i.e. the towers were built so as to allow no passage by a tower outside, but so that the men passed through the inside of them.* (See 584.)

604. A few cases occur of a peculiar assimilation of a clause with ὥστε to a preceding optative in protasis, ὥστε having apparently the force of a conditional relative. *E.g.*

Εἴ τις τὴν γυναῖκα τὴν σὴν οὕτω θεραπεύσειεν ὥστε φιλεῖν αὐτὴν μᾶλλον ποιήσειεν ἑαυτὸν ἢ σὲ, ἄρ' ἂν σε εὐφράναι; *if one should court your wife so as to make her more fond of himself than of you, etc.* XEN. Cyr. v. 5, 30 (two Mss. have ποιήσειεν). So v. 3, 47 (εἴσοιτο). Εἴ τις χρῶτο πῶ ἀργυρίῳ ὥστε περιάμενος ὅον ἐταῖραν διὰ ταύτην κάκιον

μὲν τὸ σῶμα ἔχοι, κάκιον δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν, πῶς ἂν ὠφέλιμον εἴη; Id. Oec. i. 13. Καταγελαστότερον εἰ . . . ἡμεῖς εἰς τοσοῦτον μικροψυχίας ἔλθοιμεν, ὥστε τὰ προτάγματα τούτων ὑπομεῖναιμεν (so Cod. Urb.; other Mss. ὑπομείναι). Isoc. vi. 84.

605. A few cases occur of ὥστε with the optative in indirect discourse. *E.g.*

Ἐλογίζοντο δὲ καὶ τὸ ἱππικόν, ὡς τὸ μὲν ἀντίπαλον πολὺ, τὸ δὲ αὐτῶν ὀλίγον εἶη, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, ὅτι οἱ νεκροὶ ὑπὸ τῷ τείχει ἔκειντο, ὥστε οὐδὲ κρείττωσιν οὔσι ῥάδιον εἶη ἀνελεσθαι. XEN. Hell. iii. 5, 23. See also Isoc. xvii. 11.

606. As the regular negative of the infinitive after ὥστε is μή, so that of the indicative and potential optative is οὐ. In DEM. xix. 218 we have ὥστε μήτε . . . μήτε . . . μήτε . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ . . . εἴτα τὴν εἰρήνην ἐποιήσασθε ἀγαπητῶς, where the force of a preceding εἰ seems really to govern the verb, that of ὥστε being wasted in the eight lines which separate the verb from it. In DEM. liv. 15, μὴδ' ὅτιοῦν ἔσται can be taken with εἰ. In SOPH. Tr. 575, ἔσται τοῦτο κηλητήριον, ὥστε μήτιν' εἰσιδὼν στέρξει γυναῖκα κείνος ἀντὶ σοῦ πλέον, i.e. *a charm to prevent him from loving more than you any other woman whom he may see*, ὥστε μή seems to have a final sense with the future, like a final relative. Compare ὥστε μὴ with the infinitive in PLAT. Gorg. 479 C (quoted in 587, 3).

"Ωστε WITH THE PARTICIPLE.

607. (a) As a clause with ὥστε depending on an infinitive in indirect discourse is generally assimilated to that infinitive, so one depending on a participle in indirect discourse may be assimilated to the participle. *E.g.*

Οὐδ' οὕτως ἀγνώμονα οὐδ' ἄτοπον οὐδένα (sc. ὁρῶ ὄντα) ὥστε, εἰ μὴ ποιήσουσιν ἅπαντες ὅς' ἂν αὐτὸς, οὐ φάσκοντα ποιήσειν οὐδὲν οὐδ' αὐτόν, nor do I see that any one is so unwise or absurd, that, if all will not do whatever he does, he too refuses to do anything (i.e. οὐδεὶς οὕτως ἀγνώμων ἐστὶν ὥστε οὐ φάσκει). DEM. x. 40. Τὰ δὲ πράγματα (ὁρῶ) εἰς τοῦτο προήκοντα, ὥστε ὅπως μὴ πεισόμεθα αὐτοὶ πρότερον κακῶς σκέψασθαι δέον, but I see things have come to this, that we must (ὥστε δεῖ) consider how we may not ourselves suffer harm first. Id. iii. 1. Ἐπιδείξω Ἀστυφίλον οὕτω σφόδρα μισοῦντα τοῦτον, ὥστε πολλὸν ἂν θάττον διαθέμενον μὴδένα ποτὲ τῶν ἐαυτοῦ οἰκείων διαλεχθῆναι Κλέωνι, μᾶλλον ἢ τὸν τοῦτον υἱὸν ποιησάμενον, I will show that Astyphilus so hates him, that he would much sooner have ordered in his will that no one of his relatives should ever speak to Cleon, than have adopted his son as his own (πολὺ ἂν θάττον διέθετο). ISAE. ix. 16. Other examples are [DEM.] Erot. 3; Isoc. iv. 64; PLAT. Rep. 519 A.

(b) In two cases there is a like assimilation to a participle not in indirect discourse:—

Τῶν θεατῶν συμφιλονεικούντων ἐκείνῳ καὶ μισούντων τοῦτον, ὥστε τῶν χορῶν τὸν μὲν ἐπαινούντων, τοῦ δ' ἀκροάσασθαι οὐκ ἐθελόντων. AND. iv. 20. Συγγνώμην ἔχειν εἰ; προεληλυθὸς εἰς τοῦτο ὥστε ὑπὸ τῶν ἑμαντοῦ δούλων ὑβρισθεῖς, οὐ δύναμαι κατασχεῖν, κ.τ.λ. DEM. xlv. 83.

The last examples seem to show that clauses with ὥστε can be assimilated to a preceding participle as we have seen them assimilated to an optative (604). Compare with this construction ISOC. iv. 21, οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἑτέραν πόλιν ἐπίδειξε τοσοῦτον ἐν τῇ πολέμῳ τῇ κατὰ γῆν ὑπερέχουσιν, ὅσον τὴν ἡμετέραν ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις τοῖς κατὰ θάλατταν διαφέρουσιν.

Ως USED LIKE ὥστε.

608. In their original use ὡς and ὥς τε are related precisely as ὅς and ὅς τε in Homer. But in consecutive sentences ὥστε gradually gained almost exclusive control, so that ὡς here became very rare. Ως occurs chiefly in Aeschylus, Sophocles, Herodotus, and Xenophon, where it is used in the same constructions and in the same sense as ὥστε. *E.g.*

(With Infinitive.) Ἦκουσιν ἐκφυγόντες ὡς στένειν πόλιν Περσῶν. AESCH. Pers. 510. Πεπωκὼς γ', ὡς θρασύνεσθαι μάλλον, βρότειον αἷμα, κῶμος ἐν δόμοις μένει, *having drunk of mortals' blood so as to be more emboldened, a band of revellers abides in the house.* Id. Ag. 1188. So Pers. 437, Ag. 546, Eum. 36, 427, 799, 895. Σύμμετρος γὰρ ὡς κλύειν, *for he is near enough for us to hear.* SOPH. O. T. 84. Οὐδ' ὑπὸ ζυγῷ λόφον δικαίως εἶχον, ὡς στέργειν ἐμέ. Id. Ant. 292. So Tr. 1125. Οὐκ ἐς τοῦτο ἀφροσύνης ἀπικόμενος ὡς δόξαι τὴν ἐωντοῦ δύναμιν περιέσεσθαι τῆς βασιλείας. HDT. iii. 146. Ὑψηλὸν δὲ οὕτω δῆ τι λέγεται, ὡς τὰς κορυφὰς αὐτοῦ οὐχ οἷά τε εἶναι ἰδέσθαι, *and it (the mountain) is said to be so high, that it is not possible to see its summits.* Id. iv. 184. Ὁ ποταμὸς τοσοῦτος τὸ βάθος, ὡς μηδὲ τὰ δόρατα ὑπερέχειν τοῦ βάθους. XEN. An. iii. 5, 7. So ii. 3, 10. Φέρονται κώθονα, ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἀρύσασθαι. Id. Cyr. i. 2, 8. Ἐν τῇ ἀσφαλεῖ ἤδη ἔσομαι, ὡς μηδὲν ἂν ἔτι κακὸν παθεῖν. Ib. viii. 7, 27. See iv. 2, 8. Οὕτω γὰρ δοκοῦμεν παρεκκενῶσθαι ὡς, ἣν μὲν ἀληθεύετε, ἱκανοὶ εἶναι ὑμᾶς εὖ ποιεῖν ἣν δὲ ἐξαπατᾶτε, οὕτω νομίζομεν ἔχειν ὡς οὐχ ὑμᾶς ἐφ' ὑμῖν ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μάλλον ὑμᾶς ἐφ' ἡμῖν γενήσεσθαι. Ib. iv. 2, 13. (In the last clauses we have ὡς in indirect discourse, like ὥστε in 594, the direct form being οὐχ ἡμεῖς ἐσόμεθα, ἀλλὰ μάλλον ὑμεῖς γενήσεσθε. Most Mss., however, have γενέσθαι.)

(With Indicative.) Πρὸς τὰδ' ὡς Σούσων μὲν ἄστυ πᾶν κενανδρίαν στένει. AESCH. Pers. 730. Οὕτως ἔχει γ' ἡ πίστις, ὡς τὸ μὲν δοκεῖν ἔνεστι, πείρα δ' οὐ προσωμίλησά πω, *so stands my confidence, that belief is in it, while I have had nothing to do yet with testing it.* SOPH.

Tr. 590. Οὕτω δὴ τι κλεινὴ ἐγένετο ὥς καὶ οἱ πάντες Ἕλληνες Ῥοδώπιος τὸ οὐνομα ἐξέμαθον, i.e. *so that all the Greeks came to know well the name of Rhodopis*. HDT. ii. 135. Τοῦτ' προσφιλές οὕτω δὴ τι ἐγένοντο ὥς σφας ἐκέλευε τῆς ἑαυτοῦ χάρης οἰκῆσαι. HDT. i. 163. So iii. 130. Οὕτω μοι προθύμως ἐβοήθησας ὥς νὺν τὸ μὲν ἐπ' ἐμοὶ οἴχομαι, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ σοὶ σέσωσμαι. XEN. Cyr. v. 4, 11. Τοσούτῳ πλεονεκτήσει ὥς πεινήσας τῶν ἡδίστων σιτίων τεύξεται. Ib. vii. 5, 81. So Hell. iv. 4, 16.

609. Besides the authors above mentioned, Euripides has one example of ὥς with the infinitive like ὥστε, Cycl. 647; Thucydides one, vii. 34; and Plato one, Rep. 365 D. We have ὥς with the indicative in PLAT. Men. 71 A; and with the participle in XEN. Cyr. vii. 5, 46, and PLAT. Tim. 56 C (ὥς here having both the participle and the infinitive).

For ὥς with the infinitive after the comparative and ἤ, see 764.

'Εφ' ᾧ AND ἐφ' ᾧτε WITH THE INFINITIVE AND THE FUTURE INDICATIVE.

610. 1. 'Εφ' ᾧ and ἐφ' ᾧτε, *on condition that, for the purpose of*, take the infinitive, like ὥστε in some of its senses. *E.g.*

Εἶπεν ὅτι σπεισασθαι βούλοιο, ἐφ' ᾧ μήτε αὐτὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἀδικεῖν μήτε ἐκείνους καίειν τὰς οἰκίας, λαμβάνειν τε ταπινήδεια ὅσων δέοιντο. XEN. An. iv. 4, 6. Πῶς ἂν οὗτος ἐθέλοι τὰ ἀλλότρια ἀποστερεῖν ἐφ' ᾧ κακὸςδοξος εἶναι; Id. Ag. iv. 1. 'Αφίεμέν σε, ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέντοι, ἐφ' ᾧτε μηκέτι φιλοσοφεῖν, *on condition that you will no longer be a philosopher*. PLAT. Ap. 29 C. Αἰρεθέντες ἐφ' ᾧτε ξυγγράψαι νόμους, καθ' οὓσιντις πολιτεύσονται, *for the purpose of compiling laws*. XEN. Hell. ii. 3, 11. (For πολιτεύσονται, see 574.) Δωμολογήθη αὐτῷ ἀποσταλήσεσθαι Ἀθήναζε τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ἐκάστου μνᾶς εἰκοσι, ἐφ' ᾧτε βοηθήσειν τοῖς Ἀμφισσέουσιν. AESCHIN. iii. 114. (For the future infinitive, see 113.)

2. Herodotus and Thucydides sometimes have ἐφ' ᾧ or ἐφ' ᾧτε, *on condition that*, with the future indicative. *E.g.*

Ἐπὶ τούτῳ δὲ ὑπεξίσταμαι τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἐφ' ᾧτε ὑπ' οὐδενὸς ὑμέων ἄρξομαι, *I withdraw upon this condition, that I shall be ruled by none of you*. HDT. iii. 83. Τούτοις δ' ὦν πίσυνος ἐὼν κατήγαγε, ἐφ' ᾧτε οἱ ἀπὸγονοὶ αὐτοῦ ἱροφάνται τῶν θεῶν ἔσονται. Id. vii. 153. Καὶ τὴν Βοιωτίαν ἐξέλιπον Ἀθηναῖοι πᾶσαν, σπονδὰς ποιησάμενοι ἐφ' ᾧ τοὺς ἄνδρας κομιῶνται. THUC. i. 113. Ξυνέβησαν ἐφ' ᾧτε ἐξί-ασιν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ὑπόσπονδοι καὶ μηδέποτε ἐπιβήσονται αὐτῆς, *they made an agreement with the condition that they should depart from Peloponnesus under truce, and never again set foot in it*. Id. i. 103.

Temporal Particles signifying Until and Before.

A. ἕως,¹ ὅφρα, εἰς ὃ OR εἰσόκε, ἔστε, ἄχρι, μέχρι, UNTIL.

611. All of these words are used also in the sense of *while*, *so long as*, and have the constructions of ordinary relative clauses (514). In common with *dum*, *donec*, and *quoad* in Latin, and *while* or *whiles* in Elizabethan English,² they mean not only *during the time when*, but also *up to the time when*. As relatives, in the former sense they can have an antecedent like *τέως*, *so long*, *ἕως* etc. meaning *as*; in the latter sense they can have one like *μέχρι τούτου*, *down to that time*, *ἕως* etc. supplementing this by *at which* or *when*. The idea of a clause with *until* is that the action (or negation) of the leading clause continues to a time *at which* that of the dependent clause takes place. That the former action then *ceases* is an inference generally made, but not positively implied in the language, and not necessary. Our word *until* thus includes what the Greek may express by *μέχρι τούτου* *ἕως* or (omitting the antecedent) by *ἕως* alone.

Τέως is occasionally used like *ἕως*, as in DEM. xxi. 16.

612. A clause with *until* referring to an actual past occurrence (613) is simply a temporal clause of this peculiar character, with the construction of a relative clause with a definite antecedent (519). But when it refers to the future, it becomes a conditional relative clause, and *μαχοῦμαι ἕως ἂν τὴν πόλιν ἔλω*, *I shall (continue to) fight to the time at which I shall take the city*, has the conditional force which comes from the indefinite antecedent; for even if *μέχρι τούτου* were inserted here, it would denote no definite period, but only one limited or *conditioned* by the future capture of the city. The actual apodosis to the condition is not *μαχοῦμαι* alone, but rather the whole implied idea, *I shall go on fighting* to the future time, the limit of which is set by *ἕως ἂν ἔλω*. It has been seen (486; 490) that ordinary conditional clauses may condition not their expressed leading clause, but one which the context implies; as *ἔνυμμάχιαν ποιοῦμεν, ἣν τις ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ἔη*, *we are making an alliance, (to be ready) in case any one shall attack us*. Again, a conditional clause may refer to an object which is aimed at in the action of the leading verb; as *Πάτροκλον ἔφεπε ἵππους, εἰ κέν μιν ἔλῃς*, *turn your horses on P., if haply you may take him, i.e. that you may take him, if haply you may* (487, 1). In like manner a conditional relative clause with *until* is

¹ In Homer, where the form *ἕως* would seldom suit the verse, *εἰως* or *εἰος* is commonly written.

² "He shall conceal it *whiles* (= *until*) you are willing it shall come to note." Shakespeare, *Twelfth Night*, iv. 3.

very apt to refer to an object aimed at, and thus to become at once final, relative, and conditional: thus in Il. iii. 291 (see 613, 3), it is distinctly implied that the *end of the war* (τέλος πολέμοιο) is a condition which is to limit the time of fighting, and also an object at which the fighting aims. The same is true in general of the other forms of conditional relative sentence which the clause with *until* may take. It will be seen (614, 2) that in the *Odyssey* ἕως develops a peculiar force in this direction, which makes it almost a final particle.

613. ("Εως.) 1. When ἕως, *until*, refers to a definite past action, it takes the indicative, usually the aorist. *E.g.*

Νῆχον πάλιν, εἰς ἐπὶ λθον εἰς ποταμόν, *I swam on again until I came into a river.* Od. vii. 280. Αὐτὰρ ὁ περὶς θῦναι διὰ προμάχων, εἰως φίλον ὤλεσε θυμόν. Il. xi. 341. So Od. v. 123. Οἰμωγὴ κατέχευε πελαγίαν ἅλα, ἕως κελαϊνῆς νυκτὸς ὅμμ' ἀφείλετο, *until the eye of dark night interrupted.* AESCH. Pers. 426. Πίνει ἕως ἐθέρμην' αὐτὸν ἀμφιβᾶσα φλόξ οἶνον. EUR. Alc. 758. Ἔμειναν ἕως ἀφίκοντο οἱ στρατηγοί. XEN. Hell. i. 1, 29. Καὶ τοῦτ' ἐποίουν ἕως ἐκ τῆς χώρας ἀπῆν. Id. Cyr. iii. 3, 4. Οὐ πρότερον ἐπαύσαντο, ἕως τὴν πόλιν εἰς στάσεις κατέστησαν. LYS. xxv. 26. Μέχρι τούτου φίλος ὀνομάζετο, ἕως προὔδωκεν Ὀλυμπον. DEM. xviii. 48.

In the last two examples πρότερον and μέχρι τούτου are antecedents of ἕως, *until*, as τῶς often corresponds to ἕως, *while*.

2. When a clause with ἕως, *until*, refers to a result which was *not attained* in past time in consequence of the non-fulfilment of a condition, it takes a past tense of the indicative, like a conditional relative clause in a similar case (528). *E.g.*

Ἦδέως ἂν τούτῳ ἔτι διελεγόμην, ἕως αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ Ἀμφίονος ἀπέδωκα ῥῆσιν ἀντὶ τῆς τοῦ Ζήθου, *I should gladly have continued to talk with him, until I had paid him back Amphion's speech in return for Zethus's.* PLAT. Gorg. 506 B. Οὐκ ἂν ἐπαύομην, ἕως ἀπεπειράθην τῆς σοφίας ταυτησί. Id. Crat. 396 C. Ἐπισχὼν ἂν, ἕως οἱ πλείστοι τῶν εἰωθότων γνώμην ἀπεφώνησαντο, . . . ἵσχυιαν ἂν ἦγον, i.e. *I should have waited until most of the regular speakers had declared their opinion, etc.* DEM. iv. 1. (For ἂν here, see 223.) So AR. Pac. 71. In LYS. xxii. 12 we have ἕως ἐπέλιπε after ἐχρῆν φαίνεσθαι.

The leading verb must be an indicative with ἂν, or some other form implying the non-fulfilment of a condition. (See 559.)

3. When a clause with ἕως refers to the future, and depends on a verb of future time (not an optative), ἕως has ἄν or κέ and the subjunctive, like a conditional relative clause (529). *E.g.*

Μαχήσομαι αὖθι μένων, εἵως κε τέλος πολέμοιο κιχείω, *I shall remain here and fight, until I (shall) find an end of the war.* Π. iii. 291. So xxiv. 183. "Εως δ' ἂν οὖν πρὸς τοῦ παρόντος ἐκμάθῃς, ἔχ' ἐλπίδα, *until you learn the whole from him who was present, continue to hope.* SOPH. O. T. 834. So AR. Nub. 1489. Μέχρι γὰρ τούτου νομίζω χρήναι κατηγορεῖν, ἕως ἂν θανάτου δόξῃ τῷ φεύγοντι ἄξια εἰργάσθαι, *for so far do I think I ought to proceed in my accusation, until it shall appear that deeds deserving death have been done by the defendant.* LYS. xii. 37. Δεῖ μὴ περιμένειν ἕως ἂν ἐπιστώσιν, *we must not wait until they are upon us.* ISOC. iv. 165. Οὐκ ἀναμένομεν ἕως ἂν ἡ ἡμετέρα χώρα κακῶται, *we are not waiting until our land shall be ravaged (i.e. until the ravaging shall be going on).* XEN. Cyr. iii. 3, 18. The present subjunctive is rare; but when it is needed, it is unobjectionable: see THUC. i. 90 (quoted in 614, 1).

4. When a clause with ἕως refers to the future and depends on an optative with ἄν, it generally has the optative (without ἄν) by assimilation, like a conditional relative clause (531). *E.g.*

Εἰ δὲ πᾶν σπουδάξοι φαγεῖν, εἴποιμ' ἂν ὅτι παρὰ ταῖς γυναῖξιν ἔστιν, ἕως παρατείνειμι τούτον, *but if he should be very eager to eat, I should tell him that his dinner is with the women, until I put him to torture.* XEN. Cyr. i. 3, 11. Καὶ τὸ μὲν ἂν ἐξαλείφουεν, τὸ δὲ πάλιν ἐγγράφουεν, ἕως ὅτι μάλιστα ἀνθρώπεια ἦθι θεοφιλῇ ποιήσειαν, *and they would blot out one thing and again put in another, until they made human characters as pleasing as possible to God.* PLAT. Rep. 501 B. Ὡσαύτως ἂν διδοίης (λόγον), ἕως ἐπὶ τι ἱκανὸν ἐλθοῖς. Id. Phaed. 101 D. So after an infinitive depending on an optative; as δέοιτό γ' ἂν αὐτοῦ μένειν ἕως ἀπέλθοις, *he would ask him to remain until you departed (should depart).* XEN. Cyr. v. 3, 13. In Od. ii. 77 we have ἕως κε with the optative (542): τόφρα γὰρ ἂν κατὰ ἄστυ ποτιπτυσσοίμεθα μύθῳ χρήματ' ἀπαιτίζοντες, ἕως κ' ἀπὸ πάντα δοθείη. In PLAT. Phaed. 101 D, ἕως ἂν σκέψαιο represents ἕως ἂν σκέψωμαι of direct discourse (see 702).

The optative with ἕως is most common after past tenses, in the construction of 614.

5. When the clause introduced by ἕως, *until*, depends upon a verb denoting a *customary or repeated action* or a *general truth*, and refers in a general way to any act or acts of a given class, it takes ἄν and the subjunctive after primary tenses, and the simple optative after secondary tenses. (See 532.) *E.g.*

"Α δ' ἂν ἀσύντακτα ᾖ, ἀνάγκη ταῦτα ἀεὶ πράγματα παρέχειν, ἕως ἂν χώραν λάβῃ, *they must always make trouble until they are put in order.* XEN. Cyr. iv. 5, 37. Ποιοῦμεν ταῦθ' ἐκάστοθ', ἕως ἂν αὐτὸν ἐμβάλωμεν ἐς κακόν, *we always treat him thus, until we cast him into*

trouble. AR. Nub. 1458. Περιεμένομεν οὖν ἐκάστοτε, ἕως ἀνοιχθείη τὸ δεσμωτήριον, *we waited every day until the prison was opened.* PLAT. Phaed. 59 D.

614. (*Final use of ἕως.*) 1. It will be seen by the examples under 613 (see the first under 3 and the first three under 4) that the clause with ἕως very often implies a *purpose*, the attainment of which is aimed at or expected. When such a clause, implying a purpose which would originally be expressed by a subjunctive, depends on a past tense, it generally takes the optative; but the subjunctive also may be used, to retain the mood in which the purpose would be originally conceived, as in final clauses (318). *E.g.*

Οὐδ' ἔτλη πόσιος εἶρυσθαι μέγα δῶμα διαμπερές, εἰὸς ἵκοιτο, *nor did she dare to guard her husband's great house constantly until he should come.* Od. xxiii. 150. Ἡσύχαξε τῷ στράτῳ, ἕως τοῖς Ἀμπρακιώταις δέοι βοηθεῖν, *he kept quiet until it should be necessary to help the Ambraciots.* THUC. iii. 102. (The present optative is rare.) So LYS. xiii. 25. Σπονδὰς ἐποιήσαντο, ἕως ἀπαγγελεῖν τὰ λεχθέντα εἰς Λακεδαίμονα, *they made a truce, (to continue) until what had been said should be announced at Sparta.* XEN. Hell. iii. 2, 20. (Here ἕως ἂν ἀπαγγελεθῇ might have been used, as in the following examples.) Ἔως δ' ἂν ταῦτα διαπράξωνται, φυλακὴν καὶ μισθὸν τοῖς φρουροῖς ἐξ μηνῶν κατέλιπε. Ib. v. 3, 25. Ἄλλ' ἐπισχέιν (τοὺς πρέσβεις ἐκέλευεν) μέχρι τοσούτου, ἕως ἂν τὸ τεῖχος ἱκανὸν αἴρωσιν ὥστε ἀπομάχεσθαι, *but he bade them detain the ambassadors until they (the Athenians) should be getting their wall high enough to defend.* THUC. i. 90. (Most editors emend αἴρωσιν to the aorist ἄρωσιν, which with ἕως would mean *until they should get the wall high enough*, the former being less definite and exact in its time, and therefore more appropriate here.)

For the intermediate form of ἕως ἂν with the optative in such sentences, see SOPH. Tr. 687, AND. i. 81, ISOC. xvii. 15 (in 702).

2. In five passages in the Odyssey ἕως with the optative after a past tense has an unusually strong final force, so that it appears almost like a final particle.

Πέμπε δέ μιν πρὸς δώματ' Ὀδυσσῆος, εἰὼς Πηνελόπειαν ὀδυρομένη γούωναν παύσειε κλαυθμοῖο, *she sent her to the house of Ulysses, (to the end) that she might cause Penelope to cease her lamenting.* iv. 799. Ὄρσε δ' ἐπὶ κραιπνὸν Βορέην πρὸ δὲ κύματ' ἔαξεν, ἕως ὃ γε Φαίηκεσσι φιληρέτμοισι μιγείη, *and she roused swift Boreas and broke the waves before him, that Ulysses might come to the oar-loving Phaeacians.* v. 385. Μοχλὸν ὑπὸ σποδοῦ ἤλασα πολλῆς, εἰὼς θερμαίνοιτο, *I pushed the club under the deep ashes, that it might be heated (to remain until it should be heated).* ix. 375. So δῶκεν ἔλαιον, εἰὼς χυτλώσαιτο, vi. 79; and ἀρώμενος εἰὼς ἵκοιτο, xix. 367.

In none of these cases will *until* express the final force of the clause with ἕως. It appears as if ἕως here began the same course by

which ὅφρα, ὥς, and ὅπως became final particles (312-314), but did not complete the change.

615. (Ὅφρα.) In epic poetry ὅφρα, *until*, is used like ἕως. *E.g.*

Ὡς μὲν Θρήικας ἄνδρας ἐπώχετο Τυδέος υἱός, ὅφρα δυνώδεκ' ἔπεφνεν, *until he had slain twelve*. Il. x. 488. Ἦρχ' ἔμην, ὅφρ' ἀφίκοντο κατὰ στρατὸν, ἧ μιν ἀνώγει. Il. xiii. 329. Ἦεν, ὅφρα μέγα σπῆος ἵκετο. Od. v. 57. (See 613, 1.)

Ἀλλὰ μὲν, ὅφρα κέ τοι μελιγδέα οἶνον ἐνείκω, *but wait, until I shall bring you honey-sweet wine*. Il. vi. 258. Τόφρα δ' ἐπὶ Τρώεσσι τίθει κράτος, ὅφρ' ἂν Ἀχαιοὶ υἱὸν ἔμὸν τίσωσιν, ὀφέλλωσιν τέ εἰ τιμῇ. Il. i. 509. So Il. xv. 232. (See 613, 3.)

Νωλεμέως δ' ἐχόμεν, ὅφρ' ἐξεμέσειεν ὀπίσσω ἰστὸν καὶ τροπὴν αὔτις, *I clung steadfastly, until she (Charybdis) should vomit forth again the mast and keel*. Od. xii. 437. (See 614, 1.)

616. (Εἰς ὃ κε and ἐς ὃ.) Homer uses εἰς ὃ κε (or εἰσόκε), *until*, like ἕως κε, with the subjunctive, and once with the optative. Herodotus uses ἐς ὃ and ἐς οὗ, *until*, like ἕως, with the indicative, and ἐς ὃ ἂν with the subjunctive. *E.g.*

Μῖμνετε εἰς ὃ κε ἄστυ μέγα Πριάμοιο ἔλωμεν, *wait until we capture Priam's great city*. Il. ii. 331. Ὑψι δ' ἐπ' εὐνῶν ὀρμίσσομεν, εἰς ὃ κεν ἔλθῃ νύξ ἀμβρότη, *and we will moor them far out by stones, until divine night shall come*. Il. xiv. 77. In Il. xv. 70 we have εἰς ὃ κ' Ἀχαιοὶ Ἴλιον ἔλοιεν, depending on an optative with ἂν (613, 4; 542).

Οὗτος δὲ ἀνηκούστέε τε καὶ λόγον εἶχε οὐδένα, ἐς ὃ ἔλαβε τὴν δίκην, *but he disobeyed and paid no attention to me, until he got his punishment*. HDt. i. 115. Ὁ Δηϊόκης ἦν πολλὸς αἰνεόμενος, ἐς ὃ τοῦτον κατακτείνουσι βασιλέα σφίσι εἶναι. Id. i. 98. So i. 158, 202; v. 92; vi. 75. Ἀπείχον τῆς ἐξευρέσιος οὐδὲν ἔλασσον, ἐς οὗ δὴ Λίχης ἀνέυρε. Id. i. 67. (Many editors change ἐς οὗ to ἐς ὃ.) In ii. 143, ἕως οὗ ἀπέδεξαν ἀπάσας αὐτάς, *until they had shown them all*, ἕως οὗ of the Mss. is generally emended to ἐς ὃ. Ἀλλ' αὐτὰ ἐγὼ τῷ Ἑλλήνι ξείνῳ φυλάξω, ἐς ὃ ἂν αὐτὸς ἐλθὼν ἐκείνος ἀπαγαγέσθαι ἐθέλῃ, *I shall keep them until he comes himself and wishes to take them away*. Id. ii. 115.

A singular case of ἐς ὃ occurs in THUC. v. 66, ἐς ὃ ἐμνήμηντο, *as far back as they remembered* (Schol. μετὰ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων μνήμην).

617. (Ἔσπε.) Ἔσπε, *until*, is not found in Homer, but is used like ἕως in tragedy, in Attic prose (especially in Xenophon), and in Herodotus. *E.g.*

Χρόνον τὰδ' ἦν τοσοῦτον, ἔστ' ἐν αἰθέρι μέσῳ κατέστη λαμπρὸς ἡλίου κύκλος καὶ καὐμ' ἔθαλπε. SOPH. Ant. 415: so EL. 753; AESCH. Prom. 457. Ξυνεῖρον ἀπιόντες, ἔσπε ἐπὶ ταῖς σκηναῖς ἐγένοντο, *they marched away without stopping, until they came to the tents*. XEN. Cyr. vii. 5, 6; so An. iii. 4, 49.

Τὴν παρούσαν ἀντλήσω τύχην, ἔστ' ἂν Διὸς φρόνημα λωφίσῃ

χόλου. AESCH. Prom. 375; so 697. "Ἀφθογγον εἶναι τὸν παλαμαῖον νόμος, ἔστ' ἂν σφαγαὶ καθαιμάξωσι, *it is the law that the murderer shall be speechless until streams of blood have been poured upon him.* Id. Eum. 448. Αὐτοῦ τῆδε μενόμεν ἔστ' ἂν καὶ τελευτήσωμεν. HDT. vii. 141. Περιμένετε ἔστ' ἂν ἐγὼ ἔλθω. XEN. An. v. 1, 4.

Ἐπιμείναι κελεύσαντες ἔστε βουλευσάμενοι, ἐθύοντο, *bidding them wait until they had consulted, they made sacrifice.* Id. An. v. 5, 2. ("Ἐστ' ἂν βουλευσώνται might have been retained from the direct form, as in the next example.) Ἀπεκρίνατο φυλάττειν αὐτὰ, ἔστ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἐλθὼν λάβῃ τὰ δῶρα, *until he should come and take the gifts.* Id. Hell. iii. 1, 15. So An. vii. 1, 33; HDT. viii. 4.

Ὅποτε ὦρα εἷη ἀρίστου, ἀνέμενεν αὐτοὺς ἔστε ἐμφάγοιεν τι, ὡς μὴ βουλιμῶν, *he always waited until they had eaten something.* XEN. Cyr. viii. 1, 44.

618. ("Ἀχρι and μέχρι.) Ἀχρι and μέχρι, *until*, are used like ἕως, but chiefly in prose and in later Greek. *E.g.*

Καὶ ταῦτα ἐποιοῦν μέχρι σκότος ἐγένετο, *until darkness came on.* XEN. An. iv. 2, 4; so iii. 4, 8. Εἰστήκει μέχρι ἕως ἐγένετο. PLAT. Symp. 220 D.

Μέχρι δ' ἂν ἐγὼ ἦκω, αἱ σπονδαὶ μενόντων, *but until I come, let the truce remain.* XEN. An. ii. 3, 24; so i. 4, 13. Εἴτε τοῖς προφύλαξι κελεύει τοὺς κήρυκας περιμένειν ἄχρι ἂν σχολάσῃ, *to wait until he should find leisure.* Ib. ii. 3, 2. Μέχρι δὲ τοῦτο ἴδωμεν, μενόμεν παρ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖσι, *but until we see this, we shall remain by ourselves.* HDT. iv. 119 (for the omission of ἂν see 620). Herodotus prefers the form with οὐδ (619).

"Ἀχρι is much less common in this sense than μέχρι. The forms ἄχρῃς and μέχρῃς are not used by the best writers.

619. "Ἀχρι οὐδ and μέχρι οὐδ are used like ἄχρι and μέχρι. *E.g.*

Τῶν δὲ ταῦτα πράξαντων, ἄχρι οὐδ ὅδε ὁ λόγος ἐγράφετο, Τισίφονος πρεσβύτατος ὦν τῶν ἀδελφῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶχε. XEN. Hell. vi. 4, 37. So Cyr. v. 4, 16; THUC. v. 26; HDT. i. 187, vii. 60. Τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἀπελύσατο δουλείας, ὥστ' ἐλευθέρους εἶναι μέχρι οὐδ πάλιν αὐτοὶ αὐτοὺς κατεδουλώσαντο. PLAT. Menex. 245 A.

Παραδίδωμι ἐντειλάμενος θείναι μιν ἐς ἔρμῃον ὅρος καὶ φιλάσσειν ἄχρι οὐδ τελευτήσῃ, *to watch him until he dies.* HDT. i. 117 (see 614). Κατατίθεται ἐς Τένεδον μέχρι οὐδ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τι δόξῃ, *until the Athenians shall pass some vote about them* (see 620). THUC. iii. 28.

620. (Omission of ἂν.) "Ἀν is sometimes omitted after ἕως and the other particles meaning *until* (including πρίν), when they take the subjunctive. This is most frequent in tragic poetry, but it occurs sometimes with ἐς ὃ or ἐς οὐδ in Herodotus, and with μέχρι and μέχρι (or ἄχρι) οὐδ in Herodotus and Thucydides. *E.g.*

ἕως τὸ χαίρειν καὶ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι μάθῃς. SOPH. Aj. 555. Ἀρήγεται ἔστ' ἐγὼ μεληθῶ. Ib. 1183. So O. C. 77, Tr. 148, Ph. 764. Ἐς οὐδ ἀποθάνωσι ἢ σφι παρενρεθῇ τι ἄδικον, μέχρι τούτου. HDT. iii. 31. Μηδὲνα ἐκβῆναι μέχρι πλοῦς γένηται, *that nobody should leave the ship*

before she sailed. THUC. i. 137. Αὐτοὺς ἐς φυλακὴν διεκόμισαν, μέχρι οὗ Ἀθήνας πεμφθῶσιν. Id. iv. 46; see iv. 16 and 41, and iii. 28 (quoted in 619). See also μέχρι δὲ τοῦτο ἴδωμεν, HDt. iv. 119, and ἄχρι οὗ τελευτήσῃ, Id. i. 117.

The only case in Homer of this omission of *κέ* or *ἄν* is the doubtful one, ἔχει κότον ὄφρα τελέσῃ, Il. i. 82, where ὄφρα may perhaps be final. (See 468.)

For *πρίν* without *ἄν* with the subjunctive, even in Attic prose, see 648.

B. Πρίν, BEFORE, UNTIL¹

Meaning and General Use of πρίν.

621. *Πρίν* was originally a comparative adverb (= *πρότερον* and *πάρος*), formed from *πρό* and meaning *before*. It appears in the usual adverbial relations; as *πρίν μοι ὑπέσχετο*, he once promised me; *πρίν ὦν*, having been of old; *ἐν τῷ πρίν χρόνῳ*, in the former time; and it once takes the genitive like a preposition in PIND. Py. iv. 43, *πρίν ὥρας*, before its time. With the infinitive it originally expressed a simple temporal relation, *πρίν ἐλθεῖν* being the equivalent of the later *πρὸ τοῦ ἐλθεῖν*, before going. With the finite moods *πρίν* always expresses a limit of time and means *until*, like *ἕως*, having become a conjunction, not losing, however, its original meaning of *before*. From this original comparative meaning, *πρίν* has a negative force, implying that something does or does not happen *before* (i.e. in the absence of) another event; so that *οὐπω* or *μήπω* with a temporal participle may generally be substituted for *πρίν* and the infinitive. Thus, in *ναῖε δὲ Πήδαιον πρίν ἐλθεῖν νῆας Ἀχαιῶν*, Il. xiii. 172, for *πρίν ἐλθεῖν*, before they came, we could substitute *οὐπω ἐλθόντων*, etc. So *πρίν ἄν* with the subjunctive is often interchangeable with *ἢν μή*, and always implies it; thus *μὴ ἀπέλθῃς πρίν ἄν ἀκούσῃς*, do not depart until you hear, implies *ἢν μὴ ἀκούσῃς*, without hearing. One result of this negative character of *πρίν* is its strong affinity for the aorist, the tense which denotes simple occurrence. (See *Am. Jour. Phil.* ii. pp. 466 ff.)

622. In Homeric Greek *πρίν* generally takes the primitive construction with the infinitive without regard to the nature of the leading verb. In lyric poetry, Herodotus, and Attic Greek, *πρίν* takes the infinitive chiefly when the leading clause is affirmative; otherwise, it takes one of the finite moods, like *ἕως*, having the sense of *until*. But, while the indicative may sometimes follow *πρίν*, meaning *until*, when the leading clause is affirmative, the

¹ *Geschichtliche Entwicklung der Constructionen mit Πρίν*, von Josef Sturm: Heft 3 of Schanz's *Beiträge*.

subjunctive and optative are never used unless the leading clause is negative or involves a negative idea.

Development of the Constructions with πρίν.

623. The Attic uses of *πρίν* with the indicative, subjunctive, and optative, are seen in a primitive stage of development in Homer. The construction of *πρίν* itself with the indicative was yet unknown; but four cases of *πρίν γ' ὅτε* with the indicative show a tendency in this direction. Six cases of *πρίν* (without *ἄν* or *κέ*) with the subjunctive and one with the optative (in indirect discourse) mark the beginning of the later usage with these moods. On the other hand, 81 cases of *πρίν* with the infinitive show the prevailing Homeric construction. Here, as in all periods of the language, when *πρίν* takes the infinitive, we have simply a statement of fact, that one thing precedes another; in *ναῖε δὲ Πηδαιον πρίν ἐλθεῖν νῆας Ἀχαιῶν*, and *he dwelt in Pedaeum before the coming of the sons of the Greeks*, *πρίν ἐλθεῖν* implies no more than *πρὸ ἀφίξεως* or the later *πρὸ τοῦ ἐλθεῖν*. Any further idea that may be implied comes from the context, and is not found in the words. This use of *πρίν* has little analogy in Greek syntax, its nearest parallel being the later use of *ὥστε* or *ὡς* with the infinitive. The simplest theory, which best suits the Homeric usage, seems to be that *πρίν* has a "quasi-prepositional" relation to the infinitive, which is a verbal noun, a relation the same in effect as that of *πρὸ* in *πρὸ τοῦ ἐλθεῖν* in the later Attic construction. (See XEN. Mem. ii. 6, 6, and DEM. xix. 73.) A similar use of *ἀντί* with the infinitive in a few cases in Herodotus (see 803) shows a tendency to go further in the same direction.

624. The Homeric language was generally contented with the simple *πρίν* and the infinitive, even when it was implied that the clause with *πρίν* set a limit to the action (or negation) of the leading clause, i.e. when *πρίν* could be expressed by *until*. So in Il. xxi. 100, *πρίν Πάτροκλον ἐπισπεῖν αἰσμον ἥμαρ, τόφρα τί μοι πεφιδέσθαι φίλτερον ἦεν Τρώων*, i.e. *until the death of Patroclus I preferred to spare the Trojans* (which he will no longer do); and xix. 312, *οὐδέ τι θυμῷ τέρπετο πρίν πολέμον στόμα δόμεναι*, i.e. *he felt no pleasure until he entered the battle*; in both cases the Attic Greek might have used *πρίν* with the indicative. So also when the clause with *πρίν* is future and conditional; as in Il. xix. 423, *οὐ λήξω πρίν Τρώας ἄδην ἐλάσαι πολέμοιο*, *I will not stop until I have given the Trojans enough of war*. It was in cases like the last, where the mere temporal *πρίν ἐλάσαι* expresses the future condition very imperfectly, that the need of a more exact form was

first felt. The need existed only after negative sentences, as here only could such a future condition be expressed by *πρίν* consistently with its original meaning *before*. *I shall not cease fighting until (before) I see the end of the war* contains a future condition (= ἤν μῆ) which *πρίν* can properly express; but the equivalent affirmative, *I shall go on fighting until I see the end of the war*, could not be expressed by *πρίν*, as we cannot substitute *before* for *until*, but it would require *ἕως*, which is *until* with no sense of *before*. The forms of parataxis suggested a simple and natural way of meeting this want, through the adverbial use of *πρίν*. In a sentence like οὐδέ μιν ἀνοστήσεις· πρίν καὶ κακὸν ἄλλο πάθῃσθα, *nor will you recall him to life:—sooner than this will you suffer some new affliction*, Il. xxiv. 551, we have only to remove the colon and make *πρίν* a conjunction to obtain the regular construction of *πρίν* with the subjunctive, *nor will you recall him to life before (until) you suffer some new affliction*. This result could not have been attained with an affirmative leading clause; for while οὐ τοῦτο ποιήσω· πρίν με κελεύσῃς, *I shall not do this:—you shall command me first*, gives the meaning *I shall not do this before you command me*, the paratactic affirmative, τοῦτο ποιήσω· πρίν με κελεύσῃς, would give only *you will command me before I do this*. *I shall do this before you command me* would be τοῦτο ποιήσω πρίν σε κελεύσαι, which is not the result of any form of parataxis. The six cases of *πρίν* with the subjunctive in Homer are all without ἄν or κέ, and all follow negatives. The primitive character and the rarity of this construction seem to show that we are nearer the original parataxis here than in any other form; while the change of the subjunctive to the optative after a past tense in Il. xxi. 580 (see 639) shows that the dependence of the clause with *πρίν* is thoroughly established (cf. 307). An attempt to arrive at the same result in a more awkward way appears in two cases of *πρίν* γ' ὅτ' ἄν with the subjunctive in the Odyssey (641), where *πρίν* introduces the subjunctive with ὅτ' ἄν very much as it introduces the infinitive.

625. No case of *πρίν* with the indicative occurs in Homer; but the want was supplied by *πρίν* γ' ὅτε δή with the indicative, which resembles *πρίν* γ' ὅτ' ἄν with the subjunctive just mentioned. As this construction is not the result of parataxis, and there is no such obstacle to combining the ideas of *until* and *before* in statements of past fact after affirmative clauses as was felt in future conditions (624), we find *πρίν* γ' ὅτε with the indicative after both affirmative and negative sentences (see the examples in 636). It thus appears that *πρίν* was not sufficiently established as a conjunction in Homer to take the indicative without the

intervention of *ὅτε*, although *πρίν* with the subjunctive had become a fixed construction.

The history of the uses of *πρίν* after Homer will be found below. (See 627; 632-634; 637; 642; 643; 645.)

Πρίν WITH THE INFINITIVE.

626. (*In Homer.*) In Homer the infinitive regularly follows *πρίν* after both affirmative and negative sentences, often where the Attic Greek would have the finite moods. *E.g.*

Ναῖε δὲ Πηδαῖον πρίν ἐλθεῖν νῆας Ἀχαιῶν. Π. xiii. 172. Τοῦ δ' ἐφθῆ ὀρεξάμενος πρίν οὐτάσαι, οὐδ' ἀφάμαρτεν. Π. xvi. 322. Σφῶιν δὲ πρίν περ τρόμος ἔλλαβε φαίδιμα γυνῖα, πρίν πόλεμόν τ' ἰδέειν πολέμοιο τε μέρμερα ἔργα, *before they saw the war*, etc. Π. viii. 452. (See 657.) Φεύγει πρίν περ ὄμιλον ἀολισθήμεναι ἀνδρῶν. Π. xv. 588. Ἦ κ' ἔτι πολλοὶ γαῖαν ὁδᾶξ εἶλον πρίν Ἴλιον εἰσαφικέσθαι. Π. xxii. 17. Ἀλλὰ οἱ αὐτῷ Ζεὺς ὀλέσειε βίην πρίν ἡμῖν πῆμα φυτεῦσαι. Od. iv. 668. Αἰθ' ὦφελ' ἄλλοθ' ὀλέσθαι πρίν ἐλθεῖν. Od. xviii. 402. Οὐδ' ἀπολήγει πρίν χροὸς ἀνδρομέοιο διελθεῖν. Π. xx. 100. Οὐ λήξω πρίν Τρῶας ἄδην ἐλάσαι πολέμοιο. Π. xix. 423. Οὔ μ' ἀποτρέψεις πρίν χαλκῷ μαχέσασθαι. Π. xx. 257. Οὐδ' ὅ γε λοιγὸν ἀπώσει πρίν γ' ἀπὸ πατρὶ φίλῳ δόμεναι κούρην. Π. i. 97.

In the last three examples the subjunctive would be regular in Attic, and even Homer uses it in a few such cases (639). In Π. xx. 100 *πρίν διῆλθεν* would have been the common Attic form. In the other examples, in which a mere temporal relation is expressed, the infinitive would be required in Attic Greek.

Hesiod has one example (Scut. 40) and the Homeric Hymns one (Ven. 151) of *πρίν* with the infinitive, both after negative sentences.

627. (*After Homer.*) The lyric poets, Herodotus, and the Attic writers use the infinitive after *πρίν* chiefly when the leading sentence is *affirmative*. But the infinitive is always required when *πρίν* means simply *before*, not *until*. *E.g.*

Πρίν ἐκτελέσαι κατέβη δόμον Ἀϊδος. THEOG. 917. Ἰσταμαι ἀμπνέων πρίν τι φάμεν, *I stand taking breath before I speak*. PIND. Nem. viii. 19; so Py. ix. 113. Πρίν ὦν παρῆναι ἐκείνον ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν, ἡμέας καιρὸς ἐστὶ προβοηθῆσαι ἐς τὴν Βοιωτίαν, *before he comes into Attica*, etc. HDT. viii. 144. Πρίν νῦν τὰ πλείον' ἰστορεῖν, ἐκ τῆσδ' ἔδρας ἔξελθ', *before seeking further*, etc. SOPH. O. C. 36. Ἀποπέμπουσιν οὖν αὐτὸν πρίν ἀκοῦσαι. THUC. ii. 12. So ii. 13, πρίν ἐσβαλεῖν εἰς τὴν Ἀττικὴν. Ἀφίεσαν τὰ βέλη πολλοὶ πρίν ἐξικνεῖσθαι. XEN. Cyr. iii. 3, 60. Ἡμεῖς τοίνυν Μεσσήνην εἰλομεν πρίν Πέρσας

λαβεῖν τὴν βασιλείαν καὶ κρατῆσαι τῆς ἡπείρου, καὶ πρὶν οἰκισθῆναι τινὰς τῶν πόλεων τῶν Ἑλληνίδων. ISOC. vi. 26. Καὶ πρὶν ἑξήκοντα γεγονέναι, ἀπέδωκε. PLAT. PROT. 320 A. Ἀπωλόμεσθ' ἄρ', εἰ κακὸν προσοίσομεν νέον παλαιῷ, πρὶν τόδ' ἐξηντληκέναι, *we are ruined, then, if we shall add a new calamity to the former one, before we shall have exhausted this* (109). EUR. MED. 78.

In the following cases the infinitive is necessary, even after negatives. Πρὶν ὥς Ἀφοβὸν ἐλθεῖν μίαν ἡμέραν οὐκ ἐχρήρευεν, *she was not a widow a single day before she went to Aphobus* (where *until* would be absurd). DEM. xxx. 33. Οὐδὲ γὰρ πρὶν ἡττηθῆναι τὴν δίκην εἶχεν ὢν δικαζόμεθα, i.e. *he did not have it even before he lost the suit* (much less afterwards). ISAE. v. 21. So AR. AV. 964; THUC. i. 39, 68. See also ISOC. v. 70, ὅταν δεδῶσι μὴ πρότερόν τι πάθης πρὶν τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι τοῖς πραττομένοις, *when they fear lest you may meet with some disaster before you finish what you are doing* (not *until you finish*). Indeed, μὴ after a verb of fearing does not make a negative sentence so far as the sense is concerned, what affects the dependent clause being the positive idea in πάθης: see SOPH. TR. 632.

628. An infinitive with πρὶν sometimes depends on a negative clause, where a finite mood might be allowed, because the temporal relation is still so prominent as to determine the construction. This may happen when the clause with πρὶν precedes, so that the dependence which *until* expresses is obscured by the position. *E.g.*

Ὅπως μὴ πρότερον νύξ ἔσται πρὶν πυθέσθαι ἅπαντας, i.e. *lest night should come before they had heard them all*. AND. i. 43. Πρὶν τὴν ναυμαχίαν νικῆσαι ἡμᾶς, γῆ οὐκ ἦν ἀλλ' ἡ χωρίδιον μικρόν, *before we gained the naval victory, he had only a little piece of land* (the argument tries to prove that he died poor). LYS. xix. 28. Καί μοι μὴ θορυβίσῃ μηδεὶς πρὶν ἀκοῦσαι, *and let no one interrupt me before he hears* (where πρὶν ἂν ἀκούσῃ, *until he hears*, would suggest the wrong idea). DEM. v. 15. Πρὶν δὲ ταῦτα πράξαι, μὴ σκοπεῖτε τίς εἰπὼν τὰ βέλτιστα ἀπολέσθαι βουλήσεται (where the irony of the question would make *until* absurd). ID. iii. 12: so 13. Πρὶν μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο πράξαι Λεωκράτην ἄδηλον ἦν ὁποῖοί τινες ὄντες ἐτύγχανον· νῦν δὲ πᾶσι φανερόν (where the temporal relation in πρὶν μὲν and νῦν δέ is the only important one). LYCURG. 135. See also AESCH. SEPT. 1048, AG. 1067; SOPH. AJ. 1419; XEN. CYR. iv. 3, 10.

629. The infinitive sometimes follows πρὶν after negative sentences where we might have the optative, which for some reason was not common after πρὶν. *E.g.*

Οὐκ ἂν μεθεῖτο πρὶν καθ' ἡδονὴν κλύειν, *he would not give it up until he should hear (before hearing) what he desired*. SOPH. TR. 197. (We might have πρὶν κλύοι: cf. TR. 2, οὐκ ἂν αἰὼν' ἐκμάθοις βροτῶν, πρὶν ἂν θάνῃ τις, where πρὶν θάνοι might have been used.) So AESCH. SUPP. 772. Οὐδ' ἂν διαβουλευσασθαι ἔτι ἔφη, πρὶν τρὶς ἑνῆρα ἡμέρας μείναι, *until he should wait, etc.* THUC. vii. 50. Ἰκέτευον μηδ' αὖτε ἀποτρέπεσθαι, πρὶν ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς τὴν χώραν, *until they should invade*

the country. XEN. Hell. vi. 5, 23. Οὔτε αὐτός ποτε πρὶν ἰδρῶσαι δείπνον ἤρείτο. Id. Cyr. viii. 1, 38. (Here πρὶν ἰδρῶσαι in the generic sense would be the natural expression; but it is doubtful whether this construction was ever used with πρίν. For An. iv. 5, 30, see 646.)

630. There remain some cases of πρίν with the infinitive after negative clauses where the older usage seems to be retained in place of the more exact later use of the indicative or subjunctive. *E.g.*

Οὐδὲ πρὸς δικαστηρίῳ οὐδὲ βουλευτηρίῳ ὥφθην οὐδεπώποτε, πρὶν ταύτην τὴν συμφορὰν γενέσθαι, i.e. *never, until this calamity befell me*. LYS. xix. 55. 'Επειδὴ δ' οὐκ οἶόν τ' ἐστὶν αἰσθῆσθαι (τοὺς πονηροὺς) πρὶν κακῶς τινα παθεῖν ὑπ' αὐτῶν, *but since it is not possible to recognise them until somebody is hurt by them* (for πρὶν ἂν πάθῃ τις). ISOC. xx. 14. In such cases the temporal relation seems to exclude the other in the writer's mind.

631. ("H πρίν.) We sometimes find ἡ πρίν, *than before*, with the infinitive, a past verb being understood after ἡ. *E.g.*

Οἱ πολέμοι πολὺν μὲν ἐλάττονές εἰσιν νῦν ἢ πρὶν ἡττηθῆναι, πολὺ δ' ἐλάττονες ἢ ὅτε ἀπέδρασαν ἡμᾶς, *they are much fewer now than (they were) before they were beaten*, etc. XEN. Cyr. v. 2, 36. So vii. 5, 77. Παραλαβὼν τὴν πόλιν χεῖρον μὲν φρονούσαν ἢ (sc. ἐφρόνει) πρὶν κατασχέιν τὴν ἀρχήν. ISOC. viii. 126.

This ellipsis occurs first in Xenophon.

Πρίν WITH THE INDICATIVE.

632. (*Early Poets.*) Πρίν with the indicative does not occur in the Iliad or Odyssey, except in πρίν γ' ὅτε (see 636). The first case of simple πρίν with the indicative is Hymn. Ap. Py. 178, ὃς τῇ γ' ἀντιάσειε, φέρεσκέ γέ μιν αἶσιμον ἡμαρ, πρίν γέ οἱ ὦν ἐφῆκεν Ἀπόλλων, i.e. *every one was slain, until Apollo sent an arrow at the monster*. Three cases occur in Pindar: Ol. ix. 57, xiii. 65; Nem. iv. 28. The last is the first case of πρίν with the indicative after a negative sentence. These are the only cases before the Attic writers.

633. (*Attic Poets.*) Aeschylus has one example, after a negative: οὐκ ἦν ἀλέξῃμ' οὐδὲν, ἀλλὰ φαρμάκων χρεῖα κατεσκέλλοντο, πρίν γ' ἐγὼ σφωσιν ἐδειξα κράσεις ἡπίων ἀκεσμάτων, *until I showed them*, etc., Prom. 479. So likewise Aristophanes: πρότερον δ' οὐκ ἦν γένος ἀθανάτων, πρὶν ἔρως ξυνέμιξεν ἅπαντα, Av. 700. Sophocles has one, after an affirmative: ἡγόμην δ' ἀνὴρ ἀσπῶν μέγιστος, πρίν μοι τύχῃ τοιαῦδ' ἐπίσση, *until this fortune befell me*, O. T. 775. Euripides has seven examples, all (according to Sturm) after affirmatives, as follows:—

Ἐν εὐδίᾳ δέ πως ἔσση, πρὶν δὴ τις ἐφθέγξατο. And. 1145. "Ἀφρων νεὸς τ' ἦν, πρὶν ἐσεῖδον οἶον ἦν, *I was a witless youth, until I saw*, etc. I. A. 489 (where there is a negative force in ἀφρων). Ἀνω-

λόλυξε, πρὶν γ' ὁρᾶ, *she shouted, until she saw*, etc. Med. 1173. (Here the contrast of εἰς ἣν μέγαν κώκοντον in 1176 gives the idea that she did *not* begin the loud wailing *until* she saw the foam.) Σπουδαίῃσαν ἴσαι, πρὶν Λαερτιάδης πείθει στρατιάν. Hec. 132. The others are Alc. 128; Rhes. 294, 568.

These are all the cases of πρὶν with the indicative which precede those in prose. It will be seen that the idea of *until* is always conspicuous, even when the leading verb is affirmative; and in the earlier stages of the construction little regard was paid to the character of the leading sentence. With prose a new and stricter usage begins (634).

634. (Prose.) In Attic prose and in Herodotus, πρὶν, *until*, referring to a definite past action, regularly takes the indicative after negative sentences or those implying a negative, very rarely after affirmative sentences. *E.g.*

Οὐτὶ κω συμβολὴν ἐποιέετο πρὶν γε δὴ αὐτοῦ πρυτανίῃ ἐγένετο, *he did not yet make an attack until his own day of command came*. Hdt. vi. 110. So vi. 79, vii. 239, ix. 22; all with πρὶν γε δὴ. Τούτου τοῦ ἔπεος λόγον οὐδένα ἐποιεῖντο πρὶν δὴ ἐπετελέσθη. Id. i. 13. For πρὶν ἢ in Herodotus see 651; and for πρότερον ἢ in Herodotus and Thucydides, see 653.

Οὐ πρότερον ἐπαύσαντο ἐν ὀργῇ ἔχοντες αὐτὸν, πρὶν ἐξημίωσαν χρήμασιν, *they did not cease to regard him with wrath until they fined him*. Thuc. ii. 65. Οὐδ' ἥξίωσαν νεώτερόν τι ποιεῖν ἐς αὐτὸν, πρὶν γε δὴ αὐτοῖς ἀνὴρ Ἀργίλιος μηνυτὴς γίγνεται, i.e. *until he becomes*, etc. Id. i. 132. Οὔτε τότε ἵεναι ἤθελε, πρὶν ἢ γυνὴ αὐτὸν ἔπεισε. Xen. An. i. 2, 26. Οὐ πρότερον ἠθέλησεν ἀπελθεῖν, πρὶν αὐτὸν ἐξήλασαν βία. Lys. iii. 7. Μεσσηνίους πολιορκοῦντες οὐ πρότερον ἐπαύσαντο, πρὶν ἐξέβαλον ἐκ τῆς χώρας. Isoc. xii. 91. (Isocrates has the formula οὐ πρότερον ἐπαύσαντο πρὶν with the indicative nine times.) Οὐκ ἦν ἐν Θήβαις ἀσφαλές, πρὶν τὴν Βοιωτίαν ἀπέδωκε καὶ τοὺς Φωκέας ἀνείλεν. Dem. viii. 65. Πάλιν τοῦτο τέμνων οὐκ ἐπανήκε, πρὶν ἐφευρὼν σκαῖόν τι ἐρωτα ἐλοιδόρησε μάλ' ἐν δίκῃ. Plat. Phaedr. 266 A. (This is the only case in Plato; but he has three indicatives in unfulfilled conditions. See 637.)

635. The only examples in prose of πρὶν with the indicative after strictly affirmative sentences are these three:—

Ἐπὶ πολὺ διήγον τῆς ἡμέρας πειρώμενοι ἀλλήλων, πρὶν δὴ Ἀρίστων πείθει τοὺς ἄρχοντας. Thuc. vii. 39. Παραπλήσια ἔπασχον, πρὶν γε δὴ οἱ Συρακοῖσι ἔτρεψάν τε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ κατεδίωκον ἐς τὴν γῆν. Id. vii. 71. Προσεπολέμει Ἀριστοφῶντι, πρὶν αὐτῷ τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην ἠπειλήσεν ἐπαγγελίαν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ ἦν ἔργον ἐγὼ Τιμάρχῳ ἐπήγγειλα, *he continued to attack Aristophanes, until A. threatened him before the people with this same kind of summons (to δοκιμασία) which I served on Timarchus*. Aeschin. i. 64. In these cases the force of *until* in πρὶν is made especially emphatic by the continuation of the state of things described by the leading imperfects. There seems to

be a feeling implied like that in οὐ πρότερον ἐπαύσαντο πρίν (see Sturm, p. 333).

Sturm cites also THUC. i. 51 and 118, iii. 29 and 104, as examples. But the first two have actual negatives in the leading sentence; in iii. 29, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους λαμβάνουσι, πρίν δὴ τῇ Δῆλῳ ἔσχον, the idea is that the Athenians did not see them until, etc.; in iii. 104, τὰ περὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας κατελύθη ὑπὸ ξυμφορῶν, πρίν δὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τότε τὸν ἀγῶνα ἐποίησαν, the meaning is, the games were broken up (i.e. were no longer held) until the Athenians renewed them at this time. (See *Am. Jour. Phil.* ii. p. 469.)

636. Πρίν γ' ὅτε, *until*, has the indicative in Homer, after affirmative as well as negative sentences. These cases occur:—

Ἐπὶ ἴσα μάχῃ τέτατο, πρίν γ' ὅτε δὴ Ζεὺς κῆδος ὑπέρτερον Ἑκτορι δῶκεν, the battle being equally balanced, until (when) Zeus gave higher glory to Hector. *Il.* xii. 436. Ἡμεῖθ' ἀνυζόμεναι, πρίν γ' ὅτε δὴ με σὸς υἱὸς ἀπὸ μεγάροιο κάλεσσεν, until your son called me. *Od.* xxiii. 42. Οὐδ' ὥς τοῦ θυμὸν ἔπειθον, πρίν γ' ὅτε δὴ θάλαμος πύκ' ἐβάλλετο, i.e. until the battering began. *Il.* ix. 587. So in the suspected verses, πρίν γ' ὅτε . . . θάρσυνας, *Od.* xiii. 322. For *Od.* iv. 178, see 637.

Four cases of πρίν γ' ὅτε δὴ with the indicative are found in the Homeric Hymns: *Ap. Del.* 49; *Cer.* 96, 195, 202; after which this strange construction disappears.

637. (*Indicative with πρίν in unfulfilled conditions.*) When the clause introduced by πρίν, *until*, refers to a result not attained in past time in consequence of the non-fulfilment of some condition, it takes a past tense of the indicative like the corresponding clause with ἕως (613, 2). We find examples only of the aorist indicative after negative sentences:—

Ἐχρῆν τοὺς ἄλλους μὴ πρότερον περὶ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων συμβουλεύειν, πρίν περὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων ἡμᾶς ἐδίδαξαν, they ought not to have given advice about undisputed matters, until they had instructed us about what is in dispute. *Isoc.* iv. 19. Χρῆν τοίνυν Λεπτίνην μὴ πρότερον τιθέναι τὸν ἑαυτοῦ νόμον, πρίν τούτον ἔλυσε, before he had repealed this one. *DEM.* xx. 96. Οὐκ ἂν ἐπεσκεψάμεθα πρότερον εἴτε διδασκτὸν εἴτε οὐ διδασκτὸν ἢ ἀρετὴν, πρίν οἱ ἐστὶ πρῶτον ἐζητήσαμεν αὐτό, we should not have inquired whether virtue was teachable or not, until we had first asked what it is in itself. *PLAT. Men.* 86 D; so 84 C, and *Theaet.* 165 D.

Besides these five cases in prose, we have the same construction with πρίν γ' ὅτε δὴ in *Od.* iv. 178: οὐδέ κεν ἡμέας ἄλλο διέκρινεν, πρίν γ' ὅτε δὴ θανάτω μέλαν νέφος ἀμφεκάλυψεν, nor would aught else have separated us until the black cloud of death had covered us.

For the same construction with πρότερον ἢ in *HDt.* viii. 93, see 653.

Πρὶν WITH THE SUBJUNCTIVE AND OPTATIVE.

SUBJUNCTIVE.

638. When a clause with *πρὶν*, *until*, refers to the future, and depends on a *negative* clause of future time (not containing an optative), *πρὶν* takes the subjunctive, like *ἕως* in a similar case (613, 3).

639. In Homer *πρὶν* does not take *κέ* or *ἄν* with the subjunctive, the form of the original parataxis being still retained (624). The examples of the subjunctive are these:—

Οὐ γάρ πω καταδύσομεθ' εἰς Ἀΐδαο δόμους, πρὶν μόρσιμον ἡμᾶρ ἐπέλθῃ, *we shall not yet descend to the house of Hades, until the fated day shall come.* Od. x. 174. (Here, if we insert a colon after *δόμους* and take *πρὶν* as an adverb, *sooner than this*, we have the paratactic form.) So Il. xviii. 135; Od. xiii. 335, xvii. 7. In Il. xviii. 190, οὐ με πρὶν γ' εἶα θωρήσσεσθαι, πρὶν γ' αὐτὴν ἰδωμαι, *she did not permit me to arm myself until I should see her*, the subjunctive of direct discourse (seen in xviii. 135) is retained after a past tense. So Il. xxiv. 781. In Il. xxi. 580 a similar subjunctive has been changed to the optative (644).

640. Hesiod has two cases of *πρὶν* with the subjunctive, Th. 222, Op. 738, still without *κέ* or *ἄν* as in Homer. Πρὶν ἄν first occurs in THEOG. 963 (see 642).

641. Two cases of *πρὶν γ' ὅτ' ἄν* (used like *πρὶν*) with the subjunctive occur in the Odyssey. The first is especially instructive, ii. 373: ἀλλ' ὅμοσον μὴ μητρὶ φίλῃ τάδε μυθήσασθαι, πρὶν γ' ὅτ' ἄν ἐνδεκάτῃ τε δωδεκάτῃ τε γένηται, ἣ αὐτὴν ποθέσαι καὶ ἀφορμηθέντος ἀκοῦσαι, *but swear not to tell this to my mother until the eleventh or twelfth day shall come, or (until) she shall miss me and hear of my departure.* Here *πρὶν* first introduces *ὅτ' ἄν γένηται* and then the two infinitives, having the same prepositional force with both. But in iv. 746, where the same scene is described, we have ἐμεῦ δ' ἔλετο μέγαν ὄρκον, μὴ πρὶν σοὶ ἔρεειν πρὶν δωδεκάτῃν γε γενέσθαι ἢ σ' αὐτὴν ποθέσαι καὶ ἀφορμηθέντος ἀκοῦσαι, the simpler and more common *πρὶν γενέσθαι* taking the place of the unwieldy *πρὶν γ' ὅτ' ἄν γένηται*. The other case is iv. 475: οὐ πρὶν μοῖρα φίλους ἰδέειν, πρὶν γ' ὅτ' ἄν Αἰγύπτῳ ὕδωρ ἔλθῃς.

642. After Homer and Hesiod *πρὶν ἄν* is established as the regular form with the subjunctive. *E.g.*

Μή ποτ' ἐπαινήσῃς πρὶν ἄν εἰδῆς ἄνδρα σαφηνέως. THEOG. 963 (the earliest case of *πρὶν ἄν*). Οὐδὲ λήξει πρὶν ἄν ἡ κορέσῃ κέαρ ἢ ἔλῃ τις ἄρχαν. AESCH. Prom. 165. Οὐ γάρ ποτ' ἔξει πρὶν ἄν κείνας ἐναργεῖς δευρό μοι στήσῃς ἄγων, *you shall not depart until you bring those girls and place them before my eyes.* SOPH. O. C. 909. Οὐ μὴ

ναῦς ἀφορμίσῃ χθονός, πρίν ἂν κόρην σὴν Ἴφιγένειαν Ἄρτεμις λάβῃ σφαγεῖσαν. EUR. I. T. 19. Μὴ προκαταγίγνωσκ', ὦ πάτερ, πρίν ἂν γ' ἀκούσῃς ἀμφοτέρων. AR. Vesp. 919. Οὐ κώ σε ἐγὼ λέγω (εὐδαίμονα), πρίν ἂν τελευτήσαντα καλῶς τὸν αἰῶνα πύθωμαι, *until I shall hear that you have ended your life happily*. HDT. i. 32. Οὐ χρή μ' ἐνθένδε ἀπελθεῖν, πρίν ἂν δῶ δίκην. XEN. AN. v. 7, 5. Οὐκ οἶδόν τε ὑμᾶς πρότερον εἶδέναι, πρίν ἂν καὶ ἐμοῦ ἀκούσῃτε ἀπολογουμένου. AND. i. 7. Τοὺς δ' οὐ πρότερον παύσονται πρίν ἂν οὕτως ὥσπερ ἡμᾶς διαθῶσιν. ISOC. xiv. 18. Μήπω γε, πρίν ἂν τὸ καῦμα παρέλθῃ, *not yet,—until the heat of the day is past*. PLAT. Phaedr. 242 A.

OPTATIVE.

643. When a clause with *πρίν*, *until*, referring to the future, depends on a negative clause containing an optative in protasis or apodosis, in a wish, or in a final clause, it may have the optative (without ἂν) by assimilation, like a conditional relative clause (613, 4), or it may take the infinitive. These cases of the optative occur:—

Οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἰδείης ἀνδρὸς νόον οὐδὲ γυναικὸς, πρίν πειρηθείης, *for you cannot know the mind of a man or a woman until you have tested it*. THEOG. 125 (the earliest example). Οὐποτ' ἔγωγ' ἂν, πρίν ἴδοιμ' ὀρθὸν ἔπος, μεμφομένων ἂν καταφαίην, *never would I assent when men blame him, until I should see the word proved true*. SOPH. O. T. 505. Μὴ σταίη πολύκωπον ὄχημα ναὸς αὐτῷ, πρίν τάνδε πρὸς πόλιν ἀνύσειε, *may his ship of many oars not stop until it makes its way to this city*. Id. Tr. 655 ; so Phil. 961 (both after optative of wish). Παρانیσχον φρυκτοὺς, ὅπως μὴ βοηθοίεν πρίν σφῶν οἱ ἄνδρες οἱ ἐξιόντες διαφύγοιεν, *they raised signal torches, that the enemy might not come to the rescue until their own men who had gone forth had escaped*. THUC. iii. 22. Νομίσαντες οὐκ ἂν ἔτι τὸν Βρασίδαν σφῶν προσασπαστῆσαι οὐδὲν πρίν παρασκευάσαιντο, *thinking that B. would not cause any further secessions of their allies until they had made preparations*. Id. iv. 117. So XEN. Hell. ii. 3, 48 (two examples). Οὐκ ἂν πρότερον ὀρμήσειε, πρίν πη βεβαίωσται τὴν σκέψιν τῆς πορείας. PLAT. Leg. 799 D. Εἰ ἔλκοι τις αὐτὸν, καὶ μὴ ἀνείη πρίν ἐξελκύσειεν εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς, *if one should drag him, and not let him go until he had dragged him out into the sunlight*. Id. Rep. 515 E.

These are all the cases of this use of the optative with *πρίν* cited by Sturm. In many cases where the optative could have been used, the infinitive appears (see 629).

644. The optative with *πρίν* is more frequent in indirect discourse after a negative verb of past time, representing a subjunctive of the direct form, which is often retained. (See the corresponding use of ἔως, 614.) *E.g.*

Οὐκ ἔθελεν φεύγειν πρίν πειρήσασαί τ' Ἀχιλλῆος, *he would not fly*

until he should try Achilles. II. xxi. 580. (The direct form was *πρὶν πειρήσωμαι*, and *πειρήσεται* might have been used here. See II. xviii. 190, in 639.) So Hymn. Cer. 334; HES. Scut. 18. "Ἐδοξέ μοι μὴ σίγα, πρὶν φράσαιμί σοι, τὸν πλοῦν ποιέσθαι. SOPH. Ph. 551. (In Aj. 742 we have *πρὶν τύχη* in a similar sentence.) 'Ἐδέοντο μὴ ἀπελθεῖν πρὶν ἀπαγάγοι τὸ στράτευμα (v. l. *πρὶν ἂν ἀπαγάγῃ*). XEN. An. vii. 7, 57. (See εἶπον *μηδένα* τῶν ὀπισθεν *κινεῖσθαι* πρὶν ἂν ὁ πρόσθεν ἡγήται, Cyr. ii. 2, 8.) 'Απηγόρευε *μηδένα* βάλλειν, πρὶν Κύρος ἐμπλησθεῖη θηρῶν, *until Cyrus should be satisfied.* Id. Cyr. i. 4, 14. "Ἡγούμθ' οὐδὲν οἰοί τ' εἶναι κινεῖν, πρὶν ἐκποδῶν ἐκείνος αὐτοῖς γένοιτο. ISOC. xvi. 5. So PLAT. Ap. 36 C, Rep. 402 B, Leg. 678 D.

For the infinitive, often preferred to the optative in such sentences, see 629.

Πρὶν WITH SUBJUNCTIVE IN GENERAL SUPPOSITIONS.

645. When the clause introduced by *πρὶν*, *until*, is generic, and depends on a negative clause of present time expressing customary or repeated action or a general truth, we have *πρὶν ἂν* with the subjunctive (613, 5). *E.g.*

'Ορώσι τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους οὐ πρόσθεν ἀπίοντας γαστροὺς ἔνεκα, πρὶν ἂν ἀφώσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες. XEN. Cyr. i. 2, 8. Οὐ γὰρ πρότερον κατήγορος παρὰ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἰσχύει, πρὶν ἂν ὁ φεύγων ἀδυνατήσῃ τὰς προειρημένας αἰτίας ἀπολύσασθαι. AESCHIN. ii. 2. Οὐδεὶς ὥποτε ἐπέθετο (gnomic) πρότερον τῇ τοῦ δήμου καταλύσει, πρὶν ἂν μείζον τῶν δικαστηρίων ἰσχύσῃ. Id. iii. 235. Οὐ πρότερον παύονται, πρὶν ἂν πείσωσιν οὓς ἡδίκησαν. PLAT. Phaed. 114 B. So Leg. 968 C.

646. It is doubtful whether the optative was ever used with *πρὶν* in the corresponding generic sense. In XEN. An. iv. 5, 30, for *πρὶν παραθεῖν* the weight of Mss. authority seems to favour *πρὶν παραθεῖναι*. In II. ix. 488 *πρὶν γ' ὅτε* δὴ σ' ἄσαιμι is of this class.

647. The principle by which *πρὶν* takes the subjunctive and optative only after negative sentences, or sentences which were felt as negative, seems to have allowed of no exceptions. The two following cases have been cited:—

Ἀίσχρὸν δ' ἡγοῦμαι πρότερον παύσασθαι, πρὶν ἂν ὑμεῖς ὅ τι ἂν βούλησθε ψηφίσησθε, which is practically equivalent to *I refuse to stop until you have voted what you wish*, *αἰσχρόν* having elsewhere a negative force (see 817). LYS. xxii. 4. "Οστις οὖν οἶται τοὺς ἄλλους κοινῇ τι πράξειν ἀγάθον, πρὶν ἂν τοὺς προεστῶτας αὐτῶν διαλλάξῃ, λίαν ἀπλῶς ἔχει καὶ πόρρω τῶν πραγμάτων ἐστίν, which amounts to this: *nobody but a simpleton thinks that the others will do anything in common until their leaders are united.* ISOC. iv. 16. In SIMON. AM.

i. 12, *πρίν ἔκηται* cannot be correct, as *πρίν* here does not mean *until*, but merely *before*.

648. *Πρίν*, like *ἕως*, etc. (620), sometimes takes the subjunctive without *ἄν*, even in Attic Greek. *E.g.*

Μὴ στέναζε *πρίν μάθῃς*. SOPH. Ph. 917. So ANT. 619, AJ. 742, 965, Tr. 608, 946. Οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις αὐτὸν ἐξαιρήσεται, *πρίν γυναικ' ἐμοὶ μεθῇ*. EUR. Alc. 848. So OR. 1218, 1357. Μῆ, *πρίν γ' ἀκούσῃς* χἀτέραν στάσιν μελῶν. AR. Ran. 1281. So Eccl. 629. See HDT. i. 32, iv. 157, vi. 82. Even in Attic prose the Mss. omit *ἄν* in some places; as THUC. vi. 10, 29, 38, viii. 9; XEN. Oec. xii. 1, Cyn. iii. 6; AESCHIN. iii. 60; HYPER. Eux. xx. 10 (§ 4); PLAT. Theaet. 169 B, Tim. 57 B; but many editors insert *ἄν* in all these places on their own responsibility.

649. A few cases of *πρίν ἄν* with the optative, if the text is sound, are to be explained (like those of *ἕως ἄν*, 613, 4, end) as indirect discourse in which the direct form had *πρίν ἄν* with the subjunctive. See XEN. Hell. ii. 4, 18 (quoted in 702).

650. In sentences with *πρίν* we sometimes have a subjunctive depending on an optative with *ἄν*, as in conditional relative sentences (556). *E.g.*

Οὐκ ἂν αἰὼν' ἐκμάθοις βροτῶν, *πρίν ἄν θάνῃ τις*, you cannot fully understand the life of mortals, until one dies. SOPH. Tr. 2. Οὐκ ἂν ἀπέλθοιμι *πρίν παντάσῃν ἡ ἀγορὰ λυθῇ*. XEN. Oec. xii. 1. "Ἡ λέγοιμεν ἂν τι ἀληθές, οὐ μὴν σαφές γε οὐδὲ τέλειον *πρίν αὖ* (!) καὶ ταύτας αὐτῆς πάσας περιέλωμεν; PLAT. Polit. 281 D. The leading verb here has merely the effect of a future form on the clause with *πρίν*.

Πρίν ἢ, πρότερον ἢ, AND πάρος, IN THE SENSE OF πρίν.

651. *Πρίν ἢ*, sooner than, which is a more developed form of *πρίν*, is found twice in the Iliad with the infinitive; and very frequently in Herodotus with the infinitive (only after past tenses), the indicative, and the subjunctive (without *ἄν*). *E.g.*

Οὐ μὴν σφάι γ' οἶω *πρίν γ' ἀποπαύσασθαι πρίν ἢ ἕτερόν γε πεσόντα αἵματος ἄσαι* "Αργα. II. v. 287. The same words occur after *πρίν ἢ* in xxii. 266. Οἱ δὲ Αἰγύπτιοι, *πρίν μὲν ἢ Ψαμμήτιχον σφέων βασιλεύσαι, ἐνόμιζον ἐντοὺς πρώτους γενέσθαι πάντων ἀνθρώπων*. HDT. ii. 2. Πρίν γάρ ἢ ὀπίσω σφέας ἀναπλῶσαι ἐς τὰς Σάρδεις ἦλω ὁ Κροῖσος. Id. i. 78. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ πρότερον ἀπανέστη, *πρίν ἢ σφέας ὑποχειρίους ἐποιήσατο*. Id. vi. 45. Ἀδικεῖ ἀναπειθόμενος *πρίν ἢ ἀτρεκέως ἐκμάθῃ*. Id. vii. 10. Οὐ πρότερον παύσομαι *πρίν ἢ ἔλω τε καὶ πυρώσω τὰς Ἀθήνας*. Id. vii. 8.

652. A few cases of *πρίν ἢ* occur in the Mss. in Attic prose, as in

λάβοι). Id. Mem. ii. 7, 2 : see i. 2, 17. *Πρότερον ἐπεθύμησαν ἢ τὸν τρόπον ἐγνώσαν.* PLAT. Phaedr. 232 E. Compare *μᾶλλον ἢ ζῆν*, XEN. Mem. iv. 4, 4.

So with *πρόσθεν* ἢ, which is not used like *πρίν*; as *πρόσθεν ἢ σὺ ἐφαίνου, τοῦτ' ἐκηρύχθη.* SOPH. O. T. 736. See also XEN. An. ii. 1, 10, *ἀπεκρίνετο ὅτι πρόσθεν ἂν ἀποθάνοιεν ἢ τὰ ὄπλα παραδοίησαν*, they answered, that they would die before they would give up their arms.

655. Thucydides once uses *ὔστερον ἢ* with the infinitive, after the analogy of *πρότερον ἢ* : *πρὶν δὲ ἀναστήναι, ἔτεσιν ὔστερον ἑκατὸν ἢ αὐτοὺς οἰκῆσαι, Πάμμilon πέμψαντες Σελινούντα κτίζουσιν*, before they were removed, and a hundred years after their own settlement, vi. 4.

656. *Πάρος*, before, which is originally an adverb like *πρίν*, is used in Homer with the infinitive, but never with the other moods. *E.g.*

Τέκνα ἀγρόται ἐξείλοντο πάρος πετεηνὰ γενέσθαι. Od. xvi. 218. **Ἐνθα με κῦμ' ἀπόρσε, πάρος τάδε ἔργα γενέσθαι.* Il. vi. 348. *Οὐδέ οἱ ὕπνος πίπτεν ἐπὶ βλεφάροισι πάρος καταλέξει ἅπαντα.* Od. xxiii. 309.

Πάρος with the infinitive occurs twelve times in Homer, always after affirmative sentences (except in Od. xxiii. 309).

Πρίν (AS ADVERB), *πάρος, πρότερον, πρόσθεν*, ETC., BEFORE *πρίν*, IN THE LEADING SENTENCE.

657. Homer very frequently has the adverb *πρίν*, and occasionally other adverbs of the same meaning, in the clause on which *πρίν* with the infinitive or subjunctive depends. *E.g.*

Μὴ πρίν ἐπ' ἥελιον δῶναι, πρίν με κατὰ πρηνὲς βαλέειν Πριάμοιο μέλαθρον, may the sun not (sooner) go down before I have thrown to the ground Priam's palace (the first *πρίν* emphasising in advance the idea of the second). Il. ii. 413. So Il. i. 97, ii. 348, 354, iv. 114; Od. iv. 747; Il. ix. 403 (τὸ *πρίν*). *Οὐ γάρ μιν πρόσθεν παύσεσθαι δῶν, πρίν γ' αὐτόν με ἴδεται.* Od. xvii. 7. So with *οὐ γάρ πω*, Od. x. 174.¹

658. In Attic Greek *πρότερον* or *πρόσθεν* frequently stands in the clause on which *πρίν* depends, like the adverb *πρίν* in Homer (657). *E.g.*

**Ἀποθνήσκουσι πρότερον πρίν δῆλοι γίγνεσθαι οἷοι ἦσαν.* XEN. Cyr. v. 2, 9. *Καὶ ἔτι πρότερον, πρίν ἐς τὴν Ῥόδον αὐτοὺς ἀναστή-*

¹ See Sturm, pp. 239, 261-263, who calls attention to the decrease of the double *πρίν* in the Odyssey. Of 43 cases of *πρίν* with the infinitive in the Iliad, 20 have a preceding *πρίν* or other adverb; of 30 cases in the Odyssey, only 10 have such an adverb. Besides *πρίν* or *τὸ πρίν* in the leading clause in Homer, *πάρος* occurs three times, and *πρόσθεν* and *πρότερος* each once. Before *πρίν* with the subjunctive in Homer such an adverb is always found, *πρίν* twice, *οὐπω* or *μήπω* three times, and *πρόσθεν* once.

ναι, τάδε ἐπράσσετο. THUC. viii. 45. Πρότερον οὐκ ἦν γένος ἀθανάτων, πρὶν ἔρως ξυνέμιξεν ἅπαντα. AR. AV. 700. Οὐ πρότερον πρὸς ἡμᾶς τὸν πόλεμον ἐξέφηναν, πρὶν ἐνόμισαν, κ.τ.λ. XEN. AN. iii. 1, 16. Οὐ τοίνυν ἀποκρινοῦμαι πρότερον, πρὶν ἂν πύθωμαι. PLAT. Euthyd. 295 C. Καὶ οὐ πρόσθεν ἔστησαν, πρὶν (ἢ) πρὸς τοῖς πεζοῖς θέν' Ἀσσυρίων ἐγένοντο. XEN. Cyr. i. 4, 23. Δεῖται αὐτοῦ μὴ πρό-σθεν καταλύσαι πρὶν ἂν αὐτῷ συμβουλευσῇται. XEN. AN. i. 1, 10. The formula οὐ πρότερον παύσασθαι πρὶν with the indicative in the orators is familiar (see 634).

659. Other adverbs of time sometimes occur in the leading clause : thus πάροιθεν . . . πρὶν, SOPH. EL. 1131; οὐπω . . . πρὶν, THUC. vi. 71, viii. 9. Πρὶν (used as in Homer) occurs twice in Euripides, and before πρὶν ἢ in HDT. i. 165. Even πρό in composition may refer to a following πρὶν, as προὔφαιρῶν τὰς ἐκκλησίας πρὶν ἐπιδημῆσαι τοὺς πρέσβεις, AESCHIN. ii. 61. See DEM. iv. 41, οὐδὲ πρὸ τῶν πραγμάτων προοράτε οὐδέν, πρὶν ἂν πύθῃσθε.

660. Φθάνω in the leading sentence may emphasise a following πρὶν. E.g.

"Ἐφθην αἰνίσσας πρὶν σου κατὰ πάντα δαῖναι ἡθεα. THEOG. 969 (see 887). So IL. xvi. 322, ἔφθῃ ὀρέξάμενος πρὶν οὐτάσαι. "Ἐφθῆσαν ἀπικόμενοι πρὶν ἢ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἦκειν, they arrived before the barbarians came. HDT. vi. 116: so ix. 70. Φθῆσονται πλείσαντες πρὶν Χίους αἰσθῆσθαι. THUC. viii. 12. Φθῆναι συμβαλόντες πρὶν ἐλθεῖν τοὺς βοηθήσοντας, to join battle before the auxiliaries should come up. ISOC. iv. 87.

661. In HDT. vi. 108 we find the infinitive depending on φθάνω . . . ἢ, the verb implying πρότερον or πρὶν: φθαίητε ἂν πολλάκις ἐξανδραποδισθέντες ἢ τινα πυθέσθαι ἡμέων, you would often be reduced to slavery before any of us heard of it.

SECTION VIII.

Indirect Discourse or Oratio Obliqua, including Indirect Quotations and Questions.

662. The words or thoughts of any person may be quoted either *directly* or *indirectly*. A direct quotation is one which gives the exact words of the original speaker or writer. An indirect quotation is one in which the original words conform to the construction of the sentence in which they are quoted. Thus the expression ταῦτα βούλομαι may be quoted either directly (in *oratio recta*), as λέγει τις "ταῦτα βούλομαι"; or indirectly (in *oratio obliqua*), as

λέγει τις ὅτι ταῦτα βούλεται or φησί τις ταῦτα βούλεσθαι,
some one says that he wishes for these.

663. Indirect quotations may be introduced by ὅτι or ὥς and occasionally by other particles (negatively ὅτι οὐ, ὥς οὐ, etc.) with a finite verb; sometimes by the infinitive without a particle; sometimes also by the participle.

1. "Ὅτι, *that*, was originally the neuter relative ὃ τι, used as a limiting accusative, *in respect to which* (or *what*), *as to which, how far*, etc. In Homer ὃ, neuter of the relative ὅς, is used like ὅτι (709, 1). Thus οἶδα ὃ τι (or ὃ) κακὰ μέγεται at first meant *I know as to what he plans evil*, or *I know about his planning evil*, and afterwards came to mean *I know that he plans evil*.

2. Ὡς, the relative adverb of manner (312, 1), in this construction originally meant *in what manner, how*; and afterwards became established in the same sense as ὅτι, *that*. Compare the German use of *wie* (*how*) in narration. *How for that* is heard in vulgar English (as *I told him how I saw this*), and *how that* was once in good use in this sense for *that*. Ὅπως is sometimes used like ὥς in indirect discourse (706).

3. By a use similar to that of ὥς (2), οὔνεκα and ὁθούνεκα are sometimes weakened from their meaning *for which purpose, wherefore*, to the same sense as ὅτι and ὥς, *that* (710, 1). These words are also used in a causal sense, *because*, like ὅτι, ὃ, and ὥς (712).

On the other hand, διότι, *because*, sometimes has the sense of ὅτι, *that* (710, 2).

4. Ὅτε, *when*, in Homer sometimes loses its temporal force, and approaches ὅτι in meaning (709, 3).

664. 1. Indirect quotations with ὅτι, ὥς, etc., form the chief part of the class of *substantive* sentences, in which an assertion introduced by one of these particles is the subject or the object of a verb. But these sentences have no peculiar construction, except after verbs implying thought or the expression of thought (*verba sentiendi et declarandi*), as they elsewhere have the simple indicative or any other form which would be used in the corresponding independent assertions. See οὐχ ἄλις ὥς ἐκείρετε κτήματ' ἐμέ, *is it not enough that you wasted my property?* Od. ii. 312; πολὺ κέρδιον ἔπλετο ὅττι ὑπέειξεν, Il. xv. 227; τοῦτο ἄξιον ἐπαινεῖν, ὅτι τὸν φόβον διέλυσαν τῶν Ἑλλήνων (668), PLAT. MENEX. 241 B; τοῦτ' ἀδικεῖ, ὅτι ἀχρεῖον τὴν ἐπιείκειαν καθίστησιν, DEM. xx. 155.

2. The infinitive of indirect discourse belongs to the large class of subject and object infinitives (745; 746; 751), being distinguished from the others of this class by preserving the time of its tense from the finite verb which it represents (85; 667, 3).¹

¹ See Schmitt, *Ueber den Ursprung des Substantivsatzes mit Relativpartikeln im Griechischen*, in Schanz's *Beiträge*, Heft 8.

665. 1. Indirect questions may be introduced by *εἰ*, *whether* (rarely by *ἄρα*), and also by interrogative pronouns, pronominal adjectives, and adverbs, and by most relatives. Alternative indirect questions may be introduced by *πότερον* (*πότερα*) . . . *ἤ*, *εἴτε* . . . *εἴτε*, *εἰ* . . . *ἤ*, *εἰ* . . . *εἴτε*, *whether* . . . *or*.

Ἐάν or *ἥν* never means *whether* (see 493).

2. In Homer single indirect questions (when they are not introduced by interrogatives) generally have *ἤ* or *εἰ*, *whether*; and alternative questions have *ἤ* (*ἤέ*) . . . *ἤ* (*ἤέ*), sometimes *εἴτε* . . . *εἴτε*, *whether* . . . *or*.

Bekker never allows *εἰ* or *εἴτε* in indirect questions in Homer, always writing *ἤ* or *ἤτε*, without regard to the Mss.

3. Indirect questions follow the same principles as indirect quotations with *ὅτι* or *ὥς*, in regard to their moods and tenses. (For examples, see 669.)

666. The term *indirect discourse* or *oratio obliqua* includes all clauses which express indirectly the words or thoughts of any person (including those of the speaker himself), after verbs which imply thought or the expression of thought (*verba sentiendi et declarandi*), and after such expressions as *φαίνεται*, *it appears*, *δοκεῖ*, *it seems*, *δηλόν ἐστιν*, *it is evident*, *σαφές ἐστιν*, etc.

The term may be further applied to any single dependent clause, in any sentence, which indirectly expresses the thought of any other person than the speaker (or past thoughts of the speaker himself), even when the preceding or following clauses are not in indirect discourse. (See 694 and 684.)

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INDIRECT DISCOURSE.

667. The following are the general principles of indirect discourse, the particular applications of which are shown in 669-710.

1. In indirect quotations after *ὅτι* or *ὥς* and in indirect questions,

(a) after primary tenses, each verb retains both the mood and the tense of the direct discourse, no change being made except (when necessary) in the person of the verb;

(b) after secondary tenses, each primary tense of the indicative and each subjunctive of the direct discourse may be either changed to the same tense of the optative or

retained in its original mood and tense. The imperfect and pluperfect, having no tenses in the optative, are generally retained in the indicative (but see 673). An aorist indicative belonging to a *dependent* clause of the direct discourse remains unchanged, but one belonging to the leading clause may be changed to the optative like a primary tense.

2. Secondary tenses of the indicative expressing an unreal condition, indicatives with *ἄν*, and all optatives (with or without *ἄν*), are retained, with no change in either mood or tense, after both primary and secondary tenses.

3. When the quotation depends on a verb which takes the infinitive or participle, the leading verb of the quotation is changed to the *corresponding tense* of the infinitive or participle, after both primary and secondary tenses, *ἄν* being retained if it is in the direct form; and the dependent verbs follow the preceding rules.

4. The adverb *ἄν* is never joined with a verb in indirect discourse unless it stood also in the direct form. On the other hand, *ἄν* is never omitted in indirect discourse if it was used in the direct form; except that, when it is joined to a relative word or a particle before a subjunctive in direct discourse, it is regularly dropped when the subjunctive is changed to the optative after a past tense in indirect discourse.

5. The indirect discourse regularly retains the same negative particle which would be used in the direct form. But the infinitive and participle sometimes take *μή* in indirect discourse where *οὐ* would be used in the direct form. (See examples under 685 and 688.) In indirect questions introduced by *εἰ*, *whether*, and in the second part of alternative indirect questions (665), *μή* can be used as well as *οὐ*.

668. As an indirect quotation or question is generally the object or subject of its leading verb, it may stand in apposition with a pronoun like *τοῦτο* which represents such an object or subject; as *τοῦτο λέγομεν*, *ὅτι σοφός ἐστιν*, *we say this, that he is wise*; *τοῦτο δῆλόν ἐστιν*, *ὅτι σοφός ἐστιν*, *this is plain, that he is wise*; *τοῦτο σκεψόμεθα*, *εἰ ἀληθὴ λέγεις*, *we shall inquire into this, whether you tell the truth*.

SIMPLE SENTENCES IN INDIRECT DISCOURSE.

Indicative and Optative after ὅτι and ὥς, and in Indirect Questions.

669. When the direct form is an indicative (without ἄν) in a simple sentence, we have (667, 1) the following rules for indirect quotations after ὅτι or ὥς and for indirect questions:—

1. After *primary* tenses the verb stands in the indicative, in the tense of the direct discourse. *E.g.*

Λέγει ὅτι γράφει, *he says that he is writing*; λέγει ὅτι ἔγραφεν, *he says that he was writing*; λέγει ὅτι γέγραφεν, *he says that he has written*; λέγει ὅτι ἔεγραψε, *he says that he had written*; λέγει ὅτι ἔγραψεν, *he says that he wrote*; λέγει ὅτι γράψει, *he says that he shall write*.

Εἶφ' ὅτι οἱ σῶς εἰμι καὶ ἐκ Πύλου εἰλήλουθα, *say that I am safe and have come from Pylos*. *Od.* xvi. 131. Ὅτρυνον δ' Ἀχιλλῆι εἰπεῖν ὅτι ῥά οἱ πολλὸν φίλτατος ὦλεθ' ἑταῖρος, *urge him to tell Achilles that his dearest friend perished*. *Il.* xvii. 654. (See 662, 1.) Γνωτὸν δὲ ὥς ἦδη Τρώεσσι νύκτερον πείρατ' ἐφήπταται. *Il.* vii. 401.

Λέγει γὰρ ὥς οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἀδικώτερον φήμης. *AESCHIN.* i. 125. Οὐ γὰρ ἂν τοῦτό γ' εἴποις, ὥς ἔλαθεν. *Id.* ii. 151. Εἴ δ' ὥστε, ὅτι πλείστον διαφέρει φήμη καὶ συκοφαντία. *Ib.* 145. Ἀλλ' ἐννοεῖν χρὴ ταῦτο μὲν, γυναιχ' ὅτι ἔφθμεν. *SOPH. ANT.* 61. Καὶ ταῦθ' ὥς ἀληθὴ λέγω, καὶ ὅτι οὔτε ἐδόθη ἡ ψήφος ἐν ἅπασιν πλείους τ' ἐγένοντο τῶν ψηφισαμένων, μάρτυρας ὑμῖν παρέξομαι, *I shall bring witnesses to show that I speak the truth, etc.* *DEM.* lviii. 14.

(Indirect Questions.) Ἐρωτᾷ τί βούλονται, *he asks what they want*; ἔρωτᾷ τί ποιήσουσιν, *he asks what they will do*.

Σὺ δὲ φράσαι εἰ με σώσεις (Bekker ἢ με), *and do you consider whether you will save me*. *Il.* i. 83. Σάφα δ' οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ θεός ἐστιν. *Il.* v. 183. Ὅφρα καὶ Ἐκτωρ εὔεται ἢ καὶ ἐμὸν δόρυ μαίνεται ἐν παλάμῃσιν (v. l. εἰ καί). *Il.* viii. 111. Ὅφρα δαῶμεν ἢ ἐτέδν Κάλχας μαντεύεται ἢ καὶ οὐκί. *Il.* ii. 299; so *Od.* iv. 487, 712. Ὅς εἴπῃ ὅ τι τόσσον ἐχώσατο Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων, εἰ τ' ἄρ' ὁ γ' εὐχολῆς ἐπιμέμφεται εἴ θ' ἐκατόμβης (Bekker ἢ τ' . . . ἢ θ'). *Il.* i. 64; see ii. 349. Πύστεις ἐρωτῶντες εἰ λησταί εἰσιν, *asking whether they are pirates*. *THUC.* i. 5. Εἰ ξυμπονήσεις καὶ ξυνεργάσει σκόπε. *SOPH. ANT.* 41. See *EUR.* Alc. 784. Εὐβούις' ὦν δ' ἔβλασταν οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν. *SOPH. TR.* 401. Ἐρωτᾷς εἰ οὐ καλὴ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, *you ask whether it does not seem to me to be fine*. *PLAT.* Gorg. 462 D. Βουλόμενος ἐρεῖσθαι εἰ μαθὼν τίς τι μεμνημένος μὴ οἶδεν. *Id.* Theaet. 163 D. Σκοπῶμεν εἰ ἡμῖν πρέπει ἢ οὐ. *Id.* Rep. 451 D. Τοῦτ' αὐτὸ, εἰ χαίρεις ἢ μὴ χαίρεις, ἀνάγκη δὴ ποῦ σε

ἀγνοεῖν. Id. Phil. 21 B. (For οὐ and μή in the last four examples, representing οὐ of the direct question, see 667, 5.) Θανμάζω πότερα ὡς κρατῶν αἰτεῖ τὰ ὄπλα ἢ ὡς διὰ φιλίαν δῶρα. XEN. An. ii. 1, 10. Σήμαιν' εἴτ' ἔχει χῶρον πρὸς αὐτὸν τόνδε γ' εἴτ' ἄλλη κυρεῖ. SOPH. Ph. 22. Εἴτε κατὰ τρόπον κείται εἴτε μη, οὕτω θεᾶσθαι. PLAT. Crat. 425 B (667, 5). See also XEN. Cyr. ii. 1, 7 (εἰ . . . εἴτε μή); EUR. Alc. 139 (εἰ . . . εἴτε). Περί πάντων ἰδῶμεν, ἀρ' οὕτωςί γίγνεται πάντα. PLAT. Phaed. 70 D. (*Ara regularly introduces only direct questions.)

It is to be noticed that indirect *questions* after primary tenses retain an indicative of the direct question in Greek, where the subjunctive is used in Latin. Thus, nescio quis sit, *I know not who he is*, in Greek is simply ἀγνοῶ τίς ἐστίν. This does not apply to indirect questions which would require the subjunctive in the direct form (677).

2. After *secondary* tenses the verb may be either changed to the optative or retained in the indicative, the *tense* of the direct discourse being retained in either case. The optative is the more common form. *E.g.*

"Ἐλεξεν ὅτι γράφοι (or ὅτι γράφει), *he said that he was writing*; i.e. *he said γράφω*. "Ἐλεξεν ὅτι γεγραφώς εἴη (or ὅτι γέγραφεν), *he said that he had written*; i.e. *he said γέγραφα*. "Ἐλεξεν ὅτι γράψοι (or ὅτι γράψει), *he said that he should write*; i.e. *he said γράψω*. "Ἐλεξεν ὅτι γράψειεν (or ὅτι ἔγραψεν), *he said that he had written*; i.e. *he said ἔγραφα*. (For the imperfect and pluperfect, see 672.)

(Optative.) "Ἐπέκλησε φρονήματος τοὺς Ἀρκάδας, λέγων ὡς μόνοις μὲν αὐτοῖς πατρὶς Πελοπόννησος εἴη, πλείστον δὲ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν φύλον τὸ Ἀρκαδικὸν εἴη, καὶ σώματα ἐγκρατέστατα ἔχοι. XEN. Hell. vii. 1, 23. (He said μόνοις μὲν ὑμῖν ἐστι, πλείστον δὲ ἐστι, καὶ σώματα ἔχει: these indicatives might have been used in the place of εἴη, εἴη, and ἔχοι.) "Ἐλεγε δὲ ὁ Πελοπίδας ὅτι Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Ἀρκάδες μάχη ἡττημένοι εἶεν ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, i.e. *he said that they had been defeated* (he said ἡττηνται). Ib. vii. 1, 35. So HDT. i. 83 (perf. and pres.) "Υπειπὼν τὰλλα ὅτι αὐτὸς τάκει πράξοι, ἔχeto, *having hinted that he would himself attend to affairs there*. THUC. i. 90. (He said τάκει πράξω, and πράξει might have been retained. See 128.) "Ο δὲ εἶπεν ὅτι ἔσονται (he said ἔσονται). XEN. Cyr. vii. 2, 19. "Ἐλεξαν ὅτι πέμψειε σφᾶς ὁ Ἰνδῶν βασιλεὺς, κελύων ἐρωτᾶν ἐξ ὅτου ὁ πόλεμος εἴη, *they said that the king of the Indians had sent them, commanding them to ask on what account there was war*. Ib. ii. 4, 7. (They said ἐπεμψεν ἡμᾶς, and the question to be asked was ἐκ τίνος ἐστὶν ὁ πόλεμος;) "Ἐλεγον ὅτι οὐ πάποθ' οὗτος ὁ ποταμὸς διαβατὸς γένοιτο περὶ εἰ μὴ τότε, *they said that this river had never been (ἐγένετο) fordable except then*. Id. An. i. 4, 18. Περικλῆς προηγόρευε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, ὅτι Ἀρχίδαμος μὲν οἱ ξένος εἴη, οὐ μέντοι ἐπὶ κακῇ γε τῆς πόλεως γένοιτο, *he announced that A. was his friend, but that he had not been made his friend to the injury of the state*. THUC. ii.

13. (He said *ξένος μοί ἐστιν, οὐ μέντοι ἐγένετο*. See 116, 1; 124, 1.) Ἐγνώσαν ὅτι κενὸς ὁ φόβος εἶη. XEN. AN. II. 2, 21. Προϊδόντες ὅτι ἔσοιτο ὁ πόλεμος, ἐβούλοντο τὴν Πλάταιαν προκαταλαβεῖν. THUC. II. 2. Ἐπειρώμην αὐτῷ δεικνύειν, ὅτι οἴοιτο μὲν εἶναι σοφός, εἶη δ' οὐ. PLAT. AP. 21 C.

(Indicative.) Ἐλεγον ὡς ἐλπίζουσιν σὲ καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔξιν μοι χάριν, *they said that they hoped*, etc. ISOC. V. 23. (They said *ἐλπίζομεν*, which might have been changed to *ἐλπίζοιεν*.) Ἦκε δ' ἀγγέλλων τις ὡς τοὺς πρυτάνεις ὡς Ἐλάτεια κατεῖληπται, *some one had come with the report that Elateu had been taken*. DEM. XVIII. 169. (Here the perf. opt. might have been used.) Δεινὸς λόγους ἐτόλμα περὶ ἐμοῦ λέγειν, ὡς ἐγὼ τὸ πρῶγμ' εἰμι τοῦτο δεδρακώς. ID. XXI. 104. Αἰτιασάμενος γάρ με ἄ καὶ λέγειν ἂν ὀκνησεί τις, τὸν πατέρα ὡς ἀπέκτονα ἐγὼ τὸν ἐμαντοῦ, κ.τ.λ. ID. XXII. 2. Φανερώς εἶπεν ὅτι ἡ μὲν πόλις σφῶν τετεῖχισται ἤδη, *he said that their city had already been fortified*. THUC. I. 91. Ἀποκρινάμενοι ὅτι πέμψουσιν πρέσβεις, εὐθὺς ἀπήλλαξαν. ID. I. 90. (Cf. ὅτι πράξῃς, quoted above from the same chapter.) Ἦιδεσαν ὅτι τοὺς ἀπενεγκόντας οἰκέτας ἐξαιτήσομεν. DEM. XXX. 23. (Ἐξαιτήσοιμεν might have been used.) Ἐτόλμα λέγειν ὡς ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἐχθροὺς ἐφ' ἐαυτὸν εἰλκυσε καὶ νῦν ἐν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις ἐστὶ κινδύνους. ID. XXII. 59.

(Indirect Questions.) Ἠρώτησεν αὐτὸν τί ποιοίη (or τί ποιεῖ), *he asked him what he was doing*; i.e. *he asked τί ποιεῖς*; Ἠρώτησεν αὐτὸν τί πεποιηκώς εἶη (or τί πεποίηκεν), *he asked him what he had done*; i.e. *he asked τί πεποιήκας*; Ἠρώτησεν αὐτὸν τί ποιήσοι (or τί ποιήσῃ), *he asked him what he should do*; i.e. *he asked τί ποιήσεις*; Ἠρώτησεν αὐτὸν τί ποιήσῃεν (or τί ποίησεν), *he asked him what he had done*; i.e. *he asked τί ἐποίησας*;

Ἦχετο πενδόμενος μετὰ σὸν κλέος, ἢ που ἔτ' εἶης, i.e. *he went to inquire whether you were still living*. OD. XIII. 415. Ἀλλήλους τ' εἶροντο τίς εἶη καὶ πόθεν ἔλθοι (i.e. τίς ἐστὶν καὶ πόθεν ἦλθεν); OD. XVII. 368. Ἦρετο, εἴ τις ἐμοῦ εἶη σοφώτερος, *he asked whether any one was wiser than I*. PLAT. AP. 21 A. (The direct question was *ἔστι τις σοφώτερος*;) Ὅ τι δὲ ποιήσοι οὐ διεσμήνη, *but he did not indicate what he would do*. XEN. AN. II. 1, 23. (The direct question was *τί ποιήσω*;) Ἐπειρώτα, τίνα δευτέρον μετ' ἐκείνον ἴδοι, *he asked whom he had seen (who came) next to him*. HDT. I. 31. (The direct question was *τίνα εἶδες*;) Εἶρετο κόθεν λάβοι τὸν παῖδα, *he asked whence he had received the boy*. ID. I. 116. Ἠρώτων αὐτὸν εἰ ἀναπλεύσειεν ἔχων ἀργύριον, *I asked him whether he had set sail with the money*. DEM. I. 55. (The direct question was *ἀνέπλευσας*; See 125 and 670, b.)

Εἶρετο ὅττεν χρηζίω ἰκόμην, *he asked what I wanted that I came*. OD. XVII. 120. Ἠπόρουν τί ποτε λέγει, *I was uncertain what he meant*. PLAT. AP. 21 B. (Here *λέγοι* might have been used.) Ἐβουλεύονθ' οἷτοι τίν' αὐτοῦ καταλείψουσιν, *they were considering whom they should leave here*. DEM. XIX. 122. Ἐρωτῶντων τινῶν διὰ τί ἀπέθανεν, παραγγέλλειν ἐκέλευεν, κ.τ.λ. XEN. HELL. II. 1, 4.

670. (a) After past tenses the indicative and optative are in equally good use; the optative being used when the writer incorporates the quotation entirely into his own sentence, and the indicative when he quotes it in the original words as far as his own construction allows. The indicative here, like the subjunctive in final clauses after past tenses (318), is merely a more vivid form of expression than the optative, with no difference in meaning. We even find both moods in the same sentence. *E.g.*

Οἷτοι ἔλεγον ὅτι Κῦρος μὲν τέθνηκεν, Ἀριαῖος δὲ πεφνευγὼς ἐν τῷ σταθμῷ εἶη καὶ λέγοι, κ.τ.λ. XEN. AN. ii. 1, 3. (Here τέθνηκεν contains the most important part of the message.) Ἐκ δὲ τούτου ἐπυνθάνετο ἡδὴ αὐτῶν καὶ ὁπόσῃν ὁδὸν διήλασαν, καὶ εἰ οἰκοῖτο ἢ χώρα. Id. Cyr. iv. 4, 4. Ἐτόλμα λέγειν, ὥς χρέα τε πάμπολλα ἐκτέτικεν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ καὶ ὥς πολλὰ τῶν ἐμῶν λάβοιεν. DEM. xxvii. 49. Ὅμοιοι ἦσαν θαυμάζειν ὅποι ποτὲ τρέψονται οἱ Ἕλληγες καὶ τί ἐν νῶ ἔχοιεν. XEN. AN. iii. 5, 13.

(b) The perfect and future were less familiar than the other tenses of the optative, so that these tenses were sometimes retained in the indicative even when the present or the aorist was changed to the optative. See the last two examples under (a). In indirect questions the aorist indicative was generally retained (see 125). Some writers (as Thucydides) preferred the more direct forms in all indirect discourse (320).

671. In Homer this construction (669) is fully developed in indirect questions: see examples of both indicative and optative in 669, 1 and 2. But in indirect quotations, while the indicative is freely used after both present and past tenses, the change of the indicative to the optative after past tenses had not yet been introduced. In the single case of εἰπεῖν ὥς with the optative, μερμήριξε . . . ἕκαστα εἰπεῖν, ὥς ἔλθοι καὶ ἵκοιτ' ἐς πατρίδα γαίαν, *he hesitated about telling him each event, how he had returned, etc.*, Od. xxiv. 237, ὥς appears only on its way from its meaning *how* (663, 2) to its later use with the optative as *that*. We first find the optative in genuine oratio obliqua (with ὥς) Hymn. Ven. 214, εἶπεν ὥς ἔοι. Further, the later principle by which the indicative after past tenses (when it is not changed to the optative) retains the *tense* of the direct form is almost unknown in the Homeric language. Here a present or perfect indicative of the direct discourse after a past tense is changed to an imperfect or pluperfect; so that *I knew that he was planning evil*, which in Attic would be ἐγὼ γινώσκον ὅτι κακὰ μῆδοιτο (or μῆδεται), in Homer is γινώσκον ὅ (= ὅτι) κακὰ μῆδετο, Od. iii. 166. (For examples, see 674.) The aorist indicative, which has no corresponding tense to express its own time referred to the past, was always retained after past tenses; as in γνῶ ὅ οἱ οὔτι ἦλθεν, Il. xi. 439; so i. 537, xxii. 445. Likewise the future indicative is once retained, in Od. xiii. 340, ἦδε' ὁ νοστήσεις, *I knew that you would return*; but elsewhere the past future with

ἐμελλον is used, as in Il. xx. 466, οὐδὲ τὸ ἦδη ὁ οὐ πείσεσθαι ἐμελλον, and Od. xix. 94, Il. xi. 22. These examples show the need of the later future optative (129). In Il. xxii. 10, οὐδέ νύ πώ με ἔγνωσ ὡς θεός εἰμι, and xx. 265 the present expresses a present truth rather than a past fact.

It thus appears that the peculiar constructions with ὅτι and ὡς in oratio obliqua (667, 1, b), which gave such grace and variety to the later language, were not yet developed in Homer; but clauses with ὅτι, ὡς, etc., were still connected with the leading verb by the same looser construction which we use in English (as *I knew that he was planning evil*), the dependent verb expressing its own absolute time (see 22), as it did in the relative clauses in which these clauses originated, or in the more primitive parataxis. Thus γίγνωσκον ὁ κακὰ μῆδετο (above) meant originally *I knew as to what he was planning evil*; and without ὁ, in a still earlier stage, *I knew: he was planning evil* (which we can say in English). Even after the more thorough incorporation of the dependent clause was established, by which either μῆδεται or μῆδοιτο became the regular form, the more primitive imperfect is occasionally found, even in Attic prose (see 674, 2).

The most common Homeric construction in indirect discourse is that of φημί with the infinitive, of which 130 examples occur.¹

672. An imperfect or pluperfect of the direct discourse is regularly retained in the indicative, after past tenses, for want of an imperfect or pluperfect optative. *E.g.*

Ἀκούσας δὲ Ξενοφῶν ἔλεγεν ὅτι ὀρθῶς ᾔτιῳντο καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῖς μαρτυροίη, *he said that they had accused him rightly, and that the fact itself bore witness to them*; i.e. *he said ὀρθῶς ᾔτιῳσθε καὶ τὸ ἔργον ὑμῖν μαρτυρεῖ*. XEN. AN. iii. 3, 12. Εἶχε γὰρ λέγειν, καὶ ὅτι μόνου τῶν Ἑλλήνων βασιλεῖ συνεμάχοντο ἐν Πλαταιαῖς, καὶ ὅτι ὕστερον οὐδέποτε στρατεύσαιντο ἐπὶ βασιλέα (*he said μόνου συνεμαχόμεθα, καὶ οὐδέποτε ἐστρατεύσάμεθα*). Id. Hell. vii. 1, 34. Τούτων ἕκαστον ἡρόμην εἰ τινες εἶεν μάρτυρες ὧν ἐναντίον τὴν προῖκ' ἀπέδοσαν, αὐτὸν δ' Ἀφροβον, εἴ τινες παρήσαν ὅτ' ἀπελάμβανεν, *I asked each of these men whether there were any witnesses before whom they had paid the dowry; and Aphobus, whether there had been any present when he received it*. DEM. xxx. 19. (The two questions were εἰσὶ μάρτυρές τινες; and παρήσαν τινες;)

¹ See Schmitt, *Ursprung des Substantivsatzes*, p. 70. The following statistics are based on Schmitt's collection of Homeric examples. Homer has 40 cases of ὅτι, ὅπτι, or ὅ with the indicative after verbs of *knowing, hearing, perceiving, or remembering* (23 of ὅ, 17 of ὅτι or ὅπτι); and 4 after verbs of *saying* (3 of ὅτι, 1 of ὅ).

18 of ὡς after verbs of *knowing*, etc.; 8 after verbs of *saying*.

5 of ὅ τ' (for ὅ τε=ὅ) after γίγνωσκω, εἶδομαι, and ὅλγω.

2 of οὐνεκα after verbs of *knowing*, etc.; 4 after verbs of *saying* (omitting Od. vii. 299 as causal).

Only 3 of the 16 cases of these particles after verbs of *saying* are in the Iliad; while of the 65 cases after verbs of *knowing*, etc., 42 are in the Iliad (29 with ὅτι, etc., 9 with ὡς, 3 with ὅ τ', 1 with οὐνεκα).

673. (*Imperfect Optative.*) In a few cases, the present optative is used after past tenses to represent the imperfect indicative. The present optative thus supplies the want of an imperfect, like the present infinitive and participle (119 and 140). This can be done only when the context makes it perfectly clear that the optative represents an imperfect, and not a present. *E.g.*

Τὸν Τιμαγόραν ἀπέκτειναν, κατηγοροῦντος τοῦ Λέοντος ὡς οὔτε συσκηνοῦν ἐθέλοι ἑαυτῷ μετὰ τε Πελοπίδου πάντα βουλευέοιτο. XEN. Hell. vii. 1, 38. (The words of Leon were οὔτε συσκηνοῦν ἤθελέ μοι, μετὰ τε Πελ. πάντα ἐβουλευέτο.) Τὰ πεπραγμένα διηγούντο, ὅτι αὐτοὶ μὲν ἐπὶ τοὺς πολεμίους πλείοιεν, τὴν δὲ ἀναίρεσιν τῶν ναυαγῶν προστάξαιεν ἀνδράσιν ἱκανοῖς. Ib. i. 7, 5. (The direct discourse was αὐτοὶ μὲν ἐπλέομεν, τὴν δὲ ἀναίρεσιν προσετάξαμεν.) Καὶ μοι πάντες ἀπεκρίναντο, ὅτι οὐδεὶς μάρτυς παρείη, κομίζετο δὲ λαμβάνων καθ' ὅποσονοῦν δέοιτο Ἀφροβος παρ' αὐτῶν, they all replied, that no witness had been present, and that Aphrobus had received the money from them, taking it in such sums as he happened to want. DEM. xxx. 20. (The direct discourse was οὐδεὶς μάρτυς παρήν, ἐκομίζετο δὲ λαμβάνων καθ' ὅποσονοῦν δέοιτο. Παρείη contains the answer to the question εἴ τις παρήσαν in the preceding sentence, quoted in 672. The imperfect in that sentence prevents the optatives in the reply from being ambiguous.) Ἀκούσας πιστεύω τούτῳ, ὡς ἄρα Λεόντιος, αἰσθόμενος νεκροὺς παρὰ τῷ δημῷ κειμένους, ἅμα μὲν ἰδεῖν ἐπιθυμοῖ, ἅμα δ' αὖ δυσχεραῖνοι καὶ ἀποτρέποι ἑαυτὸν, καὶ τέως μάχοιτό τε καὶ παρακαλύπτοιτο. PLAT. Rep. 439 E. (All the optatives represent imperfects.) See also HDT. ix. 16 (end).

674. 1. In Homer, where clauses with *ὅτι*, *ὥς*, etc. are not yet constructed on the principles of indirect discourse (see 671), a present or perfect of the direct form appears as an imperfect or pluperfect in these clauses after past tenses. *E.g.*

Οὐδέ τι ᾗδῃ ὅτιι δηϊόωντο λαοί. Il. xiii. 674 (here the present optative or indicative would be regular in Attic Greek). Ἐπόρουσε, γιννώσκων ὃ οἱ αὐτὸς ὑπείρεχε χεῖρας Ἀπόλλων (later ὑπέρεχοι or ὑπερέχει). Il. v. 433. Οὐ γάρ οἱ τις ἡγγεῖλ' ὅτιι ῥά οἱ πόσις ἔκτοθι μίμνε πυλάων. Il. xxii. 438. See Od. xxiv. 182; and iii. 166, discussed in 671.

2. We sometimes find the imperfect and pluperfect with *ὅτι* or *ὥς* representing the present or perfect of the direct form after past tenses, even in Attic Greek. In such cases the context always makes it clear that the tense represented is not an imperfect or pluperfect (672). *E.g.*

Ἐν πολλῇ ἀπορίᾳ ἦσαν οἱ Ἕλληνες, ἐννοούμενοι μὲν ὅτι ἐπὶ ταῖς βασιλείας θύραις ἦσαν, κύκλῳ δὲ αὐτοῖς πόλεις πολέμια ἦσαν, ἀγορὰν δὲ οὐδεὶς ἔτι παρέξειν ἔμελλεν, ἀπεῖχον δὲ τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐ μείων ἢ μύρια στάδια, προὔδεδῶκεσαν δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ οἱ βάρβαροι, μόνοι δὲ καταλελειμμένοι ἦσαν οὐδὲ ἵππεια οὐδένα σύμμαχον

ἔχοντες, the Greeks thought: *We are at the king's gates; hostile cities surround us; no one will supply us a market; we are not less than ten thousand stades from Greece; the barbarians have betrayed us, and we have been left alone.* XEN. AN. iii. 1, 2. (The direct forms would be the present and perfect indicative.) Διὰ τὸν χθιζινὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὃς ἡμᾶς διεδύετ', ἐξαπατᾶν καὶ λέγων ὡς φιλαθήναιός ἦν καὶ τὰν Σάμῳ πρῶτος κατεΐποι, i.e. *saying φιλαθήναιός εἰμι καὶ τὰν Σάμῳ πρῶτος κατεΐπον.* AR. Vesp. 283. (Here εἰμί is changed to ἦν, not to εἶη or ἐστί: κατεΐπον could be changed only to κατεΐποι.)

3. In such cases the more thorough incorporation of the dependent clause which is required to make the oratio obliqua complete is wanting, and the clause stands in the loose relation in which, for example, causal sentences usually stand to their leading verb (see 715). For the same incomplete oratio obliqua in dependent clauses of a quotation, see 691 and 701.

675. 1. An indirect quotation with ὅτι or ὡς and the optative is sometimes followed by an independent optative, generally introduced by γάρ, which continues the quotation as if it were itself dependent on the ὅτι or ὡς. *E.g.*

Ἦκονοὶ δ' ἔγωγέ τινων ὡς οὐδὲ τοὺς λιμένας καὶ τὰς ἀγορὰς ἔτι δόσοιεν αὐτῷ καρποῦσθαι· τὰ γὰρ κοινὰ τὰ θεταλὸν ἀπὸ τούτων δέοι διοικεῖν, *for (as they said) they must administer, etc.* DEM. i. 22. Ἀπεκρίναντο αὐτῷ ὅτι ἀδύνατα σφίσιν εἶη ποιεῖν ἃ προκαλεῖται ἄνεν Ἀθηναίων· παῖδες γὰρ σφῶν καὶ γυναῖκες παρ' ἐκείνοις εἴησαν. THUC. ii. 72. Ἐλεγον ὅτι παντὸς ἀξία λέγοι Σεύθης· χειμῶν γὰρ εἶη, κ.τ.λ. XEN. AN. vii. 3, 13.

2. Such independent optatives are sometimes found even when no optative precedes; but the context always contains some allusion to another's thought or expression. *E.g.*

Ὑπέσχετο τὸν ἄνδρ' Ἀχαιοὺς τόνδε δηλώσειν ἄγων· οἷοιτο μὲν μάλισθ' ἐκούσιον λαβῶν, εἰ μὴ θέλοι δ' ἄκοντα, i.e. *he thought (as he said), etc.* SOPH. PH. 617. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον ἦν ἀθάνατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἰς ἀνθρώπου σῶμα ἐλθεῖν ἀρχή ἦν αὐτῇ ὀλέθρον, ὥσπερ νόσος· καὶ ταλαιπωρουμένη τε διὰ τοῦτον τὸν βίον ζῶη, καὶ τελευτῶσα γε ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ θανάτῳ ἀπολλύοιτο, *and (according to the theory) it lives in misery, etc., and finally perishes in what is called death.* PLAT. PHAED. 95 D. (Plato is here stating the views of others.)

676. We may even have ὅτι or ὡς with the optative when the leading verb is not past, if there is an implied reference to some former expression of the thought quoted. *E.g.*

Ἄρ' οὖν διὰ οὐ μετρίως ἀπολογησόμεθα, ὅτι πρὸς τὸ ὄν πεφυκὼς εἶη ἀμύλασθαι, καὶ οὐκ ἐπιμένει, . . . ἀλλ' ἔοι καὶ οὐκ ἀμβλύ- νοιτο οὐδ' ἀπολήγοι τοῦ ἔρωτος, κ.τ.λ., i.e. *shall we not defend him very properly by stating (what we once said) that it is (was) his nature to press on towards pure Being, etc. (the optatives representing indicatives).* PLAT. REP. 490 A.

*Subjunctive or Optative representing the Interrogative
Subjunctive.*

677. In indirect questions, after a primary tense, an *interrogative subjunctive* (287) retains its mood and tense; after a secondary tense, it may be either changed to the same tense of the optative or retained in the subjunctive. *E.g.*

Φραζώμεθ' . . . ἢ ῥ' αὖτις πόλεμον ὄροσμεν (subj.) ἢ φιλότῃτα μετ' ἀμφοτέροισι βάλωμεν, *let us consider whether we shall again rouse war or cast friendship upon both armies.* IL iv. 14. Σὺ δέ μοι νημερτὲς ἐνίσπες, ἢ μιν ἀποκτείνω ἢ σε σοὶ ἐνθάδ' ἄγω, *and do you tell me truly whether I shall slay him or bring him hither to you.* Od. xxii. 166. See Od. xvi. 73, xix. 524. Πρὸς ἀμφοτέρα ἀπορῶ, ταύτην θ' ὅπως ἐκδῶ καὶ τὰλλ' ὁπόθεν διοικῶ, *I am at a loss on both questions, how I shall give her a dowry (πὼς ταύτην ἐκδῶ);, and how (whence) I shall pay my other expenses (πόθεν τὰλλα διοικῶ);.* DEM. xxvii. 66. Βουλευόμεαι ὅπως σε ἀποδρῶ, *I am trying to think how I shall escape you (πὼς σε ἀποδρῶ);.* XEN. Cyr. i. 4, 13. Οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω, *I know not what I shall say.* DEM. ix. 54. So in Latin, *non habeo quid (or quod) dicam.* Οὐκ ἔχω σόφισμ' ὅτῳ ἀπαλλαγῶ, *I have no device (i.e. I know not) how I shall escape.* AESCH. Prom. 470. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ δι' ἀπειρίαν γε οὐ φήσεις ἔχειν ὃ τι εἴπῃς, *for it is not surely through inexperience that you will declare that you know not what to say (i.e. τί εἴπω);.* DEM. xix. 120. So ὃ τι δῶ and οἷς δῶ, XEN. An. i. 7, 7. (See 572.) Τὰ δὲ ἐκπώματα οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ Χρυσάντα τούτῳ δῶ, *I do not know whether I shall give them, etc.* Id. Cyr. viii. 4, 16. Ἐπανερομένου Κτησιφώντος εἰ καλέσῃ Δημοσθένην, *when Ctesiphon asks whether he shall call Demosthenes.* AESCHIN. iii. 202. (For εἰ see 680.)

Ἐν δέ οἱ ἥτορ μεμήριξεν, ἢ ὃ γε τοὺς μὲν ἀναστήσειεν, ὃ δ' Ἀτρεΐδην ἐναρίζοι, ἢ ἐ χόλον παύσειεν ἐρητύσειέ τε θυμόν. IL i. 188. (The direct questions were τοὺς μὲν ἀναστήσω; Ἀτρεΐδην δ' ἐναρίζω; παύσω ἐρητύσω τε;) Κλήρους πάλλον, ὁπότερος δὴ πρόσθεν ἀφείῃ χάλκεον ἔγχος, *i.e. they shook the lots (to decide) which should first throw his spear, the question being πότερος πρόσθεν ἀφῆ;.* IL iii. 316. Ἐχρησθηριάζετο εἰ ἐκβάλοι τὸν Ἀδρηστον. HDT. v. 67. Ἐπῆροντο εἰ παραδοίεν Κορινθίους τὴν πόλιν, *they asked whether they should give up their city, the question being παραδῶμεν τὴν πόλιν;.* THUC. i. 25. Ἐβουλευόντο εἰ τὰ σκευοφόρα ἐνταῦθα ἄγοιτο ἢ ἀπίοιεν ἐπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον. XEN. An. i. 10, 17: so i. 10, 5. Ἡπόρει ὃ τι χρῆσαιτο τῷ πράγματι, *he was at a loss how to act in the matter, i.e. τί χρῆσμαι;.* Id. Hell. vii. 4, 39. Οὐ γὰρ εἴχομεν ὅπως δρῶντες καλῶς πράξαιμεν, *for we could not see how we should fare well if we did it.* SOPH. Ant. 270.

Ἀπορέοντος δὲ βασιλέως ὃ τι χρήσεται τῷ παρεόντι πρήγματι, Ἐπιάτης ἡλθέ οἱ ἐς λόγους. HDT. vii. 213. Ἡπόρησε μὲν ὁποτέ-

ρωσε διακινδυνεύσῃ χωρήσας. THUC. i. 63. Οἱ Πλαταιῆς ἐβουλεύοντο εἴτε κατακαύσωσιν ὥσπερ ἔχουσιν, ἐμπρήσαντες το οἶκημα, εἴτε τι ἄλλο χρήσονται, *whether they should set the house on fire and burn them as they were, or should dispose of them in some other way.* Id. ii. 4. Ἀπορήσαντες ὅπη καθορμίσονται, ἐς Πρώτην τὴν νῆσον ἐπλευσαν. Id. iv. 13.

678. The context must decide whether the optative in an indirect question represents a subjunctive (as here) or an indicative (669). The distinction is especially important with the aorist optative (see 125).

679. When the leading verb is an optative referring to the future, the optative can be used, by assimilation, to represent the subjunctive in these indirect questions. *E.g.*

Χαρίεντα γοῦν πάθουμι ἂν, εἰ μὴ ῥοιμὶ ὅποι ταῦτα καταθείην, *if I should not have anywhere to put these down (know where to put them).* AR. Eccl. 794. (See other examples under 186.)

680. Εἰ, *whether*, can introduce the subjunctive here, as well as the indicative or optative: see XEN. Cyr. viii. 4, 16, and AESCHIN. iii. 202, quoted in 677. Ἐάν cannot mean *whether*, and wherever this introduces a subjunctive the expression is conditional. (See 493.)

Indicative or Optative with ἂν.

681. An indicative or optative with ἂν retains its mood and tense (with ἄν) unchanged in indirect discourse with ὅτι or ὥς and in indirect questions, after both primary and secondary tenses. *E.g.*

Λέγει ὅτι τοῦτο ἂν ἐγένετο, *he says that this would have happened*: ἔλεγεν ὅτι τοῦτο ἂν ἐγένετο, *he said that this would have happened.* Λέγει (or ἔλεγεν) ὅτι οὗτος δικαίως ἂν θάνοι, *he says (or said) that this man would justly be put to death.*

(Θεμιστοκλῆς) ἀπεκρίνατο, ὅτι οὐτ' ἂν αὐτὸς Σερίφιος ἂν ὀνομαστὸς ἐγένετο οὐτ' ἐκεῖνος Ἀθηναῖος, *he replied that he should not have become famous himself if he had been a Seriphian, nor would the other if he had been an Athenian.* PLAT. Rep. 330 A. Ἐννοεῖτε, ὅτι ἦττον ἂν στάσις εἴη ἐνὸς ἀρχοντος ἢ πολλῶν. XEN. An. vi. i. 29. Απεκρίνατο, ὅτι πρόσθεν ἂν ἀποθάνοιεν ἢ τὰ ὅπλα παραδοίησαν. Ib. ii. 1, 10. (The direct discourse was πρόσθεν ἂν ἀποθάνοιεν.) Οὐκ ἂν ἐλπίσαντας ὥς ἂν ἐπεξέλθοι τις αὐτοῖς ἐς μάχην, *when they would never have expected that any one would come out to fight with them.* THUC. v. 9. Παρελθὼν τις δειξάτω, ὥς οἱ Θετταλοὶ νῦν οὐκ ἂν ἐλείθεροι γένοιοντο ἄσμενοι. DEM. ii. 8. Οὐδ' εἰδέναι φησὶ τί ἂν ποιῶν ὑμῖν χάρισαιτο, *he says he does not even know what he could do to gratify you.* Id. xix. 48. Οὐκ ἔχω τίς ἂν γενοίμαν. AESCH. Prom. 905; so 907. Ἡρώτων εἰ δοίεν ἂν τούτων τὰ πιστά. XEN. An. iv. 8, 7.

682. The same principle applies when a secondary tense of the indicative without ἂν in the construction of 415 is quoted. *E.g.*

(Ἐλεγεν) ὅτι κρείττον ἦν αὐτῷ τότε ἀποθανεῖν, *he said that he had better have died at once.* LYS. x. 25. (The direct discourse was κρείττον ἦν μοι ἀποθανεῖν.)

Infinitive in Indirect Discourse.

683. When the infinitive stands in indirect discourse, its tense represents the corresponding tense of the finite verb in the direct form, the present and perfect including the imperfect and pluperfect. If ἄν was used in the direct form, it must be retained in the quotation, each tense with ἄν representing the corresponding tenses of either indicative or optative with ἄν. *E.g.*

Φησὶ γράφειν, *he says that he is writing*; ἔφη γράφειν, *he said that he was writing*; φήσκει γράφειν, *he will say that he is (then) writing.* (He says γράφω.) Φησὶ (ἔφη) γράφειν ἄν, εἰ ἐδύνατο, *he says (or said) that he should now be writing, if he were able.* (He says ἔγραφεον ἄν.) Φησὶ (ἔφη) γράφειν ἄν, εἰ δύναιτο, *he says (or said) that he should write, if he should (ever) be able.* (He says γράφοιμι ἄν.)

Φησὶ γράψαι, *he says that he wrote*; ἔφη γράψαι, *he said that he had written*; φήσκει γράψαι, *he will say that he wrote.* (He says ἔγραψα.) Φησὶ (ἔφη) γράψαι ἄν, εἰ ἐδυνήθη, *he says (or said) that he should have written, if he had been able.* (He says ἔγραψα ἄν.) Φησὶ (ἔφη) γράψαι ἄν, εἰ δυνήθῃ, *he says (or said) that he should write, if he should (ever) be able.* (He says γράψαιμι ἄν.)

Φησὶ (φήσκει) γεγραφέναι, *he says (or will say) that he has written*; ἔφη γεγραφέναι, *he said that he had written.* (He says γέγραφα.) For the perfect with ἄν, see below and 206.

Φησὶ (φήσκει) γράψειν, *he says (or will say) that he will write*; ἔφη γράψειν, *he said that he would write.* (He says γράψω.)

(Present.) Καὶ τέ μέ φησι μάχη Τρώεσσιν ἀρήγειν. II. i. 521. Πῶς δὴ φῆς πολέμοιο μεθιέμεν; II. iv. 351. So II. xvii. 338. Σκύζεσθαί οἱ ἐπὶ θεοῦ, ἐμὲ δ' ἔξοχα πάντων ἀθανάτων κεχολῶσθαι, *tell him that the Gods are angry with him and that I am enraged with him beyond all the immortals.* II. xxiv. 113. Ἀρρωστεῖν προφασίζεται, *he pretends that he is sick*: ἐξώμοσεν ἄρρωστεῖν τούτον, *he took his oath that this man was sick.* DEM. xix. 124. Οὐκ ἔφη αὐτὸς ἀλλ' ἐκείνον στρατηγεῖν, *i.e. Cleon said that not he himself, but Nicias, was general*; *i.e. he said, οὐκ ἐγὼ αὐτὸς ἀλλ' ἐκείνος στρατηγεί.* THUC. iv. 28. Τίνας οὖν εὐχὰς ἵπολαμβάνετ' εὐχεσθαι τὸν Φίλιππον ὅτ' ἔσπειδεν; *what prayers do you suppose Philip made, etc.?* DEM. xix. 130. (Εὐχεσθαι represents ἡὔχετο: see 119.) Οἶμαι γὰρ ἄν οὐκ ἀχαρίστως μοι ἔχειν, *for I think it would not be a thankless labour*; *i.e. οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι.* XEN. AN. ii. 3, 18. Οἶσθε γὰρ τὸν πατέρα οὐκ ἂν φυλάττειν καὶ τὴν τιμὴν λαμβάνειν τῶν πωλουμένων ξύλων; *do you think that my father would not have taken care and have received the pay for the timber*

sold? i.e. οὐκ ἂν ἐφύλαττεν καὶ ἐλάμβανεν; DEM. xlix. 35. (See 205.)

(Aorist.) Οὐδὲ κε φαίης ἀνδρὶ μαχησάμενον τόν γ' ἐλθέμεν, *nor would you say that he came after a battle with a man.* IL. iii. 393. Κατασχέιν φησι τούτους, *he says that he detained them.* Τοὺς δ' αἰχμαλώτους οὐδ' ἐνθυμηθῆναί φησι λύσασθαι, *but he says that he did not even think of ransoming the prisoners.* DEM. xix. 39. (He says κατέσχον and οὐδ' ἐνθυμήτην.) Ὁ Κύρος λέγεται γενέσθαι Καμβύσῳ, *Cyrus is said to have been the son of Cambyses.* XEN. Cyr. i. 2, 1. Τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἤλπικεν ἰσως ἂν ἐπεξέλθῃν καὶ τὴν γῆν οὐκ ἂν περιιδεῖν τμηθῆναι, *he hoped that the Athenians would perhaps march out and not allow their land to be laid waste*; i.e. ἰσως ἂν ἐπεξέλθοιεν καὶ οὐκ ἂν περιίδοιεν. THUC. ii. 20. Ἀπῆσαν νομίσαντες μὴ ἂν ἔτι ἱκανοὶ γενέσθαι κωλύσαι τὸν τειχισμόν. Id. vi. 102. (Here οὐκ ἂν γενοίμεθα would be the direct form: see 685.) So i. 139. Οὐκ ἂν ἡγεῖσθ' αὐτὸν κἂν ἐπιδραμεῖν, *do you not believe that (in that case) he would have run thither*? i.e. ἐπέδραμεν ἂν. DEM. xxvii. 56. (See 223.) A single infinitive with ἂν occurs in Homer: καὶ δ' ἂν τοῖς ἄλλοισιν ἔφη παραμυθῆσασθαι, IL. ix. 684. (The direct discourse is given in the words of Achilles in vs. 417, καὶ δ' ἂν παραμυθησαίμην.) (See 207.)

(Perfect.) Φρονέω τετιμῆσθαι Διὸς αἴσῃ, *I feel that I have been honoured.* IL. ix. 608. Φησὶν αὐτὸς αἴτιος γεγενῆσθαι, *he says αἴτιος γεγένημαι.* DEM. xix. 37. Εἵκαζον ἢ διώκοντα οἴχεσθαι ἢ καταληφόμενον τι προσεληλακέναι. XEN. An. i. 10, 16. (Their thought was ἢ διώκων οἴχεται, ἢ προσελέλακεν.) Ἐφη χρήμαθ' ἑαυτῷ τοὺς Θηβαίους ἐπικεκρυχέναι, *he said that the Thebans had offered a reward for him.* DEM. xix. 21. Ἀντέλεγον μὴ δικαίως σφὼν καταδικασθαι, λέγοντες μὴ ἐπηγγέλλθαι πω ἐς Λακεδαίμονα τὰς σπονδὰς ὅτ' ἐσέπεμψαν τοὺς ὀπλίτας, *they rejoined that they (the Eleans) had not justly condemned them, saying that the truce had not yet been announced at Sparta when they sent in the soldiers (they said οὐ καταδεδίκασθε, and οὐκ ἐπηγγελλμένα ἦσαν πω αἱ σπονδαὶ ὅτ' ἐστέμψαμεν).* THUC. v. 49. So ἐκπεπλήχθαι, representing ἐξεπέπληκτο, XEN. Cyr. i. 4, 27. (See 123, above.)

(For examples of the perfect infinitive with ἂν, representing the pluperfect indicative and the perfect optative, see 206.)

(Future.) Ἐφης σὼς ἔσσεσθαι. IL. xxii. 331. So Od. iv. 664. Καὶ μοι ἔειπεν Μνημιόδων τὸν ἄριστον λείψειν φάος ἡελίου, *he told me ὁ ἄριστος . . . λείψει.* IL. xviii. 9. Καὶ δὴ μοι γέρας αὐτὸς ἀφαιρήσεσθαι ἀπειλεῖς. IL. i. 161. Ἐπαγγέλλεται τὰ δίκαια ποιῆσειν, *he promises to do what is right.* DEM. xix. 48. Ἐφη ἐντὸς ἡμερῶν εἴκοσιν ἢ ἄξιεν Λακεδαιμονίους ζῶντας ἢ αὐτοὺ ἀποκτενεῖν, *he said that within twenty days he would either bring them alive or kill them where they were.* THUC. iv. 28. (Cleon said ἢ ἄξω ἢ ἀποκτενῶ.) Ταῦτα (φησὶ) πεπράξεσθαι δυοῖν ἢ τριῶν ἡμερῶν, *he says that this will have been accomplished within two or three days* (137). DEM. xix. 74. (For the rare future infinitive with ἂν, see 208.)

684. The infinitive is said to *stand in indirect discourse* and its tenses correspond to those of the indicative or optative, when it depends on a verb implying thought or the expression of thought (one of the class of *verba sentiendi et declarandi*), and when also the thought, as originally conceived, would have been expressed by some tense of the indicative (with or without ἄν) or optative (with ἄν), so that it can be transferred without change of tense to the infinitive. Thus in βούλεται ἔλθεῖν, *he wishes to go*, ἔλθεῖν represents no form of either aorist indicative or aorist optative, and is therefore said to be not in indirect discourse. But in φησὶν ἔλθεῖν, *he says that he went*, ἔλθεῖν represents ἦλθον of the direct discourse. The distinction in the time of the infinitive (especially of the aorist infinitive) in these two uses is obvious.

It may be asked why the infinitive after certain other verbs should not be said to stand in indirect discourse; for example, why in κελεύει σε ἔλθεῖν or μὴ ἔλθεῖν we should not say that ἔλθεῖν represents ἔλθέ or μὴ ἔλθῃς of direct discourse. This might perhaps be done; and we might possibly make ἔλθεῖν in βούλομαι ἔλθεῖν represent ἔλθοιμι, *may I go*. But with other verbs of the same class, as those of *advising, teaching, striving, choosing*, no form of direct discourse can even be imagined. It is much harder to draw a line between these last verbs and verbs like κελεύω and βούλομαι, or even between these two, than where it is drawn above. It is impossible to say where a Greek would have drawn the line, or to be sure that he would have drawn any line at all; for our own use, the usual definition of the infinitive in oratio obliqua (as given above) is certainly the most convenient.

685. (*Mή with Infinitive.*) The negative particle of the infinitive in indirect discourse is regularly οὐ, which is retained from the direct form (667, 5). But, after certain verbs which belong to the intermediate class between those which take the infinitive in indirect discourse and those which do not (see 136), the infinitive regularly takes μή for its negative. Such are verbs of *hoping, promising, and swearing*; with those signifying to *agree or consent* (ὁμολογῶ), to *trust* (πιστεύω), to *be persuaded* (πέπεισμαι), to *testify* (μαρτυρῶ).¹ The infinitive occasionally has μή even after the verbs which most regularly take the infinitive with οὐ in indirect discourse, as φημί, λέγω, νομίζω, ἡγούμαι, etc. *E.g.*

Χρῆν ὁμόσαι μὴ ἔκόντα ἔλθεῖν, *he had to swear that he did not come intentionally*. HDT. ii. 179; so i. 165. "Ομνυσιν μὴ πώποτ' ἀμείνον' ἔπη μηδέν' ἀκοῦσαι, *he swears that nobody ever heard better verses*. AR. Vesp. 1047. "Ομνυε μηδὲν εἰρηκέναι. DEM. xxi. 119. "Οταν ἐπίσσωσιν οδοὶ μὴ ἄλλως τὸν νέον καθέξειν. PLAT. Rep. 572 E. Οὐδεμίαν ὑμέων ἔχω ἐλπίδα μὴ οὐ δώσειν ὑμέας δίκην. HDT. vi. 11. (For μὴ οὐ see 815, 2.) Μαυιάδος υἱὸς ὑποσχόμενος κατένευσε μὴ ποτ' ἀποκλέψειν ὅσ' Ἐκρηβόλος ἐκτεάττωται. Hymn. Merc. 521; so μὴ τινα ἔσσεσθαι. Ibid. 525.

¹ See Liddell and Scott, ed. 7, under μή, B. 5, C; also Gildersleeve in *Am. Jour. Phil.* i. p. 51.

‘Ὁμολογήσαμεν μήποτε’ ἂν αὐτὴν ἐναντία ᾔδειν. PLAT. Phaed. 94 C. Μεμαρτυρήκασιν οἱ πρότερον ἐργαζόμενοι μὴ εἶναι σῆκόν ἐν τῷ χωρίῳ. LYS. vii. 11. So DEM. xlv. 15. Σωκράτη γε ἐγὼ ἐγγνώμαι μὴ ἐπιλήσσεσθαι. PLAT. Prot. 336 D. Πιστεύω μὴ ψεύσειν με ταύτας τὰς ἀγαθὰς ἐλπίδας. XEN. Cyr. i. 5, 13. Πέπεισμαι ἐγὼ μηδένα ἀδικεῖν ἀνθρώπων. PLAT. Ap. 37 A : so 37 B.

Φαίην δ’ ἂν ἔγωγε μηδενὶ μηδεμίαν εἶναι παίδευσιν παρὰ τοῦ μὴ ἀρέσκοντος. XEN. Mem. i. 2, 39. So PLAT. Theaet. 155 A. Πάντες ἐροῦσι τὸ λοιπὸν μηδὲν εἶναι κερδαλέωτερον ἀρετῆς. XEN. Cyr. vii. 1, 18. Ἐνόμισε δὲ μὴ ἂν γενέσθαι ποτὲ πιστὸν ἄνθρωπον. Ib. vii. 5, 59. Καὶ ἄρτι ἔλεγον μηδένα ἐθέλειν ἐκόντα ἄρχειν. PLAT. Rep. 346 E. Τίς ἂν θεὸν μὲν παῖδας ἡγόιτο εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ μὴ; Id. Ap. 27 D. Προὔλεγον μὴ ἂν γίγνεσθαι πόλεμον (i.e. οὐκ ἂν γίγνοιτο πόλεμος). THUC. i. 139. See also THUC. v. 49, vi. 102, quoted in 683.

The examples in the last paragraph are opposed to the regular usage of the language, which would demand οὐ in all of them. We must suppose that the use of μὴ with the infinitive was so fixed, before the infinitive began to be used in indirect discourse, that μὴ always seemed natural, even after οὐ had become the regular form after verbs of *saying, thinking*, etc. We sometimes find strange uses of μὴ. In THUC. i. 118, ὄντες μὲν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ μὴ ταχεῖς ἵεναι ἐς τοὺς πολέμους, *having even before this been not hasty to go into wars*, it may be difficult to find a better explanation of the anomalous μὴ than the perhaps heretical one, that τοῦ μὴ ταχεῖς ἵεναι had a more natural sound than τοῦ οὐ ταχεῖς ἵεναι, although neither τοῦ nor the negative has anything to do with the infinitive. So some people say *between you and I*, merely because *you and me* sounds vulgar.

686. With μὴ and the infinitive in indirect discourse we may compare the rare ὅτι μὴ with the indicative, which occurs in THEOG. 659, οὐδ’ ὁμόσαι χρή τοῦθ’, ὅτι μήποτε πρήγμα τόδ’ ἔσται, and ANT. v. 21, ταῦτα σκοπεῖτε, ὅτι μὴ προνοῖα μάλλον ἐγίγνετο ἢ τύχη: see also SOPH. ANT. 685, ὅπως σὺ μὴ λέγεις ὀρθῶς τάδε. Ὅτι μὴ with the indicative became a regular construction in later Greek (as in Lucian). Ὅμόσαι ὅτι μὴ ἔσται in Theognis suggests the still more puzzling cases of μὴ alone with the indicative after oaths in Homer and Aristophanes: ἴστω Ζεὺς, μὴ μὲν τοῖς ἵπποισιν ἀνὴρ ἐποιχέσεται ἄλλος, Il. x. 329; ἴστω νῦν τόδε γαῖα . . . μὴ δι’ ἐμὴν ἰότητα Ποσειδάων ἐνοσίχθων πημαίνει Τρῶας, Il. xv. 36; μὰ τὸν Ἀπόλλω μὴ σ’ ἐγὼ κατακλινῶ χαμαί, AR. LYS. 917; so Eccl. 1000; μὰ γῆν, μὰ παγίδας, . . . μὴ γὼ νόημα κομψότερον ἤκουσά πω, AV. 194. I have no explanation, even to suggest, of the strange use of μὴ in these last examples.

Participle in Indirect Discourse.

687. When the participle stands in indirect discourse,

it follows the rules already given for the infinitive (683), in regard to its tense and the use of ἄν. *E.g.*

Ἀγγέλλει τούτους ἐρχομένους, *he announces that they are coming*; ἤγγειλε τούτους ἐρχομένους, *he announced that they were coming*. (The announcement is οὗτοι ἐρχονται.) Ἀγγέλλει τούτους ἐλθόντας, *he announces that they came*; ἤγγειλε τούτους ἐλθόντας, *he announced that they had come*. (He says ἦλθον.) Ἀγγέλλει τούτους ἐληλυθότας, *he announces that they have come*; ἤγγειλε τούτους ἐληλυθότας, *he announced that they had come*. (He says ἐληλύθα-σιν.) Ἀγγέλλει (ἤγγειλέ) τοῦτο γενησόμενον, *he announces (or announced) that this is (or was) about to happen*. (He says τοῦτο γενήσεται.)

Οὐδ' ἄρα πώ τι ἤδη Πάτροκλον τεθνηότα διός Ἀχιλλεύς, *nor yet did Achilles have any knowledge that Patroclus was dead*. II. xvii. 402. Γίγνωσκε θεοῦ γόνον ἣν ἐόντα. II. vi. 191. Τηλέμαχος δ' ἄρα μιν πάλοι ἤδεεν ἔνδον ἐόντα. Od. xxiii. 29: so xvii. 549, 556. Τοῖς τε γὰρ ἐπιχειρήμασιν ἑώρων οὐ κατορθοῦντες καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας ἀχθομένους τῇ μονῇ, *for they saw that they were not succeeding in their attempts, and that the soldiers were distressed by the delay*; i.e. they saw οὐ κατορθοῦμεν καὶ οἱ στρατιῶται ἀχθονται. THUC. vii. 47. Ἐμμένονεν οἷς ὠμολογήσαμεν δίκαιος οὖσιν; *do we abide by what we acknowledged to be just (i.e. δίκαιά ἐστιν)?* PLAT. CRIT. 50 A. Πάνθ' ἔνεκα ἑαυτοῦ ποιῶν ἐξελέγκται, *it has been proved that he is doing everything for his own interest*. DEM. ii. 8. Αὐτῷ Κύρον ἐπιστρατεύοντα πρῶτος ἤγγειλα, *I first announced to him that Cyrus was on his march against him*. XEN. AN. ii. 3, 19. See SOPH. O. T. 395.

Ἡ σάφα οἶδε νοστήσαντά σε δεῦρο, *whether she is perfectly certain that you have returned hither*. Od. xxiv. 404. Ἐπιστάμενοι καὶ τὸν βάρβαρον αὐτὸν περὶ αὐτῷ τὰ πλείω σφαλέντα, καὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους πολλὰ ἡμᾶς ἤδη τοῖς ἀμαρτήμασιν αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ ἀφ' ἡμῶν τιμωρίᾳ περιγεγενημένους (i.e. ὁ βάρβαρος ἐσφάλη, καὶ ἡμεῖς περιγεγενήμεθα). THUC. i. 69. So in the same chapter, τὸν Μῆδον αὐτοῖ ἴσμεν ἐκ πειράτων γῆς ἐπὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἐλθόντα, i.e. ὁ Μῆδος ἦλθεν. Ἐπειδὴ ἔγνωσαν οὐ μετ' Ἀθηναίων πρα-χθεῖσαν τὴν τῶν Βοιωτῶν ξυμμαχίαν, ἀλλ' ἐς διαφορὰν μεγάλην καθεστῶτας αὐτοὺς πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους (i.e. οὐκ ἐπράχθη and καθεστάσιν). Id. v. 44. Οὐ γὰρ ἤδεσαν αὐτὸν τεθνηκότα, *for they did not know that he was dead (i.e. τέθνηκεν)*. XEN. AN. i. 10, 16. See AND. i. 23; SOPH. TR. 739. Ἐπέδειξα οὐδὲν ἀληθές ἀπηγγέλ-κότα ἀλλὰ φενακίσανθ' ὑμᾶς, *I have shown that he has reported nothing that is true, and that he deceived you (ἀπήγγελλεν and ἐφε-νάκισεν)*. DEM. xix. 177.

Εἰ εὖ ἤδειν καὶ τὴν συμμαχίαν μοι γενησομένην, *if I were sure that I should obtain an alliance also (i.e. συμμαχία μοι γενήσεται)*. Ibid. 40. So XEN. HELL. iv. 7, 3. Ο δ' ἀντοφείλων ἀμβλιότερος, εἰδὼς οὐκ ἐς χάριν ἀλλ' ἐς ὀφείλημα τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀποδώσων, *knowing that*

he shall not return the benefit, etc. (i.e. οὐκ ἀποδώσω). THUC. ii. 40. Γινόντες οὐτ' ἀποκωλύσειν δυνατοὶ ὄντες, εἴ τ' ἀπομονωθήσονται τῆς ξυμβάσεως, κινδυνεύουσιν, ποιοῦνται ὁμολογίαν (i.e. οὔτε δυνατοὶ ἔσμεν, εἴ τ' ἀπομονωθησόμεθα, κινδυνεύσομεν). Id. iii. 28.

Εὖ δ' ἴσθι μηδὲν ἂν με τούτων ἐπιχειρήσαντα σε πείθειν, εἰ δυναστείαν μόνον ἢ πλοῦτον ἐώρων ἐξ αὐτῶν γενησόμενον. ISOC. v. 133 (μηδὲν ἂν ἐπιχειρήσαντα represents οὐδὲν ἂν ἐπεχείρησα, and γενησόμενον represents γενήσεται). Εὖ ἴσμεν μὴ ἂν ἦσσαν ὑμᾶς λυπηροὺς γενομένους (i.e. οὐκ ἂν ἐγένεσθε). THUC. i. 76. Σκοπούμενος οὖν εὗρισκον οὐδαμῶς ἂν ἄλλως τοῦτο διαπραξάμενος, I found that I could accomplish this (διαπραξαίμην ἂν) in no other way. ISOC. xv. 7.

"Ὅπως δέ γε τοὺς πολεμίους δύναισθε κακῶς ποιεῖν, οὐκ οἶσθα μανθάνοντας ὑμᾶς πολλὰς κακουργίας; do you not know that you learned, etc.? XEN. Cyr. i. 6, 28. (Here δύναισθε and the whole context show that μανθάνοντας represents ἐμανθάνετε.) Μέννημαι δὲ ἔγωγε καὶ παῖς ὢν Κριτίᾳ τῷδε ξυνόντα σε, I remember that you were with (ξυνῆσθα) this Critias. PLAT. Charm. 156 A. (See 140 and the examples.)

See other examples in 904.

688. (Negative μὴ.) The participle of indirect discourse, like the infinitive, regularly retains the negative οὐ from the direct form. But, as in the case of the infinitive (685), we find many exceptions. Compare ISOC. v. 133 and THUC. i. 76, which have μὴ after οἶδα, with THUC. ii. 40 and ISOC. xv. 7, which have οἶδα οὐ (all quoted in 687). See also SOPH. O. C. 656, 797 (οἶδα μὴ), PH. 79 (ἔξοἶδα μὴ), O. C. 1121 (ἐπίσταμαι μὴ); EUR. Tro. 970 (δείξω μὴ); THUC. ii. 17 (προῆδει μὴ). Here also the irregularity may be explained by the fixed earlier use of μὴ in other constructions affecting the later construction of indirect discourse (685).

INDIRECT QUOTATION OF COMPLEX SENTENCES.

689. When a complex sentence is indirectly quoted, its leading verb follows the principles already stated for simple sentences (669-688).

1. If the quotation depends on a primary tense, all the dependent verbs of the original sentence retain the mood and tense of the direct discourse.

2. After a secondary tense, all dependent verbs of the original sentence which there stood in the present, perfect, or future indicative, or in any tense of the subjunctive, may either be changed to the same tense of the optative or retain

both the mood and tense of the direct discourse, the optative being the more common form. When the subjunctive is changed to the optative, *ἄν* is dropped, *εἰάν*, *ὅταν*, etc., becoming *εἰ*, *ὅτε*, etc.

3. But dependent secondary tenses of the indicative and all dependent optatives remain unchanged after all tenses (see, however, 693). *E.g.*

1. (After primary tenses.) **Ἄν δ' ὑμεῖς λέγητε, ποιήσιν (φησὶ) ὁ μήτ' αἰσχύνην μήτ' ἀδοξίαν αὐτᾷ φέρει.* DEM. xix. 41 (i.e. ποιήσω, ὁ μήτ' . . . ἐμοὶ φέρει). *Νομίζω γάρ, ἂν τοῦτ' ἀκριβῶς μάθητε, μᾶλλον ὑμᾶς τούτοις μὲν ἀπιστήσιν ἐμοὶ δὲ βοηθήσιν.* ID. xxx. 25. **Ἐὰν ἐκεῖνο εἰδῶμεν, ὅτι ἅπανθ' ὅσα πόποτ' ἡ λπίσαμεν τινα πράξιν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν καθ' ἡμῶν εὐρηται, κἂν μὴ νῦν ἐθέλωμεν ἐκεῖ πολεμῆιν αὐτῷ, ἐνθάδ' ἴσως ἀναγκασθισόμεθα τοῦτο ποιῆν, κ.τ.λ.* ID. iv. 50. *Προλέγω ὅτι, ὁπότ' ἂν ἀποκρίνηται, ἐξελεγχθήσεται.* PLAT. Euthyd. 275 E. See DEM. xxi. 66, where two such conditional sentences depend on *εἰ πρόδηλον γένοιτο*, and II. xiii. 741 (see 178 and 184, above).

**Ὅρῳ σοὶ τούτων δεῆσον, ὅταν ἐπιθυμήσῃς φιλίαν πρὸς τινὰ ποιέσθαι.* XEN. Mem. ii. 6, 29. *Παράδειγμα σαφὲς καταστήσατε, ὃς ἂν ἀφιστῇται, θανάτῳ ζημιωσόμενον.* THUC. iii. 40. See 687.

2. (Optative after secondary tenses.) *Εἶπε ὅτι ἄνδρα ἄγοι ὃν εἶρξαι δέοι, he said that he was bringing a man whom it was necessary to confine, i.e. he said ἄνδρα ἄγω ὃν εἶρξαι δεῖ.* XEN. Hell. v. 4, 8. **Ἀπεκρίνατο ὅτι μανθάνοιεν οἱ μανθάνοντες ἃ οὐκ ἐπίσταντο, i.e. he replied, μανθάνουσι ἃ οὐκ ἐπίστανται.* PLAT. Euthyd. 276 E. (Here οὐκ shows that ἃ has a definite antecedent, and takes the optative only because it is in indirect discourse. So with ὃν in the preceding example.) **Ἀγασίλαος ἔλεγεν ὅτι, εἰ βλαβερά πεπραχὼς εἴη, δίκαιος εἴη ζημιούσθαι, i.e. he said εἰ βλαβερά πέπραχε, δίκαιός ἐστι ζημιούσθαι.* XEN. Hell. v. 2, 32. So AN. ii. 1, 3, iii. 5, 15, vi. 6, 25.

Εἰ δέ τινα φεύγοντα λήψοιτο, προηγόρευεν ὅτι ὡς πολεμῶ χρήσοιτο. ID. Cyr. iii. 1, 3. (This is a quotation of εἰ τινα λήψομαι, χρήσομαι.) *Γνόντες δὲ ὅτι, εἰ δώσοιεν εὐθύνας, κινδυνεύοιεν ἀπολέσθαι, πέμπουσιν καὶ διδάσκουσιν τοὺς Θηβαίους ὡς, εἰ μὴ στρατεύσοιεν, κινδυνεύοιεν οἱ Ἀρκάδες πάλιν λακωνίσαι.* ID. Hell. vii. 4, 34. **Ἦιδει γὰρ ὅτι, εἰ μάχης ποτὲ δεήσει, ἐκ τούτων αὐτῷ παραστάτας ληπτέον εἴη.* ID. Cyr. viii. 1, 10. (The direct discourse was εἰ τι δεήσει, ληπτέον ἐστίν.)

Ἐλογίζοντο ὡς, εἰ μὴ μάχοιντο, ἀποστήσονται αἱ περιουκίδες πόλεις.* ID. Hell. vi. 4, 6. (Ἐὰν μὴ μαχώμεθα, ἀποστήσονται.*) *Χρήμαθ' ὑπισχνεῖτο δώσειν, εἰ τοῦ πράγματος αἰτιῶντο ἐμέ.* DEM. xxi. 104. (*Δώσω, ἐὰν αἰτιάσθε.*) **Ἦγεῖτο γὰρ ἅπαν ποιήσιν αὐτὸν, εἰ τις ἀργύριον διδοίη.* LYS. xii. 14. *Εὗξαντο σωτήρια θύσειν. ἔνθα πρῶτον εἰς φιλίαν γῆν ἀφίκοντο.* XEN. An. v. 1, 1.

(The dependent clause is found in the direct form in iii. 2, 9: δοκεῖ μοι εὔφασθαι τῷ θεῷ τούτῳ θύσειν σωτήρια ὅπου ἂν πρῶτον εἰς φιλίαν χώραν ἀφικώμεθα.) Τοῦτο ἐπραγματεύετο νομίζων, ὅσα τῆς πόλεως προλάβοι, πάντα ταῦτα βεβαίως ἔξειν (δοῦν ἂν προλάβω, βεβαίως ἔξω). DEM. xviii. 26. Ἦλπιζον ὑπὸ τῶν παίδων, ἐπειδὴ τελευτή-σειαν τὸν βίον, ταφίσεσθαι (ἐπειδὴν τελευτήσωμεν, ταφισόμεθα). LYS. xiii. 45. Κόνων ἐδίδασκεν ὡς οὕτω μὲν ποιοῦντι πάσαι αὐτῷ αἱ πόλεις φιλίαι ἔσονται, εἰ δὲ δουλοῦσθαι βουλόμενος φανερός ἔσοιτο, ἔλεγεν ὡς μία ἐκάστη πολλὰ πράγματα ἱκανὴ εἶη παρέχειν, καὶ κίνδυνος εἶη μὴ καὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες, εἰ ταῦτα αἰσθόιντο, συσταίεν. XEN. Hell. iv. 8, 2. Εἶπε τε ὅτι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη εἶη τοῦτον ἐλλόγιμον γενέσθαι, εἴπερ εἰς ἡλικίαν ἔλθοι (ἀνάγκη ἐστίν, ἂν ἔλθῃ). PLAT. Theaet. 142 D. Ἐνόμισε μὴ ἂν γενέσθαι ποτὲ πιστὸν ἄνθρωπον ὅστις ἄλλον μᾶλλον φιλήσοι τοῦ τῆς φυλακῆς δεομένου, *he believed that no man could ever be made faithful who was to love* (see 527) *any one more than the one needing his guardianship* (οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο εἰ φιλήσει). XEN. Cyr. vii. 5, 59. Ὡμοσεν Ἀγρεσιλάῳ, εἰ σπείσονται ἕως ἔλθοιεν οὖς πέμψειε πρὸς βασιλέα ἀγγέλους, διαπράξεσθαι, κ.τ.λ. Id. Ag. i. 10. (The oath was ἂν σπείσῃ ἕως ἂν ἔλθωσιν ἀγγελοὶ οὓς ἂν πέμψω, διαπράξομαι.) Even in Homer, Π. ii. 597, we find στεῦτο γὰρ εὐχόμενος νικησέμεν, εἴ περ ἂν αὐταὶ Μοῦσαι ἀείδοιεν, *for he promised with a boast that he would be victor, even if the Muses themselves should sing*. (For εἰ ἂν with the optative, see 460; or ἀείδοιεν may represent a subjunctive, 692.)

Ἔτι δὲ γιγνώσκων ἔφασαν φθοροῦντας μὲν αὐτοὺς εἴ τι σφίσιν ἀγαθὸν γίγνοιτο, ἐφηδομένους δ' εἴ τις συμφορὰ προσπίπτει, *they said they knew that they (the Mantineans) were envious if any good came to them, but pleased if any calamity befell them*. XEN. Hell. v. 2, 2. (Φθοροῦτε μὲν ἂν τι ἡμῖν ἀγαθὸν γίγνηται, ἐφήδεσθε δ' ἂν τις συμφορὰ προσπίπτῃ.) Τὴν αἰτίαν, ἣ πρόδηλος ἦν ἐπ' ἐκείνους ἤξουσα εἴ τι πάθοι Χαρίδημος (ἤξει, ἂν τι πάθῃ Χαρίδημος). DEM. xxiii. 12.

(Subjunctive and Indicative retained after secondary tenses.) Ἔλεγον ὅτι ἄκρα τέ ἐστιν ἔνδον καὶ οἱ πολέμοι πολλοί, οἱ παίοουσιν τοὺς ἔνδον ἀνθρώπους, *they said that there was a height, etc.* XEN. An. v. 2, 17. (Here εἶεν and παίοιεν might have been used.)

Ἐδόκει μοι ταύτη πειράσθαι σωθῆναι, ἐνθυμονμένῳ ὅτι, ἂν μὲν λάθω, σωθήσομαι, κ.τ.λ. LYS. xii. 15. (Here εἰ λάθοιμι, σωθη-σοίμην might have been used.) Φάσκων τε, ἦν σωθῇ οἰκαδὲ, κατὰ γε τὸ αὐτῷ δυνατὸν διαλλάξιν Ἀθηναίους καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους, ἀπέ-πλευσεν. XEN. Hell. i. 6, 7. (He said ἦν σωθῶ, which might have been changed to εἰ σωθείη.) Ταῦθ' ἡμᾶς ἔπεισε πράξαι, εἰ εἰδὼς ὅτι, εἰ μὴ πασῶν τῶν ἐλπίδων ἀποστερηθήσεσθε, ταχέϊαν παρ' αὐτοῦ τὴν τιμωρίαν κομίσεσθε. LYS. xii. 70. Ὑπέσχοντο αὐτοῖς, ἦν ἐπὶ Ποτί-δαιαν ἴωσιν Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐς τὴν Ἀπτικήν ἐσβαλεῖν (ἦν ἴωσιν, ἐσβαλ-οῦμεν). THUC. i. 58. Καὶ οὐκ ἔφασαν ἰέναι, ἂν μὴ τις αὐτοῖς χρή-ματα διδῷ· ὁ δ' ὑπέσχετο ἀνδρὶ ἐκάστῳ δώσειν πέντε μνᾶς, ἐπ' αὖ εἰς Βαβυλῶνα ἦκωσι, καὶ τὸν μισθὸν ἐντελῇ, μέχρι ἂν καταστήσῃ

τοὺς Ἕλληνας εἰς Ἰωνίαν πάλιν. XEN. AN. i. 4, 12 and 13. *Ἐφη χρῆναι, οἱ ἂν ἐλεγχθῶσι διαβάλλοντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ὡς προδότας ὄντας τιμωρηθῆναι. Ib. ii. 5, 27. See AESCHIN. iii. 145.

Εἰ δὲ μὴ, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔφασαν αὐτῶν τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀποκτενεῖν οὓς ἔχουσι ζώντας, *otherwise, they said, they should themselves kill their men whom they had in their hands alive* (ἐχοῖεν might have been used). THUC. ii. 5. Κατασχίσειν τὰς πύλας ἔφασαν, εἰ μὴ ἐκόντες ἀνοίξουσιν. XEN. AN. vii. 1, 16. (Εἰ μὴ ἀνοίξοιεν might have been used.) So THUC. i. 137. Αὐτοῖς τοιαύτη δόξα παρειστῆκει, ὡς, εἰ μὲν πρότερον ἐπ' ἄλλην πόλιν ἴασιν, ἐκείνοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις πολεμῆσουσιν· εἰ δ' ἐνθάδε πρῶτον ἀφίξονται, οὐδένας ἄλλους τολμήσειν, κ.τ.λ. LYS. ii. 22. Οὐδὲν ὄφελος ἔφη τὸν χθὲς εἰρημένων εἶναι λόγων, εἰ ταῦθ' οἱ Φιλίππου μὴ συμπεισθήσονται πρὸς βεῖς. AESCHIN. iii. 71. "Ὁ πρόδηλον ἦν ἐσόμενον, εἰ μὴ ὑμεῖς κωλύσετε, *it was manifest that this would be so unless you should prevent it* (i.e. ἔσται, εἰ μὴ κωλύσετε). Id. iii. 90. (Κωλύσετε might be used; and εἰ μὴ κωλύσατε representing ἔαν μὴ κωλύσῃτε is in one Ms.)

3. (Past tenses of Indicative retained after secondary tenses.) Ἐπιστεῖλαι δὲ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἐφόρους (ἔφασαν) εἰπεῖν, ὡς ὦν μὲν πρόσθεν ἐποίουν μέμφοιντο αὐτοῖς, *that the Ephors charged them to say that they blamed them for what they had done before* (i.e. ὦν πρόσθεν ἐποιεῖτε μεμρόμεθα ὑμῖν). XEN. HELL. iii. 2, 6.

"Ἡλιζὼν τοὺς Σικελοὺς ταύτη, οὓς μετέπεμψαν, ἀπαντήσεσθαι, *they hoped that the Sikels whom they had sent for would meet them here*. THUC. vii. 80. Λέγουσι δὲ τινες καὶ ἐκούσιον φαρμάκῳ ἀποθανεῖν αὐτὸν, ἀδύνατον νομίσαντα εἶναι ἐπιτελέσαι βασιλεῖ ἃ ὑπέσχετο, *and some say even that he (Themistocles) died a voluntary death by poison, believing that it was impossible to perform for the King what he had promised* (ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἐπιτελέσαι ἃ ὑπεσχόμην). Id. i. 138. Ἀντέλεγον, λέγοντες μὴ ἐπηγγέλλαι πω τὰς σπονδὰς δὲ ἐσέπεμψαν τοὺς ὀπλίτας. Id. v. 49. Ἐλεγον ὡς Ξενοφῶν οἴχοιτο ὡς Σεύθην οἰκίσων καὶ ἃ ὑπέσχετο αὐτῷ ἀποληψόμενος. XEN. AN. vii. 7, 55. Ἐκαστον ἡρόμην, εἴ τινες εἰεν μάρτυρες ὦν ἐναντίον τὴν προῖκ' ἀπέδουσαν (εἰσὶ μάρτυρες, ὦν ἐναντίον ἀπέδοτε;). DEM. xxx. 19.

The aorist indicative is not changed to the aorist optative here, to avoid confusion, as the latter tense in such dependent clauses generally represents the aorist subjunctive of the direct form. Thus ἔφη ἃ εὖροι δώσειν means *he said that he would give whatever he might find* (ἃ ἂν εἦρω δώσω); but if ἃ εὖροι could also represent ἃ ἔδρων, it might also mean *he said that he would give what he had found*. In the leading clause the ambiguity is confined to indirect questions, in which the aorist indicative is generally retained for the same reason (see 125).

(Past tenses of the Indicative in unreal conditions retained.) Ἐδόκει, εἰ μὴ ἔφθασαν ξυλλαβόντες τοὺς ἄνδρας, προδοθῆναι ἂν τὴν πόλιν. THUC. vi. 61. (If ἔφθασαν were optative, it would represent an optative of direct discourse.) Οἴεσθε τὸν πατέρα, εἰ μὴ Τιμοθέου ἦν τὰ ξέλα καὶ ἐδεήθη οὗτος αὐτοῦ παρασχεῖν τὸ ναῦλον, ἔασαι ἂν ποτε,

κ.τ.λ., ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν φυλάττειν καὶ τὴν τιμὴν λαμβάνειν, ἕως ἐκομίσασατο τὰ ἑαυτοῦ; DEM. xlix. 35. Τούτων εἴ τι ἦν ἄληθές, οἷοσθ' οὐκ ἂν αὐτὴν λαβεῖν; Id. xxvii. 56. 'Ἡδέως ἂν ὑμῶν πυθοίμην, τίν' ἂν ποτε γνώμην περὶ ἐμοῦ εἴχετε εἰ μὴ ἐπετριηράρχησα ἀλλὰ πλέων ψυχόμην. Id. l. 67.

(Dependent Optatives retained.) Εἶπεν ὅτι ἔλθοι ἂν εἰς λόγους εἰ δμήρους λάβοι (he said *ἔλθοιμι ἂν εἰ δμήρους λάβοιμι*). XEN. Hell. iii. 1, 20. 'Ἦττον ἂν διὰ τοῦτο τυγχάνειν (δοκεῖ μοι), εἴ τι δέοισθε παρ' αὐτῶν. Id. An. vi. 1, 26. 'Ἐλεγεν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ποτε προοίτο, ἐπεὶ ἀπαξ φίλος αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο, οὐδ' εἰ ἔτι μὲν μείους γένοιντο ἔτι δὲ κάκιον πράξειαν. Ib. i. 9, 10. Δεινὸν ἂν τι παθεῖν σαυτὸν ἡλιπίξες, εἰ πύθοινθ' οὐτοὶ τὰ πεπραγμένα σοι. DEM. xix. 240.

Sentences such as these are often translated like those which had a future and a dependent subjunctive in the direct discourse. Thus *ἔλεγεν ὅτι χαίροι ἂν εἰ τοῦτο γένοιτο* or *ἔλεγε χαίρειν ἂν εἰ τοῦτο γένοιτο*, as well as *ἔλεγεν ὅτι χαίρήσοι εἰ τοῦτο γένοιτο* or *ἔλεγε χαίρήσιν εἰ τοῦτο γένοιτο*, may all be translated *he said that he should rejoice if this should happen*; although in the first two sentences the direct discourse was *χαίροιμι ἂν εἰ τοῦτο γένοιτο*, *I should rejoice if this should happen*, and in the last two, *χαίρήσω ἂν τοῦτο γένηται*, *I shall rejoice if this shall happen*. (See 456.)

690. The dependent verbs of a quotation may be changed to the optative in indirect discourse, even when the leading verb retains the indicative; and sometimes (though rarely) a dependent verb retains the subjunctive or indicative, when the leading verb is changed to the optative. This may give rise to a great variety of constructions in the same sentence. *E.g.*

Δηλώσας ὅτι ἐτοιμοὶ εἰσι μάχεσθαι εἴ τις ἐξέρχοιτο. XEN. Cyr. iv. 1, 1. ('Ἐτοιμοὶ εἰσιν ἔάν τις ἐξέρχῃται.) Δύσανδρος εἶπε ὅτι παρασπόνδους ὑμᾶς ἔχοι, καὶ ὅτι οὐ περὶ πολιτείας ὑμῖν ἔσται ἀλλὰ περὶ σωτηρίας, εἰ μὴ ποιήσασθ' ἃ Θηραμένης κελεύει. LYS. xii. 74. ('Ἐχω, καὶ οὐκ ἔσται ἔάν μὴ ποιήσῃθ' ἃ Θ. κελεύει. There is no need of the emendations *ποιήσετ'* and *κελεύει*.) 'Ἐδόκει δῆλον εἶναι ὅτι αἰρήσονται αὐτὸν εἴ τις ἐπιψηφίξοι. XEN. An. vi. 1, 25. Οὐκ ἡγνόει Εὐβουλίδης ὅτι, εἰ λόγος ἀποδοθήσοιτο καὶ παραγένοιντό μοι πάντες οἱ δημόται καὶ ἡ ψῆφος δικαίως δοθείη, οὐδαμῶ γενήσονται οἱ μετὰ τούτου συνεστηκότες. DEM. lvii. 16. (Εἰ ἀποδοθήσεται καὶ ἔάν παραγένωνται καὶ ψῆφος δοθῇ, οὐδαμῶ γενήσονται.) 'Αγασίλαος γινούς ὅτι, εἰ μὲν μηδετέρω συλλήψοιτο, μισθὸν οὐδέτερος λυσεῖ τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν, ἀγορὰν δὲ οὐδέτερος παρέξει, ὁπότερος τ' ἂν κρατήσῃ, οὗτος ἐχθρὸς ἔσται· εἰ δὲ τῷ ἑτέρῳ συλλήψοιτο, οὗτός γε φίλος ἔσοιτο, κ.τ.λ. XEN. Ag. ii. 31.

'Ἐλεγον ὅτι εἰκότα δοκοῖεν λέγειν βασιλεῖ, καὶ ἡκοιεν ἡγημόνας ἔχοντας, οἱ αὐτοὺς, ἔάν σπονδαὶ γένωνται, ἄξουσιν ἔσθην ἔξουσι τὰ ἐπιτήδεια. Id. An. ii. 3, 6. 'Ἐπρωτά, ποῖα εἰη τῶν ὁρέων ὁπόθεν οἱ Χαλδαῖοι καταθέοντες ληίζονται. Id. Cyr. iii. 2, 1. Ἐλεξας ὅτι μέγιστον εἶη μαθεῖν ὅπως δεῖ ἐξεργάζεσθαι ἕκαστα· εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐδὲ

τῆς ἐπιμελείας ἔφησθα ὄφελος οὐδὲν γίγνεσθαι, εἰ μὴ τις ἐπίσταται
 ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ ποιεῖν. *Id. Oec. xv. 2.*

In *DEM. xviii. 148*, we have both constructions of 689, 2 in the same sentence: εἰ μὲν τοῦτο τῶν ἐκείνου συμμάχων εἰσηγοῖτό τις, ὑπόψεσθαι τὸ πᾶγμα ἐνόμιζε πάντας· ἂν δ' Ἀθηναῖος ἢ ὁ τοῦτο ποίῳ, εὐπόρως λήσκειν. Here εἰ εἰσηγοῖτο represents ἂν (= ἔαν) εἰσηγήται, corresponding to ἂν ἢ. By keeping the subjunctive in the latter case, the expression is made more vivid by contrast.

In *PLAT. Rep. 337 A* we have τοῦτοις προὔλεγον, ὅτι εἰρωνεύσοιο καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ποιήσοις ἢ ἀποκρινοῖο, εἰ τίς τί σε ἐρωτᾷ. which must mean *I warned them that you would dissemble and would do anything rather than answer if any one should ask you anything.* The direct discourse must be εἰρωνεύσεται καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ποιήσει ἢ ἀποκρινεῖται ἔάν τις τι αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾷ (subj.). Ἐάν ἐρωτᾷ must have been retained or changed to εἰ with the optative; and ἐρωτᾷ in the text is probably a copyist's mistake for ἐρωτῶ, a form of the optative frequently found in the *Cod. A Parisin.* of Plato. See in the *Republic* 516 A (καθορῶ), 518 A (γελῶ), 559 A (μελετῶ), 598 C (ἐξαπατῶ). There is, however, a various reading ἔροιτο in a few Mss. in 337 A.

691. The imperfect or pluperfect sometimes stands irregularly in a dependent (as well as in the leading) clause of the indirect discourse after a secondary tense, to represent a present or perfect indicative, which would regularly be retained or changed to the present or perfect optative. Such clauses are really not included in the indirect discourse. (See 674; 701.) *E.g.*

Ἔλεγον οὐ καλῶς τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλευθεροῦν αὐτὸν, εἰ ἄνδρας διεφθείρεν οὔτε χεῖρας ἀνταγομένους οὔτε πολέμιους (οὐ καλῶς ἐλευθεροῖς, εἰ διαφθείρεις). *THUC. iii. 32.* Οὔτε γὰρ τοῖς θεοῖς ἔφη καλῶς ἔχειν, εἰ ταῖς μεγάλας θυσίας μᾶλλον ἢ ταῖς μικραῖς ἔχαιρον (εἰ χαίρουσιν). *XEN. Mem. i. 3, 3.* Καὶ ἔφη εἶναι παρ' ἐαυτῷ ὅσον μὴ ἦν ἀνηλωμένον (ὅσον μὴ ἔστιν ἀνηλωμένον). *DEM. xlviii. 16.* Ἄ μὲν εἰλήφει τῆς πόλεως ἀποδόνειν (ἡγούμην), *I thought that he would give back what he had taken from the city; i.e. ἃ εἰλήφεν ἀποδώσει.* *Id. xix. 151.*

692. In a few cases, a relative or particle which had ἂν with the subjunctive in the direct form irregularly retains ἂν in indirect discourse after a past tense, although the verb has been changed to the optative. This must not be confounded with ἂν belonging to a potential optative (506; 557). *E.g.*

Οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅστις οὐχ ἡγείτο τῶν εἰδότεων δίκην με λήψεσθαι παρ' αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὴν τάχιστα ἀνὴρ εἶναι δοκιμασθείην (so the Mss.). *DEM. xxx. 6.* (The direct discourse was ἐπειδὴν δοκιμασθῇ, and the regular indirect form would be ἐπειδὴ δοκιμασθείην or ἐπειδὴν δοκιμασθῶ.) (See also 702.)

693. When no ambiguity can arise from the change of an aorist indicative to the optative in a dependent clause of the indirect discourse, this tense may follow the general principle. This occurs chiefly in

causal sentences after ὅτι, ἐπεὶ, etc., *because* (713), in which the subjunctive can never be used. *E.g.*

Εἶχε γὰρ λέγειν ὡς Λακεδαιμόνιοι διὰ τοῦτο πολέμησιν αὐτοῖς, ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέλῃσαιεν μετ' Ἀγησιλάου ἔλθειν ἐπ' αὐτὸν οὐδὲ θύσαι ἑάσαιεν αὐτὸν ἐν Αὔλιδι. XEN. Hell. vii. 1, 34. (The direct discourse was ἐπολέμησαν ἡμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἠθέλησαμεν ἔλθειν οὐδὲ θύσαι εἰάσαμεν αὐτόν.) Ἀιγηγήσασθαί (φασί) ὡς ἀνοσιώτατον μὲν εἶη εἰργασμένος ὅτε τοῦ ἀδελφεοῦ ἀποτάμοι τὴν κεφαλὴν, σοφώτατον δὲ ὅτι τοὺς φυλίκους καταμεθύσας καταλύσειε τοῦ ἀδελφεοῦ κρεμάμενον τὸν νέκυν. HDT. ii. 121. Here ὅτι καταλύσειε represents ὅτι κατέλυσα, *because I took down*; ὅτε ἀποτάμοι (so the Mss.) might also be understood in a causal sense, *since he had cut off*, although in the sense of *when he cut off* it could not be ambiguous here. Madvig, however, reads ὅτι in both clauses. See XEN. Mem. i. 4, 19 (quoted in 714). (See also 700, and the examples.)

SINGLE DEPENDENT CLAUSES IN INDIRECT DISCOURSE.

694. 1. The principles which govern dependent clauses of indirect discourse (689) apply also to all dependent clauses in sentences of every kind (even when what precedes is not in indirect discourse), if such clauses express *indirectly* the past thought of any person, even that of the speaker himself. This affects the construction only when the leading verb is past; then the dependent clause may either take the optative, in the *tense* in which the thought was originally conceived, or retain both the mood and the tense of the direct discourse. When a subjunctive is changed to an optative, ἄν is dropped.

2. Secondary tenses of the indicative here (as in 689, 3) regularly remain unchanged. But an aorist indicative sometimes becomes optative when no ambiguity can result from the change (see 693): this may occur in causal sentences (699 and 714) and in the relative sentences of 700.

The principle of 694 applies to the following constructions:—

695. I. Clauses depending on the infinitive which follows verbs of *wishing, commanding, advising*, and others which imply *thought* but do not take the infinitive in indirect discourse (684). *E.g.*

Ἐβούλοντο ἔλθειν εἰ τοῦτο γένοιτο, *they wished to go if this should happen*. (Here the original expression of the thought would be βουλόμεθα ἔλθειν ἐὰν τοῦτο γένηται, and therefore ἐὰν γένηται might be

retained.) Γαδάταν δὲ καὶ Γωβρύαν ἐκέλευσεν ὃ τι δύναιτο λαβόντας μεταδώκειν· καὶ ὅστις εἶχε τὰς ἐπομένας ἀγέλας, εἶπε τούτῳ καὶ ἅμα πρόβατα πολλὰ ἐλαύνειν ὅπῃ ἂν αὐτὸν πυνθάνηται ὄντα, ὡς ἐπιωφαιγίῃ. XEN. Cyr. vii. 3, 7. (Here ὃ τι δύναιτο represents ὃ τι ἂν δύνῃσθε, while ὅπῃ ἂν πυνθάνηται represents ὅπῃ ἂν πυνθάνῃ.) Ἐβούλοντο γὰρ σφίσιν, εἴ τινα λάβοιεν, ὑπάρχειν ἀντὶ τῶν ἔνδον, ἣν ἄρα τύχῳ σί τινες ἐζωγρημένοι, for they wished that, if they should capture any one, he might be a hostage for their friends within the city, in case any should chance to have been taken prisoners (ἣν λάβωμεν, and ἣν τύχῳ). THUC. ii. 5. Οἱ δ' ἄλλοι Θηβαῖοι, οὓς ἔδει παραγενέσθαι εἴ τι μὴ προχωροίῃ τοῖς ἐσεληλυθόσιν, ἐπεβόηθον, who were to come up if anything should go wrong with those who had entered the city (ἣν τι μὴ προχωρή). Ibid.

Προεῖπον αὐτοῖς μὴ ναυμαχεῖν Κορινθίοις, ἣν μὴ ἐπὶ Κέρκυραν πλέωσι καὶ μέλλωσιν ἀποβαίνειν. Id. i. 45. Καὶ παρήγγελλαν ἐπειδὴ δειπνήσειαν συνεσκευασμένους πάντας ἀναπαύεσθαι, καὶ ἐπεσθαι ἡνίκ' ἂν τις παραγγέλλῃ. XEN. An. iii. 5, 18. (Ἐπειδὴ δειπνήσῃτε, and ἡνίκ' ἂν τις παραγγέλλῃ.) Περὶ αὐτῶν κρύφα πέμπει, κελεύων μὴ ἀφείναι πρὶν ἂν αὐτοὶ πάλιν κομισθῶσιν, he sent bidding the Athenians not to let them go until they should themselves have returned. THUC. i. 91. (Πρὶν κομισθῆεν might be used.) Καὶ πολλάκις τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις παρῇναι, ἣν ἄρα ποτὲ κατὰ γῆν βιασθῶσι, καταβάντας ἐς αὐτὸν ταῖς ναυσὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας ἀνθίστασθαι. Id. i. 93. (Εἰ βιασθῆεν might be used.) Ἡξίουσαν αὐτοὺς ἡγεμόνας σφῶν γενέσθαι, καὶ Πανσανίαν μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν ἣν πον βιάζεται. Id. i. 95. (Ἐ' πον βιάζοιτο might be used.) Ἀφικνοῦνται ὡς Σιτάλκῃ, βουλόμενοι πείσαι αὐτὸν, εἰ δύναιτο, στρατεῦσαι ἐπὶ τὴν Ποτιδαίαν. Id. ii. 67. Ἐτοιμος ἦν ἀποτίνειν, εἰ καταγνοίεν αὐτοῦ. ISOC. xvii. 16. Εἶπον μηδένα τῶν ὀπισθεν κινεῖσθαι πρὶν ἂν ὁ πρόσθεν ἡγήται, I commanded that no one at the rear should move until the one before him should lead. XEN. Cyr. ii. 2, 8.

Παρηγγέλλετο γὰρ αὐτοῖς δέκα μὲν οὓς Θηραμένης ἀπέδειξε χειροτονῆσαι, δέκα δὲ οὓς οἱ ἑφόροι κελεύοιεν, they were bidden to choose ten whom Theramenes had nominated, and ten whom the Ephors commanded (i.e. οὓς ἀπέδειξε and οὓς κελεύουσιν). LYS. xii. 76. Ἐκέλευσέ με τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἣν ἔγραψα οἰκαδὲ δοῦναι, the letter which I had written. XEN. Cyr. ii. 2, 9. (Ἦν γράψαιμι would mean whatever letter I might write, representing ἣν ἂν γράψῃς.) Διεννοοῦντο αὐτοὺς πάλιν ὅθεν ἦλθον ἐς Θράκην ἀποπέμπειν, they planned to send them back to Thrace, whence they had come. THUC. vii. 27. (See 689, 3.)

696. II. Clauses containing a protasis, the apodosis of which is implied in the past leading verb or its adjuncts. *E.g.*

Διδόντος δ' αὐτῷ πάμπολλα δῶρα Τιθραῖστοι, εἰ ἀπέλθοι, ἀπεκρίνατο, when T. offered (to give) him many gifts, if he would go away. XEN. Ag. iv. 6. (Ἐὰν ἀπέλθῃ might be used.) Φύλακας συμπέμπει, ὅπως φυλάττοιεν αὐτὸν, καὶ εἰ τῶν ἀγρίων τι φανείη θηρίων, and (to be ready) in case any wild beast should appear; his

thought being *ἐάν τι φανῇ*. Id. Cyr. i. 4, 7. *Πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, εἰ ἐπιβοηθοῖεν, ἐχώρουν*, they marched towards the city, in case they (the citizens) should rush out (i.e. so as to meet them, if they should rush out), the thought being *ἣν ἐπιβοηθῶσιν* (490, 1). Thuc. vi. 100. *Οὐδ' ἦν τοῦ πολέμου πέρας οὐδ' ἀπαλλαγὴ Φιλίππῳ, εἰ μὴ Θηβαίους καὶ Θετταλοὺς ἐχθροὺς ποιήσειε τῇ πόλει*, i.e. Philip saw that he could neither end nor escape the war unless he should make the Thebans and Thessalians hostile to the city (the original apodosis, I cannot end or escape the war, to which *ἐάν μὴ ποιήσω* was the protasis, is implied in *οὐδ' ἦν* . . . Φιλίππῳ). DEM. xviii. 145.

Ἦν δέ τις εἶπῃ ἢ ἐπιψηφίσῃ κινεῖν τὰ χρήματα ταῦτα ἐς ἄλλο τι, θάνατον ζημίαν ἐπέθεντο, they set death as the penalty (i.e. voted that death should be the penalty) if any one should move, or put to vote a motion, to divert this money to any other purpose. Thuc. ii. 24. (*Εἰ εἴποι ἢ ἐπιψηφίσειεν* might be used.) *Τᾶλλα, ἣν ἔτι ναυμαχεῖν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τολμήσωσι, παρεσκευάζοντο*, i.e. they made their other preparations, (to be ready) in case the Athenians should still dare to risk a sea fight (their thought being *we will be ready in case they shall dare*, *ἣν τολμήσωσι*). Id. vii. 59. *So ἦν ἴωσιν*, Id. iv. 42. *Οὐ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐμελλον ἔξιν εἰ μὴ ναυκρατήσουσιν*, they were not likely to have them (provisions) for the future (as they thought) unless they should hold the sea. Id. vii. 60. *Ἦν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον μέγ' αὐτῷ καθ' ἑμὸν οὐδ' οὕτω πράξει, εἰ μὴ τοὺς Φωκεῶς ἀπολεῖ*, he was none the more able even then to do you any great harm (he thought) unless he should destroy the Phocians (εἰ μὴ ἀπολώ). DEM. xix. 317. See II. v. 301. *Καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Εὐνὸν ἐμακάρισα, εἰ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔχει ταύτην τὴν τέχνην καὶ οὕτως ἐμμελῶς διδάσκει*, I congratulated him (told him he was happy), if he really had this art. PLAT. AP. 20 B. (Here *ἔχοι* and *διδάσκει* might be used.)

697. III. Clauses containing a protasis depending on a past verb of emotion, like *θαυμάζω, αἰσχύνομαι*, etc. (494). *E.g.*

Ἐθαύμαξε δ' εἴ τις ἀρετὴν ἐπαγγελλόμενος ἀργύριον πρᾶττοιο, he wondered that any demanded money, etc. XEN. MEM. i. 2, 7. (But in i. 1, 13, we find *ἐθαύμαξε δ' εἰ μὴ φανερόν αὐτοῖς ἔστιν*, he wondered that it was not plain.) *Ἐχαιρον ἀγαπῶν εἴ τις ἔασοι*, I rejoiced, being content if any one would let it pass. PLAT. REP. 450 A. *Οὐκ ἡσχύνθη εἰ τοιοῦτο κακὸν ἐπάγει τῷ*, he was not ashamed if (or that) he was bringing such a calamity on any one. DEM. xxi. 105. *Τῷ δὲ μηδὲν αὐτῷ συνειδότε δεινὸν εἰσῆι, εἰ πονηρῶν ἔργων δόξει κοινωνεῖν τῷ σωπῆσαι*, it seemed hard, if he was to appear to be implicated, etc.; he thought, *δεινόν ἔστιν εἰ δόξω* (407). Id. xix. 33. (Here *δόξοι* might be used like *ἔασοι* above.) *Οἱ δ' ὅκτειρον, εἰ ἀλώσονται*, and others pitied them if they were to be captured, the direct thought being *we pity them if they are to be captured*, *εἰ ἀλώσονται*, which might be retained (see the next example). XEN. AN. i. 4, 7. *Οὐκ ἔφασαν ἐπυρέψαι, οὐκ ἔλεοντες τὰ τεῖχη εἰ πεσεῖται, οὐδὲ κηδόμενοι τῶν νεῶν εἰ Λακεδαιμονίους παραδοθήσονται*, i.e. they felt no pity for the

walls if they were to fall, nor care for the ships if they were to be surrendered. LYS. xiii. 15.

698. IV. Temporal sentences expressing a past intention, purpose, or expectation, especially those introduced by ἕως or πρὶν, until, after past tenses. *E.g.*

᾽Ωρσε δ' ἐπὶ κραιπνὸν Βορέην, πρὸ δὲ κύματ' ἔαξεν, ἕως ὃ γε Φαιήκεσσι φιληρέτμοισι μιγείη, i.e. to the end that (until) Ulysses should get to the Phaeacians; originally ἕως ἂν μιγῇ (614, 2). OD. v. 385. So εἰως θερμαίνοιτο, OD. ix. 376. Σπονδὰς ἐποιήσαντο ἕως ἀπαγγελθείη τὰ λεχθέντα εἰς Λακεδαιμόνα, they made a truce (to continue) until what had been said should be announced at Sparta; i.e. ἕως ἂν ἀπαγγελθῇ, which might have been retained. XEN. Hell. iii. 2, 20. Ἀπυγόρευε μηδὲνα βάλλειν πρὶν Κύρος ἐμπλησθεῖη θηρῶν, until Cyrus should be satisfied. ID. Cyr. i. 4, 14. (His words were πρὶν ἂν ἐμπλησθῇ.) Οἱ δὲ μένοντες ἔστασαν ὅποτε πύργος Ἀχαιῶν ἄλλος ἐπελθὼν Τρώων ὀρμήσειε καὶ ἄρξειαν πολέμοιο, i.e. they stood waiting for the time when, etc. II. iv. 334. So II. ii. 794. Προῦκίνησαν τὸ στίφος, ὡς πανσομένους τοῦ διωγμοῦ ἐπεὶ σφᾶς ἴδοιεν προορμήσαντας, when they should see them, etc. XEN. Cyr. i. 4, 21.

Οὐ γὰρ δὴ σφεας ἀπίει ὁ θεὸς τῆς ἀποικίης πρὶν δὴ ἀπίκωνται ἐς αὐτὴν Λιβύην. HDT. iv. 157. (Ἀπίκοντο might be used.) Οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι οὐ προεθυμήθησαν ξυμπλεῖν πρὶν τὰ Ἴσθμια, ἃ τότε ἦν, διεορτάσωσιν, until they had (should have) finished celebrating the Isthmian games, which were then going on. THUC. viii. 9.

699. V. Past causal sentences in which the cause is stated as one assigned by another, so far as these allow the optative (714). *E.g.*

Ἐκάκισον ὅτι στρατηγὸς ὢν οὐκ ἐπέξάγοι, they abused him because (as they said) he did not lead them out. THUC. ii. 21. See other examples under 714.

Though the optative is allowed here, on the principle of indirect discourse, the indicative of the direct form (e.g. ἐπεξάγει in the above example) seems not to have been allowed (see 715). Causal sentences are usually constructed without reference to the principle of indirect discourse (see 713).

700. VI. Even some ordinary relative sentences expressing the previous thought of another, which allow the optative in place of the ordinary indicative. *E.g.*

Καὶ ἦτε σῆμα ἰδεῖσθαι, ὅτι ῥά οἱ γαμβροῦ πάρα Προῖτου φέροιτο, he asked to see the token, which (he said) he was bringing from Proetus, i.e. he said φέρομαι. II. vi. 176. So OD. v. 240. Εἶπετο παῖδα τὸν Εὐάδνα τέκoi, he asked for the child which Evadne had borne. PIND. Ol. vi. 49. Κατηγορεῖον τῶν Αἰγυνητέων τὰ πεποιήκοιεν προδόντες τὴν Ἑλλάδα, i.e. they accused them for what (as they said) they had done. HDT. vi. 49. So τὰ πεπονθὼς εἶη, i. 44. Καλεῖ τὸν Λάϊον, μνημὴν παλαιῶν σπερμάτων ἔχονσ', ὅφ' ὢν θάνοι μὲν αὐτὸς, τὴν δὲ

τίκτουσαν λίποι, *by which* (as she said) *he had perished himself, and had left her the mother*, etc. SOPH. O. T. 1245. If the relative clause contained merely the idea of the speaker, *ἔθανε* and *ἔλπε* would be used. Here no ambiguity can arise from the use of the aorist optative (see 693). Τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον ἔλεγεν ὁ ἡγοῖτο ὁ κρείττων αὐτῷ ξυμφέρειν, *he meant the superior's advantage which the superior believed to be his own advantage*. PLAT. Rep. 340 B. This construction is rare in Attic Greek, but is not uncommon in Herodotus.

701. The imperfect and pluperfect occasionally represent the present and perfect indicative in this construction. Such clauses are simply not included in the indirect discourse. (See 674 ; 691.) *E.g.*

Ἐτοῖμος ἦν, εἰ μὲν τούτων τι εἴργαστο, δίκην δοῦναι, εἰ δ' ἀπολυθείη, ἀρχεῖν, *he was ready, if he had done any of these things, to be punished; but if he should be acquitted, to hold his command*. THUC. vi. 29. (Εἰ εἴργαστο represents εἰ εἴργασμαι, while εἰ ἀπολυθείη represents εἰ ἀπολυθῶ.)

702. Ἄν is occasionally retained with relatives and temporal particles in sentences of this kind, even when the subjunctive to which they belonged has been changed to the optative. (See 692.) *E.g.*

Τοὺς δὲ λαμβάνοντας τῆς ὀμιλίας μισθὸν ἀνδραποδιστὰς ἐαυτῶν ἀπεκάλει, διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῖς εἶναι διαλέγεσθαι παρ' ὧν ἂν λάβοιεν τὸν μισθόν, *because they were obliged* (as he said) *to converse with those from whom they received the pay*. XEN. Mem. i. 2, 6. (Here ὧν ἂν λάβοιεν represents ὧν ἂν λάβωσιν.) Καί μοι τάδ' ἦν πρόρρητα, τὸ φάρμακον τοῦτο σφῆξιν ἐμέ ἕως ἂν ἀρτίχριστον ἀρμόσαιμί που. SOPH. Tr. 687 (see Schneidewin's note). Ἡξιῶν αὐτοῦς μαστιγοῦν τὸν ἐκδοθέντα ἕως ἂν τάληθῇ δόξειεν αὐτοῖς λέγειν. ISOC. xvii. 15. Χαίρειν ἐφῆς ἂν καὶ οὐκ ἀποκρίναὶ ἕως ἂν τὰ ἀπ' ἐκείνης ὀρμηθέντα σκέψαιτο, *you would not answer* (you would say) *until you should have examined*, etc. (ἕως ἂν σκέψωμαι). PLAT. Phaed. 101 D. Here we must place ὅταν ἐκσφροΐατο, AESCH. Pers. 450, if the text is sound. Παρήγγειλεν αὐτοῖς μὴ πρότερον ἐπιτίθεσθαι πρὶν ἂν τῶν σφετέρων ἢ πέσοι τις ἢ τρωθείη. XEN. Hell. ii. 4, 18 ; so πρὶν ἂν μετέχουεν, ii. 3, 48. See ἕως ἂν οἱ νόμοι τεθείεν. AND. i. 81. Many scholars repudiate this use of ἂν and emend the passages: see Dindorf on SOPH. Tr. 687.

It is doubtful whether ἐάν was ever thus used with the optative.

703. Upon this principle (694) final and object clauses with *ἵνα*, *ὥς*, *ὅπως*, *ὅφρα*, and *μή*, after past tenses, admit the double construction of indirect discourse, and allow the subjunctive or the future indicative instead of the optative, to retain the form in which the purpose would be originally conceived. (See 318 and 339.)

704. The principles of indirect discourse (689, 2) apply to future conditional and conditional relative clauses which depend upon final and object clauses or other expressions of purpose after past tenses. *E.g.*

Ἐλθόντες ἐς Λακεδαίμονα (ἔπρασσον) ὅπως ἐτοιμάσαιιντο τιμωρίαν, ἣν δέη. THUC. i. 58. (Here εἰ δέοι might have been used.) Ἐφοβεῖτο γὰρ μὴ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι σφᾶς, ὅποτε σαφῶς ἀκούσειαν, οὐκέτι ἀφῶσιν. Id. i. 91. (Here ὅπῃσαν ἀκούσωσιν is changed to ὅποτε ἀκούσειαν, although ἀφῶσιν is retained.)

Οἶδ' ὅτι without a Verb.

705. Οἶδ' ὅτι sometimes means *I am sure*, when the context readily suggests a verb for ὅτι. *E.g.*

Πάρειμι δ' ἄκων οὐχ' ἐκούσιν, οἶδ' ὅτι, and here *I am*, against my will, and against your will, *I am sure*. SOPH. ANT. 276. Μὰ τὸν Δί' οὐκ οὐν τῷ γε σῶ, σάφ' ἴσθ' ὅτι, i.e. *be assured*. AR. PL. 889. Πάντων οἶδ' ὅτι φησάντων γ' ἄν, when all, *I am sure, would say*. DEM. ix. 1. Βούλομαι μνημονεύοντας ὑμῶν οἶδ' ὅτι τοὺς πολλοὺς ὑπομνήσαι, i.e. *I wish to remind you, though I am sure most of you remember it*. Id. xix. 9.

In such cases it would be useless or impossible to add the implied verb.

“Ὅπως, ὅ, οὐνεκα, and ὁθύνεκα in Indirect Quotations.

706. Ὅπως is sometimes (especially in poetry) used in indirect quotations in the sense of ὥς. *E.g.*

Τοῦτ' αὐτὸ μὴ μοι φράς', ὅπως οὐκ εἰ κακός, this very thing tell me not, that you are not base. SOPH. O. T. 548. Ἄναξ, ἐρῶ μὲν οὐχ ὅπως τάχους ὑπο δύσπινους ἰκάνω, *I will not say exactly that I come breathless with haste*. Id. ANT. 223. Μὴ γὰρ ἐλπίσσης ὅπως ἐμ' ἐκβαλεῖς, for do not hope that you will expel me. EUR. HER. 1051. So SOPH. EL. 963. Ἀνάπεισον ὅκως μοι ἀμείνω ἐστὶ ταῦτα οὕτω ποιούμενα. HDT. i. 37. Οὐ μὲν οὐδὲ φήσω ὅκως Αἰγύπτιοι παρ' Ἑλλήνων ἔλαβον τοῦτο. Id. ii. 49. So iii. 115, 116. See also ὅπως οὐ πάντα ἐπίσταμαι, PLAT. EUTHYD. 296 E. In most of these, the original modal force of ὅπως, how, can be seen.

In SOPH. ANT. 685, we have ὅπως σὺ μὴ λέγεις ὀρθῶς τάδε, where μὴ is a standing puzzle. It probably must be classed with the very rare ὅτι μὴ with the indicative, and with the irregular μὴ with the infinitive after verbs of saying and thinking (for all these see 685 and 686, above).

707. (Οὐχ ὅπως, οὐχ ὅτι, etc.) Οὐχ ὅπως or (rarely) μὴ ὅπως, and οὐχ ὅτι or μὴ ὅτι, by the ellipsis of a verb of saying, often mean *I do not speak of* or *not to speak of*. Ἀλλά, ἀλλὰ καί, ἀλλ' οὐδέ, or ἀλλὰ μὴδέ usually follows in a clause which expresses a strong antithesis. After οὐχ the implied verb of saying would be an indicative, after μὴ it would be an imperative or subjunctive; but, like most elliptical idioms, this is often used where the ellipsis cannot be precisely supplied. What is men-

tioned in the former clause as *not to be spoken of* may be understood to be either affirmed or negated by the expression, according to the context; so that the force of οὐχ ὅπως may sometimes be conveniently given by *not only*, sometimes by *so far from (not only not)*. *E.g.*

Οὐχ ὅπως τὰ σκεύη ἀπέδοσθε, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ θύραι ἀφηγπάσθησαν, *not to speak of your selling furniture (i.e. not only did you have no furniture to sell), even the doors were carried off.* LYS. xix. 31. (With λέγω supplied with οὐχ ὅπως we have *I do not speak of your selling the furniture*; but this would be awkward, and probably no precise verb was thought of.) Εἰ κατώρθωσεν ἐκείνος, οὐχ ὅτι τῶν ὄντων ἂν ἀπεστερήμην, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἂν ἔξην, *if he had succeeded, not to speak of being deprived of my property, (not only should I have been deprived of my property, but) I should not even be alive.* DEM. xxiv. 7. Οὐκ ἔστιν ἄξια μὴ ὅτι δυοῖν ταλάντων προσόδου, ἀλλ' οὐδ' εἰκοσι μνῶν, *it is not sufficient to represent an income even of twenty minas, not to speak of two talents.* Id. xxxvi. 39. Τῶνδε οὐχ ὅπως κωλυταὶ γενήσεσθε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ὑμετέρας ἀρχῆς δύναμιν προσλαβεῖν περιόψεσθε, *not to speak of (so far from) your becoming a hindrance to them, you will even permit them to add to their power from your own dominions.* THUC. i. 35. Μὴ ὅπως ὀρχεῖσθαι ἐν ρυθμῷ, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὀρθοῦσθαι ἐδύνασθε, *not to speak of dancing in time, you could not even stand erect.* XEN. Cyr. i. 3, 10. Τοὺς Θηβαίους ἡγήτο ἐάσειν ὅπως βούλεται πράττειν ἑαυτὸν, καὶ οὐχ ὅπως ἀντιπράξειν καὶ διακωλύσειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ συστρατεύσειν, *he thought the Thebans would let him do as he pleased, and—not to speak of opposing and hindering him—would even join forces with him.* DEM. vi. 9. (Here no definite verb can be supplied.) Ἐδίδασκον τὸν δῆμον ὡς οὐχ ὅπως τιμωρήσαιντο, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπαινέσαιεν τὸν Σφοδρίαν, *that, so far from having punished S., they had even praised him (οὐχ ὅπως with an optative after ὡς in indirect discourse).* XEN. Hell. v. 4, 34.

708. Occasionally one of these expressions stands in the second clause; as διὰ τὸν χειμῶνα οὐδὲ πλεῖν, μὴ ὅτι ἀναιρεῖσθαι τοὺς ἄνδρας, *duyavtōn ἦν, on account of the storm it was not possible even to sail, much less to pick up the men (not to speak of picking up the men).* XEN. Hell. ii. 3, 35. So πεπαύμεθ' ἡμεῖς, οὐχ ὅπως σε παύσομεν, *we have been stopped ourselves; there is no talk of our stopping you,* SOPH. El. 796.

Compare DEM. xix. 137: ἐπύθετο αὐτὸν οὐδὲ τοῦ ζῆν ὄντα κύριον αὐτῷ βεβαιῶσαι, μῆτι γ' ἂ ἐκείνῳ ὑπέσχετο πρᾶξαι, *i.e. not at all (much less) to do what he had promised him.*

709. 1. In Homer ὅ, the neuter of ὅς, is used like ὅτι, *that.* *E.g.*

Γιγνώσκων ὃ οἱ αὐτὸς ὑπείρεχε χεῖρας Ἀπόλλων, *knowing that Apollo himself held over him his hands.* Il. v. 433. Εὖ νυ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν ὅ τοι σθένος οὐκ ἐπικτόν. Il. viii. 32. Ἀεῦσете γὰρ τό γε πάντες, ὃ μοι γέρας ἔρχεται ἄλλῃ, *that my prize goes elsewhere.* Il. i. 120. So Od. xii. 295. (See 663, 1, and 671.)

2. In the following cases ὁ τ' for ὅ τε (neuter of ὅς τε) is used in Homer like ὅ and ὅτι:—Γιγνώσκων ὁ τ' ἀναλκις ἔην θεός, *knowing that the Goddess was weak*. Il. v. 331: so xvii. 623, Od. viii. 299. Ὡς εἶδονθ' ὁ τ' ἄρ' ἐκ Διὸς ἦλυθεν ὄρνις. Il. viii. 251. Νῦν δ' ἤδη τόδε δῆλον, ὁ τ' οὐκέτι νόστιμός ἐστιν. Od. xx. 333.

Since ὅτι does not allow elision, it is now customary to write this form ὁ τ' (as above). But Schmitt (after Capelle) writes ὅτ' in all these cases, assuming the form to be an elided ὅτε (709, 3).

3. In a few cases ὅτε, *when*, is used in Homer in a sense which approaches very near that of ὅτι, *that*. *E.g.*

Οὐδ' ἔλαθ' Αἶαντα Ζεὺς, ὅτε δὴ Τρώεσσι δίδω νίκην, i.e. *nor was Ajax unaware that Zeus was giving victory to the Trojans* (lit. *when Zeus was giving*). Il. xvii. 626. Compare Il. xxiv. 563, οὐδέ με λήθεις, ὅτι θεῶν τις σ' ἤγε. See Schmitt, pp. 40-50.

This occasional use of ὅτε seems hardly to justify the assumption that ὁ τ' in all the cases in 709, 2 stands for ὅτε.

710. 1. Οὐνεκα in Homer, and ὀθούνεκα and οὔνεκα in the tragedians, are sometimes used like ὅτι or ὥς, *that*. *E.g.*

Πεύθετο γὰρ Κύπρονδε μέγα κλέος, οὔνεκ' Ἀχαιοὶ ἐς Τροίην νήεσσιν ἀναπλεύσεσθαι ἔμελλον, *for in Cyprus he heard a mighty rumour, that the Achaeans were about to sail for Troy in ships*. Il. xi. 21. So Od. v. 216, xiii. 309. "Αγγελλε ὀθούνεκα τέθνηκ' Ὀρέστης, *report that Orestes is dead*. SOPH. El. 47; see El. 1478. Ἴσθι τοῦτο, οὔνεκα Ἑλληνές ἐσμεν, *know this, that we are Greeks*. Id. Ph. 232. Ἐκδιδασχεῖς οὔνεκα ἄκουσα ἔρξειεν τάδε. Id. Tr. 934.

2. Διότι is sometimes used in the sense of ὅτι, *that*, by Aristotle, and occasionally by Herodotus and even by Isocrates. *E.g.*

Διότι μὲν τοίνυν οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ (sc. ἐστὶ), φανερόν ἐκ τούτων, i.e. *that it is not the same, is plain from this*. ARISTOT. Pol. iii. 4, 7. So Metaph. x. 5, 3. Διότι ἐκ τῶν βαρβάρων ἤκει, πυνθανόμενος οὕτω εὐρίσκω ἐόν. HDT. ii. 50: see ii. 43 (with Stein's note). See ISOC. iv. 48: συνειδυῖα ὅτι τοῦτο . . . ἔφυσεν ἔχοντες, καὶ διότι . . . αὐτῶν διηνέγαμεν.

"ΟΤΙ before Direct Quotations.

711. Even direct quotations are sometimes introduced by ὅτι, rarely by ὥς, without further change in the construction. "Οτι or ὥς here cannot be expressed in English. *E.g.*

Ὁ δὲ ἀπεκρίνατο ὅτι Οὐδ' εἰ γενοίμην, ὦ Κῦρε, σοί γ' ἂν ποτε ἔτι δόξαιμι. XEN. AN. i. 6, 8. Ἀπεκρίνατο ὅτι Ὡς δέσποτα, οὐ ζῇ. Id. Cyr. vii. 3, 3. Εἶπε δ' ὅτι Εἰς καιρὸν ἦκεις, ἔφη, ὅπως τῆς δίκης ἀκούσης. Ib. iii. 1, 8. Ἡ ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς, ὅτι Ἡδίκει γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις, καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην ἔκρινε,—ταῦτα ἡ τί ἐροῦμεν; PLAT. CRIT. 50 B; so PHAED. 60 A. Ἄν λέγῃ τις τάληθῇ, ὅτι Ληρεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. DEM. viii. 31: so xviii. 40, 174; xix. 22, 40, 253. See also

HDT. ii. 115 (the earliest example); THUC. i. 137, iv. 38; AND. i. 49; LYS. i. 26; AESCHIN. iii. 22, 120; DIN. i. 12, 102 (both with ὥς).¹

SECTION IX.

Causal Sentences.

712. Causal sentences express the cause of something stated in the leading sentence. They may be introduced by ὅτι, διότι or διόπερ, ὥς, οὖνεκα or ὁθύνεκα, *because*; by ἐπεί, ἐπειδή, ὅτε, ὁπότε, εὖτε, and sometimes ὅπου, *since, seeing that*; and in Homer by ὃ ὃρ ὃ τε (ὃ τ'), *because*.

713. (*Indicative.*) Causal sentences regularly take the indicative, after both primary and secondary tenses; past causes being expressed by the past tenses of the indicative. The negative particle is οὐ. *E.g.*

Κήδετο γὰρ Δαναῶν, ὅτι ῥα θνήσκοντας ὄρᾱτο, *for she pitied the Danaans, because she saw them dying.* II. i. 56. Χωόμενος, ὃ τ' ἄριστον Ἀχαιῶν οὐδὲν ἔτισας, *angry, because you did in no way honour the best of the Achaeans.* II. i. 244. Δημοβόρος βασιλεὺς, ἐπεὶ οὐτιδανοῖσιν ἀνάσσεις. II. i. 231. Μὴ δ' οὕτως κλέπτε νόψ, ἐπεὶ οὐ παρελεύσαιο οὐδέ με πείσεις. II. i. 132. Νοῦσον ἀνὰ στρατὸν ὦρσε κακὴν, ὀλέκοντο δὲ λαοὶ, οὖνεκα τὸν Χρῦσσην ἠτίμασεν ἀρητῆρα Ἀτρεΐδης. II. i. 11. Τηλέμαχον θαύμαζον, ὃ θαρσαλέως ἀγόρευεν, *because he spoke boldly.* Od. i. 382. Καὶ τριήρης δέ τοι ἡ σεσαγμένη ἀνθρώπων διὰ τί ἄλλο φοβερόν ἐστι ἢ ὅτι ταχὺ πλεῖ; διὰ τί δὲ ἄλλο ἄλυτοι ἀλλήλοισι εἰσὶν οἱ ἐμπλέοντες ἢ διότι ἐν τάξει κάθηται; XEN. Oec. viii. 8. Οἱ ἐμοὶ φίλοι οὕτως ἔχοντες περὶ ἐμοῦ διατελοῦσιν, οὐ διὰ τὸ φιλεῖν ἐμέ, ἀλλὰ διόπερ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀν' οἷονται βέλτιστοι γίνεσθαι. Id. Mem. iv. 8, 7. Οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐνόμιζον ἡσασθαι ὅτι οὐ πολὺ ἐνίκων, *the Athenians thought they were defeated because they were not signally victorious.* THUC. vii. 34. Μᾶλλον τι εἰδενολογεῖτο ὅτι μιν ἀπέκτεινε τὸν αὐτὸς φόβος ἐκάθηρε. HDT. i. 44. Πρὸς ταῦτα κρύπτε μὴδὲν, ὥς ὃ πάνθ' ὁρῶν καὶ πάντ' ἀκούων πάντ' ἀναπτύσσει χρόνος, *i.e. since time develops all things.* SOPH. Fr. 280. Μέγα δὲ τὸ ἐμοῦ τραφῆναι, ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις πόθος τις ἐγγίγνεται τῶν συντροφῶν. XEN. Mem. ii. 3, 4. 'Ὅτ' οὖν παλαιούσ' οὐδὲν ἐς πλέον ποιῶ, ἱκέτις ἀφίγμαι. SOPH. O. T. 918. 'Ὅποτε οὖν πόλις μὲν τὰς ἰδίας εὐμοφὰς οἶα τε φέρειν, εἰς δὲ ἕκαστος τὰς ἐκείνης ἀδύνατος (sc. ἐστὶ), πῶς οὐ χρὴ πάντας ἀμύνειν αὐτῇ; THUC. ii. 60. "Ὅτε τοίνυν τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, προσήκει προθύμως ἐθέλειν ἀκούειν τῶν βουλομένων συμβου-

¹ See Spieker in *Am. Jour. Phil.* v. pp. 221-227, who has traced the history of this construction and collected examples, especially those in the Orators.

λεύειν. DEM. i. 1. For εὔτε, *since*, see SOPH. AJ. 715, O. C. 84; for ὅπου (ὅκου) see HDT. i. 68.

714. (*Optative.*) When, however, the speaker implies that a cause was assigned by some other person, the principle of indirect discourse (694), after past tenses, allows the verb to stand in the optative, in the tense originally used by the person who assigned the cause (699). *E.g.*

Τὸν Περικλέα ἐκάκιζον, ὅτι στρατηγὸς ὢν οὐκ ἐπεξάγοι, *they abused Pericles, because being general he did not lead them out.* THUC. ii. 21. (This states the reason of the Athenians for reproaching Pericles (ὅτι ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἐπεξάγει); if Thucydides had wished to assign the cause merely on his own authority, he would have used ὅτι οὐκ ἐπεξήγεν. Cf. THUC. vii. 34 in 713.) Τοὺς συνόντας ἐδόκει ποιεῖν ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀνοσιῶν, ἐπείπερ ἡγήσαιντο μηδὲν ἂν ποτε ὢν πράττειν θεοὺς διαλαθεῖν (see 693). XEN. MEM. i. 4, 19. Οἶσθα ἐπαινέσαντα αὐτὸν (Ὀμηρον) τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα, ὡς βασιλεὺς εἶη ἀγαθός, *because (as he said) he was a good king.* Id. Symp. iv. 6. Ἐκάλεε . . . τὸν μὲν ἐπίσσιον (Δία), διότι φονέα τοῦ παιδὸς ἐλάνθανε (694, 2) βόσκων, τὸν δὲ ἑταιρήιον, ὡς φύλακα συμπέμψας αὐτὸν εὐρήκοι πολεμιώτατον. HDT. i. 44. (Croesus would have said διότι ἐλάνθανον and ὡς εὐρηκα.)

715. We should suppose that in causal sentences of the latter class (714) the mood and tense by which the cause would be originally stated might also be retained, as in ordinary indirect discourse; so that in THUC. ii. 21, above, for example, we might have ὅτι οὐκ ἐπεξάγει in the same sense as ὅτι οὐκ ἐπεξάγοι. This, however, seems to have been avoided, to prevent the ambiguity which might arise from the three forms, ἐπεξήγεν, ἐπεξάγοι, and ἐπεξάγει. It will be remembered that the form ἐπεξήγεν, which is the most common in the expression of a past cause, is also the original form for expressing the corresponding time in indirect discourse, although it became exceptional here in the later usage (671; 674).

For causal relative sentences see 580. For the causal participle see 838.

716. The optative in causal sentences is not found in Homer.

717. A cause may be expressed by a potential indicative or optative with ἄν.

Δέομαι οὖν σου παραμείναι ἡμῖν ὡς ἐγὼ οὐδ' ἂν ἐνὸς ἡδίου ἀκούσαιμι ἢ σοῦ, *I beg you then to remain with us; as there is not one whom I should hear more gladly than you.* PLAT. PROT. 335 D. Νῦν δέ, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐθέλεις καὶ ἐμοὶ τις ἀσχολία ἐστὶ καὶ οὐκ ἂν ὁλός τ' εἶην σοι παραμείναι ἀποτείνοντι μακροὺς λόγους, ἐλθεῖν γάρ ποί με δεῖ, εἴμι ἐπεὶ καὶ ταῦτ' ἂν ἴσως οὐκ ἀηδῶς σου ἤκουον (for ἐπεὶ see 719, 2). Ib. 335 C. Ὅτι τῶν ἀδικημάτων ἂν ἐμέμνητο τῶν αὐτοῦ, εἴ τι περὶ ἐμοῦ γ' ἔγραφεν. DEM. xviii. 79; so xviii. 49.

718. A causal sentence may be interrogative, or its verb may express a wish or a command. *E.g.*

Ἐπεὶ, φέρ' εἰπὲ, ποῦ σὺ μάντις εἶ σαφής; *for—come tell me—where do you ever show yourself a prophet?* SOPH. O. T. 390. Ἐπεὶ διδάξον, ἢ μάθ' ἐξ ἐμοῦ, τί μοι κέρδος γένοιτ' ἄν. *Id. El. 352: so O. C. 969.* See PLAT. Gorg. 474 B: ἐπεὶ σὺ δέξαι' ἄν; Ἐπεὶ ἄθεος ἄφιλος ὅτι πύματον ὀλοῖμαν, *for—may I perish!* SOPH. O. T. 662.

719. 1. A causal sentence may give the cause of something that is implied, but not expressed, in the leading sentence. Especially it may give the reason for making a statement, rather than for the fact stated. In dialogues, a causal sentence may refer to an implied *yes* or *no*. *E.g.*

Οὐ νυ καὶ ὑμῖν οἶκοι ἔνεστι γόος, ὅτι μ' ἤλθετε κηδήσοντας; *have you now no mourning at home, that you have come to distress me? (i.e. I ask this, because you have come).* IL. xxiv. 239. (If the two clauses were reversed—*have you come because you have no mourning at home?*—the causal relation would be plainer.) Οὐ μ' ἔτ' ἐφάσκεθ' ὑπότροπον οἴκαδ' ἰκέσθαι, ὅτι μοι κατεκείρετε οἶκον, *i.e. you thought I should never return (as is plain), because you wasted my house.* OD. xxii. 35. See ἐπεὶ in OD. i. 231. Ὡς ἔστιν ἀνδρὸς τοῦδε τάργα ταυτά σοι, *yes (answering the preceding question), for here you have the deeds of this man.* SOPH. Aj. 39: so Ph. 812.

2. By a natural ellipsis, ἐπεὶ sometimes has virtually the force of *although* or *and yet*. *E.g.*

Αἰσχυνόμην ἂν ἔγωγε τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖν, ἐπεὶ πολλοὶ γέ φασι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, *I should be ashamed for my part to admit this, and yet many men do say so (in full, I speak for myself alone, since many say this).* PLAT. Prot. 333 C. See *ibid.* 335 C (quoted in 717), where ἐπεὶ ἂν . . . ἤκουον refers to the implied idea *I am sorry after all to go*. In OD. i. 236, ἐπεὶ οὐ κε . . . ἀκαχοίμην, and yet *I should not be thus afflicted by his death*, refers to what ἄστρον suggests, *I am especially grieved by his death in obscurity* (cf. vss. 241, 242).

SECTION X.

Expression of a Wish.

720. Wishes may be divided into two classes: (*a*) those referring to a future object, and (*b*) those referring to a present or past object which (it is implied) is not or was not attained. To the former class belong such wishes as *O that he may come!* or *O that this may happen!*—*Utinam veniat, Utinam fiat*; and to the latter, such as *O that this had happened!* or *O that this were true!*—*Utinam hoc factum esset, Utinam hoc verum esset.*

From its use in wishes the *optative* mood (ἐγκλισις εὐκτική) received its name.

WISHES REFERRING TO THE FUTURE.

721. A wish referring to the future may be expressed in Greek in two ways:—

I. by the optative alone; as in γένοιτο τοῦτο, *may this happen*, μὴ γένοιτο τοῦτο, *may this not happen*;

II. by the optative with εἴθε or εἰ γάρ (Homeric also αἶθε or αἶ γάρ), sometimes by the simple εἰ, negatively εἴθε μὴ, εἰ γάρ μὴ, etc.; as in εἴθε γένοιτο τοῦτο, *O that this may happen*, εἰ γάρ μὴ γένοιτο, *O that it may not happen*.

722. I. The pure optative in a wish (with no introductory particle) is an independent verb. *E.g.*

Ἵμῖν μὲν θεοὶ δοῖεν Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχοντες ἐκπέρσαι Πριάμοιο πόλιν εἰ δ' οἰκαδ' ἰκέσθαι, *may the Gods grant you to destroy Priam's city*, etc. Il. i. 18. Μὴ μὰν ἀσπουδί γε καὶ ἀκλειῶς ἀπολοίμην, *may I not perish*, etc. Il. xxii. 304. Μηκέτ' ἔπειτ' Ὀδυσῆϊ κάρη ὤμοισιν ἐπείη, μηδ' ἔτι Τηλεμάχου πατὴρ κεκλημένος εἴην, *then may the head of Ulysses no longer stand on his shoulders, and no longer may I be called the father of Telemachus*. Il. ii. 259. Τεθναίην ὅτε μοι μηκέτι ταῦτα μέλοι, *may I die when these are no longer my care*. MIMN. i. 2. Τὸ μὲν νῦν ταῦτα πρήσσοις τάπερ ἐν χερσὶ ἔχεις, *may you for the present continue to do what you now have in hand*. HDT. vii. 5. ὦ παῖ, γένοιτο πατὴρ εὐτυχέστερος. SOPH. Aj. 550. Οὕτω νικήσαιμι τ' ἐγὼ καὶ νομιζοίμην σοφός, *on this condition may I gain the prize (in this contest) and be (always) considered wise*. AR. Nub. 520. Θήσω πρυτανεῖ', ἢ μηκέτι ζῶην ἐγώ, *or may I no longer live*. Ib. 1255. Ξυνενέγκοι μὲν ταῦτα ὡς βουλόμεθα, *may this prosper as we desire*. THUC. vi. 20. Ἀλλὰ βουληθείης, *but may you only be willing!* PLAT. Euthyd. 296 D. Πλούσιον δὲ νομίζοιμι τὸν σοφόν. Id. Phaedr. 279 C. Νικῶν δ' ὅ τι πᾶσιν ὑμῖν μέλλει συνούσειν, *and may that opinion prevail which is to benefit you all*. DEM. iv. 51. Ὅ τι ὑμῖν δόξει, τοῦτ', ὦ πάντες θεοὶ, συνενέγκοι (see 561). Id. ix. 76. So εἰεν, *well, be it so*.

For the relation of the optative in wishes to the optative in its most primitive meaning, see Appendix I.

723. II. The optative in a wish with εἴθε (αἶθε), εἰ γάρ (αἶ γάρ), or εἰ is probably in its origin a protasis with the apodosis suppressed. *E.g.*

Αἶθ' οὕτως ἐπὶ πᾶσι χόλον τελέσει' Ἀγαμέμνων, *O if Agamemnon would thus fulfil his wrath upon all*. Il. iv. 178. Αἶθ' οὕτως,

Εὔμαιε, φίλον Διὶ πατρὶ γένοιτο ὥς ἐμοί, *mayest thou become in like manner a friend to father Zeus*. Od. xiv. 440. Αἶ γὰρ δὴ οὕτως εἴη, φίλος δὲ Μενέλαε, *O that this may be so*. Il. iv. 189. Αἶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τοσσὴνδε θεοὶ δύνανται περιθεῖν, *O if the Gods would clothe me with so much strength!* Od. iii. 205. Ἀλλ' εἴ μιν ἀεικισσάμεθ' ἐλόντες, τεύχεα τ' ὥμουιν ἀφελοίμεθα, καὶ τιν' ἐταίρων αὐτοῦ ἀμνημονέων δαμασάμεθα νηλεὶ χαλκῷ, *but if we could only take him and insult him, and strip him of his armour, and subdue, etc.* Il. xvi. 559.¹ Εἴθε μήποτε γνοίης δὲ εἶ, *may you never learn who you are*. SOPH. O. T. 1068. Εἴθ' ὅμιν ἀμφοῖν νοῦς γένοιτο σωφρονεῖν. Id. Aj. 1264. Εἴθε παῖς ἐμὸς εὐθῆρος εἴη. EUR. Bacch. 1252. Εἰ γὰρ γενοίμην, τέκνον, ἀντὶ σοῦ νεκρός. Id. Hipp. 1410. Εἴθ', δὲ λῶσθε, σὺ τοιούτος ὢν φίλος ἡμῖν γένοιτο. XEN. Hell. iv. 1, 38. Εἰ γὰρ γένοιτο. Id. Cyr. vi. 1, 38. Εἰ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ εἴη, *if it may only depend on this!* PLAT. Prot. 310 D. Εἴθε γράψειεν ὥς χρή, κ.τ.λ. Id. Phaedr. 227 C.

The simple εἰ (without -θε or γάρ) with the optative in wishes is poetic. Ἀλλ' εἴ τις καὶ τούσδε μετοιχώμενος καλέσειεν. Il. x. 111. See three other Homeric examples cited in the footnote.² Εἴ μοι ξυνείη μοῖρα. SOPH. O. T. 863. Εἴ μοι γένοιτο φθόγγος ἐν βραχίουσιν. EUR. Hec. 836.

The future optative was not used in wishes. The perfect was probably not used, except in the signification of the present (see 48); as in Il. ii. 259, quoted in 722.

724. In Homer, as the examples show, both present and aorist optative are freely used in future wishes, as in the corresponding future conditions (455). But the present optative

¹ On this passage we have the note of Aristarchus in the Scholia: ἡ διπλῇ, ὅτι ἐξώθεν προσυπακουστέον τὸ καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι· εἰ αὐτὸν ἀνελόντες ἀεικισσάμεθα, καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι. Schol. A. It does not follow necessarily from this that Aristarchus explained all optatives with forms of εἰ in wishes by supplying καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι as an apodosis (see Lange, p. 6, note 15); but if he explained this passage as an elliptical protasis, he can hardly have objected to the same explanation of other similar passages. It is surely no more necessary or logical to insist on explaining both forms of wishes alike, than it would be in English to insist that *may I see him again* and *O if I might see him again* are originally of the same construction.

² The Homeric examples of the optative with various forms of εἰ or αἰ are of the highest importance for the understanding of the construction generally. The following is a list of the passages (according to Lange, *Partikel EI*, pp. 19-40):—

Simple εἰ with optative: Il. x. 111, xv. 571, xvi. 559, xxiv. 74. (4.)

Αἰ γάρ or εἰ γάρ with optative: Il. iv. 189, x. 536, xvi. 97, xviii. 272, 464, xxii. 346, 464; Od. iii. 205, iv. 697, vi. 244, viii. 339, ix. 523, xv. 156, xvii. 251, 513, xviii. 235, 366, xix. 22, xx. 169, xxi. 402. (20.)

Αἴθε or εἴθε with optative: Il. iv. 178; Od. ii. 33, xiv. 440, xv. 341, xvii. 494, xviii. 202, xx. 61. (7.)

Eight examples (five with εἴθε, two with εἰ γάρ, one with αἰ γάρ), in which the present optative expresses an unattained present wish, are omitted here and will be found under 739. The cases discussed in 730 are not included here.

For the use of αἴθε, αἰ γάρ, and αἰ (for εἴθε, etc.) in Homer, see footnote to 379.

in Homer also expresses a *present* wish implying that it is not attained, as it may express a present unreal condition (438). For this use, see 739.

725. In the poets, especially Homer, the simple optative may express a command or exhortation, in a sense approaching that of the imperative. *E.g.*

Ταῦτ' εἶποις Ἀχιλῆϊ, (*you may*) *say this to Achilles*. II. xi. 791. Τεθναίης, ὦ Προίτ', ἢ κάκτανε Βελλεροφόντην, (*you may*) *either die, or kill Bellerophontes*. II. vi. 164. Ἀλλά τις Δολίον καλέσειε, *let some one call Dolios*. Od. iv. 735. So in prohibitions with μή: μὴδ' ἔτι σοῖσι πόδεσσιν ὑποστρέψειας Ὀλυμπον, II. iii. 407 (between two pairs of imperatives). See also AÆSCH. Prom. 1049 and 1051.

For Homeric optatives (without ἄν), which form a connecting link between the potential and the wishing optative (like II. iv. 18, 19), see 13 and 233.

726. The poets, especially Homer, sometimes use ὥς before the optative in wishes. This ὥς cannot be expressed in English, and it is probably exclamatory. It must not be confounded with οὕτως used as in 727. *E.g.*

Ὡς ἀπόλοιτο καὶ ἄλλος ὅτις τοιαῦτά γε ῥέξοι, *O that any other may likewise perish*, etc. Od. i. 47. See Od. xxi. 201. Ὡς ὁ τὰδε πορὼν ἔλκοιτ', εἰ μοι θέμις τὰδ' αὐδᾶν. SOPH. El. 126. Compare ut pereat telum, HOR. Sat. ii. 1, 43.

727. Οὕτως, *thus, on this condition*, may be prefixed to the optative in *protestations*, where a wish is expressed upon some condition; the condition being usually added in another clause. *E.g.*

Οὕτως ὄναυσθε τούτων, μὴ περιδιδίγέ με, *may you enjoy these on this condition,—do not neglect me*. DEM. xxviii. 20.

728. When the potential optative is used to express a wish, as in πῶς ἂν ὀλοίμην, *how gladly should I perish*, EUR. Supp. 796, it does not belong here, as ὀλοίμην ἂν and ὀλοίμην are, in use, wholly different constructions. If εἰ γάρ κεν μίμνους, Od. xv. 545, is a wish, εἴ κεν may be used as it often is in protasis in Homer (460) in the same sense as εἰ, or the optative may be potential in the sense *O if you could remain*. In II. vi. 281, ὥς κέ οἱ αἰθεὶ γαῖα χάνοι, if κέ is correct, must mean *O that the earth could gape for him at once* (potential). But the exceptional character of these expressions makes both suspicious. Hermann and Bekker read εἰ γὰρ καί in Od. xv. 545; and Bekker reads ὥς δέ in II. vi. 281.

729. The infinitive occurs twice in Homer in wishes with αἶ γάρ: see 786, and 739 (end). For the infinitive used like the simple optative in wishes, especially in poetry, see 785.

730. There are many passages in Homer in which it is open to doubt whether the poet intended to express a wish with some

form of *εἰ*, followed by a potential optative in a new sentence, or to form a complete conditional sentence. Such are—

*Εἰ γὰρ ἐπ' ἄρῃσιν τέλος ἡμετέρῃσι γένοιτο·
οὐκ ἂν τις τούτων γε ἐύθρονον Ἡὼ ἴκοιτο.* Od. xvii. 496.
*Αἶ γὰρ τοῦτο, ξεῖνε, ἔπος τετελεσμένον εἶη·
τῷ κε τάχα γνώιης φιλότῃτά τε πολλά τε δῶρα
ἐξ ἐμεῦ.* Od. xv. 536.

If we keep the colon after *γένοιτο* in the former passage, we may translate, *O that fulfilment may be granted our prayers: not one of these would (then) see the fair-throned Dawn.* With a comma after *γένοιτο*, we may translate, *if fulfilment should be granted our prayers, not one of these would see the fair-throned Dawn.* So in the second passage we may translate, according to the punctuation, *O that this word may be accomplished: then would you quickly be made aware of kindness and many gifts from me;—or if this word should be accomplished, you would then quickly be made aware, etc.* These are probably rightly punctuated above, especially the second; and the wish is on the verge of independent existence, being almost ready to dispense with the apodosis. The half-independent half-dependent nature of such clauses is best seen in a case like the following, where *εἰ ἐθέλοι* is first stated as an independent wish, and is afterwards repeated as the protasis of a regular apodosis:—

*Εἰ γὰρ σ' ὥς ἐθέλοι φιλέειν γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη
ὥς τότε Ὀδυσσεύς περικιήδετο κυδαλίμοιο
δήμῳ ἐνὶ Τρώων, ὅθι πάσχομεν ἀλγέ' Ἀχαιοί· . . .
εἰ σ' οὕτως ἐθέλοι φιλέειν κήδοιτό τε θυμῷ,
τῷ κέν τις κείνων γε καὶ ἐκλελάθοιτο γάμοιο.* Od. iii. 217.

The meaning is, *if only Athena would love you as she then loved Ulysses; . . . if (I say) she would thus love you, then would many a one (of the suitors) cease to think of marriage.* Here, instead of leaving a simple apodosis like the *καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι* of Aristarchus to be mentally supplied, or to be felt without being actually supplied, the protasis is repeated (as if by afterthought) and a more precise form of conclusion is then actually expressed.

Such examples as the first two are sometimes adduced as evidence that *εἰ* with the optative in protasis was originally a form of wish, to which an apodosis was afterwards appended. For a discussion of this view, see Appendix I.

WISHES (NOT ATTAINED) IN PRESENT OR PAST TIME.

731. A wish referring to a present or past object, which (it is implied) is not or was not attained, may be expressed in Greek in two ways:—

I. by the past tenses of the indicative, used as in unreal conditions, with *εἴθε* or *εἰ γάρ*; or

II. by ὄφελον, aorist of ὀφείλω, *owe*, with the infinitive.

732. I. The past tenses of the indicative with εἶθε or εἰ γάρ, in present and past wishes, correspond to the optative with these particles in future wishes. The construction was originally a protasis with its apodosis suppressed, εἰ γάρ με εἶδες meaning, *O if you had seen me!* This form of wish is common in the Attic writers, but is unknown to Homer (735).

The imperfect and aorist indicative are distinguished here as in the unreal condition (410). *E.g.*

Ἰὼ γὰ γὰ, εἶθ' ἐμ' ἐδέξω, *O Earth, Earth, would that thou hadst received me.* AESCH. Ag. 1537. Εἰ γάρ μ' ὑπὸ γῆν ἦκεν, *O if he had sent me beneath the earth.* Id. Prom. 152. Εἶθε σε εἶθε σε μήποτ' εἰδόμεν. SOPH. O. T. 1217. Εἶθ' εὐρομέν σ', Ἀδμητε, μὴ λυπούμενον. EUR. Alc. 536. Εἶθε σοι, ὦ Περικλείς, τότε συνεγενόμην, *would that I had met you then.* XEN. Mem. i. 2, 46. Εἶθ' εἶχες, ὦ τεκοῦσα, βελτίους φρένας, *O mother, would that you had a better understanding.* EUR. El. 1061. Εἰ γὰρ τοσαύτην δύναμιν εἶχον, *would that I had so great power.* Id. Alc. 1072. Εἶθ' ἦσθα δυνατὸς δρᾶν ὅσον πρόθυμος εἶ. Id. Her. 731.

733. The indicative cannot be used in wishes without εἶθε or εἰ γάρ, as it would occasion ambiguity; this cannot arise in the case of the optative, which is not regularly used in independent sentences without ἄν, except in wishes. SOPH. O. C. 1713, ἰὼ, μὴ γὰς ἐπὶ ξένας θανεῖν ἐχρηζες (so the Mss.) is often quoted to show that at least the indicative with μὴ alone can be used in negative wishes, with the translation, *O that thou hadst not chosen to die in a foreign land.* But the passage is probably corrupt, as the following words ἀλλ' ἔρημος ἔθaves show. See, however, Hermann's note on this passage, and on EUR. Iph. Aul. 575.

734. II. The aorist ὄφελον, *ought*, and sometimes (in Homer) the imperfect ὄφελλον, of ὀφείλω (Epic ὀφέλλω), *owe, debeo*, may be used with the infinitive to express a present or past unattained wish. The present infinitive is used when the wish refers to the present or to continued or repeated past action, and the aorist (rarely the perfect) when it refers to the past.

Ὀφελον or ὄφελλον may be preceded by the particles of wishing, εἶθε and εἰ γάρ, and in negative wishes by μὴ (not οὐ). *E.g.*

Ὀφеле τοῦτο ποιεῖν, *would that he were (now) doing this* (lit. *he ought to be doing it*), or *would that he had (habitually) done this* (lit. *he*

ought to have done this). "Ὁφέλε τοῦτο ποιῆσαι, would that he had done this.

Ὦν ὄφελον τριτάτην περ ἔχων ἐν δώμασι μοῖραν ναίειν, οἱ δ' ἄνδρες σοοὶ ἔμμεναι οὐ τότε δλοντο, *O that I were living with even a third part, etc., and that those men were safe who then perished.* Od. iv. 97. So Il. i. 415. Ἄνδρὸς ἔπειτ' ὄφελλον ἀμείνωνος εἶναι ἄκοιτις, ὅς ῥ' ὦν νέμεσιν τε καὶ αἰσχα πολλὰ ἀνθρώπων, *O that I were the wife of a better man, who knew, etc.* Il. vi. 350. Τὴν ὄφελ' ἐν νήεσσι κατακτάμεν Ἀρτεμῖς ἴψ, *O that Artemis had slain her, etc.* Il. xix. 59. Αἰθ' ὄφελλες στρατοῦ ἄλλον σημαίνειν. Il. xiv. 84. Αἰθ' ἅμα πάντες Ἐκτορος ὄφέλετ' ἀντὶ θοῆς ἐπὶ νηυσὶ πεφάσθαι, *would that ye all had been slain instead of Hector.* Il. xxiv. 253. Μηδ' ὄφελος λίσσεσθαι ἀμύμονα Πηλεΐωνα, *would that you had not besought the son of Peleus.* Il. ix. 698. (See 736, below.) So xviii. 86; Od. viii. 312. Μηκέτ' ἔπειτ' ὄφειλον (?) ἐγὼ πέμπτοισι μετεῖναι ἀνδράσιν, ἀλλ' ἢ πρόσθε θανεῖν ἢ ἔπειτα γενέσθαι, *would that I were no longer living with this fifth race of men, but had either died before it or been born after it.* HES. Op. 174. Ὁλέσθαι ὄφελον τῇδ' ἡμέρᾳ, *O that I had perished on that day.* SOPH. O. T. 1157. Μή ποτ' ὄφελον λιπεῖν τὴν Σκύρον, *O that I never had left Scyros.* Id. Ph. 969. See El. 1021. Αἰθ' ὄφελ' Ἀργούς μὴ διαπτάσθαι σκάφος Κόλχων ἐς αἶαν κνανέας Συμπληγάδας. EUR. Med. 1. Εἰ γὰρ ὄφελον οἰοί τε εἶναι οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐξεργάζεσθαι, *O that the multitude were able, etc.* PLAT. Crit. 44 D. Εἰ γὰρ ὄφελον (sc. κατιδεῖν). Id. Rep. 432 C. Παθόντων ἂ μὴ ποτ' ὄφελον (sc. παθεῖν), *when they suffered what would they had never suffered.* DEM. xviii. 288; so 320. So ὡς μήποτε ὄφελεν, XEN. Cyr. iv. 6, 3 (see 737).

735. This form with ὄφελον or ὄφελλον is the only expression known to Homer for *past* wishes, the secondary tenses of the indicative being not yet used in this construction, although they were already in good use in past (though not in present) conditions (435). In present wishes, Homer has the present optative (739) as well as the construction with ὄφελον. (See 438.)

736. For an explanation of the origin of the use of ὄφελον in wishes, see 424. It is there seen to be analogous to εἶδει and χρῆν with the infinitive, implying that what *ought to be* or *to have been* does not or did not happen. Only after its original meaning was obscured by familiar use could εἴθε or εἰ γάρ have been prefixed to it. Μὴ ὄφελον may be explained in the same way; or we may suppose that μὴ originally belonged to the infinitive, and afterwards came to negative the whole expression. See the examples in 734.

737. Ὡς, used as in 726, often precedes ὄφελον etc. in Homer, and rarely in the Attic poets. *E.g.*

Ἦλυθες ἐκ πολέμου; ὡς ὄφελες αὐτόθ' ὀλέσθαι, *would you had perished there.* Il. iii. 428. Ὡς δὲ μὴ ὄφελον νικᾶν τοιῷδ' ἐπ' ἀέθλῳ, *O that I had not been victorious in such a contest.* Od. xi. 548.

‘Ως ὥφελλ’ Ἑλένης ἀπὸ φῦλον ὀλέσθαι. Od. xiv. 68. So Il. iii. 173, xxii. 481. ‘Ως πρὶν διδάξαι γ’ ὥφελες μέσος διαρραγῆναι, *would that you had split in two before you ever taught it.* AR. Ran. 955.

738. Neither the secondary tenses of the indicative nor the form with ὥφελον in wishes can (like the optative) be preceded by the simple εἰ (without -θε or γάρ).

739. (*Present Wishes in Homer.*) In Homer a present unattained wish may be expressed by the present optative, like a present unfulfilled condition (438). Here εἴθε or εἰ γάρ generally introduces the wish. *E.g.*

Εἰ γὰρ ἐγὼν οὕτω γε Διὸς παῖς αἰγιόχοιο
εἶην ἡματα πάντα, τέκοι δέ με πότνια Ἥρη,
τιοίμην δ’ ὥς τιέτ’ Ἀθηναίη καὶ Ἀπόλλων,
ὥς νῦν ἡμέρη ἦδε κακὸν φέρει Ἀργείοισιν,

O that I were the son of Zeus, and that Hera were my mother, and that I were honoured as Athena and Apollo are honoured, etc. Il. xiii. 825. (Here τέκοι is nearly equivalent to μήτηρ εἶη : cf. ὦ τεκοῦσα, *O mother*, quoted under 732.) Almost the same wish occurs in Il. viii. 538.

ᾧ γέρον, εἴθ’ ὥς θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φίλοισιν
ὥς τοι γούναθ’ ἔποιτο, βίη δέ τοι ἔμπεδος εἶη·
ἀλλὰ σε γῆρας τείρει ὁμοῖον· ὥς ὄφελέν τις
ἀνδρῶν ἄλλος ἔχειν, σὺ δὲ κουροτέροισι μετεῖναι,

would that, even as thy spirit is in thy breast, so thy knees obeyed and thy strength were firm. Il. iv. 313. At the end we have the more common form of a present wish, ὄφελέν τις ἄλλος ἔχειν, *would that some other man had it (γῆρας).*

Εἴθ’ ὥς ἡβώοιμι, βίη δέ μοι ἔμπεδος εἶη·

τῷ κε τάχ’ ἀντήσειε μάχης κορυθαίολος Ἔκτωρ,

O that I were again so young, and my strength were firm, etc. Il. vii. 157. The same wish, in precisely the same words, occurs also in Il. xi. 670, xxiii. 629, and Od. xiv. 468; also in Il. vii. 132 in the form αἰ γάρ, Ζεῦ τε πάτερ, . . . ἡβῶμ’ ὥς ὅτ’ . . . μάχοντο. See Od. xiv. 503, ὥς νῦν ἡβώοιμι, repeating the idea of vs. 468. In Od. xviii. 79 we have νῦν μὲν μήτ’ εἶης, βουγᾶιε, μήτε γένοιο, *better that thou wert not now, thou braggart, and hadst never been born*, where γένοιο looks like a past wish; but *not having been born* may be included in the present wish of εἶης : compare τέκοι in Il. xiii. 826 (above). For αἰ γάρ ἐλασαίαιο, Il. x. 536, see 93 (end).

For the infinitive with αἰ γάρ in a past unattained wish in Homer, see 786.

740. It has been seen that the use of the moods and tenses in both classes of wishes with εἰ γάρ and εἴθε is precisely the same as in the corresponding forms of protasis (455; 410). The analogy with the Latin is also the same as in protasis:—

εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο ποιήῃ (or ποιήσειεν), *O si hoc faciat, O that he may do this*; εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο ἐποίει, *O si hoc faceret, O that he were doing this*; εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο ἐποίησεν, *O si hoc fecisset, O that he had done this*; εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐγένετο, *utinam ne factum esset, O that it had not happened*.

It must be remembered that it is the *futurity* of the object of a wish, and not its probability or possibility, that requires the optative. No amount of absurdity or extravagance in a future wish can make anything but the optative proper in expressing it. As Aristotle says (*Eth. iii. 2, 7*), βούλησις δ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων, οἷον ἀθανασίας, *wish may refer to impossibilities, as that we may live for ever*; but this very wish would require the optative. So no amount of reasonableness in a present or past wish can make the imperfect or aorist indicative improper; for we may wish that the most reasonable thing were or had been ours, only such wishing implies that we do not or did not have it.

CHAPTER V.

THE INFINITIVE.

741. The infinitive is originally a verbal noun, expressing the simple idea of the verb. As a verb, it has voices and tenses; it has a subject (expressed or understood), which may define its number and person; it may have an object and other adjuncts; and, further, it is qualified by adverbs, and not by adjectives. It may have *ἄν* in a potential sense. It thus expresses the verbal idea with much greater definiteness than the corresponding substantives; compare, for example, *πράττειν* and *πράξαι* with *πράξις*, as expressions of the idea of *doing*.

742. The origin of the infinitive in a verbal noun is beyond question. In the oldest Sanskrit certain verbal nouns in the dative express purpose, that is, the object *to* or *for* which something is done, and are almost identical in form with the equivalent infinitives in the older Greek. Thus *vidmāne*, dative of *vidman*, knowledge (from root *vid*), may mean *for knowing* or *in order to know* (old English *for to know*); and in Homer we have *Ἰδμεναι* (= Attic *ιδεῖν*) from the same root *Ἰδ*. So Sanskrit *dāvāne*, dative of *dāvan*, giving (from root *da*), is represented in Greek by the Cyprian *δόFeναι* (= Attic *δοῦναι*) from root *δο*.¹ It is safe to assume, therefore, that the Greek infinitive was originally developed in a similar way, chiefly from the dative of a primitive verbal noun; that in the growth of the language this case-form became obscured, its origin as a dative was forgotten, and it

¹ Whitney (*Sanskrit Grammar*, p. 314) says of these primitive Sanskrit datives: "It is impossible to draw any fixed line between the uses classed as infinitive and the ordinary case-uses." See Delbrück, *Synt. Forsch.* iv. p. 121; and Monro, *Hom. Gr.* p. 163.

came to be used for other cases of the verbal noun, especially the accusative; that it was allowed to take an object, like the corresponding verb, and afterwards a subject (in the accusative) to make the agent more distinct; that in course of time, as its relation to the verb became closer, it developed tenses like those of the verb, so as to appear as a regular mood of the verb. The final step, taken when the use of the definite article was established, was to allow the half-noun and half-verb to have the article and so be declined like a noun in four cases, while it still retained its character as a verb. This last step was taken after Homer; but the earlier stages were already passed, more or less decidedly, before the Homeric period, so that they cannot be traced historically. Thus, although the infinitive in Homer retained some of its uses as a dative more distinctly than the later infinitive, it is hardly possible that those who used the Homeric language retained any consciousness of the original dative; for the infinitive was already established as an accusative and a nominative, it had formed its various tenses to express present, past, and future time, and it could even be used with *ἄν* (683). Indeed, the condition in which the infinitive appears in indirect discourse in Homer seems utterly inconsistent with any conscious survival of its force as a dative (see examples in 683).

743. The later addition of the article enlarged the uses of the infinitive and extended it to new constructions, especially to the use with prepositions. It thus gained a new power of taking adjuncts, not merely single words, but whole dependent clauses. (See examples in 806.) In all the constructions which were developed before the article came into use with the infinitive, as when it is the subject or the object of a verb, or follows adjectives or nouns, the infinitive continued to be used regularly without the article, although even in these constructions the article might be added to emphasise the infinitive more especially as a noun, or to enable it to carry adjuncts which would otherwise be cumbersome; in other words, all constructions in which the original force of the noun had become obscured or forgotten before the article began to be used generally remained in their original form. On the other hand, newer expressions, in which the infinitive was distinctly felt as a noun in the structure of the sentence, generally added the article to designate the case.

744. The subject of the infinitive, if expressed, is in the accusative. The most indefinite infinitive, so far as it is a verb, must at least have a subject implied; but as the infinitive has no person or number in itself, its subject can remain more obscure than that of a finite verb. Thus *καλόν ἐστιν ἀποθανεῖν*, *it is*

glorious to die, may imply a subject in any number or person, according to the context, while ἀποθνήσκεις or ἀπέθανε is restricted to *thou* or *he* as its subject. Still, in the former case, ἀποθανεῖν must have an implied subject in the accusative; and if this is not pointed out by the context, we can supply τινά or τινάς, as sometimes appears when a predicate word agrees with the omitted subject, as in φιλάνθρωπον εἶναι δεῖ (sc. τινά), *one must be humane*, ISOC. ii. 15, and δρώντας ἥδιον θανεῖν (sc. τινάς), *it is sweeter to die acting*, EUR. Hel. 814. The infinitive of indirect discourse, which seems to have been developed originally by the Greek language, must always refer to a definite subject, as it represents a finite verb in a definite mood, tense, number, and person. Other infinitives, both with and without the article, may have a subject whenever the sense demands it, although sometimes the meaning of the leading verb makes it impossible to express an independent subject, as in πειράται μαθάνειν, *he tries to learn*. In general, when the subject of the infinitive is the same as the subject or object of the leading verb, or when it has been clearly expressed elsewhere in the sentence, it is not repeated with the infinitive.¹

A. INFINITIVE WITHOUT THE ARTICLE

Infinitive as Subject, Predicate, or Appositive.

745. The infinitive may be the subject nominative of a finite verb, or the subject accusative of another infinitive. It is especially common as subject of an impersonal verb or of ἔστί. It may also be a predicate nominative or accusative, and it may stand in apposition to a noun in the nominative or accusative. *E.g.*

Συνέβη αὐτῷ ἐλθεῖν, *it happened to him to go*. Οὐκ ἔνεστι τοῦτο ποιῆσαι, *it is not possible to do this*. Ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τοῦτο ποιῆσαι. Ἐξῆν αὐτῷ μένειν, *he might have remained* (i.e. *to remain was possible for him*). Δεῖ μένειν. Οὐ μὴν γάρ τι κακὸν βασιλευμένον, *for it*

¹ A few exceptional cases are quoted by Birklein (p. 93) in which the infinitive with the article appears to have a subjective genitive, like an ordinary verbal noun, instead of a subject accusative. These are γιγνώσκω τὰς τούτων ἀπειλὰς οὐχ ἥττον σωφρονίζουσας ἢ ἄλλων τὸ ἥδη κολάζειν, XEN. An. vii. 7, 24; τὸ εὖ φρονεῖν αὐτῶν μμεῖσθε, DEM. xix. 269; and εἰ τῆς πόλεως τέθνηκε τὸ τοῖς ἀδικούντας μισεῖν, Ib. 289. In the first case the parallelism between τούτων and ἄλλων caused the anomaly; in the second, αὐτῶν has a partitive force, as if it were τοῦτο αὐτῶν μμεῖσθε; and in the third, πόλεως is separated from the infinitive by the verb, and the idea is *whether the hatred of evil-doers has died out* (i.e. *disappeared from*) the state. In none of these cases would a subject accusative be the exact equivalent of the genitive. For undoubted examples in later Greek, see *Trans. of Am. Phil. Assoc. for 1877*, p. 7.

is no bad thing to be a king. *Od.* i. 392. Ἀεὶ γὰρ ἡβῶ τοῖς γέρονσιν εἰ μαθεῖν. *AESCH.* *Ag.* 584. Πολὺ γὰρ ῥῶον ἔχοντας φυλάττειν ἢ κτήσασθαι πάντα πέφυκεν. *DEM.* ii. 26. (Compare i. 23, quoted in 790.) Ἡδὺ πολλοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἔχειν; *Id.* xix. 221. Δοκεῖ οἰκονόμου ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι εἰ οἰκεῖν τὸν ἑαυτοῦ οἶκον. *XEN.* *Oec.* i. 2. Φησὶ δεῖν τοῦτο ποιῆσαι, *he says that it is necessary to do this.* (Here ποιῆσαι as accusative is subject of δεῖν.) Τὸ γινῶναι ἐπιστήμην πον λαβεῖν ἐστίν, *to learn is to acquire knowledge* (pred. nom.). *PLAT.* *Theaet.* 209 E. Ξυνέβη τοὺς Ἀθηναίους θορυβηθῆναι, *it chanced that the Athenians fell into confusion.* *THUC.* v. 10. Οὐ φάσκων ἀνεκτον εἶναι ξυγκεῖσθαι κρατεῖν βασιλέα τῶν πόλεων. *Id.* viii. 52. (Here κρατεῖν βασιλέα τῶν πόλεων is subject of ξυγκεῖσθαι, which is subject of εἶναι, the whole being object of φάσκων.) Εἰς οἰωνὸς ἀριστος, ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης, *one omen is best, to fight for our country.* *IL.* xii. 243.

For the subject infinitive in indirect discourse, see 751.

Infinitive as Object.

746. The infinitive may be the object of a verb, generally appearing as the accusative of the direct object, sometimes as the accusative of kindred meaning. Here belong (1) the infinitive after verbs of *wishing, commanding*, and the like (*not* in indirect discourse), and (2) the infinitive in indirect discourse as the object of verbs of *saying* and *thinking*.

For the infinitive in indirect discourse, see 751.

Object Infinitive not in Indirect Discourse.

747. The verbs which take the ordinary object infinitive are in general the same in Greek as in English. Any verb whose action directly implies another action or state as its object, if this object is to be expressed by a verb and not by a noun, may take the infinitive.

Such are verbs signifying to *wish, ask, advise, entreat, exhort, command, persuade, compel, teach, learn, accustom, cause, intend, begin, attempt, effect, permit, decide, dare, prefer, choose*; those expressing *willingness, unwillingness, eagerness, caution, neglect, danger, postponement, forbidding, hindrance, escape, etc.*; and all implying *ability, fitness, desert, qualification, sufficiency, necessity, or their opposites.* *E.g.*

Διδάσκουσιν αὐτὸν βάλλειν, *they teach him to shoot.* Ἔμαθον τοῦτο ποιεῖσαι, *they learned to do this.* Βούλεται ἐλθεῖν. *Παραينوῦμέν σοι*

πείθεσθαι. Αἰροῦνται πολεμεῖν. Ἡ πόλις κινδυνεύει διαφθαρῆναι, *the city is in danger of being destroyed*. Δύναται ἀπελθεῖν. Τοῖς ξυμμάχοις ἔφραζον ἵνα ἔσθαι ἐς τὸν Ἴσθμόν, *they told the allies to go to the Isthmus*. THUC. iii. 15. Δέομαι ὑμῶν συγγνώμην μοι ἔχειν. Εἶπε στρατηγὸς ἐλθεῖν, *he proposed to choose generals*. Ἀπαγορεύουσιν αὐτοῖς μὴ τοῦτο ποιῆσαι, *they forbid them to do this* (815, 1). Τί κωλύσει αὐτὸν βαδίζειν ὅποι βούλεται; *what will prevent him from marching whither he pleases?* Ἀξιώ λαμβάνειν τοῦτο, *I claim the right to take this*. Ἀξιοῦται θανεῖν, *he is thought to deserve death*. Οὐ πέφυκε δουλεύειν, *he is not born to be a slave*. Ἀναβάλλεται τοῦτο ποιεῖν, *he postpones doing this*.

Λαοὺς δ' Ἀτρεΐδης ἀπολυμαίνεσθαι ἄνωγεν, *and the son of Atreus ordered the hosts to purify themselves*. II. i. 313. Βούλομαι ἐγὼ λαὸν σὸν ἔμμεναι ἢ ἀπολέσθαι, *I wish that the people may be safe, rather than that they perish*. II. i. 117. Ἐπειθεν αὐτὸν πορεύεσθαι. XEN. AN. vi. 2, 13. Ἐδοξε πλεῖν τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην, *it was decided that Alcibiades should sail*. THUC. vi. 29. Φυλακὴν εἶχε μήτ' ἐκπλεῖν μηδὲνα μήτ' ἐσπλεῖν, *he kept guard against any one's sailing out or in* (815, 1). Id. ii. 69. Τί δὴτα μέλλεις μὴ οὐ γεγωνίσκειν τὸ πᾶν; *why do you hesitate to speak out the whole?* AESCH. Prom. 627.

This use of the infinitive is too familiar to need more illustration. The tenses commonly used are the present and aorist (87), for examples of which see 96; for the perfect see 109 and 110; for the exceptional future see 113; and for the infinitive with ἄν (seldom used in this construction) see 211. For μή and μὴ οὐ with the infinitive (as used above) see 815-817.

748. The poets, especially Homer, allow an infinitive after many verbs which commonly do not take this construction. The meaning of the verb, however, makes the sense clear. *E.g.*

Ὀδύρονται οἰκόνδε νέεσθαι, *they mourn (i.e. long) to go home*. II. ii. 290. Ἐπενθήμησαν Ἀχαιοὶ αἰδεῖσθαι ἱερά, *the Achaeans shouted with applause, (commanding) that they should reverence the priest*. II. i. 22. Ὅφρα τις ἐρρίγησι κακὰ ρέξαι, *that one may shudder (dread) to do evil*. II. iii. 353. Ἐκτορα μέναι μοῖρα πέδισεν, *Fate bound (fettered) Hector to remain*. II. xxii. 5.

For the infinitive of direct object after verbs of fearing and caution, see 373. For the infinitive (not in indirect discourse) after χράω and other verbs meaning *to give an oracle*, see 98.

749. When a noun and a verb (especially ἐστί) form an expression which is equivalent to any of the verbs above mentioned (747), they may take the infinitive. Some other expressions with a similar force may have the infinitive. *E.g.*

Ἀνάγκη ἐστὶ πάντας ἀπελθεῖν. Κίνδυνος ἦν αὐτῷ παθεῖν τι. Ὁκνος ἐστὶ μοι τοῦτο ποιῆσαι. Φόβος ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ἐλθεῖν. Οὐ μάντις εἰμὶ τάφαν' γινῶναι, *I am not enough of a prophet to decide, etc.* EUR. Hipp. 346. (Here ability is implied in μάντις εἰμὶ.) Ἀμαξία ἐν

αὐταῖς ἦν, κώλυμα οὖσα (τὰς πύλας) προσθεῖναι, *a wagon, which prevented them from shutting the gates.* THUC. iv. 67. So ἐπεγένετο δὲ ἄλλοις τε ἄλλοθι κωλύματα μὴ αὐξήθῃναι, *obstacles to their increase.* Id. i. 16. (See 815, 1.) Τοῖς στρατιώταις ὁρμὴ ἐνέπεσε ἐκτειχίσαι τὸ χωρίον. Id. iv. 4. Τὸ ἀσφαλὲς καὶ μένειν καὶ ἀπελθεῖν αἱ νῆες παρέξουσιν, *safety both to remain and to depart.* Id. vi. 18. Ἐχοντα τιθασεύσθαι φύσιν, *capable by nature of being tamed* (= πεφυκότα τιθασεύσθαι). PLAT. Polit. 264 A. Τίς μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχὶ πάντα καταναλωθῇναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι; i.e. *how can it be effected that all things shall not be destroyed in death?* Id. Phaed. 72 D. (See 815, 2.) Δέδοικα μὴ πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ εἰς ἀνάγκην ἔλθωμεν ποιεῖν, *lest we may come to the necessity of doing.* DEM. i. 15. "Ὡρα ἀπιέναι, *it is time to go away* (like χρὴ ἀπιέναι, *we must go away*). PLAT. Ap. 42 A. Ἐλπιδὺς ἔχει τοῦτο ποιῆσαι (= ἐλπίζει τοῦτο ποιῆσαι), *he hopes to do this.* But ἐλπίς τοῦ ἐλεῖν, THUC. ii. 56 (798). Οἱ δὲ ζῶντες αἴτιοι θανεῖν, *and the living are those who caused them to die.* SOPH. Ant. 1173. We might also have αἴτιοι τοῦ τούτους θανεῖν or αἴτιοι τὸ τούτους θανεῖν. (See 101.) So in phrases like πολλοῦ (or μικροῦ) δέω ποιεῖν τι, *I want much (or little) of doing anything*; παρὰ μικρὸν ἦλθον ποιεῖν τι, *they came within a little of doing anything*; where the idea of *ability, inability, or sufficiency* appears: so in THUC. vii. 70, βραχὺ γὰρ ἀπέλιπον διακόσαι γενέσθαι. So ἐμποδὼν τούτῳ ἐστὶν ἐλθεῖν (= κωλύει τοῦτον ἐλθεῖν), *it prevents him from going*; where τοῦ ἐλθεῖν may be used (807).

The infinitive depending on a noun is generally an *adnominal* genitive with the article τοῦ. See the examples above, and 798.

750. In laws, treaties, proclamations, and formal commands, the infinitive is often used in the leading sentences, depending on some word like *ἔδοξε*, *it is enacted*, or *κελεύεται*, *it is commanded*; which may be either expressed in a preceding sentence or understood. *E.g.*

Ταμίαι δὲ τῶν ἱερῶν χρημάτων αἰρεῖσθαι μὲν ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμωμάτων τὴν δὲ αἵρεσιν τούτων καὶ τὴν δοκιμασίαν γίγνεσθαι καθάπερ ἡ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐγίγνετο, *and (it is enacted) that treasurers of the sacred funds be chosen, etc.* PLAT. Leg. 759 E. So in most of the laws (genuine or spurious) standing as quotations in the text of the orators, as in DEM. xxiii. 22: *δικάζειν δὲ τὴν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ φόνον καὶ τραύματος ἐκ προνοίας, κ.τ.λ.* See AR. Av. 1661. Ἐτη δὲ εἶναι τὰς σπονδὰς πεντήκοντα, *and that the treaty shall continue fifty years.* THUC. v. 18. Ἀκούετε λεγὲ τοὺς ὀπλίτας νυνμὲν ἀνελομένους θῶπλ' ἀπιέναι πάλιν οἴκαδε. AR. Av. 448.

Infinitive in Indirect Discourse.

751. The infinitive in indirect discourse is generally the object of a verb of *saying* or *thinking* or some equivalent expression. It may also be the subject of a passive verb of this class

(as λέγεται), or of such a verb as φαίνεται, *it appears*, or δοκεῖ, *it seems* (see 754). Here each tense of the infinitive represents the corresponding tense of the indicative (with or without ἄν) or the optative (with ἄν). (See 664, 2.)

For examples see 683 and 689. For the various tenses of the infinitive with ἄν, representing the indicative or optative with ἄν, see 204-210.

752. Verbs of *hoping, expecting, promising, swearing*, and a few others of like meaning, form an intermediate class between this construction and that of 747. For examples of the infinitive (in both constructions) after these verbs, see 136.

753. 1. Of the three common verbs signifying *to say*, φημί is regularly followed by the infinitive in indirect discourse, εἶπον by ὅτι or ὡς and the indicative or optative, while λέγω allows either construction. The active voice of λέγω, however, generally has ὅτι or ὡς.

2. Exceptional cases of ὅτι or ὡς after φημί are very rare and strange: one occurs in Lys. vii. 19, ὅς φησιν ὡς ἐγὼ μὲν παρειστήκειν οἱ δ' οἰκέται ἐξέτενον τὰ πρέμνα. See also XEN. Hell. vi. 3, 7, and PLAT. Gorg. 487 D (where a clause with ὅτι precedes φῆς).

3. Cases of εἶπον with the infinitive of indirect discourse are less rare, but always exceptional. See Il. xxiv. 113, xviii. 9, quoted in 683; Hdt. ii. 30; THUC. vii. 35; PLAT. Gorg. 473 A, εἶπον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικέσθαι κάκιον εἶναι. A remarkable case of οὐ μὴ with the infinitive after εἶπε occurs in EUR. Phoen. 1590 (quoted in 296). Εἶπον and the active voice of λέγω take the infinitive chiefly as verbs of *commanding* (747).

754. After many verbs of this class in the passive both a personal and an impersonal construction are allowed: thus, we can say λέγεται ὁ Κύρος ἐλθεῖν, *Cyrus is said to have gone*, or λέγεται τὸν Κύρον ἐλθεῖν, *it is said that Cyrus went*. Δοκέω in the meaning *I seem* (*videor*) usually has the *personal* construction, as in English; as οὗτος δοκεῖ εἶναι, *he seems to be*. When an infinitive with ἄν follows a personal verb like δοκέω, this must be translated by an impersonal construction, to suit the English idiom: thus, δοκεῖ τις ἄν ἔχειν τοῦτο must be translated *it seems that some one would have this*, although τις is the subject of δοκεῖ, since we cannot use *would* with our infinitive to translate ἔχειν ἄν.

755. When an indirect quotation has been introduced by an infinitive, a dependent relative or temporal clause sometimes takes the infinitive by assimilation, where we should expect an indicative or optative. The temporal particles ὡς, ὅτε, ἐπεὶ, ἐπειδὴ, as well as the relative pronouns, are used in this construction. Herodotus uses even εἰ, ἵφ, and διότι, *because*, in the same way. *E.g.*

Μετὰ δὲ, ὡς οὐ παύεσθαι, ἅκεα διζήσθαι (λέγονσι), and afterwards, when it did not cease, they say that they sought for remedies. HDT. i. 94. (Here we should expect ὡς οὐκ ἐπαύετο.) Ὡς δ' ἀκούσαι τοὺς παρόντας, θόρυβον γενέσθαι (φασίν), they say that, when those present heard it, there was a tumult. DEM. xix. 195. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ γενέσθαι ἐπὶ τῇ οἰκίᾳ τῇ Ἀγάθωνος, (ἔφη) ἀνεφγμένην καταλαμβάνειν τὴν θύραν. PLAT. Symp. 174 D. Ἐφῇ δὲ, ἐπειδὴ οὐ ἐκβῆναι τὴν ψυχὴν, πορεύεσθαι. Id. Rep. 614 B. So ὡς φαίνεσθαι, as it appeared, 359 D. Λέγεται Ἀλκμαίωνι, ὅτε δὴ ἀλῶσθαι αὐτὸν, τὸν Ἀπόλλω ταύτην τὴν γῆν χρῆσαι οἰκεῖν. THUC. ii. 102. Καὶ ὅσα αὖ μετ' ἐκείνων βουλευέσθαι, οὐδενὸς ὕστερον γνώμῃ φανῆναι (ἔφασαν). Id. i. 91. (Here ἐβουλευόντο would be the common form.) Ἡγουμένης δὲ ἀληθείας οὐκ ἂν ποτε φαίμεν αὐτῇ χορὸν κακῶν ἀκολουθήσας, ἀλλ' ὑγίης τε καὶ δίκαιον ἦθος, ᾧ καὶ σωφροσύνην ἔπεσθαι. PLAT. Rep. 490 C. Εἰ γὰρ δὴ δεῖν πάντως περιθεῖναι ἄλλῃ τέφ τὴν βασιλὴν, (ἔφη) δικαιότερον εἶναι Μῆδων τέφ περιβαλεῖν τοῦτο, for if he was bound (= εἰ ἔδει) to give the kingdom to any other, etc. HDT. i. 129. Εἰ ὦν εἶναι τῷ θεῷ τοῦτο μὴ φίλον, if this were (= εἰ ἦν) not pleasing to God. Id. ii. 64. So iii. 108 (εἰ μὴ γίνεσθαι = εἰ μὴ ἐγίνετο, had there not occurred); vii. 229 (εἰ ἀπονοστήσαι, if he had returned); ii. 172 (εἰ εἶναι, if he was); iii. 105 (εἰ μὴ προλαμβάνειν = εἰ μὴ προλαμβάνοιμεν). Τιμᾶν δὲ Σαμίους ἔφη, διότι ταφῆναι οἱ τὸν πάππον δημοσίῃ ὑπὸ Σαμίων. Id. iii. 55.

756. In some cases, particularly when the provisions of a law are quoted, a relative is used with the infinitive, even when no infinitive precedes. *E.g.*

*Ἔθηκεν ἐφ' οἷς ἐξεῖναι ἀποκτινύναι, he enacted on what conditions it is allowed to kill. DEM. xx. 158. Καὶ διὰ ταῦτα, ἂν τις ἀποκτείνῃ τινα, τὴν βουλὴν δικάζειν ἔγραψε, καὶ οὐχ ἅπερ, ἂν ἄλλῃ, εἶναι, and he did not enact what should be done if he should be convicted. Id. xxiii. 26. (Here εἶναι, the reading of Cod. Σ, is amply defended by the preceding example, in which all allow ἐξεῖναι.) Δέκα γὰρ ἄνδρας προσείλοντο αὐτῷ ξυμβούλους, ἄνευ ὧν μὴ κύριον εἶναι ἀπάγειν στρατιὰν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως. THUC. v. 63.

757. In narration, the infinitive often appears to stand for the indicative. It depends, however, on some word like λέγεται, it is said, expressed (or at least implied) in something that precedes. *E.g.*

Ἀπικομένους δὲ τοὺς Φοίνικας ἐς δὴ τὸ Ἄργος τοῦτο, διατίθεσθαι τὸν φόρτον, and (they say) that the Phoenicians, when now they had come to this Argos, were setting out their cargo for sale. HDT. i. 1. (Here διατίθεσθαι is imperfect.) "Ἄλλ', ᾧ παῖ," φάναι τὸν Ἀστυάγην, "οὐκ ἀχθόμενοι ταῦτα περιπλανώμεθα." "Ἀλλὰ καὶ σέ," φάναι τὸν Κύρον, "ὀρῶ," κ.τ.λ. Καὶ τὸν Ἀστυάγην ἐπερέσθαι, "καὶ τίνι δὴ σὺ τεκμαίρομενος λέγεις;" "Ὅτι σέ," φάναι, "ὀρῶ," κ.τ.λ. Πρὸς ταῦτα δὲ τὸν Ἀστυάγην εἰπεῖν, κ.τ.λ. Καὶ τὸν Κύρον εἰπεῖν, κ.τ.λ. XEN. Cyr. i. 3, 5 and 6. (Here all these infinitives, and twelve

others which follow, depend on λέγεται in § 4.) Καὶ τὸν κελεύσαι δοῦναι, and he commanded him to give it. Id. i. 3, 9. So in HDT. i. 24 the story of Arion and the dolphin is told in this construction, the infinitives all depending on λέγονσι at the beginning.

Infinitive after Adjectives, Adverbs, and Nouns.

758. The infinitive may depend on adjectives denoting *ability, fitness, desert, qualification, sufficiency, readiness*, and their *opposites*; and, in general, those expressing the same relations as the verbs which govern the infinitive (747). The omitted subject of the infinitive is the same as the substantive to which the adjective belongs. *E.g.*

Δυνατὸς ποιεῖν, *able to do*. Δεινὸς λέγειν, *skilled in speaking*. "Ἀξίος ἐστὶ ταῦτα λαβεῖν, *he deserves to receive this*. "Ἀξιος τιμᾶσθαι, *worthy to be honoured*. Οὐχ οἷός τε ἦν τοῦτο ἰδεῖν, *he was not able to see this*. Πρόθυμος λέγειν, *eager to speak*. "Ετοιμος κίνδυνον ὑπομένειν, *ready to endure danger*.

Θεμιστοκλέα, ἱκανώτατον εἰπεῖν καὶ γινῶναι καὶ πρᾶξαι. LYS. ii. 42. Αἱ γὰρ εὐπραξίαι δεῖναι συγκρύνθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐκ εἶδον. DEM. ii. 20. Κυρίαν ἐποίησαν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς εὐταξίας, *they gave it (the Areopagus) power to superintend good order*. ISOC. vii. 39. Βίην δὲ ἀδύνατοι ἦσαν προσφέρειν. HDT. iii. 138. Μαλακοὶ καρτερεῖν, *too effeminate to endure*. PLAT. REP. 556 B. Ταπεινὴ ὕμῶν ἡ διάνοια ἐγκαρτερεῖν ἃ ἔγνωτε, *your minds are too dejected to persevere*, etc. THUC. ii. 61. (In the last two examples, μαλακοὶ and ταπεινὴ govern the infinitive by the idea of *inability* implied in them.) Χρήματα πορίζειν εὐπορώτατον γυνή. AR. ECL. 236. Σοφώτεροι δὲ συμφορὰς τὰς τῶν πέλας πάντες διαθρεῖν ἢ τύχας τὰς οἰκοθεν. EUR. FR. 103. Ἐπιστήμων λέγειν τε καὶ σιγᾶν. PLAT. PHAEDR. 276 A. Τᾶλλα εὐρήσεις ὑποπυρεῖν ὄντας ἡμᾶς οὐ κακοὺς. AR. PAC. 430.

For examples of nouns followed by the infinitive in a similar sense, see 749. (See also 766.)

759. The infinitive after τοιοῦτος οἷος and τοσοῦτος ὅσος depends on the idea of *ability, fitness, or sufficiency* which is expressed in these combinations. The antecedent may be omitted, leaving οἷος with the infinitive in the sense of *able, fit, likely*, and ὅσος in that of *sufficient*. *E.g.*

Τοιοῦτοι οἷοι πονηροῦ τινος ἔργου ἐφίεσθαι, *capable of aiming at any vicious act*. XEN. CYP. i. 2, 3. Τοιαύτας οἷας χειμῶνός τε στέγειν καὶ θέρους ἱκανὸς εἶναι. PLAT. REP. 415 E. "Εφθασε τοσοῦτον ὅσον Πάχητα ἀνεγνωκέναι τὸ ψήφισμα, *it came enough in advance (of the other ship) for Paches to have already read the decree* (the fact that he had read it is inferred, but not expressed: see 584). THUC. iii. 49.

Εἶπεν ὡς ἐγὼ εἰμι οἷος αἰεὶ ποτε μεταβάλλεσθαι, *that I am (such)*

a man (as) to be always changing. XEN. Hell. ii. 3, 45. Οὐ γὰρ ἦν ὥρα οἷα τὸ πεδίον ἄρδεν, for it was not the proper season to irrigate the land. Id. An. ii. 3, 13. Νεμόμενοι τὰ αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι ὅσον ἀποζῆν, each cultivating their own land enough (to an extent sufficient) to live upon it. THUC. i. 2. Ἐλείπετο τῆς νυκτὸς ὅσον σκοταίους διελθεῖν τὸ πεδίον, there was left enough of the night for crossing the plain in the dark. XEN. An. iv. 1, 5.

This construction suggests at once the analogous use of οὕτως ὥστε or ὥστε alone, in the sense of so as, with the infinitive (see 593). Here, as with ὥστε, the subject of the infinitive is not restricted as it is in 758.

760. In Homer, the pronominal adjectives τοῖος, τοιοῦτος, τοιοῦτος, τόσος, τηλίκος, and ποῖος, without a relative, sometimes take an infinitive in the same way (759); as ἡμεῖς δ' οὐ νύ τι τοιοῖο ἀμυνόμεν, but we are not able to keep it off, Od. ii. 60; ποιοῖοι κ' εἴτ' Ὀδυσσῆι ἀμυνόμεν; Od. xxi. 195. See also Il. vi. 463; Od. iii. 205, vii. 309, xviii. 20.

761. Certain impersonal verbs (like ἔνεστι, πρέπει, προσήκει), which regularly take an infinitive as their subject (745), are used in the participle in a personal sense with the infinitive, the participle having the force of one of the adjectives of 758. Thus τὰ ἐνόντα εἰπεῖν is equivalent to ἃ ἔνεστι εἰπεῖν, what it is permitted to say; τὰ προσήκοντα ῥηθῆναι is equivalent to ἃ προσήκει ῥηθῆναι, what is proper to be said, as if it represented a personal construction like ταῦτα προσήκει ῥηθῆναι, these things are becoming to be said. E.g.

Κατιδὼν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐνόντων εἰπεῖν, seeing the number of things that may be said. ISOC. v. 110. Τὸν θεὸν καλεῖ οὐδὲν προσήκοντ' ἐν γούσι παραστατεῖν, she is calling on the God who ought not to be present at lamentations. AESCH. Ag. 1079. (Προσήκοντα is used like adjectives meaning fit, proper.) Φράζ', ἐπεὶ πρέπων ἔφυσ πρὸ τῶνδε φωνεῖν. SOPH. O. T. 9. So τὰ ἡμῖν παραγγελθέντα διεξελεθεῖν (= ἃ παραγγέλθη ἡμῖν διεξελεθεῖν). PLAT. Tim. 90 E.

762. In the same way (761) certain adjectives, like δίκαιος, ἐπικαίριος, ἐπιτήδειος, ἐπίδοξος, may be used personally with the infinitive; as δίκαιός ἐστι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, it is right for him to do this (equivalent to δίκαιόν ἐστιν αὐτὸν τοῦτο ποιεῖν). E.g.

Φημὶ πολλῶ μείζονων ἔτι τούτων δωρεῶν δίκαιος εἶναι τυγχάνειν, I say that I have a right to receive even far greater rewards than these. DEM. xviii. 53. Ἐδόκουν ἐπιτήδαιοι εἶναι ὑπεξαίρεθῆναι, they seemed to be convenient persons to be disposed of. THUC. viii. 70. Θεραπεύεσθαι ἐπικαίριοι, important persons to be taken care of. XEN. Cyr. viii. 2, 25. Τάδε τοι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐπίδοξα γενέσθαι, it is to be expected that this will result from it. HDT. i. 89. Πολλοὶ ἐπίδοξοι τῷτὸ τοῦτο πείσεσθαι εἰσι, it is to be expected that many will suffer this same thing. Id. vi. 12 (for the future infinitive see 113).

763. Any adjective may take an infinitive to limit its

meaning to a particular action; as αἰσχρὸν ὁρᾶν, *disgraceful to look upon*. The infinitive is here regularly active or middle, even when the passive would seem more natural. The omitted subject of the infinitive (except when it is passive) is distinct from that of the adjective. *E.g.*

Αἰσχρὸν γὰρ τὸδε γ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἐσομένοις πυνθέσθαι, *for this is disgraceful even for future men to hear*. II. ii. 119. So II. i. 107 and 589. Τοὺς γὰρ ὑπὲρ τούτων λόγους ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀναγκασιότατους προεῖπέν ἡγοῦμαι, ὑμῖν δὲ χρησιμωτάτους ἀκοῦσαι, *i.e. most necessary for me to speak, and most useful for you to hear*. DEM. xxi. 24. Φοβερὸν προσπολεμῆσαι, *a terrible man to fight against*. Id. ii. 22. (Οἰκία) ἡδίστη ἐνδιαίτῃσθαι, *a house most pleasant to live in*. XEN. Mem. iii. 8, 8. Χαλεπώτατα εὑρεῖν, *hardest to find*: ῥῆστα ἐντυγχάνειν, *easiest to obtain*. Ib. i. 6, 9. (Πολιτεία) χαλεπὴ συζῆν, *a form of government hard to live under*: ἄνομος δὲ (μοναρχία) χαλεπὴ καὶ βαρυντάτῃ ξυνοικῆσαι. PLAT. Polit. 302 B and E. Λόγος δυνατὸς κατανοῆσθαι, *a speech capable of being understood (which it is possible to understand)*. Id. Phaed. 90 D. Ὁ χρόνος βραχὺς ἀξίως διηγῆσθαι, *the time is too short for narrating it properly*. Id. Menex. 239 B. Ἡ ὁδὸς ἐπιτηδεύα πορευομένοις καὶ λέγειν καὶ ἀκούειν, *convenient both for speaking and for hearing*. Id. Symp. 173 B. Πότερον δὲ λούσασθαι ψυχρότερον; *which of the two (waters) is colder for bathing?* XEN. Mem. iii. 13, 3.

(Passive.) (Κόνες) αἰσχροὶ ὁρᾶσθαι (instead of ὁρᾶν). Id. Cyn. iii. 3. Ἔστι δ' ὁ λόγος φιλαπεχθήμων μὲν, ῥηθῆναι δ' οὐκ ἀσύμφορος. ISOC. xv. 115.

The infinitive with adjectives (here and in 758) shows distinct traces of its origin as a dative, though this origin was already forgotten. See 742 (end) and 767.

764. (a) The infinitive after the comparative with ἢ depends on the idea of *ability* or *inability* implied in the expression. *E.g.*

Τὸ γὰρ νόσημα μείζον ἢ φέρειν, *for the disease is too heavy to bear*. SOPH. O. T. 1293. (See 763, above.) Ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις ἀσθενεστέρα ἢ λαβεῖν τέχνην ὧν ἂν ᾖ ἄπειρος, *human nature is too weak to acquire the art of those things of which it has no experience*. PLAT. Theaet. 149 C. (See 758.)

(b) Ὡστε or ὥς is sometimes expressed before this infinitive; as in XEN. Hell. iv. 8, 23, ἦσθοντο αὐτὸν ἐλάττω ἔχοντα δύναμιν ἢ ὥστε τοὺς φίλους ὠφελεῖν, and Cyr. vi. 4, 17, τὰς ἀσπίδας μείζους ἔχουσιν ἢ ὥς ποιεῖν τι καὶ ὁρᾶν. (See 588.)

765. The infinitive may be used after adverbs which correspond to the adjectives of 763. *E.g.*

Συνεβουλευέτο αὐτῷ πῶς ἂν τοῖς μὲν εὖνοις κάλλιστα ἰδεῖν ποιοῖτο τὴν ἐξέλασιν, τοῖς δὲ δυσμενέσι φοβερῶτατα, *he took counsel with him how he might proceed forth in a manner most splendid for the friendly to behold, and most terrible for the indisposed*. XEN. Cyr. viii. 3, 5.

766. Certain nouns, which correspond in meaning to adjectives which take the infinitive as in 763, may themselves have the same construction. *E.g.*

Θαῦμα ιδέσθαι, *a wonderful thing to behold* (like θαυμαστὸν ιδέσθαι). *Od.* viii. 366. See the examples under 749.

767. In Homer, verbs expressing *excellence* or *fitness* sometimes take a limiting infinitive, like adjectives of similar meaning. *E.g.*

"Εκτορος ἦδε γυνή, ὃς ἀριστεύσκε μάχεσθαι, *this is the wife of Hector, who was the first (= ἀριστος ἦν) in fighting.* *Il.* vi. 460. Ὀμηλικήν ἐκέκαστο ὄρνιθας γινῶναι καὶ ἀναίσιμα μνθῆσασθαι, *he excelled all of his age in knowledge of birds and in declaring fate.* *Od.* ii. 158. Οἱ περὶ μὲν βουλὴν Δαναῶν, περὶ δ' ἔστέ μάχεσθαι, *ye who excel the Danai in counsel and excel them in battle.* *Il.* i. 258. (Here βουλὴν shows that μάχεσθαι was already felt as a limiting accusative, notwithstanding its primitive force as a dative. See 763, and 742, end.)

768. Even in Attic Greek a limiting infinitive, like the Homeric infinitive just mentioned (767), is sometimes found. Especially ἀκούειν, ἀκούσαι, *in sound*, and ὁρᾶν, ιδεῖν, *in appearance*, are used in this way. *E.g.*

Δοκεῖς οὖν τι διαφέρειν αὐτοὺς ιδεῖν χαλκῶς φαλακροῦ καὶ σμικροῦ; *do you think that they differ at all in appearance from a bald little tinker?* *PLAT. Rep.* 495 E. Ἀκούσαι παγκάλως ἔχει, *it is very fine to hear.* *DEM.* xix. 47. Πράγματα παρέξουσιν (οἱ ἵπποι) ἐπιμέλειεσθαι, *the horses will be troublesome to tend.* *XEN. Cyr.* iv. 5, 46.

769. The Homeric use of ὁμοίος, *equal, like*, with the infinitive belongs here. *E.g.*

Λευκότεροι χιόνος, θείειν δ' ἀνέμοισιν ὁμοίῳ, *(horses) whiter than snow, and like the winds in swiftness* (lit. *to run*). *Il.* x. 437. Οὐ γάρ οἱ τις ὁμοίος ἐπισπένεσθαι ποσὶν ἦεν, ἀνδρῶν τρεσσάντων, *for none was like him for following with his feet when men fled.* *Il.* xiv. 521.

Infinitive of Purpose.

770. The infinitive may express a *purpose*. *E.g.*

Τρώων ἄνδρα ἕκαστον (εἰ) ἐλοίμεθα οἶνοχοεῦειν, *if we should choose every man of the Trojans to be our cup-bearers.* *Il.* ii. 127. Χέρνιβα δ' ἀμφίπολος προχῶν ἐπέχευε φέρουσα, νίψασθαι, *i.e. brought and poured water for washing.* *Od.* i. 136. So *Il.* i. 338, δὸς ἄγειν, and *Il.* 107, 108. Τὴν ἕξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλὴν ἐπέστησαν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς εὐκοσμίας, *i.e. to guard good order.* *ISOC.* vii. 37. Οἱ ἄρχοντες, οὓς ὑμεῖς εἴλεσθε ἄρχειν μου, *the rulers, whom you chose to rule me.* *PLAT. Ap.* 28 E. Δέκα δὲ τῶν νεῶν προῦπεμψαν ἐς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα πλεῦσαι τε καὶ κατασκέψασθαι, καὶ κηρύξαι, κ.τ.λ., *i.e. they sent them to sail and examine, and to proclaim, etc.* *THUC.* vi. 50. Τοὺς ἱππέας παρείχοντο Πελοποννησίοις ἐυστρατεύειν. *Id.* ii. 12. Ξυνέβησαν τοῖς Πιλαταιεῦσι παραδοῦναι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ ὅπλα, *χρήσασθαι*

ὅ τι ἂν βούλωνται, i.e. *to do with them whatever they pleased*. Id. ii. 4. Ἐὶ βουλοίμεθα τῷ ἐπιτρέψαι ἢ παῖδας παιδεῦσαι ἢ χρήματα διασῶσαι, *if we should wish to entrust to any one either children to instruct or money to keep*. XEN. Mem. i. 5, 2. Θεάσασθαι παρὴν τὰς γυναῖκας πιεῖν φεροῦσας, *women bringing (something) to drink*. Id. Hell. vii. 2, 9. Τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν ἄκραν φυλάττειν αὐτοῖς παρέδωκαν, *they delivered the city and the citadel to them to guard*. Ib. iv. 4, 15. "Ὅς γὰρ ἂν ὑμᾶς λάθῃ, τοῦτον ἀφίετε τοῖς θεοῖς κολάζειν. DEM. xix. 71.

Ἡ θύρα ἣ ἐμὴ ἀνέφκτο εἰσιέναι τῷ δεομένῳ τι ἐμοῦ. XEN. Hell. v. 1, 14. Οὐκ εἶχον ἀργύριον ἐπισιτίζεσθαι, *they had no money to buy provisions*. Id. An. vii. 1, 7. Ἀριστάρχῳ ἔδοτε ἡμέραν ἀπολογήσασθαι, i.e. *a day to defend himself in*. Id. Hell. i. 7, 28. Ἐμῶν τόν σοι ἐμμελετᾶν παρέχειν οὐ πάνν δέδοκται, i.e. *to practise on*. PLAT. Phaedr. 228 E. Οἷς ἐνευδαιμονῆσαι τε ὁ βίος ὁμοίως καὶ ἐντελευτῆσαι ξυνεμετρήθη, i.e. *for enjoyment as well as for death*. THUC. ii. 44.

771. Here, as in 763, the infinitive is generally active or middle, even where the passive would seem more natural; as *κτανεῖν ἐμοῖ νιν ἔδοσαν*, *they gave her to me to be killed*. EUR. Tro. 874.

772. (a) The infinitive is thus used in prose chiefly after verbs signifying *to choose* or *appoint*, *to give* or *take*, to express the purpose for which anything is given or taken; and also after those signifying *to send* or *bring*. (See examples in 770.) With the last class the future participle is still more common (840). A final clause after *ἵνα* etc. may also be used in the same sense.

(b) In poetry, the same construction occurs after verbs of *motion*, like *εἶμι*, *ἦκω*, and *βαίνω*; and also after *εἰμί*, *ἔπειμι*, and *πάρεμι* (*to be*, *to be at hand*), expressed or understood. *E.g.*

Ἀλλά τις εἴη εἰπεῖν Ἀτρεΐδῃ Ἀγαμέμνονι, ποιμένι λαῶν, *but let some one go to tell Agamemnon*. Od. xiv. 496. Βῆ δὲ θέειν, *and he started to run*. Il. ii. 183. Οὐδέ τις ἔστιν ἀρὴν καὶ λοιγὸν ἀμύναι, *nor is there any one to keep off curse and ruin*. Il. xxiv. 489. Πολλοὶ δ' αὖ σοὶ Ἀχαιοὶ ἐναιρέμεν ὃν κε δύνῃαι, i.e. *for you to slay whomsoever you can*. Il. vi. 229. Οὐ γὰρ ἔπ' ἀνὴρ οἶος Ὀδυσσεὺς ἔσκεν, ἀρὴν ἀπὸ οἴκου ἀμύναι. Od. ii. 59. Μανθάνειν γὰρ ἤκομεν, *for we are come to learn*. SOPH. O. C. 12.

(c) Even in prose, the infinitive occasionally occurs after *εἰμί* in this sense, as in PLAT. Phaedr. 229 A, ἐκεῖ σκιά τ' ἐστὶ καὶ πόα καθίζεσθαι ἣ ἂν βουλώμεθα κατακλιθῆναι, *there is grass to sit upon*, etc. See also XEN. An. ii. 1, 6, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ πέλται καὶ ἄμαξαι ἦσαν φέρεσθαι ἔρημοι, i.e. *they were left to be carried away*.

773. In Homer and Herodotus *εἶναι* is often introduced to denote a purpose, where in Attic Greek a simple noun, connected directly with the leading verb, would be sufficient. *E.g.*

Θώρηκα, τὸν ποτέ οἱ Κινύρης δῶκε ξεινήμιον εἶναι, i.e. *which they gave him as a present* (lit. *to be a present*). Il. xi. 20. Λίθον εἶλετο

χερὶ παχείῃ, τὸν ῥ' ἄνδρες πρότεροι θέσαν ἔμμεναι οὐρον ἀρούρης, *which former men had placed (to be) as a boundary of the land.* II. xxi. 405. Δαρείος καταστήσας Ἀρταφέρνηα ὑπαρχὸν εἶναι Σαρδίων. Hdt. v. 25. So in the passive construction: Γέλων ἀπεδέχθη πάσης τῆς ἵππου εἶναι ἱππαρχος. Id. vii. 154.

774. Even in Attic prose, this use of εἶναι (773) sometimes occurs; as in DEM. xxix. 25, *μνημονεύουσιν ἀφελόντα τοῦτον ἐλεύθερον εἶναι τότε, they remember his having been then manumitted (so as) to be a free-man.* So ἀφίησιν αὐτὰ δημόσια εἶναι, *he gives them up to be public property,* THUC. ii. 13.

775. The simple infinitive in Homer may express a result as well as a purpose, as ὥστε is seldom used there in the sense of *so as* (589). It thus follows many expressions which would not allow it in Attic Greek. *E.g.*

Τίς τ' ἄρ σφωε θεῶν ἔριδι ξυνέηκε μάχεσθαι; *i.e. who brought them into conflict, so as to contend?* II. i. 8. So i. 151; and ἐριζέμεναι, ii. 214. Ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ κοίλῃ νηὺς ἤχθετο τοῖσι νέεσθαι, *when now their ship was loaded, so as (to be ready) to sail.* Od. xv. 457.

For the infinitive in consecutive sentences with ὥστε or ὥς, and ἐφ' ᾧ or ἐφ' ᾧτε, see 582-600; 608-610.

For the infinitive with πρὶν, see 626-631.

*Absolute Infinitive.*¹

776. The infinitive may stand absolutely in certain parenthetical phrases, expressing a limitation or qualification of some word or of the whole sentence.

777. 1. Most frequent are the simple ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν and ὥς εἰπεῖν, *so to speak*; and ὥς εἰπεῖν or εἰπεῖν with an adverb or other adjunct, sometimes with an object. *E.g.*

Καὶ ἔργον, ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἢ οὐδενὸς προσδέονται ἢ βραχείος πάνν, *and of action, so to speak, they need either none or very little.* PLAT. Gorg. 450 D. Plato uses ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν 77 times. Ὡς εἰπεῖν ἔπος, *so to speak.* AESCH. Pers. 714: so EUR. Hipp. 1162, Her. 167 (see Or. 1). Ὡς δὲ συντόμως εἰπεῖν, *to speak concisely.* ISOC. vii. 26: so PLAT. Tim. 25 E. Ὡς συνελόντι εἰπεῖν. XEN. Mem. iii. 8, 10. Ὡς εἰπεῖν. PLAT. Phaedr. 258 E: so Rep. 619 D. Ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν, *to speak simply.* ISOC. iv. 154. Ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν. PLAT. Symp. 186 C. Ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν γένος. Id. Crat. 192 C. Ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πᾶν εἰπεῖν. Id. Leg. 667 D. So ὥς περὶ ὅλης εἰπεῖν ψυχῆς, Rep. 577 E. Ὡς γε τὸ δικαιοτάτον εἰπεῖν. Id. Leg. 624 A. Ὡς πόλιν εἰπεῖν, *speaking of a state.* Id. Rep. 577 C. Without ὥς: τὸ σύμπαν εἰπεῖν, Hdt. ii. 91; THUC. i. 138, vii. 49. Ἐς τὸ ἀκριβὲς εἰπεῖν. Id. vi. 82. Σὺν θεῷ

¹ See Grünwald, *Der freie formelhafte Infinitiv der Limitation im Griechischen*, in Schanz's *Beiträge*, Heft 6.

εἰπεῖν. PLAT. Prot. 317 B. Τὸ δ' ὁρθὸν εἰπεῖν, ἀνέπνευσα, SOPH. O. T. 1220.

2. Other verbs of *saying* are used in the same way with ὥς. *E.g.*

Ὡς τορῶς φράσαι. AESCH. Ag. 1584. Ὡς ἐκ τοῦ παραχρήμα λέγειν. PLAT. Crat. 399 D. Ὡς γε ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι λέγειν. Id. Leg. 857 C. Ὡς ἐν φράζειν. Id. Polit. 282 B. Ὡς πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰρῆσθαι, i.e. *between ourselves*. Id. Rep. 595 B. Ὡς γε πρὸς σὲ εἰρῆσθαι τάληθῇ. Id. Prot. 339 E. Ὡς ἐν τύπῳ, μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας, εἰρῆσθαι. Id. Rep. 414 A.

For ὥς λόγῳ εἰπεῖν in Herodotus, see 782.

778. Ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν or (less frequently) ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν means *in my opinion, it seems to me*. Other similar expressions are (ὥς) εἰκάσαι, *to make a guess*; (ὥς) συμβάλλειν, *to compare, if we may compare*; (ὥς) ἀκοῦσαι, *to the ear*; ὥς ἰδεῖν or ὅσον ἰδεῖν, *to the eye, in appearance*; ὅσον ἐμὲ εἰδέναι, *so far as my knowledge goes*; ὥς τεκμήρασθαι, *so far as one can judge*. *E.g.*

Ἄλλ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν, τάχ' εἴσει, *but, methinks, you will soon know*. AESCH. Pers. 246: so SOPH. El. 410. Αὐτόχθονες δοκέειν ἐμοὶ εἶσι. HDT. i. 172. Ἀπεπέμπετο ἡ στρατιῇ, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκέειν, ἐπὶ Λιβύης καταστροφῇ. Id. iv. 167. Δοκεῖν δ' ἐμοί. THUC. viii. 64: so vii. 87. Ἀληθῇ, ἐμοιγε δοκεῖν. PLAT. Men. 81 A. See Id. Rep. 432 B, ὥς γε οὕτωςι δόξαι.

Χῶρος δὲ ἱρὸς, ὥς ἀπεικάσαι. SOPH. O. C. 16. Ὡς θύραθεν εἰκάσαι. EUR. H. F. 713. See HDT. i. 34. Ὡς μικρὸν μεγάλῳ εἰκάσαι. THUC. iv. 36. Once εἰκάσαι alone: SOPH. O. T. 82. Ὑδωρ γε ἐν πρὸς ἐν συμβάλλειν, i.e. *to compare the waters one with the other*. HDT. iv. 50 (cf. ἐν πρὸς ἐν, THUC. ii. 97). Ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο οὕτωςι μὲν ἀκοῦσαι λόγον τιν' ἔχον, i.e. *on first hearing it*. DEM. xx. 18. Ἀτοπα, ὥς οὕτω γ' ἀκοῦσαι. PLAT. Euthyph. 3 B. Ὡς γε ἐντεῦθεν ἰδεῖν, *as it looks from this point*. Id. Rep. 430 E. Ὅσον ἔδην. SAPPH. Fr. 101. Ὅσα γ' ὦδ' ἰδεῖν. AR. Pac. 856. Οὐχ, ὅσον γέ μ' εἰδέναι, *no, as far as I know*. Id. Nub. 1252. See also Eccl. 350, ὃ τι κάμ' εἰδέναι, and Thesm. 34, ὥστε (i.e. ὥς τε) κάμ' εἰδέναι, in the same sense. Ὡς γε τῷ ποδὶ τεκμήρασθαι. PLAT. Phaedr. 230 B.

See also ὥς γ' ἐμοὶ χρῆσθαι κριτῇ, EUR. Alc. 801; ὥς γε κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν ἀποφήνασθαι, PLAT. Polit. 272 D. See further, for Herodotus, 782.

779. (a) Here belong ὀλίγου δεῖν and μικροῦ δεῖν, *wanting little, almost*, and the rare πολλοῦ δεῖν, *far from*. *E.g.*

Πολλῶν λόγων γιγνομένων ὀλίγου δεῖν καθ' ἑκάστην ἐκκλησίαν, *when many speeches are made almost in every assembly*. DEM. ix. 1. Μικροῦ δεῖν ὁμοίον ἔστι τῷ ὀνειδίξειν. Id. xviii. 269: so ISOC. iv. 144, viii. 44, 89. Ἴν' εἰδῇτε πολλοῦ δεῖν ἄξιον ὄντα, *that you may know that he is far from deserving*, etc. DEM. xxiii. 7 (the only case of πολλοῦ δεῖν).

(b) Here δέιν is often omitted, leaving ὀλίγον or μικροῦ in the sense of *almost*. *E.g.*

Ὁλίγον φροῦδος γεγένημαι, *I am almost gone myself*, AR. Nuḡ. 722, and μικροῦ κατηκόντισαν ἅπαντας, *they came near shooting them all*. DEM. xviii. 151.

780. In many expressions εἶναι is used absolutely, and it often seems to us superfluous. The most common case is that of ἐκὼν εἶναι, *so far as being willing goes*, or *willingly*, used almost exclusively in negative sentences. *E.g.*

Οὔτε αὐτὸς ἔφη ἐκὼν εἶναι δουλεύσειν. HDT. viii. 116. See THUC. ii. 89, vi. 14. Ἐκὼν γὰρ εἶναι οὐδὲν ψεύσομαι, *willingly I will tell no falsehood*. PLAT. Symp. 215 A. Οὐκ ᾔμην γε κατ' ἀρχὰς ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐκόντος εἶναι ἐξαπατηθήσεσθαι. Id. Gorg. 499 C. (Ἀνάγκη ἔχειν) τὴν ἀψεύδειαν καὶ τὸ ἐκόντας εἶναι μηδαμῇ προσδέχασθαι τὸ ψεῦδος. Id. Rep. 485 C: see 336 E. One positive sentence occurs, HDT. vii. 164.

781. Other cases of absolute εἶναι are τὸ ἐπὶ σφᾶς (ἐπὶ ἐκείνοις, ἐπὶ τοῖσι, κατὰ τοῦτον) εἶναι, *so far as they were concerned*, etc. THUC. iv. 28, viii. 48; XEN. An. i. 6, 9, Hell. iii. 5, 9;—κατὰ (εἰς) δύναμιν εἶναι, ISAE. ii. 32; PLAT. Polit. 300 C;—κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναι, *so far as concerns this*. Id. Prot. 317 A;—τὴν πρώτην εἶναι, *at first*, HDT. i. 153. So especially τὸ νῦν εἶναι, *at present* (τὸ belonging to νῦν): see ISOC. xv. 270; PLAT. Lach. 201 C, Rep. 506 E; XEN. Cyr. v. 3, 42; also τὸ τήμερον εἶναι, *to-day*, PLAT. Crat. 396 E. In Aristotle's τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, the εἶναι is probably absolute, and τί ἦν may be a "philosophic" imperfect (40), the expression meaning *the original essence* (the "what was it?").

Two expressions have ὥς: ὥς πάλαια εἶναι, *considering their antiquity*, THUC. i. 21; and ὥς γε διακόνους εἶναι πόλεως, *considering that they were servants of a state*, i.e. *for servants*, PLAT. Gorg. 517 B.

782. Herodotus has a remarkable variety of expressions of this kind. Besides those already quoted, see the following:—

Τὸ Δέλτα ἐστὶ κατάρρυτον τε καὶ νεωστὶ, ὥς λόγῳ εἶπειν, ἀναπεφηνός, *and recently, so to speak, has appeared above water*. ii. 15. (Ὡς λόγῳ εἶπειν is peculiar to Herodotus.) Καὶ ὥς ἐμὲ εἰ μεμνήσθαι τὰ ὁ ἑρμηνεύς μοι ἔφη, *so far as I remember rightly what the interpreter told me*, etc. ii. 125. Ὡς ἐμὲ κατανοέειν, *as I understand it*. ii. 28. Ὡς μὲν νῦν ἐν ἐλαχίστῳ δηλωσάι, πᾶν εἴρηται ὥς δὲ ἐν πλείονι λόγῳ δηλωσάι, ὅδε ἔχει. ii. 24 and 25. Μετὰ δέ, οὐ πολλὸν λόγῳ εἶπειν, χρόνος διέφνυ. i. 61. Ὡς ἐμὲ συμβαλλόμενον εὐρίσκειν, *so far as I find by conjecture*. vii. 24. Ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν συμβαλλομένῳ. iv. 87. Ὡς εἶναι ταῦτα σμικρὰ μέγαλοις συμβάλλειν, *so far as I may (εἶναι) compare these small things with great ones*. iv. 99: see ii. 10. Ὡς Σκύθας εἶναι, *for Scythians, considering that they are Scythians*. iv. 81. Ὡς εἶναι Αἰγύπτου, *for Egypt*, i.e. *for a land like Egypt*. ii. 8. Μεγάλα ἐκτήσατο χρήματα ὥς ἂν εἶναι Ῥοδῶπιν, *she gained great sums of money for a Rhodopis*. ii. 135. (The force of ἂν is very doubtful

here; and 'Ροδῶπιν is often emended to 'Ροδῶπιος or 'Ροδῶπι, neither of which is satisfactory.)

783. The absolute infinitive was probably felt as a limiting accusative; and in AR. PAC. 232, ἐξίεναι γνώμην ἐμὴν μέλλει, we might substitute ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν for γνώμην ἐμήν.¹ Ὡς as used here can hardly be expressed in English; but it resembles some uses of ὥστε and ὥς with the infinitive after adjectives in 588. It cannot be demonstrative, as might be supposed from our inadequate translation of ὥς εἰπεῖν, *so to speak*.

Infinitive in Commands and Prohibitions for the Imperative.

Infinitive in Wishes and Exclamations.

784. 1. The infinitive is sometimes used in the sense of the second person of the imperative, especially in Homer. *E.g.*

Τῷ νῦν μή ποτε καὶ σὺ γυναικί περ ἥπιος εἶναι· μή οἱ μῦθον ἅπαντα πιφανυσκέμεν, ὃν κ' ἐν εἰδῆς, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν φάσθαι, τὸ δὲ καὶ κεκρυμμένον εἶναι, *now therefore be thou never indulgent to thy wife*, etc. OD. xi. 441. So IL i. 20, 582, ii. 10, xvii. 501; OD. x. 297, xi. 72, xvii. 278, xviii. 106, xxii. 287. Οἷς μὴ πελάζειν, *do not approach these* (= μὴ πέλαζε). AESCH. PROM. 712. Πρὶν δ' ἂν τελευτήσῃ, ἐπισχεῖν μηδὲ καλέειν κω ὄλβιον, *wait, and do not yet call him happy*. HDT. i. 32. Σὺ δὲ τὰς πύλας ἀνοίξας ὑπεκθεῖν καὶ ἐπείγεσθαι, *and do you open the gates, and rush out and press on*. THUC. v. 9. 'Εὰν οἱ τοῖ τε γενώμεθα εἶρεῖν, φάναί ἡμᾶς ἐξευρηκέναι, *say that we have found it*. PLAT. REP. 473 A. Τοῦτο παρ' ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς βεβαίως γινῶναι, *understand this in your own minds*. DEM. viii. 39.

2. In the cases of the second person just given (1), the subject is in the nominative. But when the infinitive is equivalent to the third person of the imperative, its subject is in the accusative, as if some word like *δοῦναι*, *grant*, were understood. *E.g.*

Εἰ μὲν κεν Μενέλαον Ἀλέξανδρος κακαπέφνη, αὐτὸς Ἑλένην ἐχέτω· εἰ δέ κ' Ἀλέξανδρον κτείνῃ Μενέλαος, Τρῶας ἔπειθ' Ἑλένην ἀποδοῦναι, i.e. *let him keep Helen himself,—and let the Trojans surrender Helen*. IL iii. 281-285. Τεύχεα συλήσας φερέτω, σῶμα δὲ οἰκαδ' ἐμὸν δόμεναι πάλιν (sc. αὐτόν). IL vii. 78.

These examples follow the construction of the infinitive in wishes (785).

785. The infinitive with a subject accusative is sometimes used for the optative in the expression of a wish referring to the future. This occurs chiefly in poetry. *E.g.*

Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἢ Αἴαντα λαχεῖν ἢ Τυδείος υἱόν, *Father Zeus, may the lot fall on Ajax or on the son of Tydeus* (= Αἴας λάχου). IL vii. 179. Ζεῦ ἄνα, Τηλέμαχόν μοι ἐν ἀνδράσιν ὄλβιον εἶναι, καὶ οἱ πάντα γένοιθ'

¹ See Grünwald, page 17.

ὅσσα φρεσὶν ᾗσι μενοινᾶ (εἶναι = εἶη is followed by γένοιτο). *Od.* xvii. 354. Μὴ πρὶν ἐπ' ἡέλιον δύναι καὶ ἐπὶ κνέφας ἐλθεῖν. *Il.* ii. 413. Αἰεὶ δὲ τοιαύταν αἶσαν διακρίνειν ἔτυμον λόγον ἀνθρώπων. *PIND.* *Py.* i. 67. Θεοὶ πολῖται, μὴ με δουλείας τυχεῖν (= μὴ τύχοιμι). *AESCH.* *Sept.* 253. Δήμητερ, εὐδαιμονεῖν με Θησεία τε παῖδ' ἐμὸν. *EUR.* *Supp.* 3. Ἐρμᾶ ἔμπολαίε, τὰν γυναῖκα τὰν ἐμὴν οὕτω μ' ἀποδόσθαι τὰν τ' ἐμῶντοῦ ματέρα, *O that I could sell my wife and my mother at this rate!* *AR.* *Ach.* 816. ὦ Ζεῦ, ἐκγενέσθαι μοι Ἀθηναίους τίσασθαι, *may it be permitted me to punish the Athenians.* *HER.* v. 105. Ὀκότεροι δ' ἂν ἡμέων νικήσωσι, τοῦτους τῷ ἅπαντι στρατοπέδῳ νικᾶν, i.e. *let their victory count for the whole army.* *Id.* ix. 48.

This construction, like the preceding (784, 2), is often explained by an ellipsis of δός, *grant*; see *Il.* iii. 351, δὸς τίσασθαι. *Aristarchus* supplied γένοιτο or εἶη.

786. In two passages of the *Odyssey*, we find the infinitive in a wish introduced by αἶ γάρ, once in the sense of the optative and once in that of a past tense of the indicative, with the subject (understood) in the nominative:—

Αἶ γάρ, τοῖος ὢν οἷός ἐσσι, . . . παιδῶ τ' ἐμῇν ἐχέμεν καὶ ἐμὸς γαμβρὸς καλέεσθαι, *O that, being such as you now are, you might have (= ἔχοις) my daughter and be called my son-in-law.* *Od.* vii. 311. Αἶ γάρ, οἷος Νήρκον εἶλον, . . . τοῖος ὢν τοι χθιὺς ἐφ' ἐστάμεναι καὶ ἀμύνειν ἀνδρας μνηστήρας τῷ κε σφέων γούνατ' ἔλυσα, *O that I had stood by you yesterday and had punished the suitors; then would I have loosened their knees.* *Od.* xxiv. 376. So also *AESCH.* *Cho.* 362–366, 368.

These passages agree in construction with the second person of the infinitive in commands (784, 1).

787. The infinitive, with its subject accusative, may be used in exclamations of surprise or indignation. *E.g.*

Ἐμὲ παθεῖν τάδε, φεῦ, ἐμὲ παλαιόφρονα, κατὰ τε γὰρ οἰκεῖν, ἀτίστον, φεῦ, μύσος, *that I should suffer this, alas! I, with my thoughts of old; and that I should dwell in this land, alas! an unhonoured plague!* *AESCH.* *Eum.* 837. Ἀλλὰ τοῦσδ' ἐμοὶ ματαίαν γλώσσαν ὦδ' ἀπανθίσαι κάκβαλεῖν ἔπη τοιαῦτα, *that these should thus cast at me the flowers of their idle tongues, etc.* *Id.* *Ag.* 1662. ὦ δυστάλαινα, τοιάδ' ἀνδρα χρησµὸν φωνεῖν. *SOPH.* *Aj.* 410. Τοιοῦτονὶ πρέφειν κύνᾳ, *to keep a dog like that!* *AR.* *Vesp.* 835. Τοῦτον δὲ ὑβρίζειν ἀναπνεῖν δέ, *and that he should be thus insulting, and should draw his breath!* *DEM.* xxi. 209.

Compare *Mene incepto desistere victam!* *VERG.* *Aen.* i. 37. This infinitive often has the article τό (805).

B. INFINITIVE WITH THE ARTICLE.¹

788. It has been seen that the infinitive without the article

¹ See Gildersleeve, *Contributions to the History of the Articular Infinitive*,

was already established in the Homeric language, in nearly all the constructions in which it was most frequently used in later times. In this simple form it developed its various tenses, and their uses became fixed, especially in indirect discourse; so that the infinitive gradually came to be more of a verb and less of a noun.

When the definite article had become common with nouns, it was soon prefixed to the infinitive, which thus, with all its attributes as a verb unimpaired, was restored to new life as a neuter verbal noun.¹ As a nominative and accusative, it could be used with $\tau\acute{o}$ in all the constructions in which the simple infinitive was already familiar as subject or object, although here the older form was preferred except when it was desired to emphasise the infinitive especially as a nominative or accusative. But in other constructions (especially in the genitive, dative, and accusative with prepositions), and in its wonderful capacity for carrying dependent clauses and adjuncts of every kind, the articular infinitive appears as a new power in the language, of which the older simple infinitive gave hardly an intimation.

As might be expected, the articular infinitive found its chief use in the rhetorical language, as in Demosthenes and in the speeches of Thucydides. It appears first in Pindar (for $\tau\acute{o}$ in Od. xx. 52 and Hes. Frag. clxxi. can hardly be the article), but always as a subject nominative, with one doubtful exception. In the dramatists and Herodotus it is not uncommon, being generally a nominative or accusative with $\tau\acute{o}$, although it occurs also as a genitive or dative with $\tau\omicron\upsilon$ or $\tau\acute{\alpha}$; and it is found even with prepositions. In Thucydides (especially in the speeches), we find the nominative, accusative, genitive, and dative all used with the greatest freedom (in 135 cases), besides the accusative, genitive, and dative with prepositions (in 163 cases). Its fully developed power of taking dependent clauses must be seen in the Orators, especially in Demosthenes.²

in *Trans. of Am. Phil. Assoc. for 1878*, pp. 5-19; and *The Articular Infinitive in Xenophon and Plato*, in *Am. Jour. Phil.*, iii. pp. 193-202; Birklein, *Entwicklungsgeschichte des substantivierten Infinitivs*, in Schanz's *Beiträge*, Heft 7.

¹ "By the substantial loss of its dative force the infinitive became verbalized; by the assumption of the article it was substantivized again with a decided increment of its power." *Am. Jour. Phil.* iii. p. 195.

² See the statistics given by Gildersleeve in the *Am. Jour. Phil.* viii. p. 332. It appears that the average number of articular infinitives in a Teubner page of Demosthenes is 1.25; of the speeches of Thucydides, 1.00; of Xenophon (whole), 1.02; of Isocrates, .60; of Antiphon, .50; of Aeschines, .30; of Andocides, .20; of Isacus, .25; of Lysias, .12. Hypereides even exceeds Demosthenes. For the actual number of articular infinitives in each author before Aristotle, see Birklein's table, p. 91.

Articular Infinitive as Subject or Object.

789. Although the infinitive, as subject or object of a verb, generally stands without the article, the article may be prefixed to make the infinitive more prominent as a noun in the structure of the sentence.

790. The infinitive with τό may stand as a subject, especially of ἐστίν. *E.g.*

Τὸ γνῶναι ἐπιστήμην πον λαβεῖν ἐστίν, *to learn is to acquire knowledge.* PLAT. Theaet. 209 E. Τὸ δίκην διδόναι πότερον πάσχειν τί ἐστίν ἢ ποιεῖν; Id. Gorg. 476 D. (In the last two examples the *subject* infinitive has the article to emphasise it, while the *predicate* infinitive stands alone.) Τὸ δὲ παθεῖν εἰς πρῶτον ἀέθλων. PIND. Py. i. 99. Οὗτοι ἡδύ ἐστι τὸ ἔχειν χρήματα οὕτως ὡς ἀνιάρων τὸ ἀποβάλλειν. XEN. Cyr. viii. 3, 42. Πολλάκις δοκεῖ τὸ φυλάξαι τάγαθὰ τοῦ κτήσασθαι χαλεπώτερον εἶναι, *to keep advantages often seems to be harder than gaining them.* DEM. i. 23 (cf. ii. 26, quoted in 745, for both construction and sense). Τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ πλεόν των ἄλλων ζητεῖν ἔχειν. PLAT. Gorg. 483 C. 'Ἀλλ' οἶμαι, νῦν μὲν ἐπισκοτεῖ τοῖσι τὸ κατορθοῦν. DEM. ii. 20. Τὸ γὰρ θάνατον δεδιέναι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστίν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντα· δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναι ἐστίν ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν. PLAT. Ap. 29 A. See also 29 C.

It will be seen by comparison that most of these examples would admit the construction without the article by making the infinitive less prominent as a subject nominative. Compare οὕτε κλαίειν οὐτ' ὀδύρεσθαι πρέπει, AESCH. Sept. 656, with τοῖς δ' ὀλβίοις γε καὶ τὸ νικᾶσθαι πρέπει, Ag. 941.

791. The infinitive with τό can stand as an accusative of the direct object, sometimes as an accusative of kindred meaning. The relation of such an infinitive with τό to the verb is often less close than that of the simple infinitive in a similar case (see 811). *E.g.*

Τλήσομαι τὸ καθθανεῖν, *I shall dare to die.* AESCH. Ag. 1290. 'Ἔστιν τις, ἔστιν, ὅς σε κωλύσει τὸ δρᾶν, *who will prevent you from acting.* SOPH. Ph. 1241. So ἐπισπεύδειν τὸ δρᾶν, El. 467. Τὸ σπεύδειν δέ σοι παραινῶ. Id. Ph. 620. Τὸ δρᾶν οὐκ ἠθέλησαν, *they were unwilling to act (would not act).* Id. O. C. 442. Τὸ δ' αὖ ξυνοικεῖν τῇδ' ὁμοῦ τίς ἂν γυνὴ δύναίτο, *what woman would be able to live with her? (to live with her—what woman could do it?).* Id. Tr. 545. Τὸ ὑπὸ οἶνου μὴ σφάλλεσθαι ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, *to take care not to be upset by wine.* XEN. Rep. Lac. v. 7. Αἰσχύνονται τὸ τολμᾶν. PLAT. Soph. 247 C. Συνεθίξεσθαι ταῖς ψυχαῖς τὸ τὴν πατρίδα φιλεῖν. LYCURG. 100. Καὶ πῶς δὴ τὸ ἀρχιχοῦς εἶναι ἀνθρώπων παιδεύεις; XEN. Oec. xiii. 4: see also ix. 12. (So παιδεύω τινά τι.) Ἐπύσχον τὸ εὐθέως τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐπιχειρεῖν. THUC. vii. 33 (cf.

τοῦτο ἐπέσχον, ii. 76). Οὐδέ τοι τῇ χειρὶ πείθουμι τὸ δρᾶν, *nor am I persuaded by your violence to act (as you bid me)*. SOPH. Ph. 1253 (cf. οὐ πείθομαι σοι ταῦτα). Καρδίας ἐξίσταμαι τὸ δρᾶν, *I withdraw from my resolution (i.e. I consent) to do it*. Id. Ant. 1105 : cf. φρονεῖν μετέγνων, i.e. *changed his purpose (and resolved) to contemplate*, AESCH. Ag. 221.

For τὸ μὴ οὐ with the infinitive after negated verbs in this construction (e.g. AR. Ran. 68), see 815, 2, and 814.

792. The infinitive with τό as an object accusative may follow verbs which would not allow the simple infinitive in its place. *E.g.*

Τὸ τελευτῆσαι πάντων ἢ πεπρωμένη κατέκρινε, τὸ δὲ καλῶς ἀποθανεῖν ἴδιον τοῖς σπουδαίοις ἀπένειμεν, *Fate condemned all mankind to death; but a glorious death she reserved for the virtuous*. ISOC. i. 43. Μόνον ὁρῶν τὸ παῖειν τὸν ἀλυσκόμενον, *seeing only the beating of the captive*. XEN. Cyr. i. 4, 21. Τὸ μὲν εὐνοεῖν τε καὶ προορᾶν ἀγαμαί σευ. HDT. ix. 79.

The double character of the articular infinitive, as noun and verb, permits it to stand as an object wherever the object accusative of a noun would be allowed.

793. A few of the verbs included in 747, which govern the genitive of a noun, allow also the genitive of the infinitive with τοῦ (798), as well as the simple infinitive. This applies chiefly to ἀμελέω, ἐπιμελέομαι, and to the verbs of *hindrance* etc. included in 807. *E.g.*

Ἀμελήσας τοῦ ὀργίσεσθαι. XEN. Mem. ii. 3, 9. (But ἀμελήσας λέγειν, PLAT. Phaed. 98 D.) Most verbs of *desiring* and *neglecting* take only the simple infinitive. Ἐπιμελέομαι, which usually takes ὅπως with the future indicative (339), allows also the simple infinitive (THUC. vi. 54), the infinitive with τό (XEN. Rep. Lac. v. 7), and the infinitive with τοῦ (Id. Mem. iii. 3, 11). (See 361, 791, and 798.)

794. The infinitive of indirect discourse after verbs of *saying* and *thinking* sometimes takes τό. Here each tense of the infinitive preserves its time, and even the infinitive with ἄν occurs. *E.g.*

Ἦμεν δ' ἐτόιμοι θεοὺς ὀρκωμοτεῖν τὸ μήτε δρᾶσαι μήτε τῷ ξυνειδέναι τὸ πρᾶγμα βουλευσάντι, *to swear that we neither had done it (ἐδράσαμεν) nor were in the secret (ξύνισμεν) of any one who had plotted the deed*. SOPH. Ant. 264. Ἐξομεῖ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι; *will you swear that you have no knowledge?* Ib. 535. Καὶ τὸ προεידέναι γε τὸν θεὸν τὸ μέλλον καὶ τὸ προσημαίνειν ᾧ βούλεται, *τοῦτο πάντες καὶ λέγουσι καὶ νομίζουσιν*. XEN. Ap. 13. See also Hell. v. 2, 36 (814).

(With ἄν.) Τῆς ἐλπίδος γὰρ ἔρχομαι δεδραγμένος, *τὸ μὴ παθεῖν ἄν ἄλλο πλὴν τὸ μόρσιμον*, *for I come clinging to the hope that I could suffer nothing except what is fated*. SOPH. Ant. 235. For the articular infinitive with ἄν in other constructions, see 212.

Infinitive with τό after Adjectives and Nouns.

795. In some constructions in which the simple infinitive appears to preserve most distinct traces of its origin as a dative, especially after adjectives or nouns (758 ; 763 ; 766), the articular infinitive takes τό as an accusative. *E.g.*

Τὸ δὲ βία πολιτῶν δρᾶν ἔφυν ἀμήχανος, *but I am helpless to act in defiance of the citizens.* SOPH. ANT. 79. Μακρὸς τὸ κρῖναι ταῦτα χωὶ λοιπὸς χρόνος, *a long time to settle this.* ID. EL. 1030 (cf. χρόνος βραχὺς διηγῆσασθαι, *a time short for narrating*, under 763). Τὸ μὴ βλέπειν ἐτοίμα, *ready to cease beholding the light.* IB. 1079 (see 758). Τὸ προσταλαίωπειν οὐδεὶς πρόθυμος ἦν. THUC. II. 53. Τὸ μὲν ἐς τὴν γῆν ἡμῶν ἐσβάλλειν, κἂν μὴ ἐκπλεύσωμεν, ἱκανοὶ εἰσι. ID. VI. 17. 'Ες δεὸν πάρεσθ' ὅδε Κρέων τὸ πράσσειν καὶ τὸ βουλεύειν, *he is here at the right moment to act and advise.* SOPH. O. T. 1416. Αἴτιος τὸ σὲ ἀποκρίνεσθαι μὴ τοῦτο. PLAT. LACH. 190 E. (This is rare, but see DEM. VIII. 56, IX. 63. Αἴτιος generally has the infinitive with τοῦ, 798, or the simple infinitive, 749.)

Ἡ ναυμαχία οὐχὶ δικαίαν ἔχει τέκμαρσιν τὸ ἐκφοβῆσαι, *the sea-fight offers no just ground for alarm.* THUC. II. 87. Οὐδὲ τοῦ ξανιστάναι ἐστὶ θάρσος, *nor have I courage to remove you.* SOPH. O. C. 47.

The exact force given to these accusatives by those who used them is not always clear ; but they come nearest to the accusative of *respect* or *limitation* (as εἶδος κάλλιστος, *most beautiful in form*). Sometimes the infinitive with τό has this force, where the simple infinitive could not be used ; as in LYCURG. 91, ἐπεὶ γε τὸ ἐλθεῖν τοῦτον, οἶμαι θεόν τινα αὐτὸν ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἀγαγείν τὴν τιμωρίαν, *for, as to his departure, I think that some God led him directly to punishment.*

796. We occasionally find τό with the infinitive in the Mss. in a similar loose construction, where we should expect the infinitive with τοῦ or τῷ in apposition with a preceding genitive or dative. See THUC. VII. 36, τῇ πρότερον ἀμαθία δοκούσῃ εἶναι, τὸ ἀντίπρῳρον ξυγκροῦσαι, and VIII. 87, καταβοῆς ἔνεκα τῆς ἐς Λακεδαίμονα, τὸ λέγεσθαι ὡς οὐκ ἀδικεῖ, where most editors now read τῷ and τοῦ against the Mss. But Birklein defends the Mss. readings by HYPER. Epitaph. 2, ἄξιον δὲ ἐστὶν ἐπαιεῖν τὴν μὲν πόλιν ἡμῶν τῆς προαιρέσεως ἔνεκεν, τὸ προελέσθαι ὁμοία, . . . τοὺς δὲ τετελετηκότας τῆς ἀνδρείας, τὸ μὴ καταισχύναι τὰς τῶν προγόνων ἀρετάς, where the two infinitives with τό explain προαιρέσεως and ἀνδρείας. (See 804.)

797. The infinitive with τό appears in its greatest variety of meanings in the construction of τὸ μὴ or τὸ μὴ οὐ after verbs implying a negative (811). See also 813 and 814.

Infinitive with τοῦ, τῷ, and τό, as a Noun, in various Constructions.

798. The infinitive with τοῦ appears as an adnominal genitive, a genitive after verbs and adjectives and with comparatives, a partitive genitive, a genitive absolute, and a genitive expressing cause, purpose, or motive. *E.g.*

Τοῦ πιεῖν ἐπιθυμία, *the desire to drink*. THUC. vii. 84. Πόνους δὲ τοῦ ζῆν ἡδέως ἡγεμόνας νομίζετε. XEN. Cyr. i. 5, 12. Πρὸς τὴν πόλιν προσβαλόντες ἐς ἐλπίδα ἦλθον τοῦ ἐλεῖν, *i.e. hope of taking the city*. THUC. ii. 56 (see 749). Τὸ γὰρ εὖ πράττειν παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἀφορμὴ τοῦ κακῶς φρονεῖν τοῖς ἀνόητοις γίγνεται, *for doing well beyond their deserts sets fools to thinking ill*. DEM. i. 23. Ἡ δὲ διαγνώμη αὕτη τῆς ἐκκλησίας τοῦ τὰς σπονδὰς λελύσθαι, *this vote of the assembly that the treaty had been broken*. THUC. i. 87. See XEN. Cyr. i. 4, 4.

Δόξετε αἴτιοι εἶναι, ἄρξαντες τοῦ διαβαίνειν, *by having begun the passage of the river*. XEN. An. i. 4, 15. Ὀρεγόμενοι τοῦ πρώτος ἕκαστος γίγνεσθαι, *being eager each to be first*. THUC. ii. 65. Παρεκάλει ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοῦ ὡς φρονιμώτατον εἶναι. XEN. Mem. i. 2, 55; so iii. 3, 11. (See 793.) Ἐπέσχομεν τοῦ δακρύνειν, *we ceased to weep*. PLAT. Phaed. 117 E. (See below, 807.) Καὶ γὰρ ἀήθεις τοῦ κατακούειν τινός εἰσιν, *for they are unused to obeying any one*. DEM. i. 23. See xxix. 17. "Ἀξίος αὐτοῖς ἐδόκει εἶναι τοῦ τοιαυτ' ἀκούειν. Id. xxi. 134. Τοὺς καρποὺς, οἱ τοῦ μὴ θηριωδῶς ζῆν ἡμᾶς αἴτιοι γεγόνασι, *the fruits of the earth, which are the cause of our not living like beasts*. ISOC. iv. 28. Κατηράσατο τῷ αἰτίῳ τοῦ μὴ πάλαι ἀποδεδοῖσθαι τὸν μισθόν, *he cursed him who was responsible for the wages not having been paid long before*. XEN. An. vii. 7, 48. (Αἴτιος may take the simple infinitive and even the infinitive with τό. See 749 and 795.) Πολύλακίς δοκεῖ τὸ φυλάξαι τὰγαθὰ τοῦ κτήσασθαι χαλεπώτερον εἶναι. DEM. i. 23. So XEN. Cyr. i. 5, 13. Νέοις τὸ σιγὰν κρείττον' ἐστί τοῦ λαλεῖν. MEN. Mon. 387. Τοῦ θαρσεῖν τὸ πλείστον εἰληφότες, *i.e. having become most emboldened*. THUC. iv. 34. Οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀναιδείας οὔτε τοῦ ψεύδεσθαι παραλείψει. DEM. xxxvii. 45. Εἰς τοῦτ' ἐλήλυθε τὸν νομίζειν. Id. xxii. 16. Τὸ μεγάλου ἔργου ὄντος τοῦ ἑαυτῷ τὰ δέοντα παρασκευάζειν μὴ ἄρκειν τοῦτο. XEN. Mem. ii. 1, 8 (see 806).

Ζηλῶ σε μᾶλλον ἢ μὲ τοῦ μηδὲν φρονεῖν, *for want of knowledge*. EUR. I. A. 677. (Μίνως) τὸ ληστικὸν καθήρει, τοῦ τὰς προσόδους μᾶλλον ἵέναι αὐτῷ, *in order that revenues might come in to him more abundantly*. THUC. i. 4. So ii. 22, 32, 75, 93; XEN. Cyr. i. 3, 9. Τοῦ μὴ τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν, *to escape doing what was just*. DEM. xviii. 107. Πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα φιλονεικοῦντα λέγειν τοῦ καταφανὲς γενέσθαι. PLAT. Gorg. 457 E. This final use appears first and chiefly in Thucydides.

799. The infinitive with τῷ may express cause, manner, or

means; or it may follow verbs, adjectives, and adverbs which take the dative. *E.g.*

Οὐδὲ τῷ δύνασθαι καὶ εἰωθέναι λέγειν ἐπαρθείς. LYS. xxxi. 2. Οὐδενὶ τῶν πάντων πλέον κεκράτηκε Φίλιππος ἢ τῷ πρότερος πρὸς τοῖς πράγμασι γίγνεσθαι. DEM. viii. 11. See xxiii. 9, τῷ μὲν ἀκοῦσαι, τῷ δ' ἐργῶ. Ἀλλὰ τῷ φανερός εἶναι τοιοῦτος ὢν, *by making it plain that he was such a man*. XEN. Mem. i. 2, 3. So Cyr. iv. 5, 9. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῷ γε κοσμίως ζῆν ἄξιον πιστεύειν, *to trust in an orderly life*. ISOC. xv. 24. Ἵνα ἀπιστώσι τῷ ἐμὲ τετιμῆσθαι ὑπὸ δαιμόνων, *that they may distrust my having been honoured by divine powers*. XEN. Ap. 14. Μείζον μέρος νέμοντες τῷ μὴ βοῦλεσθαι ἀληθῇ εἶναι. THUC. iii. 3. Ἴσον δὲ τῷ προστένειν. AESCH. Ag. 253. Τῷ ζῆν ἔστι τι ἐναντίον, ὥσπερ τῷ ἐργηγορέναι τὸ καθεύδειν. PLAT. Phaed. 71 C. Ὅμοιον ἔστι τῷ ὀνειδίζειν. DEM. xviii. 269. Τῷ πλουτεῖν ὑπήκοα, *obedient to wealth*. AR. Pl. 146. Ἄμα τῷ τιμᾶσθαι. PLAT. Rep. 468 D; so ἄμα τῷ τιμᾶν, 468 E.

800. The infinitive with the article, as genitive, dative, or accusative, very often follows prepositions, or adverbs used as prepositions. *E.g.*

Τοὺς γὰρ λόγους περὶ τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι Φίλιππον ὁρῶ γιγνομένους, *for I see that the speeches are made about punishing Philip*. DEM. iii. 1. Πρὸ τοῦ τοὺς ὅρκους ἀποδοῦναι, *before taking the oaths*. Id. xviii. 26. Ἐκ τοῦ πρὸς χάριν δημηγορεῖν ἐνίοις. Id. iii. 3. Ἀντὶ τοῦ πόλις εἶναι φρούριον κατέστη. THUC. vii. 28; so i. 69. Ἀπὸ τοῦ πείραν διδοὺς ξυνητοὺς φαίνεσθαι. Id. i. 138. Ἔνεκα τοῦ πλείω ποιῆσαι τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν οὐσίαν. ISOC. i. 19. Πρὸς τῷ μηδὲν ἐκ τῆς πρεσβείας λαβεῖν, *besides receiving nothing from the embassy*. DEM. xix. 229. Ἐν τῷ πολίτῃν ποιεῖσθαι (Χαρίδημον), *in making Charidemus a citizen*. Id. xxiii. 188. Ἐθαυμάζετο ἐπὶ τῷ εὐθύμως ζῆν. XEN. Mem. iv. 8, 2. Ὅμως διὰ τὸ ξένος εἶναι οὐκ ἂν οἷε ἀδικηθῆναι, *on account of being a stranger*. Ib. ii. 1, 15. Πάντων διαφέρων ἐφαίνεται καὶ εἰς τὸ ταχὺ μανθάνειν ὃ δεοὶ καὶ εἰς τὸ καλῶς ἕκαστα ποιεῖν. Id. Cyr. i. 3, 1. Πρὸς τὸ μετρίων δεῖσθαι πεπαιδευμένους. Id. Mem. i. 2, 1; so DEM. i. 4. Παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρόν τι ὑπομεῖναι. PLAT. Ap. 28 C.

801. The infinitive is not found with ἀνά in any case, with ἀμφί in accusative or dative, with κατὰ in genitive, with παρὰ in genitive or dative, with περὶ in dative, with πρὸς in genitive, with ὑπέρ in accusative, or with ὑπό in accusative or dative.

802. The genitive of the infinitive with ὑπέρ is often equivalent to a final clause. *E.g.*

Τὰς δειῆσεις αἷς κέχρηται τινες ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὰ μέτρια καὶ τὰ συνήθη μὴ γίγνεσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει (= ἵνα μὴ γίγνηται), *the solicitations which some have employed in order that moderate counsels and the ordinary principles may not prevail in the state*. AESCHIN. iii. 1. Εἰς τὰς τριήρεις ἐμβάντες ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ τὸ κελεύόμενον ποιῆσαι (= ἵνα μὴ ποιήσωσιν),

embarking on shipboard that they might avoid doing what was bid. DEM. xviii. 204.

803. The article cannot ordinarily be omitted when the infinitive follows a preposition.

(a) A singular exception occurs in a few cases of *ἀντί* with the simple infinitive in Herodotus. See *ὅς ἀντὶ μὲν δούλων ἐποίησας ἐλευθέρους Πέρσας εἶναι, ἀντὶ δὲ ἄρχεσθαι ὑπ' ἄλλων ἀρχειν ἀπάντων*, i. 210, where the antithesis of *ἀντὶ μὲν δούλων* makes *ἀντὶ δὲ ἄρχεσθαι* more natural; also vi. 32 (with no antithesis). So vii. 170 (but with a various reading *ἀντὶ τοῦ*).

(b) *Πλὴν*, except, as an adverb, may have the simple infinitive; as *τί ἄλλο πλὴν ψευδῇ λέγειν*, SOPH. Ph. 100. So *πλὴν γάμου τυχεῖν*, AESCH. Eum. 737.

804. An infinitive, with the article in any case, may stand in apposition to a noun in the same case. *E.g.*

Ἡ τῶν παιδῶν ἀρχή, τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἐλευθέρους εἶναι, ἔως, κ.τ.λ., the government of children,—not permitting them to be free, until, etc. PLAT. Rep. 590 E. *Τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ πλεόν τῶν ἄλλων ζητεῖν ἔχειν.* Id. Gorg. 483 C. *Τοῦτο προσόμοιον ἔχουσι τοῖς τυράννοις, τὸ πολλῶν ἀρχειν.* Id. Rep. 578 D. *Τί τοῦτου μακαριώτερον, τοῦ γῆ μιχθῆναι;* XEN. Cyr. viii. 7, 25. *Δοκεῖ τοῦτῳ διαφέρειν ἀνὴρ τῶν ἄλλων ζῶων, τῷ τιμῆς ὀρέγεσθαι.* Id. Hier. vii. 3; so Oec. xiv. 10.

For a few doubtful cases of the infinitive with *τό*, in apparent apposition with a genitive or dative, see 796.

805. The infinitive with *τό* is used in exclamations of surprise or indignation. *E.g.*

Τὸ δὲ μὴδὲ κυνὴν οἴκοθεν ἐλθεῖν ἐμὲ τὸν κακοδαίμον' ἔχοντα, but to think that I, wretched fellow, should come from home without even my cap! AR. Nub. 268. *Τῆς μωρίας· τὸ Δία νομίζειν, ὄντα τηλικουτονί, what folly! to believe in Zeus, now you are so big!* Ib. 819.

For the simple infinitive in these exclamations, see 787.

806. The infinitive with its subject, object, or other adjuncts (sometimes including dependent clauses) may be preceded by the article *τό*, the whole sentence standing as a single noun, either as the subject or object of a verb, as the object of a preposition, or in apposition with a pronoun like *τοῦτο*. *E.g.*

Τὸ μὲν γὰρ πολλὰ ἀπολωλέκειναι κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀμελείας ἂν τις θεΐη δικαίως· τὸ δὲ μήτε πάλαι τοῦτο πεπονθέναι, πεφηνέναι τέ τινα ἡμῖν συμμαχίαν τούτων ἀντίρροπον, ἂν βουλώμεθα χρῆσθαι, τῆς παρ' ἐκείνων εὐνοίας εὐεργέτημι' ἂν ἐγῶγε θείην. DEM. i. 10. *Τὸ γὰρ πρὸς ἄνδρα θνητὸν καὶ διὰ καιροῦς τινος ἰσχύοντα γράφοντας εἰρήνην ἀθάνατον συνθέσθαι τὴν κατὰ τῆς πόλεως αἰσχύνην, καὶ ἀποστρεῖν μὴ μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν παρὰ τῆς*

τύχης εὐεργεσιῶν τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τοσαύτῃ περιουσίᾳ χρῆσθαι ποιη-
ρίας ὥστε μὴ μόνον τοὺς ὄντας Ἀθηναίους ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ὕστερόν
ποτε μέλλοντας εἶσεσθαι πάντας ἡδικηκέναι, πῶς οὐχὶ πάνδεινον ἐστίν;
Id. xix. 55.

*Simple Infinitive and Infinitive with τοῦ after Verbs of
Hindrance, etc.*¹

807. After verbs and other expressions which denote *hindrance* or *freedom* from anything, two forms are allowed, the simple infinitive, and the genitive of the infinitive with τοῦ.

Thus we can say (a) εἴργει σε τοῦτο ποιεῖν (747) and (b) εἴργει σε τοῦ τοῦτο ποιεῖν (798), both with the same meaning, *he prevents you from doing this*. As the infinitive, after verbs implying a negation, can take μή to strengthen the previous negation without otherwise affecting the sense (815, 1), we have a third and a fourth form, still with the same meaning: (c) εἴργει σε μὴ τοῦτο ποιεῖν, and (d) εἴργει σε τοῦ μὴ τοῦτο ποιεῖν, *he prevents you from doing this*. (For a fifth form, εἴργει σε τὸ μὴ τοῦτο ποιεῖν, with the same meaning, see 811.)

If the leading verb is itself *negatived* (or is interrogative with a negative implied), the double negative μὴ οὐ is generally used instead of μή in the form (c) with the simple infinitive, but probably never in the form (d) with the genitive of the infinitive; as οὐκ εἴργει σε μὴ οὐ τοῦτο ποιεῖν, *he does not prevent you from doing this* (815, 2), but *not* τοῦ μὴ οὐ τοῦτο ποιεῖν. (See also 811, for τὸ μὴ οὐ.) E.g.

(a) Κακὸν δὲ ποῖον εἴργει τοῦτ' ἐξειδέναι; SOPH. O. T. 129.
Παιδὸς Φέρητος, ὃν θανεῖν ἐρρυσάμην. EUR. Alc. 11. Ἐπὶ Ὀλύνθου ἀποπέμπουσιν, ὅπως εἴργωσι τοὺς ἐκέθεν ἐπιβοηθεῖν. THUC. i. 62.
"Ἀλλως δέ πως πορίζεσθαι τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ὄρκους ἤδη κατέχοντας ἡμᾶς (ἥδειν). XEN. An. iii. 1, 20. Εὐδοκιμεῖν ἐμποδὼν σφίσιν εἶναι. PLAT. Euthyd. 305 D. Εἰ τοῦτό τις εἴργει δρᾶν ὄκνος, *if any hesitation prevents you from doing this*. Id. Soph. 242 A. Τὴν ἰδέαν τῆς γῆς οὐδὲν με κωλύει λέγειν. Id. Phaed. 108 D. Τὸν Φίλιππον παρελθεῖν οὐκ ἐδύναντο κωλύσαι. DEM. v. 20.

(b) Τοῦ δὲ δραπετεῦειν δεσμοῖς ἀπείργουσι; XEN. Mem. ii. 1, 16. Τὸ γὰρ ψευδόμενον φαίνεσθαι καὶ τοῦ συγγνώμης τινὸς τυγχάνειν ἐμποδὼν μάλιστα ἀνθρώποις γίγνεται. Id. Cyr. iii. 1, 9. Εἴπεν οὐ κωλύσει (ἀν) τοῦ καίειν ἐπιόντας. Id. An. i. 6, 2. Ἐπέσχομεν τοῦ δακρύνειν. PLAT. Phaed. 117 E (cf. 117 C, quoted in 811). Ἀπεσχόμην τοῦ λαβεῖν τοῦ δικαίου ἔνεκα. DEM. xix. 223.

(c) Θνητούς γ' ἔπαυσα μὴ προσδέρεσθαι μόρον. AESCH. Prom.

¹ See Madvig's *Bemerkungen über einige Punkte der griechischen Wortfügungslehre*, pp. 47-66.

248. Τοῦμὸν φυλάξει σ' ὄνομα μὴ πᾶσχειν κακῶς. SOPH. O. C. 667. "Ὅπερ ἔσχε μὴ τὴν Πελοπόννησον πορθεῖν, *which prevented him from ravaging the Peloponnesus*. THUC. i. 73. Διεκώλυσε μὴ διαφθεῖραι. Id. iii. 49. Ἐπεγένετο κωλύματα μὴ αὐξηθῆναι. Id. i. 16. Πέμπονσι κήρυκα, ὑποδεξάμενοι σχήσειν τὸν Σπαρτιήτην μὴ ἐξίεναι. HDT. ix. 12. Εἶργε μὴ βλαστάνειν. PLAT. Phaedr. 251 B.

Ὁὐ γὰρ ἔστι "Ελλῆσι οὐδεμία ἔκδυσσι μὴ οὐ δόντας λόγον εἶναι σοὺς δούλους. HDT. viii. 100. (See 815, 2; 816.) Οὐ δυνατοὶ αὐτὴν ἴσχειν εἰσὶ Ἀργεῖοι μὴ οὐκ ἐξίεναι. Id. ix. 12. "Ὡστε ξένον γ' ἂν οὐδέν' ὄνθ', ὥσπερ σὺ νῦν, ὑπεκτραποίμην μὴ οὐ συνεκσφῆξιν. SOPH. O. C. 565. Τί ἐμποδῶν μὴ οὐχὶ ὑβριζομένους ἀποθανεῖν; XEN. AN. iii. 1, 13. (Τί ἐμποδῶν implies οὐδὲν ἐμποδῶν.) Τίνος ἂν δόξω μὴ οὐχὶ πάμπαν εὐδαίμων εἶναι; *what would hinder you from being perfectly happy?* Id. Hell. iv. 1, 36.

(d) Πᾶς γὰρ ἀσκὺς δύο ἄνδρας ἔξει τοῦ μὴ καταδύναί, i.e. *will keep two men from sinking*. XEN. AN. iii. 5, 11. "Ὀν οὐδεὶς πω προθεῖς τοῦ μὴ πλέον ἔχειν ἀπετράπετο. THUC. i. 76. Εἰ δ' ἂρ' ἐμποδῶν τι αὐτῷ ἐγένετο τοῦ μὴ εὐθὺς τότε δικάσασθαι. DEM. xxxiii. 25. Ἠπίστατο τὴν πόλιν μικρὸν ἀπολιποῦσαν τοῦ μὴ ταῖς ἐσχάταις συμφοραῖς περιπεσεῖν. ISOC. xv. 122. Ἀποσοβούντες ἂν ἐμποδῶν γίνοντο τοῦ μὴ ὀρᾶν αὐτοὺς τὸ ὅλον στράτευμα. XEN. Cyr. ii. 4, 23. Εἰδότες ὅτι ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ εἰσι τοῦ μηδὲν παθεῖν. Ib. iii. 3, 31 (cf. THUC. vi. 18, quoted in 749). Τοῦ δὲ μὴ (κακῶς) πᾶσχειν αὐτοὶ πᾶσαν ἄδειαν ἤγετε, *you were entirely free from fear of suffering harm*. DEM. xix. 149. Ἐνούσης οὐδεμιᾶς ἔτ' ἀποστροφῆς τοῦ μὴ τὰ χρήματ' ἔχειν ὑμᾶς, *there being no longer any escape from the conclusion that you have taken bribes (from your having bribes)*. Id. xxiv. 9.

The last two examples show that the genitive of the infinitive can take μὴ, even after nouns implying *hindrance* or *freedom*. In the two following, the addition of μὴ is more peculiar:—

Ἡ ἀπορία τοῦ μὴ ἡσυχάζειν, *the inability to rest*. THUC. ii. 49. Τῇ τοῦ μὴ ξυμπλεῖν ἀπιστίᾳ, *through distrust of sailing with them*; i.e. *through unwillingness to sail, caused by distrust*. Id. iii. 75.

808. The infinitive with τοῦ μὴ can be used as a genitive in its ordinary negative sense; as οὐτε ἔστιν οὐδεμία πρόφασις ἡμῖν τοῦ μὴ δρᾶν ταῦτα, *no ground for not doing this*. PLAT. Tim. 20 C. See also examples in 798.

809. Although μὴ οὐ is more common than μὴ after negatives in the form (c), the simple μὴ sometimes occurs. E.g.

Οὐ πολὺν χρόνον μ' ἐπέσχον μὴ με ναυστολεῖν ταχύ. SOPH. Ph. 349. Οὐδέ μ' ὄμματος φρουρὰν παρήλθε, τόνδε μὴ λεύσσειν στόλον. Id. Tr. 226.

810. The infinitive in the forms (a), (c), and (d), (but, according to Madvig, not in the form (b), with τοῦ without μὴ) may follow negatives in the construction of 807. See the examples.

Infinitive with τὸ μή or τὸ μὴ οὐ.

811. The infinitive with τὸ μή is used after many verbs and expressions which denote or even imply *hindrance, prevention, omission, or denial*, the μὴ merely strengthening the negative idea of the leading verb. If the leading verb is itself negated, or is interrogative with a negative implied, τὸ μὴ οὐ is generally used with the infinitive instead of τὸ μή (compare 807).

This infinitive with τὸ μή or τὸ μὴ οὐ is often less closely connected with the leading verb than the simple infinitive (see 791), and it sometimes denotes merely the *result* of a prevention or omission. It is sometimes an object accusative, as after expressions of denial; but it oftener resembles the accusative of respect or limitation. It adds a fifth expression, εἶργει σε τὸ μὴ τοῦτο ποιεῖν, to the four already given in 807 as equivalents of *he prevents you from doing this*; and a corresponding form, οὐκ εἶργει σε τὸ μὴ οὐ τοῦτο ποιεῖν, for *he does not prevent you from doing this*. *E.g.*

Τὸν πλείστον ὄμιλον εἶργον τὸ μὴ προεξιόντας τῶν ὅπλων τὰ ἐγγὺς τῆς πόλεως κακουργεῖν, *they prevented them from injuring, etc.* THUC. iii.

1. Τὸ δὲ μὴ λεηλατῆσαι ἐλόντας σφέας τὴν πόλιν ἔσχε τόδε, *this prevented them from plundering the city.* HD. v. 101. Οἰοί τε ἦσαν κατέχειν τὸ μὴ δακρύειν, *to restrain their tears.* PLAT. Phaed. 117 C (cf. 117 E, quoted in 807). Φόβος τε ξυγγενῆς τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν σχήσει, *will check injustice.* AESCH. Eum. 691. Οὗτοί εἰσιν μόνοι ἐτι ἡμῖν ἐμπόδων τὸ μὴ ἦδη εἶναι ἔνθα πάλοι ἐσπεύδομεν. XEN. An. iv. 8, 14. Κίμωνα παρὰ τρεῖς ἀφείσαν ψήφους τὸ μὴ θανάτῳ ζημιῶσαι, *i.e. by three votes they allowed Cimon to escape the punishment of death.* DEM. xxiii. 205. Τρεῖς δὲ μόνοι ψήφοι διήνεγκαν τὸ μὴ θανάτου τιμῆσαι, *and only three votes prevented you from condemning him to death (lit. made the difference about condemning, etc.).* Ib. 167. See XEN. Cyr. v. 1, 25, and Ag. v. 4. Φόβος γὰρ ἀνθ' ὕπνου παραστατεῖ τὸ μὴ βεβαίως βλέφαρα συμβαλεῖν ὕπνῳ, *i.e. stands by to prevent my closing my eyes in sleep.* AESCH. Ag. 15.

Οὐκ ἐναντιώσομαι τὸ μὴ οὐ γεγωνεῖν πᾶν ὅσον προσχρήσετε. Id. Prom. 786. Οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ ταῦτ' ἐπαρκέσει τὸ μὴ οὐ πεσεῖν ἀτίμως πτώματ' οὐκ ἀνασχετά, *this will not suffice to prevent him from falling, etc.* Ib. 918. Λεῖπει μὲν οὐδ' ἃ πρόσθεν ἤδεμεν τὸ μὴ οὐ βαρύστον' εἶναι, *they have no lack of being heavily grievous.* SOPH. O. T. 1232. Μήτοι, κασγινήτη, μ' ἀτιμάσῃς τὸ μὴ οὐ θανεῖν τε σὺν σοὶ τὸν θανόντα θ' ἀγνίσαι, *do not think me too unworthy to die with thee, etc.* Id. Ant. 544. (Compare Ant. 22, and O. C. 49.) Οὐκ ἀποσχόμεν τὸ μὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἐλθεῖν, *I did not refrain from proceeding to this subject.* PLAT. Rep. 354 B; see Crit. 43 C. Οὐκ ἀπέσχοντο οὐδ' ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ πλεονεκτεῖν αὐτῶν πειραῖσθαι. XEN. Cyr. i. 6, 32. Αὐτὴν μὲν οὐ μισοῦντ' ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν τὸ μὴ οὐ

μεγάλην εἶναι κευδαίμονα, *not grudging that city its right to be great*, etc. AR. AV. 36. (Compare μίσσησέν μιν κυσὶ κύρμα γενέσθαι, Π. xvii. 272.) Οὐδεὶς ἀντιλέγει τὸ μὴ οὐ λέξειν ὃ τι ἕκαστος ἡγείται πλείστον ἄξιον ἐπίστασθαι, *no one objects to saying*, etc. XEN. Symp. iii. 3. Μὴ παρῆς τὸ μὴ οὐ φράσαι, *do not omit to speak of it*. SOPH. O. T. 283. Οὐδένα δύνασθαι κρύπτειν τὸ μὴ οὐχ ἡδέως ἂν καὶ ὁμῶν ἐσθίειν αὐτῶν, *that no one is able to prevent people from knowing that he would gladly even eat some of them raw*. XEN. Hell. iii. 3, 6.

812. The form τὸ μὴ is more common here when the leading verb is negative, where regularly τὸ μὴ οὐ would be used, than μὴ for μὴ οὐ in the corresponding case (809). *E.g.*

Οὐκ ἂν ἐσχόμεν τὸ μὴ ἀποκλῆσαι τοῦμὸν ἄθλιον δέμας. SOPH. O. T. 1387. Τίς σοῦ ἀπελείφθη τὸ μὴ σοὶ ἀκολουθεῖν; i.e. *who failed to follow you?* XEN. Cyr. v. 1, 25. "Ἄκος δ' οὐδὲν ἐπῆρκεσαν τὸ μὴ πόλιν μὲν ὥσπερ οὖν ἔχει παθεῖν. AESCH. Ag. 1170. Καὶ φημὶ δρᾶσαι κοῦκ ἀπαρνοῦμαι τὸ μὴ. SOPH. Ant. 443. Οὐδ' ἄρνησις ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς τὸ μὴ ταῦθ' ὑπὲρ Φιλίππου πράττειν, *it is not even possible for them to deny that they did these things in the interest of Philip*. DEM. xix. 163; so xx. 135. So perhaps we may explain τὸ μὴ ἐπιβουλεύειν in HDR. i. 209 (see § 814).

813. Although the infinitive with τὸ μὴ is most frequently used (as in 811) after verbs containing a negative idea, it can also have a negative sense as the object of other verbs or with adjectives. See τὸ μὴ σφάλλεσθαι ἐπιμελεῖσθαι (quoted in 791), and τὸ μὴ βλέπειν ἔτοίμα (quoted in 795), in both of which the infinitive is really negatived by μὴ. We must distinguish also the use of τοῦ μὴ with the infinitive as an ordinary negative expression (see examples in 798) from that which is explained in 807. Compare, likewise, τὸ μὴ οὐ with the infinitive in 814 and in 811. The nature of the leading verb will always make the force of the negative plain. We have the same distinction, with the simple infinitive, between ἀναγκάζει σε μὴ ἐλθεῖν, *he compels you not to go* (747), and εἴργει σε μὴ ἐλθεῖν, *he prevents you from going* (807).

814. The infinitive with τὸ μὴ οὐ may be used in a negative sense in various constructions with verbs and expressions which do not have a negative meaning, provided these are themselves negatived or are interrogative implying a negative. Though τὸ μὴ οὐ is more common here, τὸ μὴ is also allowed. *E.g.*

Κουδεὶς γέ μ' ἂν πείσειεν ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὴ οὐκ ἐλθεῖν ἐπ' αὐτόν, *and no man can persuade me not to go after him*. AR. Ran. 68. Οὐ μέντοι ἔπειθέ γε τὸ μὴ οὐ μεγαλοπράγμων τε καὶ κακοπράγμων εἶναι, *but he did not persuade them that he was not full of great and evil undertakings*. XEN. Hell. v. 2, 36. (For similar expressions with μὴ οὐ without τό, see 749 and 815, 2.) Τοῖς θεοῖς οὐδὲν ἂν ἔχοιμεν μέμψασθαι τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ πάντα πεπραχέναι, *we cannot blame the Gods for not*

having done everything. Id. Cyr. vii. 5, 42 (cf. ταῦτ' οὖν ὑμῖν μέφομαι, AR. Nub. 525). Οὐδὲ ὅστιον ἔμοιγε εἶναι φαίνεται τὸ μὴ οὐ βοηθεῖν τοῦτοις τοῖς λόγοις πάντα ἄνδρα. PLAT. Leg. 891 A. "Ἀλογον τὸ μὴ οὐ τέμνειν. Id. Soph. 219 E (see 817). Τοῖς δὲ οὐδὲ λόγος λείπεται τὸ μὴ οὐ πονηροῖς εἶναι. DEM. xxiv. 69.¹

Οὐκ ὅν ἐστι μηχανὴ οὐδεμία τὸ μὴ ἐκείνον ἐπιβουλεύειν ἐμοί, *there is then no way by which I can believe that he is not plotting against me.* HDT. i. 209 (cf. PLAT. Phaed. 72 D). "Ἐξεῖ τίνα γνώμην λέγειν τὸ μὴ εὐρύπρωκτος εἶναι; AR. Nub. 1084. "Ἐφη οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναι με, *he said it was not possible not to condemn me to death.* PLAT. Ap. 29 C.

Μὴ οὐ WITH INFINITIVE AND PARTICIPLE, AND (RARELY)
WITH NOUNS.

815. 1. The use of μὴ with the infinitive in the forms (c) and (d) in 807 is to be referred to the general principle, by which the infinitive after all verbs expressing a *negative* idea (as those of *denying, distrusting, concealing, forbidding, preventing, etc.*) can always take μὴ, to strengthen the negation implied in the leading verb. Thus we say ἀρνείται μὴ ἀληθὲς εἶναι τοῦτο, *he denies that this is true*; ἀπηγόρευε μηδένα τοῦτο ποιεῖν, *he forbade any one to do this*. This μὴ can, however, be omitted without affecting the sense.

2. An infinitive which for *any* reason would take μὴ (either affecting the infinitive itself, as an ordinary negative, or strengthening a preceding negation, as in the case just mentioned) generally takes the double negative μὴ οὐ, if the verb on which it depends is *itself* negated or is interrogative with a negation implied. Thus the example given above, ἀρνείται μὴ ἀληθὲς εἶναι τοῦτο, if we negative the leading verb, generally becomes οὐκ ἀρνείται μὴ οὐκ ἀληθὲς εἶναι τοῦτο, *he does not deny that this is true*. So, when the original μὴ really negatives the infinitive, as in δικάειν ἐστὶ μὴ τοῦτον ἀφίεναι, *it is just not to acquit him*, if we negative the leading verb, we commonly have οὐ δικάειν ἐστὶ μὴ οὐ τοῦτον ἀφίεναι, *it is not just not to acquit him*. *E.g.*

Ὡς οὐχ ὅστιόν σοι ὄν μὴ οὐ βοηθεῖν δικαιοσύνη, *because (you said) it would be impious for you not to bring aid to Justice.* PLAT. Rep. 427 E. Οὐκ ἂν πιθόμην μὴ οὐ τὰδ' ἐκμαθεῖν σαφῶς, *I cannot consent not to learn the whole.* SOPH. O. T. 1065. "Ἀνδρα δ' οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι, *it is not possible for a man not to be base.* SIMON. v. 10. See also PLAT. Phaed. 72 D (in 749). For examples in which μὴ οὐ strengthens the negation of the leading verb, see 807.

¹ This is cited by Birklein (p. 67) as the only case of the article with μὴ οὐ in the Orators; and no case occurs in either Herodotus or Thucydides.

This applies also to the infinitive with τὸ μὴ. See 811 and 814.

816. When μὴ or μὴ οὐ with the infinitive follows a verb of hindrance, etc. (807), neither μὴ nor μὴ οὐ can be translated. When μὴ really negatives the infinitive (as in the examples last given), μὴ οὐ must be translated by one negative. In PLAT. Rep. 368 B, the passage quoted in 427 E (815, 2, above), Socrates had said δέδοικα μὴ οὐδ' ὄσιον ἢ . . . ἀπαγορεύειν καὶ μὴ βοηθεῖν, being prevented from saying μὴ οὐ βοηθεῖν by the previous μὴ οὐδ'. In XEN. Ap. 34 we have οὔτε μὴ μεμνήσθαι δύναμαι αὐτοῦ οὔτε μεμνημένος μὴ οὐκ ἐπαινεῖν.

817. Verbs and expressions which contain such negative ideas as impossibility, difficulty, unwillingness, or impropriety sometimes take μὴ οὐ (instead of the simple μὴ) with the infinitive, to express a real negation, even when the leading verb is not negated. *E.g.*

Δήμον ἀρχοντος ἀδύνατα μὴ οὐ κακότητα ἐγγίνεσθαι, it is impossible that vice should not come in (as if it were οὐ δυνατά). HDT. iii. 82. Δεινὸν ἐδόκεε εἶναι μὴ οὐ λαβεῖν αὐτά. Id. i. 187. "Ὡστε πᾶσιν αἰσχύνῃν εἶναι μὴ οὐ συσπονδάξιν, so that all were ashamed not to join heartily in the work. XEN. An. ii. 3, 11. So ἡσχύνετο μὴ οὐ φαίνεσθαι, Cyr. viii. 4, 5. Αἰσχρὸν ἔστι μὴ οὐχὶ φάναι. PLAT. Prot. 352 D. Πολλὴ ἀνοια μὴ οὐχ ἡγείεσθαι. Id. Symp. 210 B. So after ἀνόητον, ib. 218 C; after ἄλογον, id. Soph. 219 E (see 814). For χαλεπὸς followed by μὴ οὐ, see example under 819.

818. Μὴ οὐ is occasionally used with participles in negative sentences, in place of the simple μὴ, to express a negative condition. The following cases are quoted:—

Οὐκὼν δίκαιον εἶναι (Δαρεῖον ἀνδριάντα) ὑστάναι μὴ οὐκ ὑπερβαλλόμενον τοῖσι ἔργοις, i.e. he said that Darius had no right to set up his statue (in front of that of Sesostris), unless he surpassed him in his exploits (= εἰ μὴ ὑπερβάλλεται). HDT. ii. 110. Καταρρώδησαν μὴ οὐ . . . τὴν Μίλητον οἰοί τε ἔωσι ἐξελεῖν μὴ οὐ ἔόντες ναυκράτορες they feared that they might not be able to capture Miletus without being masters of the sea (their thought was εἰ μὴ ναυκράτορές ἐσμεν). Id. vi. 9. Εἰνάτη δὲ οὐκ ἐξελεύσεσθαι ἔφασαν μὴ οὐ πλήρης ἔοντος τοῦ κύκλου, they refused to march out on the ninth of the month (and thereafter) until the moon should be full (ἐὰν μὴ πλήρης ᾖ). Id. vi. 106. Δυσάλγητος γὰρ ἂν εἴην τοιάδε μὴ οὐ κατοικτείρων ἔδραν, for I should be hard of heart (817) should I feel no pity for such a band of suppliants (εἰ μὴ κατοικτείρομαι). SOPH. O. T. 12. Οὐ γὰρ ἂν μακρὰν ἔχενον αὐτός, μὴ οὐκ ἔχων τι σύμβολον, for I should not have traced it far, if I had attempted it by myself without any clue. Ib. 220. (For the force of the subordinate condition of μὴ οὐκ ἔχων in its relation to the real protasis in αὐτός, see 511.) "Ἡκεῖς γὰρ οὐ κενὴ γε, τοῦτ' ἐγὼ σαφῶς ἔξοιδα, μὴ οὐχὶ δέιμ' ἐμοὶ φέρονσά τι, i.e. you have not come empty-handed, — (not at least) without bringing me some cause for alarm (i.e. οὐκ εἰ μὴ φέρεις). Id. O. C. 359. (Μὴ οὐχὶ φέρονσα adds a condition as a quali-

fication to κενή.) Οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ φιλὸν τῷ φιλοῦντι οὐδὲν μὴ οὐκ ἀντιφιλοῦν, *unless it loves in return*. PLAT. Lys. 212 D. (Cf. φίλοι δέ γε οὐκ ἂν εἶεν μὴ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιούμενοι ἑαυτούς, 215 B.) Τίς γὰρ ἂν ἡβουλήθη μικρὰ κερδᾶναι, κ.τ.λ.; οὐδ' ἂν εἷς μὴ οὐ συνειδὼς ἑαυτῷ συκοφαντοῦντι, *not a man (would have wished for this) if he had not been conscious that he was a sycophant (= εἰ μὴ συνήδει)*. DEM. lviii. 13. Οὔτε γὰρ ναυαγὸς, ἂν μὴ γῆς λάβηται φερόμενος, οὔποτ' ἂν σώσειεν αὐτόν· οὔτ' ἀνὴρ πένης γεγώς μὴ οὐ τέχνην μαθὼν δύναιτ' ἂν ἀσφαλῶς ζῆν τὸν βίον (i.e. εἰ μὴ μάθοι, corresponding to ἂν μὴ λάβηται). PHILEM. Fr. 213.

819. Μὴ οὐ occasionally occurs with nouns, in the same general sense as with participles, to express a negative condition to a negative statement. *E.g.*

Αἷ τε πόλεις πολλαὶ καὶ χαλεπαὶ λαβεῖν, μὴ οὐ χρόνῳ καὶ πολιορκίᾳ, *the cities were many, and difficult (= not easy, 817) to capture except by time and siege*. DEM. xix. 123. Τοιαύτης δὲ τιμῆς τυχεῖν οὐχ οἶόν τε μὴ οὐ τὸν πολὺ τῇ γνώμῃ διαφέροντα, *to attain such honour is not possible except for one who is of far transcendent wisdom*. ISOC. x. 47. (If τόν is omitted, διαφέροντα as a participle belongs under 818.)

820. It may be noted that μὴ οὐ in poetry always forms one syllable.

CHAPTER VI.

THE PARTICIPLE.

821. As the infinitive is a verbal noun, so the participle is a verbal adjective; both retaining all the attributes of a verb which are consistent with their nature.

822. The participle has three uses :—first, it may express an *attribute*, qualifying a noun like an ordinary adjective (824-831); secondly, it may define the *circumstances* under which the action of the sentence takes place (832-876); thirdly, it may be joined to a verb to *supplement* its meaning, often having a force resembling that of the infinitive (877-919).

823. The distinction between the second and third of these classes is less clearly marked than that between the first and the two others: thus in *ἡδεται τιμώμενος*, *he delights in being honoured*, the participle is generally classed as supplementary (881), although it expresses cause (838). Even an attributive participle may also be circumstantial; as *ὁ μὴ δαρὲς ἄνθρωπος*, *the unflogged man* (824), involves a condition. The three classes are, nevertheless, sufficiently distinct for convenience, though the lines (like many others in syntax) must not be drawn so strictly as to defeat their object.

A. ATTRIBUTIVE PARTICIPLE.

824. The participle may qualify a noun, like an attributive adjective. Here it may often be translated by a finite verb and a relative, especially when it is preceded by the article. *E.g.*

Πόλις κάλλει διαφέρουσα, *a city excelling in beauty*. *Ἄνθρωπος καλῶς πεπαιδευμένος*, *a man (who has been) well educated*. *Οἱ πρό-*

σβεις οἱ παρὰ Φιλίππου πεμφθέντες, *the ambassadors (who had been) sent from Philip*. Ἄνδρες οἱ τοῦτο ποιήσοντες, *men who will do this*.

Ἐν τῇ Μεσσηνίᾳ ποτὲ οὖσῃ γῇ, *in the land which was once Messenia*. THUC. iv. 3. Στρατεύουσιν ἐπὶ τὰς Αἰόλου νήσους καλουμένας, *they sail against the so-called Aeolian islands, lit. the islands called those of Aeolus*. Id. iii. 88. Αἱ ἀρισταὶ δοκοῦσαι εἶναι φύσεις, *the natures which seem to be best*. XEN. Mem. iv. 1, 3. Αἱ πρὸ τοῦ στόματος νῆες ναυμαχοῦσαι. THUC. vii. 23. Ἐπεπείσμην μέγαν εἶναι τὸν κατεilahφότα κίνδυνον τὴν πόλιν, *the danger which had overtaken the city*. DEM. xviii. 220. Ὁ μὴ δαρεῖς ἄνθρωπος οὐ παύεται. MEN. Mon. 422.

825. The participle with the article may be used *substantively*, like any adjective. Here it may generally be translated by a finite verb and a relative, the verb expressing the tense of the participle. *E.g.*

Οἱ κρατοῦντες, *the conquerors*. Οἱ πεπεισμένοι, *those who have been convinced*. Οὗτός ἐστι ὁ τοῦτο ποιήσας, *this is the one who did it*. Οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ ὑμᾶς πάντας ἀδικήσοντες, *these are the men who will wrong you all*. Πάντες οἱ παρόντες τοῦτο ἑώρων, *all who were present saw this*. Τὸ κρατοῦν τῆς πόλεως, *the ruling part of the state*.

Ὁ μὴ λαβὼν καὶ διαφθαρεῖς νενίκηκε τὸν ὠνούμενον, *he who did not take (the bribe) and become corrupt has defeated the one who would buy him*. DEM. xviii. 247 (see 841). Τῶν ἐργασομένων ἐνόντων, *there being in the country those who would cultivate it (i.e. men to cultivate it)*. XEN. AN. ii. 4, 22. (See 826 and 840.) Παρὰ τοῖς ἀρίστοις δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, *among those who seem to be best*. Id. Mem. iv. 2, 6. Ἦν δὲ ὁ μὲν τὴν γνώμην ταύτην εἰπὼν Πείσανδρος, *and Peisander was the one who gave this opinion*. THUC. viii. 68. Τοῖς Ἀρκάδων σφετέροις οἷσι ξυμμάχοις προεῖπον, *they proclaimed to those of the Arcadians who were their allies*. Id. v. 64. Ἀφεκτέον ἐγὼ φημι εἶναι τῷ σωφρονεῖν δυνησομένῳ, *i.e. one who is to be able to be discreet*. XEN. Symp. iv. 26.

826. When the participle, in either of these constructions, refers to a purpose, intention, or expectation, it is generally future, though sometimes present. *E.g.*

Νόμον δημοσίᾳ τὸν ταῦτα κωλύσοντα τέθινται τουτονί, *they have publicly enacted this law, which is to prevent these things*. DEM. xxi. 49. See XEN. AN. ii. 4, 22 in 825. Ὁ ἡγησόμενος οὐδεὶς ἔσται, *there will be nobody who will lead us*. Ib. ii. 4, 5. Πολλοὺς ἔξομεν τοὺς ἐτόιμους συναγωνιζομένους ἡμῖν. ISOC. viii. 139.

See the more common use of the circumstantial future participle to express a purpose, in 840.

827. (a) Participles, like adjectives, are occasionally used substantively even without the article, in an indefinite sense; generally in the plural. *E.g.*

"Ἐπλεῖ δώδεκα τριήρεις ἔχων ἐπὶ πολλὰς ναῦς κεκτημένους, *he sailed with twelve triremes against men who had many ships*. XEN. Hell. v. 1, 19. "Ὅταν πολεμούντων πόλις ἀλφῶ, *whenever a city of belligerents is taken*. Id. Cyr. vii. 5, 73. Μετὰ ταῦτα ἀφικνούνται μοι ἀπαγγέλλοντες ὅτι ὁ πατήρ ἀφείται, *there come messengers announcing, etc.* ISOC. xvii. 11. Δύναιτ' ἂν οὐδ' ἂν ἰσχύων φυγεῖν, *not even a strong man could escape*. SOPH. El. 697. Οὐκ ἔστι φιλοῦντα (a lover) μὴ ἀντιφιλείσθαι; PLAT. Lys. 212 B.

(b) This use in the singular appears especially in *θνητὸν ὄντα*, *one who is a mortal*. This indefinite expression, though masculine, may refer to both sexes. *E.g.*

Ἐν ποικίλοις δὲ θνητὸν ὄντα κάλλεσιν βαίνειν ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐδαμῶς ἄνευ φόβου, *i.e. for a mortal (like myself) to walk on these rich embroideries, etc.* AESCH. Ag. 923. Κούφως φέρειν χρὴ θνητὸν ὄντα συμφοράς, *(one who is) a mortal (like yourself) must bear calamities lightly* (addressed to Medea). EUR. Med. 1018. So in SOPH. Ant. 455 *θνητὸν ὄνθ'* means *a mortal (like myself)*, and refers to Antigone, not to Creon; she means that Creon's proclamations could not justify her in violating the edicts of the Gods.

828. In the poets, the participle with the article sometimes becomes so completely a substantive, that it takes an adnominal genitive rather than the case which its verbal force would require. A few expressions like οἱ προσήκοντες, *relatives*, τὸ συμφέρον or τὰ συμφέροντα, *gain, advantage*, τὰ υπάρχοντα, *resources*, are thus used even in prose. *E.g.*

Ὁ ἐκείνου τεκών, *his father* (for ὁ ἐκείνου τεκών). EUR. El. 335. Τὰ μικρὰ συμφέροντα τῆς πόλεως, *the small advantages of the state*. DEM. xviii. 28. Βασιλέως προσήκοντές τινας, *certain relatives of the king*. THUC. i. 128.

829. (a) The neuter singular of the present participle with the article is sometimes used as an abstract noun, where we should expect the infinitive with the article. This occurs chiefly in Thucydides and in the poets. *E.g.*

Ἐν τῷ μὴ μελετῶντι ἀξυνετώτεροι ἔσονται, *in the want of practice they will be less skilful*. THUC. i. 142. (Here we should expect ἐν τῷ μὴ μελετᾶν.) Γνώτω τὸ μὲν δεδιὸς αὐτοῦ τοὺς ἐναντίους μᾶλλον φοβήσον, τὸ δὲ θαρσοῦν ἀδέεστερον ἐσόμενον. Id. i. 36. (Here τὸ δεδιὸς, *fear*, is used like τὸ δεδιέναι, and τὸ θαρσοῦν, *courage*, like τὸ θαρσεῖν or τὸ θάρσος.) Μετὰ τοῦ δρωμένου, *with action* (like μετὰ τοῦ δράσθαι). Id. v. 102. Τοῦ ὑπαπιέναι πλέον ἢ τοῦ μένοντος τὴν διάνοιαν ἔχουσιν (infin. and partic. combined). Id. v. 9. Καὶ σέ γ' εἰσάξω· τὸ γὰρ νοσοῦν ποθεῖ σε ξυμπαραστάτην λαβεῖν. SOPH. Ph. 674 (τὸ νοσοῦν = ἡ νόσος). Τὸ γὰρ ποθοῦν ἕκαστος ἐκμαθεῖν θέλων οὐκ ἂν μεθεῖτο, πρὶν καθ' ἡδονὴν κλύειν. Id. Tr. 196.

This is really the same use of the neuter singular of an adjective for the corresponding abstract noun, which is common in ordinary adjectives; as τὸ καλόν, *beauty*, for τὸ κάλλος; τὸ δίκαιον and τὸ ἄδικον for ἡ δικαιοσύνη and ἡ ἀδικία.

(b) A similar construction sometimes occurs when a participle and a noun are used like an articular infinitive with its subject, where in English we generally use a finite verb. *E.g.*

Μετὰ δὲ Σόλωνα οἰχόμενον ἔλαβε νέμεσις μεγάλη Κροίσον, *i.e. after Solon was gone (like μετὰ τὸ Σόλωνα οἰχεσθαι)*. HDT. i. 34. Ἐπὶ τούτου τυραννεύοντος, *in his reign*. Id. i. 15 : so viii. 44. Ἐτεῖ πέμπτῳ μετὰ Συρακούσας οἰκισθείσας, *in the fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse*. THUC. vi. 3. Compare *post urbem conditam* in Latin. Μετὰ καλὸν οὕτω καὶ παντοδαπὸν λόγον ῥηθέντα (like μετὰ τὸ . . . ῥηθῆναι). PLAT. Symp. 198 B. Τῇ πόλει οὔτε πολέμου κακῶς συμβάντος οὔτε στάσεως πώποτε αἴτιος ἐγένετο, *i.e. the cause of a disastrous result of any war (like τοῦ πόλεμόν τινα κακῶς συμβῆναι)*. XEN. Mem. i. 2, 63.

(c) The same construction occurs in Homer ; as ἐς ἥλιον κατὰ δύντα, *to the going down of the sun*, Il. i. 601 ; ἀμ' ἧοι φαινομένηφιν, Il. ix. 682.

For the peculiar use of the aorist participle here, see 149.

830. The participle is sometimes used like a predicate adjective, with εἰμί or γίγνομαι. *E.g.*

Τί ποτ' ἐστὶν οὗτος ἐκείνου διαφέρων ; *in what is this man different from that one (another form for διαφέρει)* ? PLAT. Gorg. 500 C. Συμφέρον ἦν τῇ πόλει, *it was advantageous to the state (= συνέφερον)*. DEM. xix. 75. Οὔτε γὰρ θρασὺς οὐτ' οὐδὲν προδείσας εἰμί τῷ γε νῦν λόγῳ. SOPH. O. T. 90. Ἀπαρνεόμενός ἐστι (= ἀπαρνέεται). HDT. iii. 99. Ἡ δὲ ἐστὶ δέκα σταδίου ἀπέχουσα, *and it (the island) is ten stades distant*. Id. ix. 51.

Ἄν ἥ θέλουσα, πάντ' ἐμοῦ κομίζεται, *whatever she wants, she always obtains from me (for ἂν θέλῃ)*. SOPH. O. T. 580. Ἦν γὰρ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς βεβαιοτάτα δὴ φύσεως ἰσχὺν δηλώσας, καὶ ἄξιός θ' αὐμῶσαι, *Themistocles was one who manifested, etc.* THUC. i. 138. Τοῦτο οὐκ ἐστὶ γιγνόμενον παρ' ἡμῖν ; *is not this something that goes on in our minds ?* PLAT. Phil. 39 C. Τοῦτο κινδυνεύει τρόπον τινὰ γιγνόμενον ἢ δικαιοσύνη εἶναι, *justice seems somehow to be proving to be (lit. becoming) this*. Id. Rep. 433 B.

So with ὑπάρχω and the poetic πέλομαι ; as τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν ὑμᾶς εἰδότας ἡγοῦμαι, *I think you may be presumed to know this*, DEM. xviii. 95 ; ἐμεῖο λελασμένος ἔπλεν, Il. xxiii. 69.

831. On the same principle, the participle is used in all periphrastic forms with εἰμί and ἔχω for the perfect, pluperfect, and future perfect. In the future perfect active, the periphrastic form is generally the only one in use ; in the third person plural of the perfect and pluperfect middle and passive of most verbs, it is the only form possible. Examples of the perfect participle with εἰμί or ἦν as peculiar forms of the perfect and pluperfect, in other persons, are given in 45 ; of ἔχω and εἶχον with the aorist and perfect participle for the perfect and pluperfect, in 47 and 48 ; of ἔσομαι with the perfect and aorist participle for the future perfect, in 80 and 81.

B. CIRCUMSTANTIAL PARTICIPLE.

832. The participle may define the *circumstances* under which an action takes place, agreeing with the noun or pronoun to which it relates. The negative of such a participle is οὐ, unless it has a conditional force.

The relations expressed by the participle in this use are the following :—

833. I. *Time*, the tenses of the participle denoting various points of time, which is relative to that of the leading verb. *E.g.*

Ταῦτα εἰπὼν ἀπῆει, *when he had said this, he departed.* Ἀπῆνθησα Φιλίππῳ ἀπιόντι, *I met Philip as he was departing.* Τοῦτο πεποιηκότες χαίρησουσιν. Ταῦτα ἔπραττε στρατηγῶν, *he did these things while he was general.* Ταῦτα πράξει στρατηγῶν, *he will do these things when he is general.* Τυραννέυσας δὲ ἔτη τρία Ἰππίας ἐχώρει ὑπόσπονδος ἐς Σίγειον, *after a rule of three years.* THUC. vi. 59. Νῦν μὲν δεῖπνετε· δεῖπνήσαντες δὲ ἀπελαύνετε, *i.e. after supping.* XEN. Cyr. iii. 1, 37. So vii. 5, 78 ; An. vii. 1, 13.

834. Certain temporal participles, agreeing with the subject of a sentence, have almost the force of adverbs. Such are ἀρχόμενος, *at first* ; τελευτῶν, *at last, finally* ; διαλιπὼν (or ἐπωχὼν) χρόνον, *after a while, or διαλείπων χρόνον, at intervals* ; χρονίζων, *for a long time.* *E.g.*

Ἄπερ καὶ ἀρχόμενος εἶπον, *as I said also at first.* THUC. iv. 64. Τελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τοὺς χειροτέχνας ἦα, *finally then I went to the artisans.* PLAT. Ap. 22 C. Ὀλίγον χρόνον διαλιπὼν ἐκινήθη, *after a little while he moved.* Id. Phaed. 118. Οὐ πολὺν χρόνον ἐπισχὼν ἦκε, *after (waiting) no long time he came.* Ib. 59 E. Διαλείπουσαν χρόνον, *at intervals (of Clotho's regular movements).* Id. Rep. 617 C. Ὅπως χρονίζον εὐ μενεῖ βουλευτέον. AESCH. Ag. 847 : cf. χρονισθεῖς, Ib. 727.

835. II. *Means.* *E.g.*

Ληζόμενοι ζῶουσιν, *they live by plunder.* XEN. Cyr. iii. 2, 25. Τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐδίδαξαν, ὃν τρόπον διοικούντες τὰς αὐτῶν πατρίδας καὶ πρὸς οὓς πολεμοῦντες μεγάλην ἂν τὴν Ἑλλάδα ποιήσειαν. ISOC. xii. 44. Οὐ γὰρ ἀλλοτρίοις ὑμῶν χρωμένοις παραδείγμασιν ἀλλ' οἰκείοις, εὐδαίμοσιν ἔξεστι γενέσθαι, *for it is by using not foreign but domestic examples that you can become prosperous.* DEM. iii. 23. Τῶν νόμων ἅπτεροι γίγνονται καὶ τῶν λόγων, οἷς δεῖ χρώμενον ὁμιλεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, *which we (τινά) must use in our intercourse with men.* PLAT. Gorg. 484 D. So often χρώμενος in the sense of *with* (cf. 843).

836. III. Manner and similar relations, including manner of employment, etc. *E.g.*

Προείλετο μάλλον τοῖς νόμοις ἐμμένων ἀποθανεῖν ἢ παρανομῶν ζῆν, *he preferred to die abiding by the laws, rather than to live disobeying them.* XEN. Mem. iv. 4, 4. Προαιρούνται μάλλον οὕτω κερδαίνειν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἢ συνωφελοῦντες αὐτούς, *they prefer to get gain by this means from each other, rather than by uniting to aid themselves.* Ib. iii. 5, 16. Καὶ ἡ γελάσασα ἔφη, *and she said with a laugh.* PLAT. Symp. 202 B. Ἀρπάσαντας τὰ ὅπλα πορεύεσθαι, *to march having snatched up their arms (i.e. eagerly).* DEM. iii. 20 : cf. οἶον ῥίψαντας τὰ ἱμάτια, PLAT. Rep. 474 A.

837. The following participles of manner are used in peculiar senses : φέρων, *hastily* ; φερόμενος, *with a rush* ; ἀνύσας, *quickly* ; κατατείνας, *earnestly* ; διατεινόμενος and διατεταμένος, *with all one's might* ; φθάσας, *before (anticipating)* ; λαθών, *secretly* ; ἔχων, *continually* ; κλαίων, *to one's sorrow* ; χαίρων, *with impunity (to one's joy).* *E.g.*

Εἰς τοῦτο φέρων περιέστησε τὰ πράγματα, *he rapidly brought things to such a pass.* AESCHIN. iii. 82. Ὡς ἐσέπεσον φερόμενοι ἐς τοὺς Ἕλληνας οἱ Μῆδοι, *when the Persians fell upon the Greeks with a rush.* HDT. vii. 210. So οἰχήσεσθαι φερομένην κατὰ ῥόδον, PLAT. Rep. 492 C. Ἄνοιγ' ἀνύσας τὸ φροντιστήριον, *make haste and open the thinking-shop.* AR. Nub. 181. Κατατείνας ἐρῶ τὸν ἀδικὸν βίον ἐπαίνων, *I will speak earnestly in praise of the unjust life.* PLAT. Rep. 358 D : so 367 B. See Rep. Mem. iv. 2, 23. Ἐρ' ἀνέψξας με φθάσας, *then you opened it (the door) before I could knock.* AR. Plut. 1102 : so ὅς μ' ἔβαλε φθάμενος, II. v. 119 ; but in such expressions ἐφθῇ βαλὼν etc. (887) is more common. Ἀπὸ τείχεος ἄλτο λαθών, *he leaped from the wall secretly.* II. xii. 390 : cf. λήθουσά μ' ἐξέπινες, SOPH. Ant. 532 ; here again ἔλαθον with the participle is more common (see 893). Τί κυπτάξεις ἔχων ; *why do you keep poking about ?* AR. Nub. 509. Κλαίων ἄψει τῶνδε, *you will lay hands on them to your sorrow.* EUR. Her. 270 : so SOPH. Ant. 754. Οὐ τι χαίρων ἐρεῖς, *you shall not speak with impunity.* Id. O. T. 363 ; so Ant. 759. Τοῦτον οὐδεὶς χαίρων ἀδικήσει. PLAT. Gorg. 510 D. Compare ταξαμένους, *according to agreement,* Id. Rep. 416 E.

838. IV. Cause or ground of action. *E.g.*

Λέγω δὲ τοῦδ' ἔνεκα, βουλόμενος δόξαι σοὶ ὅπερ ἐμοί, *and I speak for this reason, because I wish, etc.* PLAT. Phaed. 102 D. Ἀπείχοντο κερδῶν, αἰσχυρὰ νομίζοντες εἶναι, *because they believed them to be base.* XEN. Mem. i. 2, 22. Τί γὰρ ἀν βουλόμενοι ἄνδρες σοφοὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς δεσπότης ἀμείνους αὐτῶν φεύγοιεν, *with what object in view, etc. (i.e. wishing what) ?* PLAT. Phaed. 63 A. Τί γὰρ δεδιότες σφόδρα οὕτως ἐπείγεσθε ; *what do you fear, that you are in such great haste ?* XEN. Hell. i. 7, 26.

ἐαντῶν ἔσεσθαι, *do you think that Alcestis would have died for Admetus, etc., if they had not believed, etc.* PLAT. Symp. 208 D. (Here μὴ οἰόμενους is equivalent to εἰ μὴ ᾤοντο.) Οὐ γὰρ ἂν αὐτοῖς ἔμελεν μὴ τοῦθ' ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, *for it would not have concerned them, unless they had had this idea.* DEM. ix. 45. (Μὴ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν = εἰ μὴ τοῦτο ὑπελάμβανον.) "Ἀστρων ἂν ἔλθοιμ' ἡλίου πρὸς ἀντολὰς καὶ γῆς ἔνερθε, δυνατὸς ὦν δράσαι τάδε, *if I should be able to do this (εἰ δυνατὸς εἴην).* EUR. Ph. 504. So the attributive participles ὁ μὴ δαρεῖς (824) and ὁ μὴ λαβῶν (825).

In SOPH. O. T. 289, πάλαι δὲ μὴ παρὼν θαυμάζεται, the construction represents θαυμάζομεν εἰ μὴ πάρεστιν, *we wonder that he is not here* (494).

For μὴ οὐ with the participle in negative conditions, where μὴ is more common, see 818.

See other examples under 472.

842. VII. Opposition, limitation, or concession, where the participle may often be translated by *although*. E.g.

Οἷτος δὲ καὶ μεταπεμφθῆναι φάσκων ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς, καὶ ἐλθὼν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν, εἰσελθεῖν μὲν οὐ φησιν, Δημοφῶντος δ' ἀκοῦσαι γραμματεῖον ἀναγινώσκοντος, καὶ προεισεληλυθὼς καὶ ἅπαντα διωμολογημένος πρὸς τὸν πατέρα, *and this man, although he admits that he was summoned, and although he did go to the house, yet denies that he went in, etc., although he had previously gone in and arranged everything with my father.* DEM. xxviii. 14. 'Ολίγα δυνάμενοι προορᾶν περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος πολλὰ ἐπιχειροῦμεν πράττειν, *although we are able to foresee few things, etc.* XEN. Cyr. iii. 2, 15. 'Ελὼν καὶ δυνηθεὶς ἂν αὐτὸς ἔχειν, παρέδωκε, *i.e. when he had captured it (Olynthus) and might have kept it himself, he surrendered it.* DEM. xxiii. 107.

The participle in this sense is very often accompanied by καίπερ and other particles. (See 859.) This construction is the most common equivalent of a clause with *although*.

843. VIII. Any attendant circumstance, the participle being merely descriptive. E.g.

Παραλαβόντες Βοιωτοὺς καὶ Φωκέας ἐστράτευσαν ἐπὶ Φάρσαλον, *they took Boeotians and Phocians with them and marched against Pharsalus.* THUC. i. 111. Παραγγέλλει τῷ Κλεάρχῳ λαβόντι ἡκεῖν ὅσον ἦν αὐτῷ στράτευμα, *he sends orders to Cl. to come with all the army that he has.* XEN. An. i. 2, 1. Ἐρχεται Μανδάνη τὸν Κῦρον τὸν υἱὸν ἔχουσα, *Mandane comes with her son Cyrus.* Id. Cyr. i. 3, 1. Καταδιώξαντες καὶ ναῦς δώδεκα λαβόντες τοὺς τε ἄνδρας ἀνελόμενοι ἀπέπλεον, καὶ πρόπαιον στήσαντες ἀνεχώρησαν. THUC. ii. 84. Μία ἐς Πελοπόννησον ᾤχετο πρέσβεις ἄγουσα, *one (ship) was gone to Peloponnesus with ambassadors.* Id. vii. 25. Δὸς τῷ ξείνῳ ταῦτα φέρων, *take these and give them to the stranger.* Od. xvii. 345. Βοῇ χρώμενοι, *with a shout.* THUC. ii. 84.

844. The participles ἔχων, ἄγων, λαβών, φέρων, and χρώμενος may often be translated by *with*: see examples in 843. (For another use of φέρων see 837.)

845. IX. That *in which* the action of the verb *consists*.
E.g.

Τόδ' εἶπε φωνῶν, *thus he spake saying*. AESCH. Ag. 205. "Οο' ἡμᾶς ἀγαθὰ δέδρακας εἰρήνην ποιήσας, *what blessings you have done us in making peace!* AR. Pac. 1199. Εὖ γ' ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας με, *you did well in reminding me*. PLAT. Phaed. 60 C.

See other examples under 150, where the peculiar force of the aorist participle in such cases, denoting the same time with the verb, is illustrated.

846. The examples show that no exact distinctions of all circumstantial participles are possible, as many express various relations at the same time. See 823.

Genitive Absolute.

847. When a circumstantial participle (832-846) belongs to a substantive which is not grammatically connected with the main construction of the sentence, both the substantive and the participle generally stand in the genitive, in the construction called the *genitive absolute*. *E.g.*

Οὐ τις ἐμὲ ζῶντος σοὶ βαρείας χεῖρας ἐποίησε, *no one while I live shall lay heavy hands upon you*. IL. i. 88. Ταῦτ' ἐπράχθη Κόνωνος μὲν στρατηγοῦντος, Εὐαγόρου δὲ τοῦτο παρασχόντος καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως τὴν πλείστην παρασκευάσαντος, *these were accomplished while Conon was general, and after Evagoras had thus supplied him, etc.* ISOC. ix. 56. Φοβοῦμαι μὴ, προσδεξαμένων τῶν νῦν ἀνθεστηκότων αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ γνώμῃ πάντων φιλιππισάντων, εἰς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἔλθωσιν ἀμφοτέροι. DEM. xviii. 176: see xix. 50 (pres. and perf.). Ἀφίκετο δεῦρο τὸ πλοῖον, γνόντων τῶν Κεφαλλήνων ἀντιπράττοντος τούτου . . . καταπλεῖν, *the Cephallenians having determined to sail in, although this man opposed it*. ID. xxxii. 14. Ἀθηναίων δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο παθόντων, διπλασίαν ἂν τὴν δύναμιν εἰκάσθαι (οἶμαι), *i.e. if the Athenians should ever suffer this same thing, etc.* THUC. i. 10. Ὅλης γὰρ τῆς πόλεως ἐπιτρεπομένης τῷ στρατηγῷ, μεγάλα τὰ τε ἀγαθὰ κατορθοῦντος αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ κακὰ διαμαρτάνοντος εἰκὸς γίγνεσθαι. XEN. Mem. iii. 1, 3.

The genitive absolute was probably used at first to express time (present or past according to the tense), and afterwards the other circumstantial relations, cause, condition, concession, etc. The construction is most fully developed in Attic prose, especially in the Orators.¹

¹ See Spieker in *Am. Jour. Phil.* vi. pp. 310-343, on *The Genitive Absolute in the Attic Orators*.

848. A participle sometimes stands alone in the genitive absolute, when a noun or pronoun can easily be supplied from the context, or when some general word like *ἀνθρώπων* or *πραγμάτων* is understood. *E.g.*

Οἱ δὲ πολέμιοι, προσιόντων, τέως μὲν ἡσύχαζον, *but the enemy, as they (men before mentioned) came on, for a time kept quiet.* XEN. AN. v. 4, 16. So ἐπαγομένων αὐτούς, *when they were called in (when people called them in),* THUC. i. 3. Οὕτω δ' ἐχόντων, εἰκὸς, κ.τ.λ., *and things being so (sc. πραγμάτων), etc.* XEN. AN. iii. 2. 10. Οὐκ ἐξαιτούμενος, οὐκ Ἀμφικτυονικὰς δίκας ἐπαγόντων, οὐκ ἐπαγγελλομένων, οὐδαμῶς ἐγὼ προδέδωκα τὴν εἰς ὑμᾶς εὐνοίαν. DEM. xviii. 322. (Here the vague idea *they* is understood with ἐπαγόντων and ἐπαγγελλομένων.) So πολεμούντων, PLAT. Rep. 557 E.

So when the participle denotes a state of the weather; as ὕοντος πολλῶ, *when it was raining heavily,* XEN. Hell. i. 1, 16. In such cases the participle is masculine, Διὸς being understood. See AR. Nub. 370, ὕοντα; and IL. xii. 25, δε δ' ἄρα Ζεὺς.

849. A passive participle may stand in the genitive absolute with a clause introduced by ὅτι. If the subject of such a clause is plural, or if there are several subjects, the participle itself may be plural, by a kind of attraction. *E.g.*

Σαφῶς δηλωθέντος ὅτι ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὰ πράγματα ἐγένετο, *it having been clearly shown, that, etc.* THUC. i. 74. Ἐσαγγελθέντων ὅτι Φοίνισσαι νῆες ἐπ' αὐτοὺς πλέουσιν, *it having been announced, that, etc.* Id. i. 116. So XEN. Cyr. i. 4, 18; vi. 2, 19.

850. The genitive absolute is regularly used only when a new subject is introduced into the sentence (847) and not when the participle can be joined with any substantive already belonging to the construction. Yet this principle is sometimes violated, in order to make the participial clause more prominent and to express its relation (time, cause, etc.) with greater emphasis. *E.g.*

Διαβεβηκότος ἤδη Περικλέους, ἡγγέλθη αὐτῷ ὅτι Μέγαρα ἀφίστηκε, *when Pericles had already crossed over, it was announced to him that Megara had revolted.* THUC. i. 114.

So sometimes in Latin, but generally with difference in meaning; as Galliam Italianque tentari *se absente* nolebat, CAES. Bell. Civ. i. 29.

Accusative Absolute.

851. The participle of an *impersonal* verb stands in the *accusative* absolute, in the neuter singular, with or without an infinitive, when other participles with their subjects would stand in the genitive absolute.

Such are ἐξόν, δέον, παρόν, προσήκον, πρέπον, παρέχον, μέλον, μεταμέλον, δοκοῦν, δόξαν, and the like; also passive participles used impersonally (as προσταχθέν, εἰρημένον, δεδογμένον); and such

expressions as ἀδύνατον ὄν, *it being impossible*, composed of an adjective and ὄν; also τυχόν, *perchance*. *E.g.*

Οἱ δ' οὐ βοηθήσαντες δέον ὑγίεις ἀπῆλθον; *and did those who brought no aid when it was necessary escape safe and sound?* PLAT. Alcib. i. 115 B. Ἀπλᾶς δὲ λύπας ἐξὸν (sc. φέρειν), οὐκ οἶσω διπλᾶς. EUR. I. T. 688. Παρέχον δὲ τῆς Ἀσίας πάσης ἄρχειν εὐπετέως, ἄλλο τι αἰρήσεσθε; HDT. v. 49. Εἰ δὲ παρασχόν, *and when an opportunity offers*. THUC. i. 120. Οὐ προσήκον, *improperly*. Id. iv. 95. Συνδόξαν τῷ πατρὶ καὶ τῇ μητρὶ, γαμεί τὴν Κναξάρου θυγάτερα. XEN. Cyr. viii. 5, 28. Εἰρημένον κύριον εἶναι ὃ τι ἂν τὸ πλήθος τῶν ξυμμάχων ψηφίσσεται. THUC. v. 30. So δεδογμένον, id. i. 125; γεγραμμένον, v. 56; and προστεταγμένον, PLAT. Leg. 902 D. Καὶ ἐνθένδε πάλιν, προσταχθέν μοι ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου Μένωνα ἄγειν εἰς Ἑλλάσποντον, φρόμην. DEM. L. 12. Παρεκελεύοντό τε, ἀδύνατον ὄν ἐν νυκτὶ ἄλλῃ τῷ σημῆναι. THUC. vii. 44. Ἐγώ, ἔφη ὁ Κύρος, οἶμαι, ἅμα μὲν συναγορευόντων ἡμῶν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ αἰσχροὺς ὄν τὸ ἀντιλέγειν, κ.τ.λ. XEN. Cyr. ii. 2, 20. (See 876.) Ἀντιπαρεσκευάζετο ἔρρωμένως, ὡς μάχης ἔτι δεήσον, *on the ground that there would still be need of a battle*. Ib. vi. 1, 26. Οἱ δὲ τριάκοντα, ὡς ἐξὸν ἦδη αὐτοῖς τυραννεῖν ἀδέως, προέειπον, κ.τ.λ., i.e. *thinking that it was now in their power*, etc. Id. Hell. ii. 4, 1.

852. Rarely the infinitive in the accusative absolute has τό; as αἰσχροὺς ὄν τὸ ἀντιλέγειν, XEN. Cyr. ii. 2, 20 (above): so v. 1, 13; PLAT. Rep. 521 A, 604 C.

853. Even the participles of *personal* verbs sometimes stand with their nouns in the accusative absolute, in all genders and numbers, if they are preceded by ὡς or ὥσπερ (864; 867). *E.g.*

Διὸ καὶ τοὺς νείεις οἱ πατέρες ἀπὸ τῶν πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰργου-σιν, ὡς τὴν μὲν τῶν χρηστῶν ὁμιλίαν ἀσκησιν οὖσαν τῆς ἀρετῆς, τὴν δὲ τῶν πονηρῶν κατάλυσιν (sc. οὖσαν). XEN. Mem. i. 2, 20. Φίλους κτῶνται ὡς βοηθῶν δέομενοι, τῶν δ' ἀδελφῶν ἀμελοῦσιν, ὥσπερ ἐκ πολιτῶν μὲν γιγνομένους φίλους, ἐξ ἀδελφῶν δὲ οὐ γιγνομένους, *as if friends were made from fellow-citizens, and were not made from brothers*. Ib. ii. 3, 3. Ὡς τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς τὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων σύνθεσιν τῶν Δημοσθένους ἀγαπήσαντας. AESCHIN. iii. 142. Ὡσπερ ὑμᾶς ἀγνοοῦντας. Ib. 189. Μέγιστον οὕτω διακείσθαι τὰς γνώμας ὑμῶν, ὡς ἕκαστον ἐκόντα προθύμως ὃ τι ἂν δεῖ ποιήσονται. DEM. xiv. 14.

854. The accusative absolute used personally without ὡς or ὥσπερ is very rare. It occurs chiefly with neuter participles which are regularly impersonal. *E.g.*

Προσῆκον αὐτῷ τοῦ κλήρου μέρος ὅσον περ ἐμοί. ISAE. v. 12. Ταῦτα δὲ γινόμενα, πένθεα μεγάλα τοὺς Αἰγυπτίους καταλαμβάνει. HDT. ii. 66. Ἦδη ἀμφοτέροις μὲν δοκοῦν ἀναχωρεῖν, κυρωθὲν δὲ οὐδὲν, νυκτός τε ἐπιγενομένης, οἱ μὲν Μακεδόνες ἐχώρου ἐπ' οἴκου. THUC. iv. 125. Δόξαντα δὲ ταῦτα καὶ περανθέντα τὰ στρα-

τεύματα ἀπῆλθε. XEN. Hell. iii. 2, 19. Δόξαν ἡμῖν ταῦτα occurs in PLAT. Prot. 314 C, where we may supply ποιεῖν, or δόξαν ταῦτα may represent ἔδοξε ταῦτα. So XEN. An. iv. 1, 13.

Adverbs connected with the Circumstantial Participle.

855. The adverbs τότε, ἤδη (τότε ἤδη), ἐνταῦθα, εἴτα, ἔπειτα, and οὕτως are often joined to the verb of the sentence in which the *temporal* participle stands, to give greater emphasis to the temporal relation. *E.g.*

Ἐκέλευεν αὐτὸν συνδιαβάνα, ἔπειτα οὕτως ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, he commanded that, after he had joined them in crossing, he should then retire as he proposed. XEN. An. vii. 1, 4. Πειθομένων δὲ τῶν Σαμίων καὶ σχόντων τὴν Ζάγκλην, ἐνθαῦτα οἱ Ζαγκλαῖοι ἐβοήθειον αὐτῇ. HDT. vi. 23. Ἀποφυγὼν δὲ καὶ τούτους, στρατηγὸς οὕτω Ἀθηναίων ἀπεδέχθη, and having escaped these also, he was then (under these circumstances) chosen general of the Athenians. Id. vi. 104.

856. Εἴτα, ἔπειτα, and οὕτως sometimes refer in the same way to a participle expressing *opposition* or *limitation*; in which case they may be translated by *nevertheless, after all*. *E.g.*

Πάντων δ' ἀτοπώτατόν ἐστι, τηλικαύτην ἀνελόντας μαρτυρίαν οὕτως οἶσθαι δεῖν εἰκὴ πιστεῦεσθαι παρ' ἡμῖν, it is most absurd of all that, although they have destroyed so important a piece of evidence, they should after all think, etc. DEM. xxviii. 5. Δεινὰ μὲν' ἂν πάθους, εἰ Ἀθῆνας ἀφικόμενος, οὐ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πλείστη ἐστὶν ἐξουσία τοῦ λέγειν, ἔπειτα σὺ ἐνταῦθα τοῦτου μόνος ἀτυχῆσαις, if, although you are come to Athens, you should after all be the only one to fail in obtaining this. PLAT. Gorg. 461 E.

857. Οὕτως, διὰ τοῦτο, and διὰ ταῦτα sometimes refer in the same way to a participle denoting a cause. *E.g.*

Νομίζων ἀμείνονας καὶ κρείττους πολλῶν βαρβάρων ὑμᾶς εἶναι, διὰ τοῦτο προσέλαβον, because I believed, etc. XEN. An. i. 7, 3. Ὑμᾶς δὲ ἡμεῖς ἡγησάμενοι ἱκανοὺς γινῶναι, οὕτω παρελάβομεν. PLAT. Lach. 178 B.

858. The adverbs ἅμα, μεταξύ, εὐθύς (Ionic *ιθέως*), αὐτίκα, ἄρτι, and ἐξαίφνης are often connected (in position and in sense) with the *temporal* participle, although grammatically they qualify the verb of the sentence. *E.g.*

Ἄμα προῖον ἐπεσκοπεῖτο εἴ τι δυνατόν εἴη τοὺς πολεμίους ἀσθενεστέρους ποιεῖν, as he advanced, he looked at the same time to see whether it was possible, etc. XEN. Cyr. v. 2, 22. Ἄμα καταλαβόντες προσεκιάτο σφι, as soon as they had overtaken them, they pressed hard upon them. HDT. ix. 57. Νεκὼς μεταξύ ὀρύσσω ἐπαύσατο, μαντηρίου ἐμποδίου γενομένου, Necho stopped while digging (the canal), etc. Id. ii. 158. Πολλαχού δή με ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξύ, it often checked me

while speaking. PLAT. AP. 40 B. Ἐπιπόνῳ ἀσκήσει εὐθύς νέοι ὄντες τὸ ἀνδρεῖον μετέρχονται, by toilsome discipline, even while they are still young, etc. THUC. ii. 39. Τῷ δεξιῷ κέρα εὐθύς ἀποβεβηκότι οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἐπέκειντο, the Corinthians pressed upon the right wing, as soon as it was disembarked. Id. iv. 43. Ἀρξάμενος εὐθύς καθισταμένου, beginning as soon as (the war) broke out. Id. i. 1. Διόνυσον λέγουσι ὡς αὐτίκα γενόμενον ἐς τὸν μηρὸν ἐνερράφατο Ζεὺς, they say of Dionysus that, as soon as he was born, Zeus sewed him into his thigh. HDT. ii. 146. Τὴν ψυχὴν θεωροῦντα ἐξαίφνης ἀποθανόντος ἐκάστον, viewing the soul of each one the moment that he is dead. PLAT. GORG. 523 E. Καὶ αὐτοῦ μεταξὺ τὰτα λέγοντος ὁ Κλεινίας ἔτυχεν ἀποκρινάμενος. Id. Euthyd. 275 E.

859. The participle expressing *opposition*, *limitation*, or *concession* is often strengthened by καίπερ or καί (after a negative, by οὐδέ or μηδέ, with or without πέρ), or by καὶ τὰτα, and that too. Ὅμως, nevertheless, may be connected with the participle (like ἄμα, etc. in 858), belonging, however, grammatically to the leading verb. *E.g.*

Ἐκτορα καὶ μεμαῖτα μάχης σχήσεσθαι οἶα. Π. ix. 655. Ἐποικτείρω δέ νιν δύστηνον ἔμπας, καίπερ ὄντα δυσμενῆ, although he is my enemy. SOPH. AJ. 122. Οὐκ ἂν προδοίην, οὐδέ περ πρᾶσσω κακῶς. EUR. PH. 1624. Γυναικὶ πείθου μηδὲ τάληθῇ κλύων (= μηδὲ ἦν τάληθῇ κλύης). Id. FR. 443. Πείθου γυναιξί, καίπερ οὐ στέργων ὅμως, although you are not fond of them. AESCH. SEPT. 712. (Here ὅμως qualifies πείθου; although, as usual, it is joined with the participle for emphasis.) Ἀδικεῖς ὅτι ἄνδρα ἡμῖν τὸν σπουδαιότατον διαφθείρεις γελᾶν ἀναπείθων, καὶ τὰτα οὕτω πολέμιον ὄντα τῷ γέλῳτι. XEN. CYR. ii. 2, 16.

860. In Homer, the two parts of καί . . . περ are generally separated by the participle, or by some emphatic word connected with it. Καί is here very often omitted, so that πέρ stands alone in the sense of *although*. Both of these uses are found also in tragedy. *E.g.*

Τὸν μὲν ἔπειτ' εἶπσε, καὶ ἀχνύμενός περ ἑταῖρον, κείσθαι. Π. viii. 125. Καὶ κρατερός περ ἑὼν, μενέτω τριτάτῃ ἐνὶ μοίρῃ. Π. xv. 195. Τέτλαθι, μήτερ ἐμῇ, καὶ ἀνάσχεο κηδομένη περ, μή σε φίλην περ εἶδωσαν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἰδῶμαι θεινομένην· τότε δ' οὐ τι δυνήσομαι ἀχνύμενός περ χραυσμεῖν. Π. i. 586.

Κάγῳ σ' ἰκνούμαι, καὶ γυνή περ οὔσ' ὅμως. EUR. OR. 680. Τάφον γὰρ αὐτῇ καὶ κατασκαφὰς ἐγὼ, γυνή περ οὔσα, τῷδε μηχανήσομαι. AESCH. SEPT. 1037. So πέρ alone in Herodotus, as ἀσκενὴς περ ἑὼν, iii. 131.

861. Καίτοι was very seldom used like καίπερ with the participle, its only regular use being with finite verbs. *E.g.*

Οὐδέ μοι ἐμμελέως τὸ Πιπτάκειον νέμεται, καίτοι σοφοῦ παρὰ

φωτὸς εἰρημένον. SIMON. FR. 5, 8 (ap. PLAT. PROT. 339 C). Ἰκανά μοι νομίζω εἰρησθαι, καίτοι πολλά γε παραλιπών. LYS. xxxi. 34.

862. Ἄτε, and οἷα or οἷον, *as, inasmuch as*, are used to emphasise a participle denoting the *cause* or *ground* of an action. Here the cause assigned is stated merely on the authority of the speaker or writer. (See 864.) *E.g.*

Ὁ δὲ Κῦρος, ἄτε παῖς ὢν καὶ φιλόκαλος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἦδετο τῇ στολῇ, *but Cyrus, inasmuch as he was a child (as being a child), etc.* XEN. CYT. i. 3, 3. Ἄτε χρόνον ἐγγινομένου συγχροῦ, *as a long time intervened.* HDT. i. 190: in the same chapter, οἷα δὲ ἐξέπιστάνενοι. *So ἄτε ληφθέντων, THUC. vii. 85. Μάλα δὲ χαλεπῶς πορευόμενοι, οἷα δὲ ἐν νυκτὶ τε καὶ φόβῳ ἀπιόντες, εἰς Αἰγύθσθena ἀφικνούνται, inasmuch as they were departing by night, etc.* XEN. HELL. vi. 4, 26. Οἷον δὲ διὰ χρόνον ἀφιγμένους, ἀσμένως ἤα ἐπὶ τὰς συνήθεις διατριβάς. PLAT. CHARM. 153 A.

863. In Herodotus, ὥστε is used in the sense of ἄτε; as in i. 8, ὥστε ταῦτα νομίζω, *inasmuch as he believed this.* So vi. 136, ἦν γὰρ ἀδύνατος, ὥστε σηπομένου τοῦ μηροῦ. In THUC. vii. 24, ὥστε (so the Mss.) γὰρ ταμείῳ χρωμένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων τοῖς τέχεσιν, Bekker wrote ἄτε for ὥστε, and Stahl reads ὥσπερ.

864. Ὡς may be prefixed to participles denoting a *cause* or *ground* or a *purpose*, sometimes to other circumstantial participles. It shows that what is stated in the participle is stated as the thought or assertion of the subject of the leading verb, or as that of some other person prominent in the sentence, without implying that it is also the thought of the speaker or writer. *E.g.*

Οἱ μὲν διώκοντες τοὺς καθ' αὐτοὺς ὡς πάντας νικῶντες, οἱ δ' ἀρπάζοντες ὡς ἤδη πάντες νικῶντες, *one side pursuing those opposed to them, thinking that they were victorious over all; and the other side proceeding to plunder, thinking that they were all victorious.* XEN. AN. i. 10, 4. Τὴν πρόφασιν ἐποιεῖτο ὡς Πισίδας βουλόμενος ἐκβαλεῖν, *he made his pretence as if he wished to drive out the Pisidians.* Ib. i. 2, 1. Συλλαμβάνει Κῦρον ὡς ἀποκτενῶν, *he seizes Cyrus with the (avowed) object of putting him to death.* Ib. i. 1, 3. Διαβαίνει ὡς ἀμήσων τὸν σῆτον. HDT. vi. 28. Οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι παρεσκευάζοντο ὡς πολεμήσοντας, *the Athenians prepared with the (avowed) intention of going to war.* THUC. ii. 7. Τὸν Περικλέα ἐν αἰτίᾳ εἶχον ὡς πείσαντα σφὰς πολεμεῖν καὶ δι' ἐκείνον ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς περιπεπτωκότες, *they found fault with Pericles, on the ground that he had persuaded them to engage in the war, and that through him they had become involved in the calamities.* Id. ii. 59. (Here Thucydides himself is not responsible for the statements in the participles, as he would be if ὡς were omitted.) Ἀγανακτοῦσιν ὡς μεγάλων τινῶν ἀπεστερημένοι, *they are indignant, because (as they allege) they have been deprived, etc.* PLAT. REP. 329 A. Βασιλεῖ χάριν ἵσασιν, ὡς δι' ἐκείνον τυχοῦσai τῆς αὐτονομίας ταύτης, *i.e. they thank him because (they believe) they have obtained this independence through him.*

ISOC. iv. 175. 'Ὡς γὰρ εἰδότες περὶ ὧν ἐπέμφθησαν ἀκούετε, *for you hear them as men who (you believe) know about what they were sent for.* DEM. xix. 5.

"Ἐλεγε θαρρεῖν ὥς καταστησομένων τούτων εἰς τὸ δέον, *he bade them take courage, on the ground that these matters were about to be settled as they should be.* XEN. AN. i. 3, 8. 'Ἐκ δὲ τούτων εὐθὺς ἐκήρυττον ἐξίεναι πάντας Θηβαίους, ὥς τῶν τυράννων τεθνεώτων, *because (as they said) the tyrants were dead.* Id. HELL. v. 4, 9. 'Ἀπελογήσατο ὅτι οὐχ ὥς τοῖς Ἕλλησι πολεμησόντων σφῶν εἴποι, *that he said what he did, not because they intended to be at war with the Greeks.* Id. AN. v. 6, 3. So ὥς ἐπιβουλευόντος Τισσαφέρους ταῖς πόλεσι, *on the ground that T. was plotting,* ib. i. 1, 6. 'Ὡς οὐ προσοίσοντος (sc. ἐμοῦ) τὰς χεῖρας, . . . διδάσκει, *since (as you may feel sure) I will not lay hands on you, teach me.* Id. MEM. ii. 6, 32. 'Ὡς ἀναμενοῦντος καὶ οὐκ ἀποθανομένου (sc. ἐμοῦ), οὕτω παρασκευάζου, *make your preparations in the idea that I shall remain and shall not die.* Id. CYR. viii. 4, 27. Νῦν δὲ, ὥς οὕτω ἐχόντων, στρατιὴν ὥς τάχιστα ἐκπέμπετε. HDT. viii. 144. So ὥς βέβαιον ὄν, THUC. i. 2; DEM. xviii. 207.

865. It is a mistake to suppose that ὥς implies that the participle does not express the idea of the speaker or writer. It implies *nothing whatever* on this point, which is determined (if at all) by the context. The question whether the clause with ὥς gives the real or the pretended opinion of the leading subject is also determined (if at all) by the context.

866. 'Ὡς may also be used before participles standing in indirect discourse with verbs of *knowing*, etc. (see 916).

867. "Ωσπερ, *as, as it were*, with the participle denotes a comparison of the action of the verb with an assumed case. The expression may generally be translated by *as if* with a verb; but the participle is not felt to be conditional in Greek, as is shown by the negative οὐ (not μή). *E.g.*

'Ἀρχοῦντο ὥσπερ ἄλλοις ἐπιδεικνύμενοι, *they danced as if they were showing off to others* (i.e. *they danced, not really but in appearance showing off*). XEN. AN. v. 4, 34. Τί ἐμοὶ τοῦτο λέγεις, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐπὶ σοὶ ὄν ὅ τι ἂν βούλη περὶ ἐμοῦ λέγειν; *why do you say this to me, as if it were not in your power to say what you please about me?* Id. MEM. ii. 6, 36. In both these cases, there is a comparison between the action stated in the verb and dancing or speaking under circumstances stated in the participial clause. The *if* in our translation is a makeshift, which we find convenient in expressing the supposed case in a conditional form, which, however, is not the Greek form. The construction is the same as when ὥσπερ takes a noun, as τὸν κίνδυνον παρελθεῖν ἐποίησεν ὥσπερ νέφος, *it caused the danger to pass by like a cloud*, DEM. xviii. 188; only we can translate ὥσπερ νέφος, but we could not translate ὥσπερ νέφος ὄντα.

"Ὡσπερ ἤδη σαφῶς εἰδότες ὁ πρακτέον ἐστίν, οὐκ ἐθέλει ἀκοῦειν,

you are unwilling to hear, as if you already knew well what should be done. ISOC. viii. 9. Ἀπήντων ὀλίγοι πρὸς πολλὰς μυριάδας, ὥσπερ ἐν ἀλλοτρίαις ψυχαῖς μέλλοντες κινδυνεύσειν, as if they had been about to incur the risk with others' lives. ID. iv. 86. Τὴν ἡμίσειαν εἴληφεν, ὥσπερ πρὸς τὸν Δία τὴν χώραν νερόμενος, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τὰς συνθήκας ποιούμενος, he has taken half (of the land) as if he were dividing the country with Zeus, and not making a treaty with men. IB. 179. Πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ἀπλῶς καὶ μετ' εὐνοίας πάντας εἰρηκῶς τοὺς λόγους, φυλάττειν ἐμὲ ἐκέλευεν, as if he had himself spoken, etc. DEM. xviii. 276. Οἱ Ἕλληνες οὕτως ἡγανάκτισαν, ὥσπερ ὅλης τῆς Ἑλλάδος πεπορθημένης, as if the whole of Greece had been laid waste. ISOC. x. 49. See ID. iv. 53, ὥσπερ οὐ τοὺς λόγους ὄντας, and XEN. AN. iii. 1, 14, v. 7, 24; MEM. ii. 3, 3; OEC. ii. 7. In PLAT. AP. 35 A, we have ὥσπερ ἀθανάτων ἐσομένων ἐὰν ὑμεῖς αὐτοὺς μὴ ἀποκτείνητε, i.e. as if they will be (like men who will be) immortal if you do not put them to death, where the future participle indicates that there is no condition (473).

The participle with ὥσπερ generally denotes attendant circumstances (843), sometimes manner (836).

868. Ὡσπερ, like any particle meaning *as*, can be followed by εἰ and an actual condition, the apodosis of which it represents; as in ὥσπερ εἰ παρεστάτεις, as (you would do) if you had lived near by, AESCH. AG. 1201. A participle with ὥσπερ εἰ seems to have hardly more conditional force than one with the simple ὥσπερ; as ἐμὲ ὧχον καταλιποῦς ὥσπερ εἰ προκείμενον, you went off and left me as if I had been laid out, AR. ECL. 537. See ὥσπερ εἰ νομίζων, DEM. xxx. 7.

When a real condition is expressed, we generally have ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ, as in ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις αἰτιῶτο, DEM. xviii. 194. But when ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ (or ὥσπερ ἀν εἰ) is followed by a participle or a noun without a verb, it is hardly possible that either of the verbs which were originally understood with ἂν and εἰ (227) was felt as implied in the language as we find it; indeed, it would seldom be possible to supply an actual verb. Thus in ὁμοίως διεπορεύθησαν ὥσπερ ἀν εἰ προπεμπόμενοι, they proceeded as if they were under escort, ISOC. iv. 148, and in ὥσπερ ἀν εἰ ἡγούμενοι, as if they believed, DEM. xviii. 214, ὥσπερ alone would have given essentially the same sense. So in ἐφοβήθη ὥσπερ ἀν εἰ παῖς, PLAT. GORG. 479 A, ὥσπερ παῖς, like a child, would probably have expressed the whole idea with less emphasis.

REMARKS ON ὥσπερ AND ὥς WITH THE PARTICIPLE.

869. 1. In Homer ὥς τε, ὥς εἰ, and ὥς εἴ τε are used in a sense approaching that of ὥσπερ in Attic Greek. Ὡς here always expresses a comparison, and when εἰ is added the form must originally have included a condition; but, even in Homer, the force of εἰ had become so weakened that it is hardly possible that any actual verb was felt to be implied in the expression. *E.g.*

Ἀχαιῶν οἶτον αἰδέεις, ὥς τέ που ἢ αὐτὸς παρὲν ἢ ἄλλου ἀκούσας, *you sing as if you had been present yourself or had heard from another*. Od. viii. 490. Κίρκη ἐπήϊξα ὥς τε κτάμεναι μενεαίνων, *I rushed upon Circe as if I were eager to kill her*. Od. x. 322; so x. 295. Τὸν δ' ὁ γέρων ἐν ἔτρεφεν, ἀμφαγαπάσσομενος ὥς εἴ θ' ἐὼν υἱὸν ἐόντα, *welcoming him as (if he had been) his own son*. Il. xvi. 191. Πόλλ' ὀλοφυρόμενοι ὥς εἰ θανατόνδε κιόντα, *as (if he were) going to death*. Il. xxiv. 327. Τίς νύ σε τοιάδ' ἔρεξεν, ὥς εἰ τι κακὸν ῥέζουσιν ἐνωπῇ, *as if you were doing any evil openly*. Il. v. 373. Καπνὸς γίγνεται ἐξ αὐτῆς, ὥς εἰ πυρὸς αἰθομένοιο, *as (if) when a fire is burning*. Il. xxii. 149; so Od. xix. 39.

2. In Homer ὥς εἰ may have a noun without a participle. Here the comparative force is specially clear, as the difficulty of supplying a verb with εἰ is specially great: see μ' ἀσύφλητον ἔρεξεν ὥς εἴ τιν' ἀτίμητον μετανάστην, *he made me of no account, like some dishonoured stranger*, Il. ix. 648, xvi. 59. So ὥς εἴ τε κατὰ ῥόον, *as if down stream*, Od. xiv. 254; ὥς τε περὶ ψυχῆς, *as it were for my life*, Od. ix. 423.¹

870. The weak conditional force that appears in the Homeric ὥς εἰ with a participle or a noun (869) helps to explain the perhaps still weaker condition of ὥσπερ εἰ or ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ in Attic Greek (868).

871. The very few cases of ὥς with the participle in Homer do not indicate that ὥς had yet begun to develop its later force (864). See Od. xvi. 21, πάντα κύσεν περιφθὺς, ὥς ἐκ θανάτοιο φυγόντα, *he kissed him all over, like one escaped from death*, though we might translate *since he felt that T. had escaped from death*. No such force is possible, however, in Il. xxiii. 430, ὥς οὐκ αἰόντι ἐοικώς, *appearing like one who heard not*.

872. Herodotus uses ὥστε with the participle in the sense of ἄτε, although he has ὥς with the participle in the Attic sense (864). See examples under 863.

873. Ὡς εἰ (or ὥσεἰ) and ὥς εἴ τε appear occasionally in Attic poetry with nouns or adjectives in their Homeric sense. So ματῆρ ὥσεἰ τις πιστά, *like some faithful mother*, SOPH. EL. 234; πτύσας ὥσεἰ τε δυσμενῇ, *spurning her as an enemy*, ANT. 653.

874. "Ὡσπερ with the participle occasionally seems to have the same force as ἄτε or οἷον; as in EUR. Hipp. 1307, ὁ δ' ὥσπερ ὦν δίκαιος οὐκ ἐφέσπετο λόγοις, *inasmuch as he was just*, etc. Or is the meaning here *he, like a just man*?

In PLAT. Rep. 330 E, ἥτοι ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ γήρως ἀσθενείας ἢ καὶ ὥσπερ ἡδὴ ἐγγυτέρω ὦν τῶν ἐκεῖ μᾶλλον τι καθορᾷ αὐτά, *the same force is generally given to ὥσπερ*. But it may have the comparative force: *either because of the feebleness of old age, or perhaps (feeling) like one who is nearer the other world, he takes a more careful view of it*,—a

¹ See Lange, *Partikel EI*, pp. 235-243. I cannot follow Lange (p. 241), in making the Attic ὥς with the participle the natural successor of the Homeric ὥς εἰ with the participle.

genitive of cause with ὑπό and a participle of circumstance being united under ἦτοι and ἦ.

Omission of ὦν.

875. The participle ὦν is sometimes omitted, leaving a predicate adjective or noun standing by itself.

1. This occurs chiefly after ἄτε, οἶα, ὥς, or καίπερ, and much more frequently with predicate adjectives than with nouns. *E.g.*

Ἄλλὰ γινώσκω σαφῶς, καίπερ σκοτεινὸς (sc. ὦν), τὴν γε σὴν αὐδὴν ὤμως, *although my sight is darkened.* SOPH. O. T. 1325. Ἐφη κηρύξειν μηδεμίαν πόλιν δέχεσθαι αὐτοὺς, ὥς πολεμίους (sc. ὄντας), *that no city should receive them, on the ground that they were enemies.* XEN. AN. vi. 6, 9. So ὥς φίλους ἦδη, Cyr. iii. 2, 25. Αὐτὸ ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ὥς ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλ' οὐχ ὥς ἀγαθόν (sc. ὦν), *they practise it on the ground that it is necessary, and not on the ground that it is good.* PLAT. Rep. 358 C. Ἦ μὴν ἔτι Ζεὺς, καίπερ αὐθάδης (sc. ὦν) φρενῶν, ἔσται ταπεινός. AESCH. Prom. 907.

So in the genitive and accusative absolute. Ὡς ἐτοίμων δὴ χρημάτων (sc. ὄντων). XEN. AN. vii. 8, 11. Ὡς ἐμοῦ μόνης πέλας (sc. οὐσης), *since I alone am near you.* SOPH. O. C. 83. Ὡς καλὸν (sc. ὦν) ἀγορεύεσθαι αὐτόν, *on the ground that it is good for it (the speech) to be spoken.* THUC. ii. 35. Σὺ πρῶτος, ὥς οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον (sc. ὦν) τὸ κλέπτειν, αἰτιᾷ τὸν κλέπτοντα. XEN. Cyr. v. 1, 13. Ὡς ἄρα παντὶ δῆλον (sc. ὦν) ὅτι κοινὰ τὰ φίλων ἔσται. PLAT. Rep. 449 C.

(With nouns.) Εὐθύς, οἶα δὴ παῖς (sc. ὦν) φύσει φιλόστοργος, ἡσπάζετο αὐτόν, *as he was by nature an affectionate child.* XEN. Cyr. i. 3, 2. Αὐτοὺς εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν οὐ παραδεξόμεθα, ἄτε τυραννίδος ὑμνητάς (sc. ὄντας), *since they sing the praises of tyranny.* PLAT. Rep. 568 B.

2. Without the above mentioned particles (875, 1), ὦν is rarely omitted, and probably only in poetry. *E.g.*

Τοὺς ὄρνις, ὧν ὑφηγητῶν (sc. ὄντων) ἐγὼ κτανεῖν ἐμῆλλον πατέρα τὸν ἐμόν, *the birds, by whose guidance, etc.* SOPH. O. T. 966. So 1260, and O. C. 1588. Νοεῖς θάπτειν σφ', ἀπόρρητον πόλει (sc. ὦν); *do you think of burying him, when it is forbidden to the city?* Id. Ant. 44.

3. The adjectives ἐκὼν, *willing*, and ἄκων, *unwilling*, omit ὦν like participles. *E.g.*

Ἐμοῦ μὲν οὐχ ἐκόντος, *against my will.* SOPH. Aj. 455. Ἀέκοντος ἐμεῖο. Il. i. 301. Νικίαν καὶ Δημοσθένην ἄκοντος τοῦ Γυλῖππου ἀπέσφαξαν. THUC. vii. 86. So AESCH. Prom. 771. Παρὰ τούτων οὐκ ἂν ποτε λάβοις λόγον οὔτε ἐκόντων οὔτε ἀκόντων. PLAT. Theaet. 180 C.

4. A predicate adjective or noun sometimes stands without ὦν, when it is connected by a conjunction to a participle in the same construction. *E.g.*

Τί με οὐκ ὀλομένην ὑβρίζεις, ἀλλ' ἐπίφαντον; *why do you insult me when I am not yet dead, but am before your eyes?* SOPH. ANT. 839. Λόγοις δὲ συνμβὰς καὶ θεῶν ἀνώμοτος. EUR. MED. 737: so OR. 457. Λύτρα φέρων καὶ ἐκέτης (sc. ὦν) τῶν Ἀχαιῶν. PLAT. REP. 393 D. So HDT. i. 60 (ἀπολείπουσα . . . καὶ εὐειδής), and 65 (ἀδελφιδέου μὲν . . . βασιλείοντος δέ); THUC. iii. 82 (οὐκ ἂν ἔχόντων πρόφασιν οὐδ' ἐτοίμων). See other examples in Kühner, vol. ii. § 491.

Combinations of Circumstantial Participles.

876. As the participle in the genitive or accusative absolute denotes the same relations (*time, cause, etc.*) as the circumstantial participle in its ordinary construction (833-845), both may be used in the same sentence and be connected by conjunctions. When several participles denoting these relations occur in any sentence, those which belong to substantives already connected with the main construction agree with these in case, while those which refer to some new subjects stand with these in the genitive absolute; any which are impersonal standing in the accusative absolute. *E.g.*

Οἱ μὲν Ἕλληνες στραφέντες παρεσκευάζοντο ὡς ταύτῃ προσιόντος (sc. τοῦ βασιλέως) καὶ δεξόμενοι, *they prepared themselves with a view to his (the King's) coming up and to receiving him.* XEN. AN. i. 10, 6. Καὶ πάντα διαπραξάμενος ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ (Κλέων), καὶ ψηφισαμένων Ἀθηναίων αὐτῷ τὸν πλοῦν, τῶν τε ἐν Πύλῳ στρατηγῶν ἕνα προσελόμενος, τὴν ἀναγωγὴν διὰ τάχους ἐποίειτο. THUC. iv. 29. Ἀκριβιάδης τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις ὑποπτος ὢν, καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀφικομένης ἐπιστολῆς ὥστ' ἀποκτεῖναι, ὑποχωρεῖ παρὰ Τισσαφέρην. Id. viii. 45. Τῆς γὰρ ἐμπορίας οὐκ οὔσης οὐδ' ἐπιμιγνύντες ἀδελῶς ἀλλήλοις οὔτε κατὰ γῆν οὔτε διὰ θαλάσσης, νεμόμενοί τε τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἕκαστοι ὅσον ἀποζῆν καὶ περιουσίαν χρημάτων οὐκ ἔχοντες οὐδὲ γῆν φυτεύοντες, ἀδηλὸν ὃν ὅποτε τις ἐπελθὼν καὶ ἀτειχίστων ἅμα ὄντων ἄλλος ἀφαιρήσεται, τῆς τε καθ' ἡμέραν ἀναγκαίου τροφῆς πανταχοῦ ἂν ἡγούμενοι ἐπικρατεῖν, οὐ χαλεπῶς ἀπανίσταντο. Id. i. 2. Here οὔσης and ἐπιμιγνύντες belong to the leading clause; νεμόμενοι, ἔχοντες, and φυτεύοντες—corresponding to ἡγούμενοι—are in the second line; ἀδηλὸν ὃν depends on νεμόμενοι, etc., and introduces the indirect question ὅποτε . . . ἀφαιρήσεται, which contains ἐπελθὼν and ἀτειχίστων ὄντων as circumstantial participles.

C. SUPPLEMENTARY PARTICIPLE.

877. The supplementary participle completes the idea expressed by a verb, by stating that to which its action relates. It often approaches very near the use of the

object infinitive. It may belong to either the subject or the object of the verb and agree with it in case. *E.g.*

Παύομέν σε λέγοντα, *we stop you from speaking*; παύομεθα λέγοντες, *we cease speaking*.

878. The supplementary participle has two uses. In one of these it corresponds to the infinitive in indirect discourse, with its tenses representing the same tenses of the direct form; and in the other it corresponds to the object infinitive in other constructions, so far as it approaches the infinitive at all in meaning. (See 746.)

Compare παύομέν σε λέγοντα, *we stop you from speaking*, with δείκνυσί σε λέγοντα τᾷληθῇ, *he shows that you speak the truth*; and compare both with κωλύομέν σε λέγειν, *we prevent you from speaking*, and φησί σε λέγειν τᾷληθῇ, *he says that you speak the truth*.

I. NOT IN INDIRECT DISCOURSE.

879. I. The participle may be used with verbs signifying to begin, to continue, to endure, to persevere, to cease, to stop (i.e. cause to cease), and to permit or put up with. *E.g.*

Ἐγὼ δ' ἄρχον χαλεπαίνων, *and I was the first to be angry*. II. ii. 378. Ἀρξομαι ἀπὸ τῆς ἱατρικῆς λέγων, *I will begin my speech with the art of medicine*. PLAT. Symp. 186 B. Αὕτη ἡ οἰκίη διατελεῖ μόνῃ ἐλευθέρῃ ἐοῦσα Περσέων, *this house continues to be the only free one among the Persians*. HDT. iii. 83. So XEN. An. iv. 3, 2; DEM. xviii. 1. Οὐκ ἀνέξομαι ζῶσα, *I shall not endure life*. EUR. Hipp. 354. Ἀνέχεσθαι τινων ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις λεγόντων, *to endure certain men saying*. DEM. ix. 6. So ἀνέξει λέγοντος ἐμοῦ περὶ τούτων; *will you allow me to say?* PLAT. Rep. 613 C. With the accusative: καὶ ταῦτ' Ἰάσων παῖδας ἐξανέξεται πάσχοντας; *and will Jason endure to have his children suffer this?* EUR. Med. 74. Διαπρέετε μένοντες, *persevere and hold your ground*. HDT. ix. 45. Οἱ δ' ἐκαρτέρουν πρὸς κῆμα λακτίζοντες. EUR. I. T. 1395. Τρῶας δ' οὐ λήξω ἐναρίζων, *I will not stop slaying Trojans*. II. xxi. 224. Παῦσαι λέγουσα, *stop talking*. EUR. Hipp. 706; so 474. Τὴν φιλοσοφίαν παῦσον ταῦτα λέγουσαν, *stop Philosophy from talking in this style*. PLAT. Gorg. 482 A. Ἐκείνοισι ταῦτα ποιεῖν οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέα ἐστί, *we must not allow them to act in this way*. HDT. ix. 58. Ἡ πόλις αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἐπιτρέψει παραβαίνουσι τὸν νόμον, *the city will not put up with their transgression of the law*. ISOC. xii. 170.

880. The poets sometimes have the participle with *τολμᾶω* and *τλάω*, to endure, to have courage, and with *μένω*, to await, which usually take the infinitive. *E.g.*

Ἐτόλμα βαλλόμενος. Od. xxiv. 162. Τόλμα δ' ἐρώσα, *have the courage to love*. EUR. Hipp. 476. Τλήναι σε δρῶσαν ἄν ἐγὼ παραινέσω, *that you take courage to do what I shall advise*. SOPH. El. 943. So πραθέντα τλήναι, *endured to be sold*, AESCH. Ag. 1041; σπείρας ἔτλα, *was bold enough to plant*, Sept. 754. Ὅφρα μένοιεν νοστήσαντα ἀνακτα, *that they might await the king's return*. Il. xiii. 38 (compare iv. 247, μένετε Τρώας ἐλθέμεν;).

For the aorist participle in the last three examples, see 148.

881. II. The participle may be used with many verbs which denote a state of the feelings, as those signifying to *repent, to be weary, to be pleased, displeased, satisfied, angry, troubled, or ashamed*. E.g.

Μεταμέλοντο τὰς σπονδὰς οὐ δεξάμενοι, *they repented that they had not accepted the peace*. THUC. iv. 27. Τοὺς δεσμώτας μετεμέλοντο ἀποδεδωκότες, *they repented of having returned the prisoners*. Id. v. 35. Εἰ μετεμέλῃσέ οἱ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον μαστιγώσαντι, *whether he repented that he had scourged the Hellespont*. HDT. vii. 54. Ἐάν τις μὴ ἀποκάμῃ ζητῶν, *provided one is not weary of seeking*. PLAT. Men. 81 D. Τῷ μὲν ῥα χαίρον νοστήσαντι, *they rejoiced in his return*. Od. xix. 463: so Il. xviii. 259. Τιμώμενοι χαίρουσιν, *they delight to be honoured*. EUR. Hipp. 8. Χαίρουσιν ἐξεταζόμενοις τοῖς οἰομένοις μὲν εἶναι σοφοῖς οὖσι δ' οὐ, i.e. *they delight in having them examined*. PLAT. Ap. 33 C. In poetry χαίρω may have the accusative: τοὺς γὰρ εὖσεβείς θεοὶ θνήσκοντας οὐ χαίρουσι, *for the gods do not rejoice in the death of the pious*. EUR. Hipp. 1340. Σὲ μὲν εὖ πρᾶσσοντ' ἐπιχαίρω, SOPH. Aj. 136. Φιλῶ with nominative: φιλεῖς δὲ δρῶσ' αὐτὸ σφόδρα, *and you are very fond of doing it*. AR. Pl. 645. Οὐ γὰρ τοῖς ἀνιάτοι παρέοντι. Od. xv. 335. Τῆς Αἰολίδος χαλεπὸς ἔφερεν ἀπεστερημένος, *he took it hard that he was deprived of Aeolis*. XEN. Hell. iii. 2, 13. Ὑπὸ σμικροτέρων τιμώμενοι ἀγαπῶσιν, *they are content to be honoured by smaller men*. PLAT. Rep. 475 B. Ἐλεγχόμενοι ἤχοντο, *they were vexed at being exposed*. XEN. Mem. i. 2, 47. Τοὺς φρονίμους ἀγανακτεῖν ἀποθνήσκοντας πρέπει, *it is right to be indignant when the wise die*. PLAT. Phaed. 62 E. Ὡς μισῶ σ' ἔχων. EUR. Supp. 1108. Οὐ νημεσῶ Ἀγαμέμνονι ὀτρύνοντι μάχεσθαι Ἀχαιοὺς. Il. iv. 413. Ἀδικούμενοι μᾶλλον ὀργίζονται ἢ βιαζόμενοι. THUC. i. 77. Τοῦτο οὐκ αἰσχύνομαι λέγων, *I say this without shame* (see 903, 1). XEN. Cyr. v. 1, 21. Αἰδέσθαι πατέρα προλείπων. SOPH. Aj. 506. Νικώμενος λόγοσιν οὐκ ἀναίνομαι, *I am not sorry (non piget) to be overcome by your words*. AESCH. Ag. 583. Εἰ δράσας δέ σ' οὐκ ἀναίνομαι, *I do not regret that I helped you*. EUR. H. F. 1235. Θανούσα οὐκ ἀναίνομαι, *I do not regret my death* (about to come). Id. I. A. 1503. Ἀναίνομαι τὸ γῆρας ὑμῶν εἰσορῶν, *I am troubled at the sight, etc.* Id. Bacch. 251. (Ἀναίνομαι, *refuse*, takes the infinitive: see AESCH. Ag. 1652.)

882. Most of the participles of 881 denote a cause or ground of action, and might be placed under 838. (See 823.)

883. III. The participle with verbs signifying *to find, to detect, or to represent*, denotes an act or state in which a person or thing is found, detected, or represented. *E.g.*

Ἐδρεν δ' εὐρύοπα Κρονίδην ἄτερ ἡμενον ἄλλων, *she found the son of Kronos sitting apart.* II. i. 498. So i. 27. Ὁ δὲ κῆρυξ ἀφικόμενος εἶρε τοὺς ἄνδρας διεφθαρμένους, *the herald, when he came, found the men already put to death.* THUC. ii. 6. Ἦν γὰρ εὐρεθῇ λέγων σοὶ ταῦτ', ἔγωγ' ἂν ἐκπεφευγοίην πάθος, *if he shall be found to tell the same story as you, etc.* SOPH. O. T. 839. Καταλαμβάνουσι τὴν Ποτίδαιαν καὶ τὰλλα ἀφεστηκότα, *they find Potidaea and the other towns in revolt.* THUC. i. 59. Κακός γ' ὢν ἐς φίλους ἀλίσκεται, *he is detected in baseness.* EUR. Med. 84. Ἐὰν ἄλῳς ἔτι τοῦτο πράττων, ἀποθανεῖ, *if you are ever caught doing this again, you shall die.* PLAT. AP. 29 C. So Rep. 389 D. Βασιλέας πεποίηκε τοὺς ἐν Αἴδου τὸν αἰὶ χρόνον τιμωρομένους, *he has represented kings in Hades as suffering punishment without ceasing.* Id. Gorg. 525 D. Ἀκλητον ἐποίησεν (Ὀμηρος) ἐλθόντα τὸν Μενέλεων ἐπὶ τὴν θοίνην. Id. Symp. 174 C.

It is sometimes difficult to distinguish this use of the participle from that of indirect discourse, especially with εὐρίσκω. (See 904.)

884. IV. The participle (not in indirect discourse) with verbs signifying *to hear, learn (hear of), see, or perceive* denotes the act which is perceived or heard of (not, as in indirect discourse, the fact that the act occurs). Here the participle approaches very nearly the ordinary object infinitive in its use, and the tenses of the participle differ only as the same tenses of the infinitive differ in such constructions, the aorist not denoting past time (148). *E.g.*

Βαρὺ δὲ στενάχοντος ἄκουσεν, *and he heard him groaning heavily.* Od. viii. 95. Εἰ δὲ φθεγξαμένου τεν ἢ αὐδήσαντος ἄκουσεν, *but if he had heard any one call or speak.* Od. ix. 497. (The aorist participles denote the occurrence of the act, as the present denotes its progress.) Ἦκουσα δέ ποτε αὐτοῦ καὶ περὶ φίλων διαλεγομένου, *I once heard him discourse, etc.* (see 886). XEN. Mem. ii. 4, 1. Τοσαῦτα φωνήσαντος (sc. αὐτοῦ) εἰσηκούσαμεν, *so much we heard him say.* SOPH. O. C. 1645. Ἦδη πώποτε τοῦ ἡκουσας αὐτῶν λόγον διδόντος οὐ καταγέλαστον; PLAT. Rep. 493 D. Μεγάλ' ἔκλυεν αὐδήσαντος. Od. iv. 505. Οὐ πω πεπύσθην Πατρόκλῳ θανόντος, *they had not yet heard of the death of Patroclus.* II. xvii. 377; so 427. Ὡς ἐπίθοντο τῆς Πύλου κατειλημμένης, *when they heard of the capture of Pylos.* THUC. iv. 6. (But with the accusative, in ὅτι πύθοιτο τὸ Πλημμύριον ἑαλωκός, *that he had heard that P. was captured,* vii. 31, as indirect discourse. See Classen's note on iv. 6.) Οἱ τούτους ὁρῶντες πάσχοντας, *those who see these suffer.* PLAT. Gorg. 525 C. Μή σε ἴδωμαι θεινομένην. II. i. 587. So Od. x. 99. Τῷ κέ μ' ἴδοις πρώτοισιν ἐνὶ προμάχοισιν μιγέντα, *then would you see me mingle with the foremost champions.* Od. xviii. 379; so 176, ὃν ἡρῶ γενεήσαντα ἰδέ

σθαι, *to see with a beard*. Τῷ πόποι' εἶδες ἤδη ἀγαθὸν τι γενόμενον; *to whom did you ever yet see any good come?* AR. Nub. 1061. "Ὅταν αὐτὸν ἴδῃ ἐξαίφνης πταίσαντα πρὸς τῇ πόλει καὶ ἐκχέαντα τὰ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑαυτὸν, *when he sees him suddenly come into collision with the state and fall overboard with all his belongings*. PLAT. Rep. 553 A. Εἰ μὴ ὤφθῃσαν ἐλθόντες. THUC. iv. 73. (The aorist participle with a verb of seeing is not common in prose.) Αἰσθόμενος Λαμπροκλέα πρὸς τὴν μητέρα χαλεπαίνοντα, *perceiving Lamprocles angry with his mother*. XEN. Mem. ii. 2, 1. Οὐδεμίαν πώποτε ἀγέλην ἡσθήμεθα συστάσαν ἐπὶ τὸν νομέα. Id. Cyr. i. 1, 2. So also αἰσθάνομαι with the genitive: ἡσθήσασθαι μου ἢ ψευδομαρτυροῦντος ἢ συκοφαντοῦντος; Id. Mem. iv. 4, 11. Οἶμαί σε οὐκ ἂν φάναι γενομένου ποτὲ ἐν σαυτῷ τοῦ τοιούτου αἰσθῆσθαι, *I think you would not say that you ever knew such a thing to happen within yourself*. PLAT. Rep. 440 B. Τὸν δὲ νόησεν ἐστῶτ', *and he perceived him standing*. Il. iv. 200.

885. The participle may be used in a similar way, having the same distinction of present and aorist (884), with *περιορῶ* (*περιεῖδον*), and sometimes with *ἐφορῶ*, *εἰσορῶ* (*ἐπεῖδον*, *εἰσεῖδον*), and even the simple *ὄρῶ* (*εἶδον*), in the sense of *overlook*, *allow*, or *not to prevent*. *E.g.*

Τοὺς ξυμμάχους οὐ περιοφόμεθα ἀδικουμένους, *we shall not let our allies be wronged*. THUC. i. 86. Μείζω γιγνόμενον τὸν ἄνθρωπον περιορώμεν, *we allow the man to grow greater*. DEM. ix. 29. Ὑμῖν ἐπισκῆπτω . . . μὴ περιδεῖν τὴν ἡγεμονίην αὐτῆς ἐς Μήδους περιελθούσαν, *I adjure you not to see the leadership come round again into the hands of the Medes*. HDT. iii. 65. Μὴ περιδωμεν ὑβρισθείσαν τὴν Λακεδαίμονα καὶ καταφρονηθείσαν, *let us not allow Lacedaemon to be insulted and despised*. ISOC. vi. 108. Περιεῖδε τὸν αὐτοῦ πατέρα καὶ ζῶντα τῶν ἀναγκαίων σπανίζοντα καὶ τελευτήσαντα οὐ τυχόντα τῶν νομίμων, *he allowed his own father to remain in want (pres.) of the necessities of life while he lived, and not to receive (aor.) a decent burial when he died*. DIN. ii. 8. Καὶ μὴ μ' ἔρημον ἐκπεσοῦσαν εἰσίδης, *do not see me driven out without a friend*. EUR. Med. 712. Μὴ μ' ἰδεῖν θανόνθ' ἐπ' ἀσπῶν, *not to see me killed by citizens*. Id. Or. 746. See other examples of the aorist participle with these verbs in 148. For the infinitive, often in nearly the same sense, see 903, 6.

886. The verbs of perception included in 884 may take the participle also in indirect discourse, with the natural force of each tense preserved (see 904). With some of these verbs, the construction of the participle is generally shown by its case: thus *ἀκούω* and *πυνθάνομαι* in Attic Greek regularly take the genitive in the construction of 884, and the accusative in indirect discourse. See Ellendt, *Lex. Sophoc.* s.v. *ἀκούω*, who does not allow an exception in SOPH. Ph. 615. For the less fixed usage of Homer with *ἀκούω* and *πυνθάνομαι*, see Schmitt in Schanz's *Beiträge*, p. 9. Other verbs, as *ὄρῶ*, have the accusative regularly in both constructions, but the context generally makes the meaning

plain: see, however, EUR. HEC. 342. *Αισθάνομαι* sometimes has the genitive, as in some examples in 884, but not in indirect discourse.

887. V. With *λανθάνω*, to escape the notice of, *τυγχάνω*, to happen, and *φθάνω*, to anticipate or get the start of, the participle contains the leading idea of the expression and is usually translated by a verb in English. Here the aorist participle does not denote time past relatively to the leading verb (unless the latter is a present or imperfect), but coincides with it in time (144). Other tenses of the participle express their usual relations of time to the verb (147). *E.g.*

Φονέα τοῦ παιδὸς ἐλάνθανε βόσκων, *he was unconsciously supporting the slayer of his son.* HDT. i. 44. "Ἡ σε λανθάνει πρὸς τοὺς φίλους στείχοντα τῶν ἐχθρῶν κακά; *are you unaware that our enemies' evils are advancing upon our friends?* SOPH. ANT. 9. Τοὺς δ' ἔλαθ' εἰσελθὼν Πρίαμος, *and Priam entered unnoticed by them.* IL. xxiv. 477; so xvii. 1. Μή σε λάθῃσιν κείσ' ἐξορμήσασα, *lest the ship be driven thither before you know it.* OD. xii. 220. Φύλασσε δ' ὅ γ' εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν, μή ἐλάβοι παριών. OD. iv. 526. Ῥᾶον ἔλαθον εἰσελθόντες, *they entered more easily without being noticed.* THUC. ii. 2. Ἐλάθομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παίδων οὐδὲν διαφέροντες; *did we never find out that all the time we were no better than children?* PLAT. CRIT. 49 B. (See 147, 2.)

Ἀρχίδαμος αὐτῷ ξένος ὧν ἐτύγχανε. THUC. ii. 13. Ὁ ἡγεμὼν ἐτύγχανε τεθνηκώς, *it happened that the guide had died (was dead).* ID. iii. 98. Ἐτυχον ἔφοροι ἕτεροι ἄρχοντες ἤδη, *there happened to be other Ephors already in office.* ID. v. 36. Ἐτυχεν ἡμῶν ἡ φυλὴ πρυτανεύουσα, *our tribe happened to hold the prytany.* PLAT. AP. 32 B. Ἐτυχον καθ' ἡμέρας ἐνταυθα. ID. EUTHYD. 272 E. Ἐν τῷ σκοτῷ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἔτυχον ἐνδον λαβών. AR. ECCL. 375. Ἐτυχον παραγενόμενος ἵππον ἔχων, *I came, as it happened, with a horse.* PLAT. SYMP. 221 A. Ἐς Ναύπακτον, ἣν ἔτυχον ἡρηκότες νεωστί, *in Naupactus, which it happened they had lately captured.* THUC. i. 103. (See 147, 1.) Ἐὰν μὴ τις αὐτῇ βοθηθῇσας θεῶν τύχη, *unless some God by chance comes to its aid.* PLAT. REP. 492 A; so 495 B. Κἂν εἰ τύχοιεν ἐν τῷ παραχρήμα κυκεῶνα πιόντες, *even if they should happen to drink a kykeon on the spot.* IB. 408 B.

Φθάνουσιν ἐπ' αὐτὰ καταφεύγοντες, *they are the first to run to them.* AESCHIN. iii. 248. Αὐτοὶ φθίσονται τοῦτο δρᾶσαντες, *they will do this for themselves first.* PLAT. REP. 375 C. Ἐφθησαν πολλῶ τοὺς Πέρσας ἀπικόμενοι, *they arrived long before the Persians.* HDT. iv. 136. Βουλόμενοι φθῆναι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀπικόμενοι ἐς τὸ ἄστυ. ID. vi. 115. Φθάνει πᾶσαν ἐπ' αἶαν βλάπτουσι ἀνθρώπους, *i.e. she (Ate) harms men over the whole earth before Prayers can avail.* IL. ix. 506. Ἐφθῃ ὀρεξάμενος, *he hit him first.* IL. xvi. 322. Ὀππότερός κε φθῇσιν ὀρεξάμενος χρῶς καλόν, *whichever shall first hit.* IL. xxiii. 805. Οὐκ ἔφθασαν πυθόμενοι τὸν πόλεμον καὶ ἤκου, *no sooner did they hear of the war than they came.* ISOC. iv. 86. Φθάνουσιν (hist. pres.) ἐπὶ τῷ ἄκρῳ γενόμενοι τοὺς πολέμους. XEN. AN. iii. 4, 49.

888. So sometimes with διαλανθάνω and the poetic λήθω. *E.g.*

Τοιαύτης πολιτείας μετέχειν, ἐν ᾗ μὴ διαλήσει χρηστός ὢν. *ISOC.*
iii. 16. Οὐδέ σε λήθω κινύμενος, *nor do I ever move without your knowledge.* *II. x. 279.*

889. Κυρέω in poetry takes the participle like τυγχάνω. *E.g.*

Τοῦτον οἶσθ' εἰ ζῶν κυρεῖ; *do you know whether perchance he is alive?* *SOPH. Ph. 444.* Σέσωσμένος κυρεῖ. *ÆSCH. Pers. 503.* Ταῦτ' εἰρηκῶς κυρεῖ; *Id. O. C. 414.* Ἐχθρὸς ὢν κυρεῖ. *EUR. Alc. 954.*

So συγκυρέω in *HER. viii. 87*, with the aorist participle (144): εἰ συνεκίρησε ἡ τῶν Καλυνδέων παραπесоῦσα νηὺς.

890. Συμπίπτω (chiefly in Herodotus) and συμβαίνω may take the participle like τυγχάνω. *E.g.*

Καὶ τότε ἕτερον συνέπεσε γένόμενον, *and this other event occurred, as it chanced.* *HER. ix. 101.* Συνεπεπτώκει ἔρις ἐοῦσα, *it had happened that there was a quarrel.* *Id. i. 82.* Οὕτω γὰρ συμβαίνει ἅμα καὶ ἡ τῶνδε εὐγένεια κοσμουμένη. *PLAT. Menex. 237 C.* Πάντα ξυμβαίνει γιγνόμενα. *Id. Phil. 42 C.* Ὅπου ἂν ξυμπέπτη ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καλὰ ἦθῃ ἐνόντα. *Id. Rep. 402 D.*

891. Θαμίζω, *to be wont or frequent*, may take the participle. *E.g.*

Οὐ τι κομιζόμενός γε θάμιζεν, *he was not used to being thus cared for.* *OD. viii. 451.* Οὐ θαμίξεις καταβαίνων εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ, *you do not come down to the Piræus very often.* *PLAT. Rep. 328 C.*

For examples of the aorist participle with the present or imperfect of some of the above verbs (887-890), retaining its own reference to past time, see 146.

892. As λανθάνω is active and means *to escape the notice of*, it must have an object expressed or understood. When none is expressed, sometimes πάντας is understood, and sometimes a reflexive referring to the subject. Thus ἔλαθε τοῦτο ποιήσας may mean *either he did this without any one's knowing it* (sc. πάντας), or *he did this unconsciously* (sc. ἐαυτόν).

893. The usual construction of λανθάνω and φθάνω (and rarely that of τυγχάνω and κυρέω) with the participle may be reversed, these verbs appearing in the participle, and what is generally the participle becoming the verb. *E.g.*

*Ἀψ' ἀπὸ τείχεος ἄλτο λαθών, *back from the wall he leaped secretly* (for ἔλαθεν ἄλμενος). *II. xii. 390.* Ὅπως μὴ ποιῶνται ἔκπλους αὐτόθεν λανθάνοντες. *THUC. iii. 51.* Ὅς μ' ἔβαλε φθάμενος, *who took advantage of me and hit me.* *II. v. 119.* Φθάνοντες ἤδη δηοῦμεν τὴν ἐκείνων γῆν. *XEN. Cyr. iii. 3, 18.* Τὴν ἐσβολὴν φθάσαντες προκατέλαβον. *THUC. iv. 127; so ii. 52.* Ὅλγ' ἀληθῇ πολλὰ δὲ ψευδῇ λέγει τυχών, *i.e. speaks at random.* *EUR. I. A. 957.* Πλησίον γὰρ ἦν κυρῶν, *for he happened to be near.* *SOPH. Ph. 371.* See *ÆSCH. Supp. 805.*

894. The phrase οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις (or οὐκ ἂν φθάνοιτε), *you could not be too soon*, is used with the participle as an exhortation, meaning *the sooner the better*. The first and third persons are less common in this sense. *E.g.*

Ἀποτρέχων οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις, *the sooner you run off the better*. AR. Pl. 1133. So HDT. vii. 162; XEN. Mem. iii. 11, 1. Οὐκ ἂν φθάνοιμι (λέγων), *I might as well speak at once*. Ib. 214 E. Εἰ μὴ τιμωρήσεσθε τούτους, οὐκ ἂν φθάνοι τὸ πλῆθος τούτοις τοῖς θηρίοις δουλεύον, *the people might as well be slaves to these beasts at once*. DEM. xxiv. 143.

895. VI. The participle, with many verbs signifying *to come* or *to go*, contains the leading idea of the expression. Such verbs are οἶχμαι, *to be gone*, ἦκω, *to have come*, ἔρχομαι, εἶμι, with the Homeric βῆ, and ἔβαν or βάν, from βαίνω. Some of these uses are very peculiar. *E.g.*

᾽Οιχετ' ἀποπτάμενος, *it flew away and was gone*. Il. ii. 71. Οἶχεται φεύγων δὲν εἶχες μάρτυρα, *the witness whom you had has run away*. AR. Pl. 933. "Ἴν' εἰδῆς οὓς φέρων ἦκω λόγους, *that you may know the words I bring with me*. EUR. Or. 1628. Ἐρχομαι ἐπιχειρῶν σοι ἐπιδείξασθαι τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἶδος, *I am going to undertake to show you the nature of the cause*. PLAT. Phaed. 100 B. Οὐκ ἔρχομαι ἐρέων ὡς οὕτω ἢ ἄλλως πως ταῦτα ἐγένετο, *I am not going to say that these things occurred so, or in some other way* (cf. French *je vais dire*). HDT. i. 5. Ἦιε ταύτην αἰνέων διὰ παντός, *he always praised her (he went on praising her, French il allait la louant toujours: see Baehr's note)*. Id. i. 122. Καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν ἦα τὰς ἐφεξῆς ἐρών, *and I was going to speak of them in order*. PLAT. Rep. 449 A; so 562 C. Βῆ φεύγων, *he took flight*. Il. ii. 665; so βῆ ἀίξασα, ii. 167. Οὓς μὴ κῆρες ἔβαν θανάτοιο φέρουσαι, Il. ii. 302; so xix. 279.

896. VII. Herodotus uses the participle with πειρῶμαι, *to try*, and with πολλὸς εἶμι or γίνομαι, πολλὸς ἔγκειμαι, and παντοῖος γίνομαι, *to be urgent*; rarely with ἐπείγομαι, *to press on*. *E.g.*

Οὐκ ἐπειράτο ἐπιὼν ὁ Κῦρος, *Cyrus did not attempt to approach*. i. 77; so i. 84, vi. 50, vii. 9. Πολλὸς ἦν λισσόμενος ὁ ξένος, *the stranger entreated urgently*. ix. 91. Γέλων δὲ πολλὸς ἐνέκειτο λέγων τοιαῦδε, *and Gelon spoke urgently as follows*. vii. 158. Τότε παντοῖοι ἐγένοντο Σκύθαι δεόμενοι Ἰώνων λῦσαι τὸν πόρον, *they begged them in every way* (lit. *they took every form in begging them*), etc. vii. 10. Ἦν μὴ ἐπειχθῆς ναυμαχίην ποιεύμενος, *if you do not press on and fight a naval battle*. viii. 68 (but just below, ἦν ἐπειχθῆς ναυμαχῆσαι).

897. The participle with πειρῶμαι, πολλὸς ἔγκειμαι, and ἔγκειμαι alone, occurs occasionally in Attic Greek. So also with πάντα ποιῶ and rarely with σπονδάζω. *E.g.*

Οὐκ ἐρῶ σοι πρὶν ἂν πανταχῇ πεираθῶ σκοπῶν. PLAT. Theaet.

190 E. So ANT. Tetr. A. γ. 1. Πολὺς ἐνέκειτο λέγων. THUC. iv. 22. Ἐνέκειντο φεύγοντες. Id. ii. 81. Πάντα ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι φεύγοντες τὴν δίκην. PLAT. Euthyph. 8 C. Τὰ πλούτου καὶ δυνάμεων διώγματα τί καὶ τις ἂν ὥς ἄξια λόγου σπουδάξοι μεμφόμενος; *why should any one seriously censure them as if they were worth noticing?* Id. Polit. 310 B; so XEN. Oec. ix. 1.

898. VIII. Ἀποδείκνυμι, καθίζω, and παρασκευάζω, in the meaning to put into a certain condition, to render, may take the participle. E.g.

Ἄμα καὶ τὰπιτήδεα μάλιστα ἔχοντας ἀποδείξειν καὶ τὰ σώματα ἄριστα ἔχοντας παρασκευάσειν, (*I undertake to say*) that he will at the same time make them (*show them forth*) best supplied with provisions, and cause them to have their bodies in the best condition. XEN. Cyr. i. 6, 18. Βλέποντ' ἀποδείξω σ' ὀξύτερον τοῦ Λυγκέως, *I will make you see sharper than Lynceus*. AR. Pl. 210. Ἐὰν κλαίοντας αὐτοὺς καθίσω. PLAT. Ion. 535 E. So XEN. Cyr. ii. 2, 14. See these verbs in Liddell and Scott.

899. IX. Ἀρκέω (and ἄλις εἰμί in poetry), to be sufficient, and ἱκανός, ἡδίων, κρείσσων, ἀμείνων, or βελτίων with εἰμί, are sometimes used in a personal construction with the participle (like δηλὸς εἰμι, etc. 907), where we should expect an impersonal construction with the infinitive. E.g.

Ἀρκέσω θνήσκου' ἐγώ, *it will be enough for me to die*. SOPH. ANT. 547. (We might expect ἀρκέσει ἐμὲ θνήσκειν.) So ἀρκέτω δεδηλωμένον, THUC. v. 9. Ἰκανὸς ἔφη αὐτὸς ἀτυχῶν εἶναι, *he said that it was enough for himself to be in misfortune*. ISAE. ii. 7. Κρείσσων γὰρ ἦσθα μηκέτ' ὦν ἢ ζῶν τυφλός. SOPH. O. T. 1368. Ἡδίους ἔσεσθε ἀκούσαντες, *you will be more pleased to hear*. DEM. xxiii. 64. So ἄλις νοσοῦσ' ἐγώ (sc. εἰμί), *it is enough for me to be afflicted*. SOPH. O. T. 1061.

900. X. The participles βουλόμενος, ἐθέλων (poetic), ἡδόμενος, ἄσμενος, ἀχθόμενος, προσδεχόμενος, ἐλπόμενος, ἐλδόμενος (Ionic), and occasionally others, may agree in case with a dative which depends on εἰμί, γίγνομαι, or some verb signifying to come, to appear, or to happen. E.g.

Ὡς ἄρα τῷ Τρώεσσιν ἐελδόμενοισι φανήτην, *thus then did they appear to the delight of the Trojans*. II. vii. 7. Ἐμοὶ δέ κεν ἄσμένῳ εἶη, *and I should be pleased with it*. II. xiv. 108. Ἡδομένοισιν ἡμῖν οἱ λόγοι γεγόνασι, *we are pleased with the proposals made to us*. HDT. ix. 46. Θέλοντι κάμοι τοῦτ' ἂν ᾦν. SOPH. O. T. 1356. Τῷ πλῑθει οὐ βουλομένῳ ᾦν, *it was not the wish of the majority*. THUC. ii. 3; so vii. 35. Προσδεχομένῳ μοι τὰ τῆς ὀργῆς ὑμῶν ἐς ἐμὲ γεγένηται, *I have been expecting the manifestations of your wrath against me*. Id. ii. 60; so vi. 46. Ὅτφ ὑμῶν μὴ ἀχθομένῳ εἶη. XEN. Cyr. iv. 5, 21. Ἄν βουλομένοις ἀκούειν ἢ τουτοῖσι, μνησθήσομαι, *if these shall want to hear it*. DEM. xviii. 11. Ὅρα, εἰ σοι βουλομένῳ (sc. ἐστίν) ἂ λέγω. PLAT. Rep. 358 D.

See also τούτων πεπειραμένοις ἄν τι γένοιτο καὶ ὑμῖν, THUC. v. 111; and ἀσμένῳ δέ σοι ἡ ποικιλείμων νύξ ἀποκρύψει φῶς, *you will be glad when spangled-robed night shall hide the light*, AESCH. Prom. 23.

Compare Tac. Agric. 18: Quibus bellum volentibus erat.

901. XI. In a similar way, the dative of any participle may be used with certain impersonal expressions which take the dative, especially those signifying *it is fitting, good, pleasant, profitable*, or their opposites, and those implying *fear or confidence*. *E.g.*

Εἰ τόδ' αὐτῷ φίλον κεκλημένῳ (sc. ἐστίν), *if it pleases him to be thus called*. AESCH. Ag. 161. Οὐκ ἄξιον τούτοις πολλάκις χρῆσθαι συμβούλοις, οἷς οὐδὲ ἅπαξ ἐλυσιτέλησε πειθομένοις (sc. ὑμῖν), *whom it did not profit you to obey even once*. LYS. xxv. 27. Φρονεῖν ὡς δεινὸν ἔνθα μὴ τέλη λῆγ φρονούντι, *where it does not profit one to be wise*. SOPH. O. T. 316. Ἐπῆρετο τὸν θεὸν εἰ λῶν καὶ ἀμεινον εἴη τῇ Σπάρτῃ πειθομένη οἷς οὗτος ἔθηκε νόμοις, *whether it was better for Sparta to obey*. XEN. Rep. Lac. viii. 5. Ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι (sc. ἐμοὶ) τὰ ἐμμαντοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνων οὐκ ἂν ἀηδὲς εἴη, *it would not be unpleasant for me to compare, etc.* PLAT. Ap. 41 B. Αἱ δοκοῦσι κάλλιστα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ ἐμοὶ πρόποι ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιμελομένῳ, *those which seem to be the noblest of the sciences, and which it would be most fitting for me to study*. XEN. Oec. iv. 1. Τοῦτο καὶ πρέπει ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεύσαι οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν (i.e. πρέπει μοι οἰομένῳ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχειν), *it seems fitting and worth the risk for me to believe that this is so*. PLAT. Phaed. 114 D. Ὡς μὴ ᾽στι δρῶντι τάρβος, οὐκ ἔπος φοβεῖ, *one who has no dread of a deed, a word does not frighten*. SOPH. O. T. 296.

So εἰ μοι ξυνέη φέροντι μοῖρα τὰν εὐσεπτον ἀγνείαν, *may it continue to be my fate to bear, etc.* Id. O. T. 863.

With the expressions of 901 the infinitive is more common (903, 7).

Omission of ὧν.

902. Occasionally the participle ὧν is omitted in the constructions of the supplementary participle that have been enumerated (879-901). *E.g.*

Καταλαμβάνομεν Φιλίππου παρόντας πρέσβεις, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἡμετέρους φίλους ἐν φόβῳ (sc. ὄντας) τοὺς δ' ἐκείνου θρασεῖς. DEM. xviii. 211. Ἀλλ' οὐ περιόψεται μ' ὁ θεὸς ἀνιππον (sc. ὄντα), *but my uncle will not let me go without a horse*. AR. Nub. 124. Εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνει ἀηδὲς (sc. ὄν). PLAT. Gorg. 502 B. Τυχάνει ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οὐκ αὐτάρκης (sc. ὧν). Id. Rep. 369 B.

Infinitive with Verbs which may also have the Supplementary Participle.

903. Some verbs which take the supplementary participle allow also the infinitive in a similar construction, but with some difference in the meaning or at least in the point of view.

1. Αἰσχύνομαι and αἰδοῦμαι with the participle (881) mean *I am ashamed of doing* (something which I am doing or have done); with the infinitive, *I am ashamed to do* (something which I have not yet done). *E.g.*

Τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνομαι λέγων· τὸ δ' "Ἐὰν μὲνῃτε παρ' ἐμοὶ ἀποδώσω" αἰσχυνοίμην ἂν λέγειν, *this* (something just said) *I am not ashamed of saying*; but *I should be ashamed to say the following*, etc. XEN. Cyr. v. 1, 21. Αἰσχύνομαι ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν τὰληθῆ, *I am ashamed to tell you the truth* (but still I must tell it). PLAT. Ap. 22 B. Αἰδοῦνται τοὺς παρόντας ἀπολείπειν, i.e. *they are ashamed to leave them* (and do not). XEN. Symp. viii. 35. But αἰδεσθαι πατέρα προλείπων, *be ashamed of leaving your father* (as you threaten to do), SOPH. Aj. 506. A comparison of the last example with PLAT. Ap. 22 B (above) shows that the choice of the infinitive or participle may depend on the point of view of the speaker in a special case. In Aj. 506, the threat is viewed as the inception of the act.

2. Ἀνέχομαι, ὑπομένω, τλάω, and τολμῶ with the participle (879; 880) mean *to endure* something now going on or already done; with the infinitive, *to have the courage* or *to venture* to do something not yet done. *E.g.*

Καταμείναντες ἀνέσχοντο τὸν ἐπιόντα ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν δέξασθαι, *they remained and had the courage to receive the invader of their country*. HDt. vii. 139. (Cf. οὐκ ἀνέξομαι ζῶσα under 879.) So ὑπομείναντα τὰ πάντα πάσχειν, *taking courage to suffer everything*. PLAT. Leg. 869 C. (Cf. μὴ ὑπομένειν Ξέρξην ἐπιόντα, *not to await the coming of Xerxes*, i.e. *not to wait to see his coming*, HDt. vii. 120.) Ἐπὶ λαοῦ οὐράνιον φῶς ἀλλάξαι. SOPH. Ant. 944. Τόλμησόν ποτε ὀρθῶς φρονεῖν. AESCH. Prom. 999.

Ἀνέχομαι with the infinitive, and τλάω and τολμῶ with the participle, are rare.

3. Ἀποκάμνω τοῦτο ποιῶν (881) is *I am weary of doing this*; ἀποκάμνω τοῦτο ποιεῖν is *I cease to do this through weariness*. *E.g.*

Μῆτε ταῦτα φοβούμενος ἀποκάμης σαυτὸν σῶσαι, *do not, through fear of this, despair of saving yourself*. PLAT. Crit. 45 B. (Cf. οὐκ ἀποκάμνεις μηχανώμενος, *you are not tired of contriving*, XEN. Mem. ii. 6, 35.)

4. Ἀρχομαι (Homeric ἀρχω) with the participle (879) means *to be first in something, to begin with something, or to be at the*

beginning (not at the end); with the infinitive, to begin to do something. E.g.

**Ἡρξάντο τὰ μακρὰ τείχη Ἀθηναῖοι οἰκοδομεῖν, the Athenians began to build the long walls. THUC. i. 107. Δεῖ ἐμὲ ἐπιδεικνύναι, ὥς οὐτ' ἤρξατο λέγειν τὰ βέλτιστα οὔτε νῦν διατελεῖ πράττων τὰ συμφέροντα τῷ δήμῳ. AESCHIN. iii. 50.*

5. Παύω with the participle (879) means *to stop* what is going on; with the infinitive, *to prevent* a future act. *E.g.*

**Ἐμ' ἔπαυσας μάχεσθαι, you prevented me from fighting. Π. xi. 442. (But Ἐμ' ἔπαυσας μαχόμενον would be you stopped me while fighting.)* **Ραψφδοὺς ἔπαυσε ἀγωνίζεσθαι. HDT. v. 67.*

6. Περιωρῶ and the other verbs signifying *to overlook* or *see* (in the sense of *permit*) with the participle (885) mean *to see* an act *done without interfering to stop it*; with the less frequent infinitive, *to permit* an act *to be done without interfering to prevent it*. Strictly speaking, the infinitive here expresses time future to that of the verb, while the time of the participle coincides with that of the verb. Still, both forms may sometimes be used to express practically the same sense, and may even refer to the same event, though the point of view is different. *E.g.*

Περιυδεῖν αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ σκενῇ πάσῃ ἀείσαι, to let him sing in full dress. HDT. i. 24. Θάλασσαν πνεύματά φασι οὐ περιόψεσθαι φύσι τῇ ἑωυτῆς χρᾶσθαι, they say that the winds will not permit the sea to follow its own nature. Id. vii. 16. Τοὺς γὰρ Ἀθηναίους ἤλπιζεν ἴσως ἂν ἐπεξελθεῖν καὶ τὴν γῆν οὐκ ἂν περιυδεῖν τμηθῆναι, for he hoped that the Athenians would perhaps come forth and not let their land be ravaged. THUC. ii. 20. But in ii. 18 he has said, προσδύχομενος τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τῆς γῆς ἔτι ἀκεραίου οὐσης ἐνδῶσειν τι καὶ κατοκνήσειν περιυδεῖν αὐτὴν τμηθεῖσαν, ἀνείχειν, that they would be unwilling to see it (the land) ravaged (referring to the same thing with περιυδεῖν τμηθῆναι, to let it be ravaged, in 20); and again in 20, οἱ Ἀχαρνῆς οὐ περιόψεσθαι ἐδόκουν τὰ σφέτερα διαφθαρέντα, it did not seem likely that the Acharnians would see their property destroyed.

7. The impersonal expressions of 901 take the infinitive more frequently than the participle, the distinction being similar to that in the last case (6). *E.g.*

Οὐ τοῦτο πρῶτον ἥρῳτα πότερον λῶον εἶη αὐτῷ πορεύεσθαι ἢ μένειν, whether it was better for him to go or stay. XEN. AN. iii. 1, 7. But in XEN. Vect. vi. 2 we have ἐπερέσθαι τοὺς θεοὺς εἰ λῶον καὶ ἄμεινον εἶη ἂν τῇ πόλει οὕτω κατασκευαζομένην, whether it would be better for the state, supposing it to be thus constituted; the difference between this and better for the state to be thus constituted (οὕτω κατασκευάζεσθαι) being practically very slight.

8. It is more than doubtful whether *λανθάνω*, *τυγχάνω*, and *φθάνω* (887) ever have the infinitive in classic Greek. The passages

formerly cited for this are now generally emended, or the readings are doubted: thus, in PLAT. Rep. 333 E, λαθεῖν ἐμπούησαι must be for λαθεῖν ἐμπούήσας (Schneider), and in AR. Eq. 935, φθαίγης ἐλθεῖν, and Nub. 1384, οὐκ ἔφθης φράσαι, Meineke reads ἐλθών and φράσας. See Classen on THUC. iii. 82, ὁ φθάσας θαρσύνῃσαι (?).

II. PARTICIPLE IN INDIRECT DISCOURSE.

904. The participle is used with verbs signifying *to see, to hear or learn, to perceive, to know, to be ignorant of, to remember, to forget, to show, to appear, to prove, to acknowledge*, and with ἀγγέλλω, *to announce*, in a sense approaching that of the infinitive in indirect discourse. Here each tense of the participle represents the corresponding tense of the indicative or optative. (See 687.)

The participle may belong to either the subject or the object of these verbs, and agree with it in case. *E.g.*

Μέμνημαι αὐτὸν τοῦτο ποιήσαντα, *I remember that he did this (ἐποίησεν)*; μέμνημαι τοῦτο ποιήσας, *I remember that I did this (ἐποίησα)*. Οἶδε τοὺτους εἰ πράξοντας, *he knows that they will prosper*; οἶδε αὐτὸς εἰ πράξων, *he knows that he himself will prosper*.

Εἰ κ' αὐτὸν γνῶν νημερτέα πάντ' ἐνόποντα, *if I shall find that he tells all without fault*. Od. xvii. 549. 'Ορῶ δέ μ' ἔργον δεινὸν ἐξεργασμένην, *and I see that I have done a terrible deed*. SOPH. Tr. 706. 'Ημεῖς ἀδύνατοι ὁρῶμεν ὄντες τῇ οἰκείᾳ μόνον δυνάμει περιγενέσθαι, *we see that we are unable, etc. (ἀδύνατοί ἐσμεν)*. THUC. i. 32. "Ἦκουσε Κῦρον ἐν Κιλικίᾳ ὄντα, *he heard that Cyrus was in Cilicia*. XEN. An. i. 4, 5. Περὶ τῆς χώρας, ὅτι ἤκουον δηουμένην, *because they heard that it was suffering from ravages*. Ib. v. 5, 7. "Οταν κλήῃ τινὸς ἤξοντ' 'Ορέστην, *when she hears from any one that Orestes is coming*. SOPH. El. 293. Πυθόμενοι 'Αρταξέρξην νεωστὶ τεθνηκότα, *learning that Artaxerxes had recently died*. THUC. iv. 50; so HDT. vi. 23. 'Επεὶ πρὸς ἀνδρὸς ᾗσθητ' ἡδίκημένη. EUR. Med. 26. "Ἡσθοντο τοὺς μετ' 'Αριστέως ἐπιπαριόντας. THUC. i. 61. Διὰ τὴν 'Ιλίου ἄλωσιν εὐρίσκουσι ἐοῦσαν τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ἔχθρης (see 883). HDT. i. 5. 'Επειδὴν γινώσιν ἀπιστούμενοι, *when they find out that they are distrusted*. XEN. Cyr. vii. 2, 17. "Ἦδσαν Σωκράτην αὐταρκέστατα ζῶντα. Id. Mem. i. 2, 14. 'Εν πολυτρόποις γὰρ ξυμφοραῖς ἐπίστανται τραφέντες. THUC. ii. 44. Διαβεβλημένους οὐ μαθήνεις. HDT. iii. 1. 'Εννοῦμαι φαῦλος οὔσα. EUR. Hipp. 435. 'Εννοήσας γένος ἐπικρὲς ἀθλῶς διατιθέμενον. PLAT. Criti. 121 B. Τίς οὕτως εὐήθης ἐστὶν ὑμῶν ὅστις ἀγνοεῖ τὸν ἐκείθεν πόλεμον δεῦρο ἤξοντα; DEM. i. 15. Μέμνημαι Κριτία τῷδε ξυνόντα σε (i.e. ξυνήσθα). PLAT. Charm. 156 A. Μεμνήμεθ' ἐς κίνδυνον ἐλθόντες μέγαν (i.e. ἵλλομεν). EUR. Hec. 244. 'Επιτελήσμεθ' ἡδέως γέροντες ὄντες. Id.

Bacch. 188. Ἐπιδείξω δὲ τοῦτον οὐ μόνον ὁμολογηκότα εἶναι τὸν Μιλίαν ἐλεύθερον (with six other participles, perfect, aorist, and present). DEM. xxix. 5. Ὁ πόλεμος οὗτος δηλώσει μείζων γεγεννημένος αὐτῶν (i.e. μείζων γεγένηται). THUC. i. 21. Εἰ φανήσεται ταῦθ' ὁμολογηκῶς, παρά τε τοῦ Δημοφώντος τὰς τιμὰς εἰληφώς, αὐτός τε . . . ἀπογράφας, οἰκῶν τε τὴν οἰκίαν, κ.τ.λ. DEM. xxvii. 16. Εὐθὺς ἐλεγχθήσεται γελοῖος ὢν. XEN. Mem. i. 7, 2. Οὕτως ὁμολογουμένη οὖσα δούλη καὶ ἅπαντα τὸν χρόνον ἀσυχρῶς βιοῦσα, when it was thus admitted that she was a slave and was all the time living a life of disgrace. ISAE. vi. 49. Εἰ μὴ ἐξήγγειλε προσιὼν τὸ στράτευμα, had he not reported that the enemy was advancing. XEN. Hell. vii. 5, 10. Ἀπηγγέλη Φίλιππος ὑμῖν Ἡραῖον τεῖχος πολιορκῶν, it was reported to you that he was besieging, etc. DEM. iii. 4.

Compare the examples of ὁρῶ, ἀκούω, and similar verbs here given with those of the same verbs under 884, in which the participle is not in indirect discourse.

See other examples of the participle in indirect discourse under 687, where examples of the participle with ἄν may be found (see also 213-216).

905. When one of these verbs has for its object an accusative of the reflexive pronoun referring to its subject, the participle generally agrees with the reflexive. Thus we may have either δείξω ἑμαυτὸν τοῦτο πεποιηκότα, *I shall show that I have done this*, or δείξω τοῦτο πεποιηκῶς.

906. The participle of an *impersonal* verb in this construction stands alone in the neuter singular. The following includes both the personal and the impersonal construction:—

Πειράσσομαι δεῖξαι καὶ μετὸν τῆς πόλεως ἡμῖν καὶ πεπονθότα ἑμαυτὸν οὐχὶ προσήκοντα, *I shall try to show not only that we have rights in the city, but also that I have suffered*, etc. DEM. lvii. 1. (The direct discourse is μέτεστι τῆς πόλεως ἡμῖν, καὶ πέπονθα αὐτός. Compare 876.)

907. The participle is used in the same way in a personal construction with δηλός εἰμι and φανερός εἰμι, in preference to an impersonal expression. So with ἐπείστος γίνομαι in Herodotus. *E.g.*

Δηλός τ' ἦν οἰόμενος, κ.τ.λ., *it was evident that he thought*, etc. XEN. An. ii. 5, 27. (This is equivalent to δηλον ἦν ὅτι οἶοιτο. See 899; 912.) Ἀπικόμενοι μὲν φανεροί εἰσι ἐς Ὀασιν πόλιν, *it is evident that they came to the city Oasis*. HDT. iii. 26. Ὡς ἐπείστος ἐγένετο τοῦτο ἐργασμένος, *when it became known (heard of) that he had done this*. Id. ii. 119.

Similar is the participle with φανερὸν ποιῶ; as φανερὸν πᾶσιν ἐποίησαν οὐκ ἰδίᾳ πολεμοῦντες, *they made it evident to all that they were not fighting for themselves*. LYCURG. 50.

908. When *σύνοιδα* and *συγγιγνώσκω* have a dative of the reflexive referring to the subject, a participle may stand either in the dative agreeing with the reflexive, or in the nominative agreeing with the subject; as *σύνοιδα ἑμαυτῷ ἡδικημένῳ* (or *ἡδικημένος*), *I am conscious to myself that I have been wronged.* *E.g.*

Ἐγὼ οὐτε μέγα οὐτε μικρὸν ξύνοιδα ἑμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὢν. PLAT. AP. 21 B. Ἐμαυτῷ ξυνήδειν οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένῳ. Ib. 22 D.

909. When the participle of indirect discourse belongs to an infinitive depending on a verb with an object dative to which the participle refers, the participle stands in the dative. *E.g.*

Συμβέβηκε τοῖς προσετηκόσι καὶ τᾶλλα πλὴν ἑαυτοὺς οἰομένοις πωλεῖν πρώτους ἑαυτοὺς πεπρακόσιν αἰσθῆσθαι, *it has been the lot of those who were in authority and who thought they were selling everything except themselves, to find that they have sold themselves first.* DEM. xviii. 46.

910. Some verbs which regularly have the infinitive or *ὅτι* and *ὥς* in indirect discourse occasionally take the participle. *E.g.*

Νόμιζε ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν ἀποκτείνων, *think that you are putting to death a good man.* XEN. AN. vi. 6, 24. Ἀνεβήσето ἐρεούσα φίλον πῶσιν ἄνδρα ἔοντα. OD. xxiii. 1. Θανόντ' Ὁρέστην νῦν τε καὶ πάλαι λέγω. SOPH. EL. 676. See O. C. 1579; EUR. HEL. 1076. Οὐ Τρωὰς γυνὴ τεκοῦσα κομπάσειεν ἂν ποτε, *i.e. none could boast that she was the mother (of such children), ἔτεκον being the direct form.* EUR. TRO. 477. Μετὸν ἂν ποτε λέγοιτο. PLAT. PHIL. 22 E. Σμέρδιν μηκέτι ὑμῖν ἔοντα λογίσεσθε. HDT. iii. 65. Οὐ γὰρ εὐτυχῶν ἀρνῆσομαι, *for I will not deny that I am happy.* EUR. ALCE. 1158. So ἀρνέει κατακτάς; ID. OR. 1581.

911. The participle *ὢν* is sometimes omitted in indirect discourse. *E.g.*

Σὺ δὲ σῶς ἴσθι (sc. ὢν), *but know that you are safe.* SOPH. O. C. 1210. Εἰδὼς εὐτρεπεῖς ὑμᾶς (sc. ὄντας). DEM. iv. 18; so iv. 41. Ἀγγελλε πασῶν ἀθλιωτάτην ἐμέ (sc. οὖσαν). EUR. HEC. 423.

912. The verbs included in 904 may also be followed by a clause with *ὅτι* or *ὥς* in indirect discourse. When *δηλὸν ἔστιν* and *φανερὸν ἔστιν* are used impersonally, they regularly take *ὅτι* or *ὥς.* *E.g.*

Ἦσθετο ὅτι τὸ Μένωνος στράτευμα ἦδη ἐν Κιλικίᾳ ἦν. XEN. AN. i. 2, 21. Αἰσθάνεσθε ὥς ἀθύμως ἦλθον. Ib. iii. 1, 40. Ἀκούοντες ὅτι οὗτος πολίξει τὸ χωρίον. Ib. vi. 6, 4. Τοσοῦτόν γ' οἶδα κάμαντήν, ὅτι ἀλγῶ. SOPH. EL. 332. Ταῦτα ἴσασιν ὅτι φύσει τε καὶ τύχῃ γίγνεται. PLAT. PROT. 323 D. Δῆλον (sc. ἔστιν) ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει. XEN. AN. i. 3, 9. Φανερὸν δὲ ὅτι οὐτ' ἂν Θραξὶν οὕτε Σκύθαις ἐθέλοιεν ἂν διαγωνίζεσθαι. ID. MEM. iii. 9, 2. Τοῦτο φανερὸν, ὥς . . . λέγομεν. PLAT. SOPH. 237 D.

913. Verbs signifying *to remember* or *to know* may have *ᾔτε*, *when*, and the indicative, to emphasise the temporal relation. *E.g.*

Εἰ γὰρ μέμνησαι ὅτ' ἐγώ σοι ἀπεκρινάμην, *for if you remember (the time) when I answered you*, etc. PLAT. MEN. 79 D. Οἶσθ' ὅτε χρυσέοις ἐφάνη σὺν ὄπλοις. EUR. HEC. 112. So II. xv. 18. (See 519, end.)

Infinitive with the Verbs of § 904.

914. Many of the verbs which regularly have the participle in indirect discourse (904) may also take the infinitive in nearly or quite the same sense.

1. Ἀκούω, πυνθάνομαι, and αἰσθάνομαι, which have the participle both in indirect discourse (904) and in the other construction (884-886), sometimes take the infinitive in indirect discourse, in a sense differing little, if at all, from that of the participle. *E.g.*

Ἀκούω δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἔθνη πολλὰ τοιαῦτα εἶναι, *I hear that there are also many other such nations*. XEN. AN. ii. 5, 13. (Πολλὰ τοιαῦτα ὄντα would apparently mean the same.) So MEM. iv. 2, 4. Ἀκούω αὐτὸν ἐρεῖν, *I hear that he will say*. DEM. xix. 202. (Compare SOPH. EL. 293, under 904.) Πυνθανόμενος τὸν Θουκυδίδην κτῆσίν τε ἔχειν καὶ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ δύνασθαι ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις. THUC. iv. 105. So DEM. xix. 201. Αἰσθανόμενος αὐτοὺς μέγα παρὰ βασιλεῖ Δαρεῖφι δύνασθαι. THUC. vi. 59.

2. Ὀρώ has the participle in both constructions (904; 886), but the infinitive (of indirect discourse) only in THUC. viii. 60 (according to Kühner, § 484, 2): ἑώρων οὐκέτι ἄνευ ναυμαχίας οἶόν τε εἶναι ἐς τὴν Χίον βοηθῆσαι, where Krüger brackets εἶναι.

3. Ἀγγέλλω may have the infinitive in indirect discourse, in place of the regular participle (904). *E.g.*

Ὁ Ἀσσύριος εἰς τὴν χώραν αὐτοῦ ἐμβαλεῖν ἀγγέλλεται, *is reported to have invaded his country*. XEN. CYR. v. 3, 30.

4. Ὁμολογῶ, *to admit* or *grant*, is but rarely followed by the participle (904), and generally takes the infinitive of indirect discourse. *E.g.*

Ὁμολογεῖται πρὸς πάντων κράτιστος δὴ γενέσθαι θεραπεύειν (τοὺς φίλους). XEN. AN. i. 9, 20. (See 136.)

5. Φαίνομαι, *to appear*, which generally takes the participle in indirect discourse (904), sometimes has the infinitive. The distinction generally holds that φαίνεται σοφὸς ὢν means *he is manifestly wise*, while φαίνεται σοφὸς εἶναι means *he seems to be wise*; but in some cases the two constructions cannot be distinguished in sense. *E.g.*

Τῇ φωνῇ σαφῶς κλαίειν ἐφαίνετο, *by his voice he seemed plainly to be weeping* (but he really was not). XEN. Symp. i. 15. Compare καί σφι εὖνοος ἐφαίνετο ἐών, *and he was plainly well disposed towards them*, HDT. vii. 173. But see also AESCH. Ag. 593, πλαγκτὸς οὐδ' ἐφαινόμην, *I appeared to be crazed*, said by Clytemnestra of herself, after she was shown to have been right. Τοῦτό μοι θειότατον φαίνεται γενέσθαι, *this seems to me to have been a most wonderful event*, HDT. vii. 137.

915. Other verbs of this class (904) may be used in a peculiar sense, in which they have the infinitive not in indirect discourse. Others, again, allow both constructions of the infinitive; while γινώσκω and εὐρίσκω have the infinitive in three different senses.

1. Μανθάνω, μέμνημαι, and ἐπιλάνθανομαι, in the sense of *learn, remember, and forget to do anything*, take the ordinary object infinitive. *E.g.*

Ἐπεὶ μάθον ἔμμεναι ἐσθλὸς αἰεὶ καὶ πρότωσι μετὰ Τρώεσσι μάχεσθαι, *since I learned to be brave*, etc. II. vi. 444. Τοὺς προδότας γὰρ μισεῖν ἔμαθον. AESCH. Prom. 1068. So XEN. An. iii. 2, 25. Μεμνήσθω ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι, *let him remember to be a brave man*. Ib. iii. 2, 39 (with ὧν it would mean *let him remember that he is a brave man*). Μεμνήσονται δεῦρο ἀποπέμπειν. Id. Cyr. viii. 6, 6. Ἐπελαθόμεν τοὺς καδίσκους ἐκφέρειν, *I forgot to bring out the urns*. AR. Vesp. 853. Ὀλίγου ἐπελαθόμεθ' εἰπεῖν. PLAT. Rep. 563 B.

2. (a) Οἶδα and ἐπίσταμαι, which regularly have the participle in indirect discourse, take the ordinary infinitive in the sense of *know how to do anything*. *E.g.*

Μὴ ψεύδε', ἐπιστάμενος σάφα εἰπεῖν, *do not be false, when you know how to speak truly*. II. iv. 404. Οἶδ' ἐπὶ δεξιᾷ, οἶδ' ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ νωμῆσαι βῶν. II. vii. 238. Προβάλλεσθαι δ' ἢ βλέπειν ἐναντίον οὐτ' οἶδεν οὐτ' ἐθέλει. DEM. iv. 40. So EUR. Hipp. 729, Med. 664. Εἴκειν δ' οὐκ ἐπίσταται κακοῖς, *she knows not how to yield to troubles*. SOPH. Ant. 472; so Aj. 666; EUR. Hipp. 996.

(b) But these verbs in the sense *to know* or *to believe* sometimes take the infinitive (like the participle) in indirect discourse. This is rare in prose, except with ἐπίσταμαι, *to believe*, in Herodotus. *E.g.*

Ἰσθι τὰ σκλήρ' ἄγαν φρονήματα πίπτειν μάλιστα, *know that too stubborn spirits are most apt to fall* (like πίπτοντα). SOPH. Ant. 473. (Οἶδα with the participle follows in 477.) Εἶ νῦν ἐπίστω τῶνδ' ἐμ' αἰσχύνῃν ἔχειν. Id. El. 616; so O. T. 690, Ant. 1092; AESCH. Pers. 337. Εἶ ἴσθι τοῦτον ἰσχυρῶς ἀνιᾶσθαι. XEN. Cyr. viii. 3, 44; so viii. 7, 12. Ἐπιστάμενοι τότε τελευτῆσαι, *believing that he (Cyrus) had then perished*. HDT. i. 122; so iii. 66, 134, and 140, vii. 172. See ἴσθι μήποτ' ἀν τυχεῖν, SOPH. Ph. 1329; and τὸδ' ἴσθι, μὴ γῆμαι, EUR. Med. 593; cf. I. A. 1005.

3. Γινώσκω, besides its construction with the participle in indirect discourse (904), has three uses with the infinitive:—

(a) In the meaning *to decide or judge*, with the infinitive in indirect discourse; as τὸ δ' ἴσον ἀνταπόδοτε, γνόντες τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν καιρὸν, *making up your minds that this is that time*, etc., THUC. i. 43; so HDT. ix. 71; XEN. AN. i. 9, 17.

(b) In the meaning *to determine or resolve*, with the ordinary object infinitive; as Ἀλκιάττεα ἔγνωσαν δοῦναι τὴν θυγατέρα Ἀστυάγει, *they decided that Alcyattes should give his daughter to Astyages*, HDT. i. 74; so XEN. HELL. iv. 6, 9, ἔγνω δῶκεν, and iii. 1, 12; ISOC. xvii. 16.

(c) Occasionally in the meaning *to learn* (ἐγνων), with the object infinitive, like μανθάνω and μέμνημαι (1); as ἵνα γνῶ τρέφειν τὴν γλῶσσαν ἡσυχωτέραν, *that he may learn to keep his tongue more quiet*, SOPH. ANT. 1089.

4. Δείκνυμι and other verbs signifying *to show*, besides the participle in indirect discourse (904), may take an object infinitive in the sense *to show how to do anything*. E.g.

Ἀπέδειξαν οἱ ἡγεμόνες λαμβάνειν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια, *the guides instructed them to take provisions*. XEN. AN. ii. 3, 14. Διαιτητήρια τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐπεδείκνυν τοῦ μὲν θέρου ἔχειν ψυχρινὰ, τοῦ δὲ χειμῶνος ἀλεινὰ, *I taught the men to keep their dwellings cool in summer and warm in winter*. ID. OEC. ix. 4.

5. Δηλῶ sometimes has the infinitive (like the regular participle, 904) in indirect discourse; and sometimes in the sense of *command* (*make known*) it has the ordinary object infinitive. E.g.

Δηλοῖς γὰρ αὐτὸν σωρὸν ἥκειν χρημάτων ἔχοντα, *for you indicate that he has come with a heap of money*. AR. PL. 269. Δηλοῦντες προσίσθαι τὰ κεκηρυγμένα, *showing that they accepted the terms which were announced*. THUC. iv. 38. Κηρύγματι ἐδήλον τοὺς ἐλευθερίας δεομένους ὡς πρὸς σύμμαχον αὐτὸν παρεῖναι, *he proclaimed that those who wanted freedom should come to him as to an ally*. XEN. AG. i. 33.

6. (a) Εὕρισκω, which has two constructions with the participle (883; 904), occasionally has the infinitive in indirect discourse. E.g.

Εὔρισκε πρήγμα οἱ εἶναι ἐλαύνειν ἐπὶ τὰς Σάρδεις, *he found that he must (πρήγμα μοι ἐστι, mihi opus est) march to Sardes*. HDT. i. 79; so i. 125, vii. 12. See PLAT. LEG. 699 B.

(b) The middle may take the ordinary object infinitive in the sense of *discover how to do anything*. E.g.

Οὐδεὶς λύπας εὔρετο παύειν, *no one ever found out how to stop pains*. EUR. MED. 195.

(c) The middle may also have the infinitive in the sense of *procure by asking*. E.g.

Παρά δὲ σφίσιν εὗροντο παρὰ Πανσανίῳ ἐστάναι Ποτιδαητέων τοὺς παρόντας, *they gained (the favour) from Pausanias that those who were present from Potidaea should stand next to themselves*. HDT. ix. 28.

ὥς with the Participle in Indirect Discourse.

916. The participle in indirect discourse may be preceded by ὥς, which implies that the thought of the participle is expressed as that of the leading subject, or as that of some person prominent in the sentence. (See 864.) When this is already implied in the context, as it often is, ὥς adds only emphasis to the expression. Thus ἴσθι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχοντα means *know that this is so*; but ἴσθι ὥς ταῦτα ἔχοντα means *know that (as you may assume) this is so*, i.e. *be assured that this is so*. E.g.

ὥς μηδὲν εἰδότες ἴσθι μὲν ὧν ἀνιστορεῖς, *understand (that you must look upon) me as knowing nothing of what you seek*. SOPH. Ph. 253. ὥς μηκέτ' ὄντα κείνον ἐν φάει νόει, *think of him as no longer living*. Ib. 415. ὥς ταῦτ' ἐπίστω δρώμεν, οὐ μέλλοντ' ἔτι, *understand that (as you may assume) these things are going on, etc.* Ib. 567. Ταῦτα γῆ τῇδ' ὥς τελέων ἐφαίνετο. Id. O. C. 630. Καὶ τοῦτο ἐπιστάσθω Κροῖσος, ὥς ὕστερον ἄλοὺς τῆς πεπρωμένης, *and let Croesus understand this, that he was captured later than it was fated for him to be*. HDT. i. 91. ὥς μὴ ὑπολήσων ἴσθι τὴν ἐμὴν φρένα, *be assured that you will not buy me off from my determination*. SOPH. Ant. 1063. Δηλοῖς δ' ὥς τι σημανῶν νέον, *you show that you have something new in your mind to disclose*. Ib. 242. Δηλὸς ἐστὶν ὥς τι δρασεῖων κακόν, *it is very plain that he wishes to do some harm*. Id. Aj. 326. Δηλὸς ἦν Κῦρος ὥς σπεύδων, *Cyrus showed that he was in haste*. XEN. An. i. 5, 9. Δηλοὶ ἐσσεσθε ὥς ὀργιζόμενοι τοῖς πεπραγμένοις, *you will show that you are angry*. LYS. xii. 90. Πατέρα τὸν σὸν ἀγγελῶν ὥς οὐκ ἔτ' ὄντα, *(he comes) to announce that your father is no more*. SOPH. O. T. 956. (In vs. 959, the messenger himself says εἰ ἴσθ' ἐκείνον θανάσιμον βεβήκοτα.)

The force of ὥς here can seldom be well expressed in English.

917. In place of the participle with ὥς in indirect discourse, we may have a circumstantial participle with ὥς in the genitive or accusative absolute, followed by a verb to which the participle would naturally be the object. E.g.

ὥς δὲ ἔχόντων τῶνδ' ἐπίστασθαι σε χρή, *you must understand that this is so*; lit. *believing this to be so, you must understand (it is so)*. SOPH. Aj. 281; see Schneidewin's note. By an entirely different construction this comes practically to the same meaning as ὥς δὲ ἔχοντα τὰδ' ἐπίστασθαι σε χρή. ὥς τοίνυν ὄντων τῶνδ' σοὶ μαθεῖν

πάρα, in the belief that this is so, you may learn it, i.e. you may learn that this is so. AESCH. Prom. 760. 'Ὡς πολέμου ὄντος παρ' ὑμῶν ἀπαγγελῶ; shall I announce from you that there is war? lit. shall I make a report from you on the assumption that there is war? XEN. An. ii. 1, 21. 'Ὡς πάντῃ μοι δοκοῦν, οὕτως ἴσθι, know that I think so very decidedly; lit. in the belief that this seems so to me, understand accordingly. Id. Mem. iv. 2, 30. 'Ὡς ἐμοῦ ἀγωνιουμένου, οὕτως γίγνωσκε, know that I shall contend. Id. Cyr. ii. 3, 15.

918. 'Ὡς with the participle in the genitive or accusative absolute, used as in 917, may depend on verbs or expressions which do not take the participle without ὥς in indirect discourse. *E.g.*

'Ὡς οὐκέτ' ὄντων τῶν τέκνων φρόντιζε δὴ, think of it, that your children are no longer living, lit. knowing that your children are no longer living, think of it. EUR. Med. 1311. 'Ὡς καὶ τῶν στρατιωτῶν καὶ τῶν ἡγεμόνων ὑμῖν μὴ μεμπτῶν γεγενημένων, οὕτω τὴν γνώμην ἔχετε, be of this mind, that both your soldiers and their leaders have been free from blame. THUC. vii. 15. 'Ὡς ἐμοῦ οὖν ἰόντος ὅπῃ ἂν καὶ ὑμεῖς, οὕτω τὴν γνώμην ἔχετε, be of this opinion, that I shall go wherever you do. XEN. An. i. 3, 6. 'Ὡς τοίνυν μὴ ἀκουσομένων, οὕτως διανοεῖσθε, make up your minds then that we shall not hear; lit. knowing then that we shall not hear, so make up your minds. PLAT. Rep. 327 C. 'Ἐν τούτοις μὲν ὥς διδακτοῦ οὕσης τῆς ἀρετῆς λέγει, here he speaks of virtue as a thing that can be taught. Id. Men. 95 E. Ὑποθέμενοι ὥς τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος, προΐωμεν, having premised that this is so, let us proceed. Id. Rep. 437 A. Διανοηθέντες ὥς ἰόντων πάντων αἰὲ καὶ ῥέοντων, thinking of all things as moving and in flux. Id. Crat. 439 C. Οὕτω σκοπῶμεν, ὥς τάχ' ἂν, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ τούτων κακείνων συμβάντων, let us look at the case, feeling that both this and that might perhaps happen if it should so chance; lit. with the idea that both this and that might perhaps happen if it should so chance, let us look at it in this light. DEM. xxiii. 58. 'Ὡς δέον αὐτὸν τεθῆναι. Id. xxi. 70.

919. Verbs of saying and thinking which do not take the participle in indirect discourse sometimes have the participle (in the accusative or nominative) with ὥς, which in some cases approaches very near indirect discourse, and in others is more like a circumstantial participle. *E.g.*

Φροντίζεθ' ὥς τούτοις τε καὶ σοφωτέροις ἄλλοισι τούτων πλείοσιν μαχούμενοι, consider that you will have to fight with these, etc. SOPH. El. 1370 (cf. EUR. Med. 1311, quoted in 918). Λέγουσιν ἡμᾶς ὥς ὀλωλότας, they speak of us as lost. AESCH. Ag. 672. 'Ὡς οὐκ ὑπείξων οὐδὲ πιστεύσων λέγεις; do you speak with a resolution not to yield or to believe? SOPH. O. T. 625. Καμβύσις Ἴωνας μὲν καὶ Αἰολίας ὥς δούλους πατρῷους ἐόντας ἐνόμιζε, he thought of Ionians and Aeolians as his father's slaves. HDT. ii. 1. 'Ὡς στρατηγήσοντα ἐμὲ μηδεὶς λεγέτω, let no one speak of me as the one who is to be general. XEN. An. i. 3, 15. Ἐδόκει πολλὰ ἤδη ἀληθεῦσαι τοιαῦτα, τὰ ὄντα

τε ὥς ὄντα καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὥς οὐκ ὄντα, *he was thought to have already reported truly many such occurrences, (reporting) what was real as real, and what was unreal as unreal.* Ib. iv. 4, 15. "Ὅταν ὥς πετόμενοι ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ διανοῶνται, *when in their sleep they fancy themselves flying.* PLAT. Theaet. 158 B.

CHAPTER VII.

VERBAL ADJECTIVES IN -τέος AND -τέον.

920. The verbal in -τέος is used in both a personal and an impersonal construction.

921. In the personal construction, the verbal is always passive in sense. It expresses *necessity* (like the Latin participle in -*dus*) and agrees with its subject in case. This construction is, of course, restricted to transitive verbs. *E.g.*

᾽Ωφελητέα σοι ἡ πόλις ἐστί, *the city must be benefited by you.* XEN. Mem. iii. 6, 3. "Ἄλλας (ναῦς) ἐκ τῶν ξυμμάχων μεταπεμπτέας εἶναι (εἶφη), *he said that others must be sent for.* THUC. vi. 25. Οὐ γὰρ πρὸ τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος ἀνὴρ, *a man must not be honoured before the truth.* PLAT. Rep. 595 C. Ὅμοίως φησὶν ἀπάσας εἶναι καὶ τιμητέας ἐξ ἴσου. Ib. 561 C. Φράζοντες ὥς οὐ σφι περιοπτιέη ἐστί ἡ Ἑλλάς ἀπολλυμένη. HDT. vii. 168.

922. The substantive denoting the agent is here in the dative. Εἰμί is often omitted.

923. In the impersonal construction (which is the more common), the verbal is in the neuter of the nominative singular (sometimes plural), with ἐστί expressed or understood. The expression is equivalent to δεῖ, (*one*) *must*, with the infinitive active or middle of the verb to which the verbal belongs.

This construction is practically active in sense, and allows transitive verbals to have an object in the same case which would follow their verbs. The agent is generally expressed by the dative, sometimes by the accusative. *E.g.*

Ταῦτα ἡμῖν (or ἡμᾶς) ποιητέον ἐστί, *we must do this*, equivalent to ταῦτα ἡμᾶς δεῖ ποιῆσαι. Οἰστέον τάδε, *we must bear these things*. EUR. Or. 769. Πειστέον τάδε (sc. σοί), *you must obey in this* (= δεῖ πείθεσθαι). SOPH. Ph. 994. Ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ (τοῦ σώματος), καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα (= δεῖ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ θεᾶσθαι τὰ πράγματα), *we must free ourselves from it (the body), and with the soul itself we must contemplate things themselves*. PLAT. Phaed. 66 E. Φημὶ δὲ διχῇ βοηθητέον εἶναι τοῖς πράγμασιν ὑμῖν, *I say that you must give assistance in two ways*. DEM. i. 17. Τί ἂν αὐτῷ ποιητέον εἴη; *what would he be obliged to do?* XEN. Mem. i. 7, 2. Ἐψήφισαντο πολεμητέα εἶναι (= δεῖν πολεμεῖν), *they voted that they must go to war*. THUC. i. 88. Τὴν χώραν, ἐξ ἧς αὐτοῖς ὀρμωμένοις πολεμητέα ἦν. Id. vi. 50. Οὔτε μνηθοφορητέον ἄλλους ἢ τοὺς στρατευομένους, οὔτε μεθεκτέον τῶν πραγμάτων πλείους ἢ πεντακισχιλίους. Id. viii. 65. (Here both the accusative and the dative of the agent are found: see 926.) Ἡμῖν δὲ ξύμμαχοι ἀγαθοί, οὓς οὐ παραδοτέα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐστίν, οὐδὲ δίκαις καὶ λόγοις διακριτέα μὴ λόγῳ καὶ (ἡμᾶς) αὐτοὺς βλαπτομένους, ἀλλὰ τιμωρητέα ἐν τάχει καὶ παντὶ σθένει (= οὓς οὐ δεῖ ἡμᾶς παραδοῦναι, κ.τ.λ.). Id. i. 86. Ἰτέον ἂν εἴη θεασομένους (sc. ἡμᾶς), *it would be best for us to go and see her*. XEN. Mem. iii. 11, 1. Οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ φαιμέν ἐκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι. PLAT. Crit. 49 A. Ἀτὰρ οὐ γυναικῶν οὐδέποτε ἔσθ' ἡττητέα ἡμῖν (= οὐ γυναικῶν δεῖ ἡττᾶσθαι), *but we must never be beaten by women*. AR. Lys. 450. So SOPH. Ant. 678.

It will be seen that this construction admits verbals of both transitive and intransitive verbs.

924. The Latin participle in *-dus* is used in the same personal construction as the Greek verbal in *-τέος*; as *epistula scribenda est*, ἐπιστόλη γραπτέα ἐστίν, *a letter must be written*.

The impersonal construction is found in Latin, but generally only with verbs which do not take an object accusative, as *Eundum est tibi* (ἰτέον ἐστί σοι),—*Moriendum est omnibus*,—*Bello utendum est nobis* (τῷ πολέμῳ χρῆστέον ἐστὶν ἡμῖν), *we must employ war*. See Madvig's *Latin Grammar*, § 421.

Occasionally the earlier Latin uses even the object accusative, like the Greek; as *Aeternas quoniam poenas in morte timendum est*, LUCR. i. 112.

925. A sentence sometimes begins with an impersonal verbal in *-τέον* and is continued with an infinitive, the latter depending on δεῖ implied in the verbal. *E.g.*

Πανταχοῦ ποιητέον ἂν κελεύῃ ἡ πόλις καὶ ἡ πατὴρ, ἢ πείθειν αὐτήν. PLAT. Crit. 51 B.

926. The dative and the accusative of the agent are both allowed with the verbal in *-τέον* (or *-τέα*); although the equivalent δεῖ with the infinitive has only the accusative. Thus we can say *τοῦτο ἡμῖν ποιητέον* or *τοῦτο ἡμᾶς ποιητέον*, but only *τοῦτο ἡμᾶς δεῖ ποιεῖν*.

APPENDIX.

I.

THE RELATION OF THE OPTATIVE TO THE SUBJUNCTIVE AND OTHER MOODS.

IN the chapter on the general view of the moods, no attempt was made to assign to either the subjunctive or the optative a single "fundamental idea" from which all the uses of the mood could be derived, except so far as the idea of futurity was shown to belong essentially to the subjunctive in all its most primitive uses. It would be impossible to include under one fundamental idea all the actual uses of any mood in Greek, except the imperative; for even the indicative is used to express unfulfilled conditions, unaccomplished wishes, and unattained purposes, none of which can be brought under the ideas of "declaration" or "absolute assertion" commonly attributed to this mood. Again, it is not to be expected that the true fundamental idea of any mood should include all its uses in a developed language; for the fortunes of language often depend on causes which are quite independent of the original essence of the forms employed, and which seldom can be referred to invariable laws of thought. The same idea can be expressed in two cognate languages by different moods: as *he would have seen* is $\epsilon\lambda\delta\epsilon\nu$ $\acute{\alpha}\nu$ in Greek and *vidisset* in Latin, while in Sanskrit it would be expressed by a past augmented future equivalent to the Greek $\epsilon\mu\epsilon\lambda\lambda\epsilon\nu$ $\delta\psi\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ (see § 428). Even within the Greek itself, we have *if he were wise* expressed by $\epsilon\iota$ $\sigma\omicron\phi\omicron\varsigma$ $\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\eta$ in Homer and by $\epsilon\iota$ $\sigma\omicron\phi\omicron\varsigma$ $\eta\tilde{\nu}$ in Attic; and in Homer, both $\omicron\upsilon\kappa$ $\acute{\alpha}\nu$ $\epsilon\gamma\nu\omega\varsigma$ and $\omicron\upsilon\kappa$ $\acute{\alpha}\nu$ $\gamma\nu\omicron\iota\eta\varsigma$ can mean *you would not have discerned*, while the latter can mean also *you would not discern* (in the same future sense as in Attic).

One doctrine of the original meaning of the Greek subjunctive and optative has gained such general approval of late, that it is entitled to special consideration. This teaches that the fundamental idea of the subjunctive is *will*, and that of the optative is *wish*. In the subjunctive, the idea of will appears especially in exhortations and prohibitions and

in expressions of purpose. It can also be used to explain the subjunctive in protasis, by understanding $\epsilon\lambda\theta\eta$ in $\eta\nu \epsilon\lambda\theta\eta$ to mean originally *let him go, suppose him to go* (in some case). But before we can decide that will is the fundamental idea of the subjunctive, or even that it is a necessary and essential part of the idea of this mood, we must ask, first, whether it is essential to those uses of the subjunctive which we have a right on other grounds to call the most primitive; and, secondly, whether there is any other idea equally essential and equally primitive, from which the idea of will could have been evolved more simply and naturally than this could have been evolved from the idea of will.

The subjunctive nowhere bears more distinct marks of primitive simplicity than when it appears in Homer as a simple future; as in $\text{o}\acute{\upsilon} \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho \pi\omega \tau\omicron\iota\omicron\upsilon\varsigma \text{'}\delta\omicron\nu \acute{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\rho\alpha\varsigma \text{'}\omicron\delta\delta\epsilon \text{'}\delta\omega\mu\alpha\iota$, *for never yet have I seen such men, nor shall I ever see them*, Il. i. 262, and in $\text{k}\alpha\iota \text{'}\rho\omicron\tau\epsilon \tau\iota\varsigma \epsilon\text{'}\pi\eta\sigma\iota\nu$, *and some one will say*, Il. vi. 459, followed by $\text{'}\omega\varsigma \text{'}\rho\omicron\tau\epsilon \tau\iota\varsigma \epsilon\text{'}\rho\epsilon\epsilon\iota$ in vs. 462, referring to the same thing. See other examples in § 284. In this sense it is negated by $\text{'}\omicron\delta$, like an indicative; and it may be modified by $\text{k}\acute{\epsilon}$ or $\acute{\alpha}\nu$, like the future indicative in Homer, and thus acquire a potential sense (see §§ 285 and 286). It is seldom that any modal form (except a plain indicative) is found so free from associations which might affect its meaning and conceal its original character. It has, moreover, its exact counterpart in Sanskrit in the Vedic subjunctive, which is negated by $n\acute{a}$, the equivalent of $\text{'}\omicron\delta$.¹ This simple subjunctive has no element of will. It expresses what the speaker regrets as readily as what he is resolved to do. Thus in both the examples above quoted, the subjunctive expresses an act which is decidedly contrary to the speaker's will and wish. This subjunctive and the future indicative run parallel in all their constructions, and the former expresses will only so far as the latter does. The only character that is beyond question in this subjunctive is its reference to future time, and if we were left to this use alone, we should have no hesitation in designating the subjunctive as a form expressing futurity like a future tense. As this use cannot be deduced from the subjunctive as an expression of will, let us see whether the opposite process, the evolution from the simple future meaning of the uses in which will appears, is any easier and does any less violence to the principles of the language.

The use of the subjunctive which strikes every one as coming next in simplicity to the Homeric construction just described is seen in exhortations, like $\text{'}\omega\mu\epsilon\nu$, *let us go*, and (in its negative form) in prohibitions, like $\mu\eta \text{'}\omega\mu\epsilon\nu$, *let us not go*, $\mu\eta \epsilon\text{'}\pi\eta\rho\epsilon \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron$, *do not say this*. This use of the subjunctive is found also in Sanskrit, and its negative is there generally (though not always) $m\acute{a}$, the equivalent of $\mu\eta$. It thus appears that the marked distinction which is seen in the early Greek between $\text{'}\omega\mu\epsilon\nu$, *we shall go*, and $\text{'}\omega\mu\epsilon\nu$, *let us go*, in both positive

¹ See Delbrück, *Syntaktische Forschungen*, i. (*Conjunctiv und Optativ*), pp. 23-25.

and negative forms, was probably inherited from an ancestral language, so that we need not seek for the development of this distinction within the Greek itself. It is obvious that the future element is equally strong in both expressions, while the hortatory subjunctive also expresses will. Now it is much more natural to suppose that a future form expressing exhortation or prohibition originated in a form expressing mere futurity, than that the merely future form originated in the exhortation or prohibition. We cannot derive οὐκ ἴδωμαι, *I shall not see*, from μὴ ἴδωμαι, *let me not see*. But it is by no means impossible that, in some language which was a common ancestor of Greek, Latin, and Sanskrit, subjunctive (i.e. originally future) forms came to be used to express both commands and prohibitions; that, when these imperative expressions became distinguished from the subjunctive in its ordinary future sense, they adopted the negative (the ancestor of *md'* and *μη*) which was used with similar imperative forms, though this use of the negative might not at first be very rigid; and that thus *μη ἴωμεν*, in the sense *let us not go*, became established in early Greek as opposed to οὐκ ἴωμεν, *we shall not go*. In Sanskrit, however, the use of *md'* in such cases was less fixed, and here *na'* (the equivalent of *oṽ*) is sometimes found with the subjunctive in prohibitions.¹ This last is what we should have if in *χερὶ δ' οὐ ψάύσεις ποτέ*, *you shall never touch me*, EUR. Med. 1320, we could substitute an Homeric subjunctive (e.g. *ψάύσῃς*) for the future indicative. The cases of *μη* with the future in prohibitions given in § 70, like *μη βουλήσῃσθε εἰδέναι*, *do not wish to know*, DEM. xiii. 117, are too few to be of much weight in the discussion; but they seem to show an abortive tendency to establish the future indicative with *μη* by the side of the subjunctive in prohibitions. What the future could do in an imperative sense is shown by examples like *πάντως δὲ τοῦτο δράσεις*, *but by all means do this*, AR. Nub. 1352, and others quoted in § 69; but the natural negative here was *οὔ*, not *μη*, as in *οὐ ψάύσεις* above.

If the origin of the interrogative subjunctive in appeals (§ 287) and of its negative *μη* has been correctly explained in §§ 288 and 291, this is merely an interrogative form of the subjunctive in exhortations and prohibitions, and calls for no special discussion here. The origin of the use of the subjunctive with *οὔ* *μη* is still too uncertain to give this construction much weight in determining the essential character of the subjunctive. If the view of this construction which is advocated in this work (see Appendix II.) is accepted, the form is an offshoot of the prohibitory subjunctive. If it is thought to be an original construction, expressing a strong denial or prohibition by its own force, the subjunctive appears in its original future force. Whatever theory we may have of the origin of this subjunctive, the form is interchangeable in use with the future indicative.

In dependent sentences, the subjunctive is used in two constructions, —in so-called final clauses, and in conditional sentences. In negative

¹ See Delbrück, *Conjunctiv und Optativ*, p. 112.

final constructions with $\mu\eta$, the subjunctive was originally prohibitive (§§ 262, 307); in positive clauses with the final particles, it expresses something aimed at, that is, an object of will. But here, as in independent sentences, to derive the more complex from the more simple is far more natural than the reverse. Further, in all final constructions the future indicative may be used in the same sense as the subjunctive; this could hardly be done if the subjunctive contained an essential element of will which is wanting in the future. Again, the subjunctive is very common in final constructions after past tenses, where the optative is the regular form (318); it cannot be supposed that the idea of will is present in such final clauses when they have the subjunctive (as they generally do in Thucydides) and is absent when they have the optative (as is more common in Xenophon). In conditional sentences, although we may explain the subjunctive as originally hortatory, $\eta\nu \epsilon\lambda\theta\eta$ meaning *let him come (we will suppose)*, it is more natural to refer this use to the primitive use of the subjunctive as a simple future, $\epsilon\iota \kappa\epsilon\nu \epsilon\lambda\theta\eta$ (or $\epsilon\iota \epsilon\lambda\theta\eta$), *in case he shall come*, making a supposition of a future event of which the Homeric $\epsilon\lambda\theta\eta$, *he will come*, might make a statement (see §§ 11 and 398). We thus avoid the necessity of explaining the indicative and the subjunctive in protasis on different principles. As each of the various tenses of the indicative with $\epsilon\iota$ expresses a supposition in the time which it naturally denotes (§ 3, c), so the subjunctive is a natural form to express a future supposition. Thus, as $\epsilon\iota \gamma\epsilon\nu\eta\sigma\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron$ supposes what $\gamma\epsilon\nu\eta\sigma\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron$ states, $\epsilon\iota \gamma\epsilon\nu\eta\tau\alpha\iota \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron$ naturally supposes what (in the older language) $\gamma\epsilon\nu\eta\tau\alpha\iota \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron$, *this will happen*, states. As the former cannot be explained by the idea of will, it seems unnecessary and illogical to introduce this idea to account for the latter. What has been said of ordinary conditional sentences applies also to relative conditions.

The only use of the subjunctive in conditions which cannot be derived from the simple future meaning is that in general suppositions; but the undeveloped state of this construction in Homer and other considerations make it highly probable, if not certain, that this is a use of the subjunctive which grew up within the Greek language itself at a comparatively late period, and that it is not one of the primitive uses of the mood. (See §§ 11, b, 400, 401.)

It is certain that no trace of the subjunctive as a mood of will can be seen in its actual use in conditional sentences. Thus $\eta\nu \tau\eta\nu \pi\acute{o\lambda\iota\nu \epsilon\lambda\omega\sigma\iota$ could always be said as properly by the friends as by the enemies of a city, by the besieged as well as by the besiegers. In Il. iii. 71, $\acute{o}\pi\pi\acute{o}\tau\epsilon\rho\acute{o}\varsigma \kappa\epsilon \nu\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}\sigma\eta$, spoken by Priam, is, as an expression, perfectly neutral as regards the hope or desire of victory. It may be said with truth, that the primitive meaning of a verbal form is apt to be weakened, or even to disappear, in actual use. But is it logical to assume a lost meaning to account for an expression, when the meaning which remains accounts for it satisfactorily without external help? When we find $\eta\nu \epsilon\lambda\omega\sigma\iota \tau\eta\nu \pi\acute{o\lambda\iota\nu$ actually expressing a mere future supposition, with no idea of will, in all periods of the language, and

when we find ἔλωσι meaning *they will capture* in the earliest period that we know, why should we assume an original idea of will (which was afterwards lost) in ἦν ἔλωσι to account for its actual meaning? The view of the conditional sentence here adopted is confirmed by paratactic conditions like the following: *θύσεις δὲ τὴν παῖδ'· ἔνθα τίνας εὐχὰς ἐρείς*; EUR. I. A. 1185, where *θύσεις* makes a supposition, *supposing you shall sacrifice the girl*, which would generally be expressed by *εἰ θύσεις* or *ἦν θύσῃς*: so *ἀδικεῖ τις ἑκῶν* and *ἐξήμαρτέ τις ἄκων*, both expressing suppositions, DEM. xviii. 274.¹

On these grounds we may feel justified in regarding the subjunctive as originally and essentially a form for expressing future time, which the Greek inherited, with its subdivision into an absolute future negated by οὐ and a hortatory future negated by μή, and used in independent sentences.

The name *optative* mood (ἐγκλισις εὐκτική), which was invented by grammarians long after the usages of the language were settled, designated the mood by the only use which it then had in independent sentences without ἄν, that of *wishing*. It is evident that this name in itself is no ground for assuming that wishing was the primitive function, or even an essential function, of the optative, any more than the name of the subjunctive (ἐγκλισις ὑποτακτική) would lead us to assume dependence as an original or necessary characteristic of that mood. We have already mentioned the theory that the optative is the mood of *wish*, as the complement of that which makes the subjunctive the mood of *will*. This theory finds no support in the potential use of the optative with or without *κέ* or *ἄν*, which is the only independent use of the optative except in wishes and exhortations. Surely ἀπόλοιτο ἄν, *he would perish*, can never have been developed from ἀπόλοιτο, *may he perish*, for the former is no more likely to be said by one who wishes the death of a person than by one who fears it, and there is nothing in the addition of ἄν or *κέ* which can reasonably be supposed to change a form, which in itself expresses wish, to a neutral form or even to one expressing what is feared. The fundamental distinction in negative sentences between μή ἀπόλοιτο and οὐκ ἄν ἀπόλοιτο (or οὐκ ἀπόλοιτο) is still more significant. Nor can any support for the theory be found in dependent final constructions or in indirect discourse. No one would see a distinction of will and wish in ἴδῃ and ἴδοι in ἐρχεται ἵνα ἴδῃ τοῦτο and ἦλθεν ἵνα ἴδοι τοῦτο, or in φοβοῦμαι μὴ ἔλθῃ and ἐφοβήθην μὴ ἔλθοι,—not to speak of ἦλθεν ἵνα ἴδοι τοῦτο and ἦλθεν ἵνα ἴδῃ τοῦτο. Still less would any one dream of looking for wish in the optative in εἶπεν ὅτι ἔλθοι, *he said that he had come*, or in ἤρετο εἰ τις εἶναι σοφώτερος. In all these dependent constructions, the optative is only the representative of the subjunctive or indicative when these are, as it were, transferred to the past by depending on a verb of past time; but, if wish were the fundamental idea of the optative, we should hardly expect this to vanish so utterly, since

¹ See C. F. Hermann, *de Protasi Paratactica*, p. 7.

the essential character of the optative would naturally be especially marked where it is used by a fixed principle of the language as a substitute for an indicative or a subjunctive.

The only strong argument for the theory that the optative is primarily the mood of wish is found in the optative with *εἰ* in protasis. It is maintained that a gradual development of this conditional form from the simple optative in a wish can be actually seen in Homer. The strongest and most attractive statement of this argument is given by Lange in his elaborate, but unfortunately unfinished, treatise on the particle *εἰ* in Homer.¹ Delbrück's treatment of the optative in his *Syntaktische Forschungen*, vol. i., is based on this doctrine. When Lange states (p. 485) that, of 200 examples of *εἰ* with the optative in Homer, 136 are expressions of wish, the majority seems decisive; although we may even here withhold our judgment until we examine the majority and also see what the minority of 64 have to say. The majority of 136 is made up as follows:—

1. Ordinary wishes with *εἰ γάρ*, *εἴθε* (*αἶ γάρ*, *αἴθε*), or *εἰ*, like *αἴθ'* οὕτως, *Εὐμαίε, φίλος Διὶ πατρὶ γένοιτο*, Od. xiv. 440; *αἶ γὰρ οὕτως εἴη*, Il. iv. 189; *εἴθ' ὥς ἡβώοιμι, βίη δέ μοι ἔμπεδος εἴη*, Il. xi. 670. (Of these there are 38 cases.)

2. Cases in which a wish with *εἰ* and the optative (like the expressions just quoted) is followed by an apodosis expressing a consequence which would follow the fulfilment of the wish. Thus the last example in 1 appears in Il. vii. 157 with such an apodosis:—

εἴθ' ὥς ἡβώοιμι, βίη δέ μοι ἔμπεδος εἴη
τῷ κε τὰχ' ἀντήσσει μάχης κορυθαίολος "Εκτωρ.

If we put a comma at the end of the first verse, we have a full conditional sentence. In many cases it is doubtful which punctuation is correct. Lange includes under this head even such sentences as Il. vii. 28, *ἀλλ' εἴ μοι τι πίθοιο, τό κεν πολὺν κέρδιον εἴη*, and Od. xx. 381. (Of these there are 28 cases.)

3. Ordinary conditional sentences, in which the fusion between the optative with *εἰ* expressing a wish (i.e. supposing something that is desired) and a following apodosis with *κἔ* or *άν* is said to be complete, as in Il. xiii. 485:—

εἰ γὰρ ὀμηλικὴ γε γενοίμεθα τῷδ' ἐπὶ θυμῷ,
αἰψά κεν ἢ φέροιτο μέγα κράτος ἢ κε φεροίμην.

(Of these there are 19 cases, against 18 otherwise similar cases in which the optative with *εἰ* supposes something not desired.)

4. Cases of which the following are examples:—

ἦλυθον, εἴ τινά μοι κληδόνα πατρὸς ἐνίσποις, Od. iv. 317.

¹ *Der Homerische Gebrauch der Partikel EI*, von Ludwig Lange, des vi. Bandes der Abhandlungen der philologisch-historischen Classe der Königl. Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften No. 4. Lange himself, nevertheless, believes the optative to be originally the mood of "Einbildungskraft," not of wish.

πάπτηνεν δ' ἀνὰ πύργον Ἀχαιῶν, εἴ τιν' ἴδοιτο
 ἡγεμόνων, ὅς τις οἱ ἀρὴν ἐτάροισιν ἀμύναι, Il. xii. 333.

Such examples are variously explained, but the protasis generally refers to something that is desired. (Of these there are 43 cases.)

5. Ordinary conditional sentences in which εἴ with the optative expressing a wish follows an apodosis; as in Il. xxii. 20, ἦ σ' ἂν τισαίμην, εἴ μοι δυνάμεις γε παρείη. These differ from those in 3 only in the position of the protasis. (Of these there are 8 cases of wishes, against 33 in which no wish is implied, of which last 17 are concessive.)

The minority of 64 examples, in which εἴ with the optative does not express a wish, is made up of the 18 dissenting cases under 3, the 33 under 5 which contain no wishes, 5 exceptional cases (as Lange views them) under 4 (2 with doubtful readings), and 8 cases of ὥς εἴ with the optative in similes, like ὕσαν ὥς εἴ τε πυρὶ χθὼν πάσα νέμοιτο, Il. ii. 780.

It will be seen that the strength of the argument lies in the gradual development of the optative conditional sentence which is supposed to appear in 1, 2, and 3. This is further enforced by reference to cases in which the simple optative in a wish (without any form of εἴ) is followed by an apodosis, like the equivalent optatives with εἴ in 2, thus showing the absence of a conditional force in the latter. See Od. xv. 180:—

οὔτω νῦν Ζεὺς θέλῃ, ἐρίγδουπος πόσις Ἕρως.
 τῷ κέν τοι καὶ κείβῃ θεῶ ὥς εὐχετοψήμην.

Since the two clauses are grammatically independent here, it is argued that they must be equally so in the examples in 2.

The whole argument is based on the important assumption that the optative with εἴ, εἴ γάρ, etc. in a wish is the same in origin with the simple optative in a wish, so that εἴ γένοιτο τοῦτο and γένοιτο τοῦτο both come to mean *may this be done* in the same way, by a wishing power inherent in the optative itself; and from this it is argued that εἴ γένοιτο τοῦτο as a protasis is used in a more primitive and natural sense when what is supposed is desired by the speaker than when it is not. Unless we assume this as proved, and reject the opposite alternative which makes the optative with εἴ in a wish a protasis with a suppressed apodosis, we have no right to count the examples in 1 and 2 as evidence that the optative with εἴ denotes a wish by its own nature; for it would be reasoning in a circle to quote these as proof that the optative itself denotes wish, in a discussion which aims at establishing the nature and meaning of the optative in these very expressions. Again, the real nature of the 43 conditions with εἴ and the optative in 4 is in question in this discussion; and it is inadmissible here to assume at the outset that they express wish in themselves and then to use them as evidence that wishing is the original function of the optative. Proof is needed, therefore, that the optatives in 1, 2, and 4 (that is, in 109 of the 136 wishing optatives in Homer)

actually express wish by their own force, so that they can properly be used as independent testimony here. Until at least a reasonable presumption in favour of this view is established, we are without evidence that there is any such gradual development of the optative condition as is claimed. We must therefore depend at present on the only cases about which no doubts exist, the complete conditional sentences in 3 and 5, to determine whether the optative with $\epsilon\iota$ involves the idea of wish without regard to the nature of its apodosis. If it should be found that the idea of wish preponderates in these optatives, we should have a convincing proof that the same is true of the optatives in 1, 2, and 4, whether these are viewed as protases or as original wishes. A slight inspection of Lange's statistics will show that the question is not to be settled in this simple way. Of the 37 optatives in 3, 19 suppose something that is wished for, while 18 do the opposite. Of the 41 in 5, only 8 suppose desirable things, while 33 do not. Therefore, in the 78 plain cases of $\epsilon\iota$ with the optative in conditions in Homer, we find only 27 expressing wishes. If we confine ourselves to the cases in 3, where the protasis precedes, we find as equal a division as is possible (19 : 18), showing very plainly that even here wish has nothing whatever to do with the form of expression. Indeed, if we take $\epsilon\iota$ with the optative in protasis by itself, what is there to indicate that it involves a wish? It cannot be doubted that this form is the equivalent of the English *if he should go* and *if we should see him*; and who would attempt to find any such idea as wish in these expressions? Unless we are prepared to maintain that *if we should be saved* expresses the original idea of the English construction better than *if we should perish*, we must be slow to assert that $\epsilon\iota$ $\sigma\omega\theta\epsilon\iota\mu\epsilon\nu$ gives the spirit of the Greek optative better than $\epsilon\iota$ $\alpha\pi\omicron\theta\acute{\alpha}\nu\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu$. We must remember also the large class of conditional relative sentences which have the optative. This optative cannot be explained on any different principle from the optative with $\epsilon\iota$, and yet who would profess to find anything like the idea of wish in δ $\tau\omicron\varsigma$ $\rho\acute{\epsilon}\zeta\omicron\iota$, Od. i. 47, φ $\mu\eta$ $\epsilon\iota\eta$, xi. 490, or in IL vi. 330, 521, xiii. 344, xiv. 248? I give the first six examples that I meet.

It is obvious at once that we must recur to the examples in 1 and 2, and see whether these establish any such strong presumption as will justify us in making wish the fundamental idea of the optative with $\epsilon\iota$, notwithstanding the fact that a large majority of the optatives in protasis in Homer have a contrary meaning.

In dealing with the examples in 1 and 2, it will be assumed that $\epsilon\iota$, $\epsilon\iota\theta\epsilon$, $\epsilon\iota$ $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$, and $\alpha\iota$, $\alpha\iota\theta\epsilon$, $\alpha\iota$ $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ all have the same origin, and involve the same particle $\epsilon\iota$ or $\alpha\iota$ which is used in protasis.¹ The question in regard to the wishes in 1 amounts to this: is it more probable that the optative here is merely the wishing optative, preceded by a sort of exclamatory particle $\epsilon\iota$,² so that $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\iota\tau\omicron$ and $\epsilon\iota$ $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\iota\tau\omicron$ are merely

¹ See Lange, pp. 311, 312; and footnote to § 379 of this work.

² Lange, p. 484, calls $\epsilon\iota$ "eine zur Einleitung von Wünschen und Fallsetzungen geeignete *interjectionsartige* Partikel." See also p. 565.

different forms of an exclamation, *O may it be done!*—or that εἰ γένοιτο in a wish is the same as εἰ γένοιτο in protasis, meaning *if it should only be done*, deriving its force as a wish from the unconscious suppression of an apodosis like *how happy I should be or it would be well?* The difficulty of explaining εἰ in an ordinary protasis like εἰ ἦλθεν, *if he came*, as in any sense exclamatory is a great obstacle in the way of Lange's view; but his alternative is equally hard, to make εἰ in a wish radically different from εἰ in a protasis. In the incomplete state of Lange's work, it is impossible to see how successfully he would have surmounted this difficulty. But, apart from this, we are compelled on his theory to believe that the parallel construction of εἰ γάρ and εἴθε with the past tenses of the indicative in wishes is radically different in principle from that of εἰ etc. with the optative. The former is a later construction; but is it possible that the traditions of so fixed an expression as εἰ with the optative in wishes could have so utterly vanished that, while εἰ γάρ γένοιτο, *may it be done*, had no conditional force, εἰ γάρ ἐγένετο τοῦτο, *O that this had been done*, was felt as conditional? It is impossible to explain εἰ γάρ ἐγένετο except as an elliptical protasis, since there is no form of wish like ἐγένετο (alone) corresponding to γένοιτο, *may it be done*. Even if we could suppose that εἰ γάρ ἐγένετο was formed ignorantly on the analogy of εἰ γάρ γένοιτο, it would be incredible that μὴ γένοιτο should not have engendered a corresponding μὴ ἐγένετο.

But why is it thought necessary or probable that γένοιτο and εἰ γάρ γένοιτο should have had the same origin? If we can trust our feelings in the use of our own language, it is beyond doubt that our expressions of wish, like *may help come* and *O if help should (or would) come!* are entirely independent constructions, and also that the latter is a condition with its conclusion suppressed. Why should we not accept the same simple distinction in the Greek forms, and admit that the Greek had two ways of expressing a future wish, one by the simple optative, the other by a protasis with its apodosis suppressed? Absolute proof is, of course, impossible in such a case; but it is surely safe to maintain that no such strong presumption is established in favour of identity of construction in γένοιτο and εἰ γένοιτο in wishes, as to make it probable that εἰ γένοιτο in protasis was originally a form of wish, in face of the fact that only a small proportion of Homer's undoubted protases with εἰ and the optative express wishes.

But it may be said that the peculiar examples of half-formed conditional sentences in 2 (p. 376) establish the theory of the development of the conditional optative out of a wish. But this connecting link loses its value, when it is seen that it connects merely one construction, in which the wishing force of the optative is at least questionable, with another in which there is no positive evidence of any wishing force at all. If the ordinary theory of the suppression of an apodosis with εἰ γάρ γένοιτο in a wish is correct, we must suppose that the suppressed apodosis was seldom felt in a definite form of words any more than it is with our *O if he would come*. But it might sometimes

happen that an actual expression of a definite result of the fulfilment of a wish would suit the case better than the uncertain reference to a fulfilment, which the mere clause with *if* suggests. We have an excellent illustration of this when a wish is repeated as a protasis in almost the same words, and is then followed by an apodosis. See Od. iii. 217-223 (quoted in § 730), where *εἰ γὰρ σ' ὥς θέλοι* is first a simple wish, and then is repeated as *εἰ σ' οὕτως θέλοι*, with the apodosis *τῷ κέν τις*, etc. naturally following. The oft-recurring verse *εἴθ' ὥς ἡβώοιμι, βίη δέ μοι ἔμπεδος εἴη* appears in Il. xi. 670, xxiii. 629, and Od. xiv. 468 (if Bekker is right in omitting vss. 503-506) as a simple wish with no addition; but in Il. vii. 157 it stands as a repetition of the wish contained in vss. 132, 133, *αἶ γὰρ ἡβῶμ' ὥς*, etc., and is followed by the apodosis *τῷ κε τάχ' ἀντήσσει μάχης κορυθαίολος Ἑκτωρ*. In the other examples, we have simply the wish *O if I were young again*, with its vague unexpressed apodosis; but in Il. vii. 157 the result is expressed in the definite form, *then would Hector meet his match*. See Od. xvii. 496 and xv. 536 (quoted in § 730), in both of which a definite apodosis expressing a result takes the place of the usual suppressed conclusion. A distinction of optatives with *εἰ* into wishes and suppositions, based on the wishing or non-wishing nature of the verb, is often arbitrary. Thus Lange quotes, among his "paratactic" wishes followed by an apodosis in a distinct sentence (that is, half-developed conditional sentences), Il. xvii. 102:—

*εἰ δέ που Αἴαντός γε βοὴν ἀγαθοῖο πρὸς αἰὲν,
ἄμφω κ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἰόντες ἐπὶ μνηστῆρας χάρμης,*

while he gives as an ordinary conditional sentence Il. xxiv. 653:—

*τῶν εἴ τίς σε ἴδοιτο θοὴν διὰ νύκτα μέλαιναν,
αὐτίκ' ἂν ἐξείποι Ἀγαμέμνονι ποιμένι λαῶν.*

His ground for distinction is merely that the former expresses a wish, while the latter does not. Even if both sentences were held to be simply conditional (as they probably are), it would still be claimed that the optative is used in a more legitimate and primitive sense in the former than in the latter. But is not the patent fact that there is really no essential distinction between these two optatives with *εἰ* (taken as conditions) a strong argument against the whole doctrine which derives the optative in protasis from the optative in wishes?

As to the 43 examples in 4, in which the optative with *εἰ* obviously stands without any expressed apodosis, I must refer to the discussion of these in §§ 486-493, where they are explained as protases which contain within themselves an implied clause of purpose as the apodosis. Whoever will compare the examples of the optative in § 488 with those of the subjunctive in § 487, or those of the optative in Delbrück's *Conjunctiv und Optativ*, pp. 236-238, with those of the subjunctive in pp. 171-175, will probably be satisfied that the greater part of these optatives represent original subjunctives, which are regularly used in this sense after primary tenses, while the original optatives that occur after primary tenses in this construction are not more frequent than

they are in ordinary protasis in Homer (see §§ 499-501). Thus βῆ Πάνδαρον διζήμενος εἴ που ἐφεύροι, *he went seeking Pandarus, in case he should find him anywhere* (i.e. to find P. if haply he might), Il. v. 167, represents an original form βαίνω Πάνδαρον διζήμενος, ἣν που ἐφεύρω. This is true, whatever theory we hold as to the nature of the condition here. Again, this form is equally adapted to suppositions which are not objects of wish or desire; as in THUC. vi. 100, πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, εἰ ἐπιβοηθοῖεν, ἐχώρουν, *they marched towards the city, in case the enemy should rush out (to be ready to meet them if they should rush out)*. So in Od. xxii. 381:—

πάπτηνεν δ' Ὀδυσσεὺς καθ' ἔν δόμον, εἴ τις ἔτ' ἀνδρῶν
ζῶς ὑποκλοπέοιτο ἀλύσκων κῆρα μέλαιναν,

where Ulysses is said to have searched the house, *in case any one of the suitors should still be alive and be concealed* (i.e. to find any such). This is quite as natural an expression as Il. xii. 333, πάπτηνεν εἴ τιν' ἴδοιτο ἡγεμόνων, where the protasis supposes something desired. The idea of purpose which these sentences imply makes it natural that the supposition should be a desirable one in the majority of cases; but no independent support for the theory we are discussing can be found in them.

We come then to the following conclusions. The theory that wish is the fundamental idea of the optative finds no support in conditional sentences with εἰ and the optative in Homer, for among 78 full sentences of this class, only 27 express suppositions which are desired by the speaker. The other optatives with εἰ which are said to express wishes stand without apodosis, and the nature of these expressions is itself in question in this discussion. As the presence of the idea of wish in the optative in ordinary conditions would have been a strong proof that the same idea is inherent in these other optatives, so the conspicuous absence of wish in the former creates a presumption against its existence in the latter; for it appears that, even if the optative with εἰ in wishes does express the wish by its own natural force, this force has not passed over into the ordinary optative in protasis, even in Homer. We have to consider, therefore, whether in spite of this presumption it can be established that the optative is the mood of wish, or that the two forms of optative in wishes (with and without εἰ) are identical in origin and construction. The theory of their identity obliges us to believe that εἰ is a sort of exclamatory particle; whereas the older view, which has the authority of Aristarchus (§ 723), that the optative with εἰ in wishes is a protasis with a suppressed apodosis, avoids this difficulty by making the form of wish the same as that of protasis. The new theory also compels us to explain the past tenses of the indicative with εἰ and the optative with εἰ in wishes on different principles. The cases in 2 (p. 376) of an optative with εἰ in a wish followed by an apodosis in a separate sentence are easily explained by supposing an actual apodosis to be expressed in them, where commonly only a general idea of satisfaction (like καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι) is understood. The cases of εἰ with

the optative without an apodosis in 4 are to be explained by the implied apodosis: they are not necessarily expressions of desire, and the optative here generally represents an original subjunctive.

As a negative result, we do not find in the Homeric examples as a whole any satisfactory proof that wish is the fundamental idea, or even an essential idea, of the optative.

For the original meaning of the optative we must go, not to the developed wish, still less to the developed potential construction with *ἄν* or to the protasis with *εἰ*, but rather to certain simpler and less decided expressions, a few of which remain in Homer. In Il. iv. 17-19 we have a full conditional sentence,

εἰ δ' αὖ πως τόδε πᾶσι φίλον καὶ ἡδὺ πέλοιτο,
ἦ τοι μὲν οἰκέοιτο πόλις Πριάμοιο ἄνακτος,
αὐτίς δ' Ἀργεῖην Ἑλένην Μενέλαος ἄγοιτο.

This may be translated, and if moreover this should be welcome and pleasing to all, king Priam's city may continue to be a dwelling-place, and Menelaus may take Argive Helen home again. But οἰκέοιτο and ἄγοιτο (without *κέ* or *ἄν*) here do not make the usual potential apodosis, nor do they express a wish; and yet a very slight change in the thought would make them either of these. With *κέ* or *ἄν* added, the meaning would be *Priam's city would continue to be*, etc.; without *ἄν*, in the ordinary language it would be *may Priam's city continue to be*, etc. The same general result happens to be expressed in other passages in various ways. In Il. iii. 71-75 Paris proposes the duel with Menelaus, and says:—

ὀππότερος δέ κε νικήσῃ κρείσσων τε γένηται,
κτῆμαθ' ἔλὼν ἐν πάντα γυναικά τε οἰκαδ' ἀγέσθω.
οἱ δ' ἄλλοι φιλότῃ καὶ ὄρκια πιστὰ ταμόντες
ναίοιτε Τροίην ἐριβώλακα, τοὶ δὲ νέεσθων
Ἄργος ἐς ἱππόβοτον.

Here ἀγέσθω is used with the same general idea in mind as ἄγοιτο in iv. 19, and ναίοιτε is like οἰκέοιτο. This example would rather lead us to understand both ἄγοιτο and οἰκέοιτο as wishes. But in iii. 255 we have τῷ δέ κε νικήσαντι γυνή καὶ κτῆμαθ' ἔποιτο, where τῷ νικήσαντι is equivalent to ὀππότερός κε νικήσῃ in 71, and ἔποιτό κε is potential, though expressing the same general idea as ἀγέσθω and ἄγοιτο above. Also, in iii. 256 we have ναίομεν (like ναίοιτε in 74) and νέονται (as future). Again, in iii. 138 Iris says to Helen τῷ δέ κε νικήσαντι φίλη κεκλήσῃ ἄκοιτις, where κεκλήσῃ κε is potential, referring to the same result as ἔποιτό κε, ἄγοιτο, and ἀγέσθω. These passages show a use of the optative without *κέ* which comes very near to that of the optative with *κέ*, and also to that of the imperative and of the future (with and without *κέ*). This neutral use of the optative is generally called "concessive."

In other cases, the optative without *κέ* has a more decided potential force; as in Il. xxiii. 151, νῦν δ' ἐπεὶ οὐ νέομαι γε φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαίαν, Πατρόκλῳ ἥρωι κόμην ὀπάσαιμι φέρεσθαι, *I would fain send*.

So in Il. xv. 45, αὐτὰρ τοι καὶ κείνῳ ἐγὼ παραμυθησαίμην, *I should advise him*. In Il. xxi. 274, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τι πάθοιμι may be either *then let me suffer anything* (i.e. *let me perish*), or *then would I suffer anything*: that the latter is the true meaning is made more probable by xix. 321, οὐ μὲν γάρ τι κακώτερον ἄλλο πάθοιμι, *for nothing else that is worse could I suffer*, where οὐ shows that the optative is potential. On the other hand, in Il. xxiv. 148, μηδὲ τις ἄλλος ἅμα Τρώων ἴτω ἀνὴρ· κῆρύξ τις οἱ ἔποιτο γεραίτερος, i.e. *let no other of the Trojans go with him; only let an elder herald accompany him* (or *a herald may accompany him*), the general sense and the preceding imperative seem to show that ἔποιτο is hortatory. Compare Il. iii. 407, μηδ' ἔτι σοῖσι πῶδεσσιν ὑποστρέψειας Ὀλύμπῳ, between two pairs of imperatives, where μηδὲ shows the nature of the expression. Again, in Il. vi. 164, τεθναίης, ὃ Προῖτ', ἣ κάκτανε Βελλεροφόντην, we may doubt whether τεθναίης means *you must die* or *may you die* (i.e. *die*), although the connexion with κάκτανε leads us to the latter interpretation: here also compare Il. iii. 407. The tendency is not very strong in either direction in these passages, as is plain from the difficulty which we sometimes feel in deciding which the direction actually is in a given case.¹ But as the potential and the wishing forms are generally clearly distinguished in Homer, we must look upon the few neutral expressions that we find as relics of an earlier stage of the language, in which the optative without *κέ* or *ἄν* was freely used in the sense of *οἰκέοιτο* and *ἔγοιτο* in Il. iv. 18, 19. Such expressions could not be used in negative sentences, at least after οὐ and μή were established in their regular force, as the use of either negative would at once decide the character of the sentence. In the earlier language ἔλθοιμι and ἴδοιμι, *I may go* and *I may see*, probably corresponded to the subjunctives ἔλθω and ἴδω, *I shall go* and *I shall see*, as weaker forms for expressing future time. But both moods had inherited another use, by which ἔλθω and ἴδω meant *let me go* and *let me see*, while ἔλθοιμι and ἴδοιμι meant *may I go* and *may I see*. The reasons given above, for thinking a derivation of the hortatory subjunctive from the simple future expression more probable than the reverse, apply equally to the corresponding uses of the optative.

In these neutral optatives, of which Il. iv. 18, 19 gives the most striking examples, we probably come nearest to the primitive use out of which the two most common uses of the independent optative

¹ To show the uncertainty that exists concerning some of these optatives in the minds of modern scholars, I give some of the most recent translations of four of them.

Il. vi. 164: *You may as well die*, Monro; *I pray that you may die*, Leaf (ed.); *Die*, Proetus, Leaf (transl.); *Du wirst selbst sterben müssen*, Delbrück.

Il. xxiii. 151: *I may as well give*, Monro; "The optative expresses a wish," *I should like to give it, may I be allowed to give it*, Leaf; *I may give*, Myers; *Ich werde mitgeben*, Delbrück.

Il. xxi. 274: *I am ready to suffer*, Monro; *Perish; then let come what may*, Leaf; *After that let come to me what may*, Myers.

Il. xxiv. 149: *Only a herald may follow*, Monro; *I permit a herald to go with him*, Leaf; *Let some older herald attend on him*, Myers.

(potential and wishing) were developed. Before the Homeric period these two uses were already established, the potential with its mark of $\kappa\acute{\epsilon}$ or $\acute{\alpha}\nu$ and its negative $\omicron\upsilon$, and the wishing with no external mark and its negative $\mu\acute{\eta}$. It is hardly possible that the first potential use of the optative was marked by $\kappa\acute{\epsilon}$ or $\acute{\alpha}\nu$, for we find undoubted potential optatives in Homer without either of these particles (see § 240), and even in Attic poetry such indefinite expressions as $\omicron\upsilon\kappa\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\theta'$ $\delta\omicron\sigma\iota\varsigma$, $\omicron\upsilon\kappa\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\theta'$ $\delta\pi\omega\varsigma$, etc. have the optative without $\acute{\alpha}\nu$ (§ 241). Although the early Greek, even in Homer, did not always use $\kappa\acute{\epsilon}$ or $\acute{\alpha}\nu$ with the potential optative, there is no evidence that it ever failed to distinguish the wishing optative in negative sentences by the use of $\mu\acute{\eta}$, while the potential was always negated by $\omicron\upsilon$. The Sanskrit optative, which must have had a common origin with the Greek, appears in its earliest use in the state in which we have supposed the early Greek optative to have been, i.e. used both in a potential sense and in wishes without any particle like $\kappa\acute{\epsilon}$ or $\acute{\alpha}\nu$, and occasionally in a neutral or concessive sense. But while the negative $n\acute{a}$ (= $\omicron\upsilon$) is always found in the potential use, we have both $m\acute{a}'$ (= $\mu\acute{\eta}$) and $n\acute{a}$ in wishes and similar expressions in which the Greek has only $\mu\acute{\eta}$.¹ The same peculiarity

¹ See Delbrück, *Conj. u. Opt.* pp. 26, 194, 198, 199. Whitney, who agrees generally with Delbrück in deriving the other uses of the Sanskrit optative from the idea of wish or desire, says of the actual use of the mood (*Sanskrit Grammar*, § 573): "But the expression of desire, on the one hand, passes naturally over into that of request or entreaty, so that the optative becomes a softened imperative; and on the other hand, it comes to signify what is generally desirable or proper, what should or ought to be, and so becomes the mode of prescription; or, yet again, it is weakened into signifying what may or can be, what is likely or usual, and so becomes at last a softened statement of what is." Again, in § 574: "Subjunctive and optative run closely parallel with one another in the oldest language in their use in independent clauses, and are hardly distinguishable in dependent." In § 575: "The difference between imperative and subjunctive and optative, in their fundamental and most characteristic uses, is one of degree. . . . There is, in fact, nothing in the earliest employment of these modes to prove that they might not all be specialised uses of forms originally equivalent—having, for instance, a general future meaning." In § 581: "In all dependent constructions, it is still harder even in the oldest language to establish a distinction between subjunctive and optative: a method of use of either is scarcely to be found to which the other does not furnish a practical equivalent."

The original relation of the Sanskrit subjunctive and optative here stated closely resembles what I believe to have been the original relation of the Greek subjunctive and optative, the optative being essentially a sort of weaker subjunctive, both expressing essentially the same ideas. My own view would, I think, agree substantially with that suggested by Delbrück (*Syntaktische Forschungen*, iv. p. 117) as an alternative to his earlier view presented in his *Conjunctiv und Optativ* (vol. i. of the same work) eight years before: "Eine andere Möglichkeit wäre, in beiden Modi den *futurischen* Sinn zu finden, und zwar im Conj. die Bezeichnung der nahen, im Opt. die der fernen Zukunft. Unter dieser Voraussetzung müsste die von mir *Synt. Forsch.* i. gewählte Anordnung gänzlich umgestaltet werden." I was, of course, not aware of this important concession of Delbrück when I suggested in the same month (August, 1879), in my *Greek Grammar*, p. 258, the relation of the optative to the subjunctive which is advocated in the present work.

Since the above was written, Delbrück in his *Alt-Indische Syntax* has

has been noticed in the use of negatives with the subjunctive (p. 373).

It is probable that at some early period the Greek had two parallel uses of the subjunctive and optative in independent sentences, as follows:—

ἔλθω, *I shall go* (neg. οὐ), or *let me go* (neg. μὴ)

ἔλθῃς, *thou wilt go* („), or *go thou* („)

ἔλθῃ, *he will go* („), or *let him go* („)

ἔλθοιμι, *I may or might go* (neg. οὐ), or *may I go* (neg. μὴ)

ἔλθοις, *thou mayest or mightest go* („), or *mayest thou go* („)

ἔλθοι, *he may or might go* („), or *may he go* („)

Although the Greek which is best known to us did not use the second and third persons of the subjunctive in a hortatory sense, there can be little doubt that such a use existed in the earlier language, as appears from the use in Sanskrit and in Latin, and from the Greek prohibitions with μὴ. (See § 258.) In an Elean inscription we find two cases of the third person: τὸ δὲ ψάφισμα . . . ἀνατεθῆ ἐν τῷ ἱερὸν τῷ Διὸς τῷ Ὀλυμπίῳ, and (voted) *that the decree be set up, etc.*; and also ἐπιμέλειαν ποιήσῃται (subj.) Νικόδρομος ὁ βωλογράφος, *that N. have charge, etc.*¹

Both moods alike developed a distinct potential use, which was distinguished from the other by κέ or ἄν; and in Homer we have forms like ἔλθω κε and ἔλθῃ κε parallel with ἔλθοιμί κε and ἔλθοι κε, all negatived by οὐ. The potential subjunctive, however, did not survive the Epic period, while the potential optative became fixed in the language. The future indicative also developed a potential form with κέ or ἄν, which appears to have survived the potential subjunctive, at least in the colloquial language. The English has no form except its vague *I may take* to express the various shades of meaning denoted by ἐλοῦμαι κε, ἔλωμαι, ἔλωμαι κε, and ἐλοίμην, which once stood between ἐλοῦμαι, *I shall take*, and ἐλοίμην ἄν, *I should take*. (See § 399.) The subjunctive, therefore, in its two chief uses in independent sentences, from which all others are derived, was originally accompanied by a weaker future form, the optative, expressing the same idea less distinctly and decidedly.

Let us now see how this weaker subjunctive (or future) form enters into the various dependent constructions, that is, into conditional and final sentences and indirect discourse.

The only dependent construction in which the optative is an original form, not representing another mood after a past tense, is that of protasis (including the conditional relative clause, but excluding the past generic

expressed an opinion (in contradiction to his earlier view, discussed above), that the potential and wishing functions of the optative are distinct in their origin.

¹ Delbrück, *Synt. Forsch.* iv. p. 117, quotes these passages from Cauer (No. 116). In p. 118 he says of this use: "Es ist nicht zu bezweifeln, dass dieser Conjunctiv-Typus im Griechischen ausstarb, weil der Imperativ dem Bedürfniss genügte." See also i. p. 20.

condition). Here we see the same relation between εἰ (or εἰ) ἔλθω and εἰ ἔλθοιμι, *if I shall go* and *if I should go*, as between the original ἔλθω, *I shall go*, and ἔλθοιμι, *I may (or might) go*, the optative being a less distinct and vivid form for presenting a future supposition, it may be for presenting the same supposition which has already been presented by the subjunctive. The distinction, whatever it may be thought to be, is that which appears in our distinction of *shall* and *should*, and there will always be differences of opinion as to the exact nature of this.¹ The objections to deriving this form of condition from the optative in wishes have already been considered. On the theory that the protasis is an offshoot of the conditional relative clause (see § 398), we should understand εἰ ἔλθω as meaning originally *in case* (i.e. *in the case in which*) *I shall go* or *may go*, and εἰ ἔλθοιμι *in case I should go* or *might go*,—*should* and *might* being here merely weakened forms of *shall* and *may*. (Homeric optatives referring to the present are discussed below.)

In the whole class of final sentences, in which the subjunctive and optative are probably the only primitive forms, the optative always represents a dependent subjunctive in the changed relation to its leading verb in which it is placed when this verb is changed from present or future to past time, a change which we represent by our change from *may* to *might* or from *shall* to *should*; as ἐρχεται ἵνα ἴδῃ τοῦτο, *he comes that he may see this*, ἦλθεν ἵνα ἴδῃ τοῦτο, *he came that he might see this*, etc. The thought in the dependent clause is in both cases what would be expressed originally by ἵνα ἴδῃ, adapted to different circumstances; and the original subjunctive (ἵνα ἴδῃ) could always be retained, even after past tenses, and by some writers it was generally retained (§§ 318-321). The change is, in fact, the same which is made in indirect discourse when the leading verb is past, since a past final clause always expresses the past thought of the leading subject (§ 703). This relation to indirect discourse is especially clear when the future indicative is used after primary tenses, with the future optative corresponding to it after past tenses.

The optative of indirect discourse has much wider relations, which were greatly extended as the language developed. Here the optative represents not merely the subjunctive but also the indicative in the changed relation in which these are placed by a change of the leading verb from present or future to past time, the tenses of the optative (with some restrictions) representing the corresponding tenses of either subjunctive or indicative at pleasure, the present including also the imperfect. In the development of the language, the want of an optative

¹ For an attempt to make this distinction more clear and to remove some difficulties concerning it, see my paper on "Shall and Should in Protasis and their Greek Equivalents," in the *Transactions of the Am. Phil. Assoc. for 1876*, pp. 87-107, and in the *English Journal of Philology*, vol. viii. no. 15, pp. 18-38. I have there given the best answer in my power to the objection that my explanation of the optative in protasis as "less distinct and vivid" than the subjunctive lacks distinctness; this answer is, briefly, that my statement is as distinct as the distinction itself to which it refers.

form to represent the future indicative was felt, and the future optative was added to the verb to supply the need, appearing first in Pindar. In Homer, this use of the optative is imperfectly developed, as the optative with $\delta\tau\iota$ or $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ in a quotation representing a simple indicative is still unknown (§ 671). Still the Homeric language has most of the other constructions of indirect discourse, including the optative in indirect questions representing both the indicative and the subjunctive. This optative in Homer appears (as we should expect) more as the correlative of the subjunctive than as that of the indicative. In indirect discourse, as in final constructions, the optative is not absolutely demanded after past tenses; and in some writers the original indicatives and subjunctives are more common (§ 670). The future optative, as a new form, is always less freely used than the older tenses.

In final constructions and in indirect discourse the optative appears as a subjunctive or indicative (as it were) transferred to the past, and it here has many points in common with the Latin imperfect and pluperfect subjunctive. In Homer, moreover, the present optative is regularly used in present unreal conditions and conclusions, and both present and aorist optative with $\kappa\acute{\epsilon}$ occasionally refer to the past like the imperfect and aorist indicative with $\kappa\acute{\epsilon}$ or $\acute{\alpha}\nu$. These uses, taken in connexion with the secondary terminations of the optative, might lead us to think that the optative was originally a past expression, so that $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \nu\acute{\upsilon}\ \kappa\epsilon\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\theta'\ \acute{\alpha}\pi\acute{o}\lambda\omicron\iota\tau\omicron$, and *now he would have perished there*, Il. v. 311, would represent the regular use of the primitive optative, instead of being (as is commonly thought) a rare exception. Against this view, however, there are many considerations to be urged.

1. The optative is fully established in Homer in wishes and conditions as a future expression, and also in *present* unreal conditions, the imperfect indicative here being still confined (like the aorist) to the past. In *past* unreal conditions the optative never appears in protasis, and only rarely in apodosis, the aorist indicative being already established here before Homer. Thus, while $\omicron\upsilon\kappa\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\ \gamma\nu\omicron\iota\varsigma$ in Il. v. 85 means *you would not have discerned*, it would commonly mean, even in Homer, *you would not discern* (as future), and the common Homeric expression in Il. v. 85 would be $\omicron\upsilon\kappa\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\gamma\nu\omicron\varsigma$. The evidence of the Homeric language, therefore, shows that the present optative is the original form in present unreal conditions and conclusions and in present unattained wishes, but is opposed to the view that the optative was ever regularly past.

2. It is hardly possible that the past unreal conditional preceded in development the ordinary future supposition. Every primitive language must have needed expressions like *if he should go he would see this* before it ventured upon *if he had gone he would have seen this*. If now we suppose that $\omicron\upsilon\kappa\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\ \gamma\nu\omicron\iota\varsigma$ had originally the sense *you would not have discerned*, we must assume that the Greek expressed this idea before it could express *you would not discern* (future), for the language never had any other form to express the latter. We cannot hesitate, therefore, to find in the common future meaning of $\omicron\upsilon\kappa\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\ \gamma\nu\omicron\iota\varsigma$ the

original force of the expression, and to look upon the occasional reference to the past as a relic of an early attempt to express *you would not have discerned* by a form already appropriated to another use.

3. The Homeric optative in conditional sentences agrees remarkably with the Sanskrit in both the future and the present use, the Sanskrit optative being used both in future and in unreal present conditions and conclusions, but not in past conditions or conclusions. This seems to show that the Greek inherited the two principal Homeric uses of the optative, (1) in future conditions and wishes, and (2) in *present* unreal conditions and unattained wishes, while, so far as our evidence goes, the occasional use of the optative in past potential expressions is an extension of its use beyond its hereditary limits made by the early Greek itself.

4. The argument drawn from the past tenses of the Latin subjunctive will not apply to Greek conditional sentences, for here the present and perfect subjunctive in Latin (not the imperfect and pluperfect) correspond to the Greek optative in its most frequent use, and in the older Latin these primary tenses sometimes express present unreal conditions.

The most natural view seems to be, that the primitive optative, before it came into the Greek language, was a weak future form, like *he may go* and *may he go*, from which on one side came its potential and its future conditional use, and on the other side its use in exhortations and wishes. These uses would naturally all be established before there was any occasion to express either an unreal condition or an unattained wish. The need of a form for present unreal conditions and present unattained wishes would naturally come next, and the present optative was made to include these also, no practical difficulty being caused by having a single form for *it would be* as both present and future, none being felt in Homer and none being now felt in English. In this state the optative probably came into the Greek, before any attempt was made to extend its use to past unreal conditions. When a form was required for these, the optative may have been used at first, on the analogy of present unreal conditions; but here the serious difficulty of using ἀπόλοιτό κε for *he would have perished* when it was already familiar in the sense *he would perish* (hereafter) probably prevented the establishment of this usage. Before our evidence begins, the past tenses of the indicative were firmly established in past unreal conditions, while the optative was here a rare exception, even in apodosis, and was never used in protasis. But no attempt was yet made to dislodge the present optative from present unreal conditions or the corresponding wishes, although the use of ὥφελον or ὥφελλον in Homer shows that a past indicative in a present sense was not absolutely repugnant even to the early usage. But afterwards a new tendency prevailed, and the imperfect indicative took the place of the optative in present unreal conditions, still retaining its older use (with the aorist) in past conditions. The Greek, Sanskrit, and Latin appear

to have developed their expressions of past unreal conditions independently. The Sanskrit, which seldom needed such a form, used its past future, as the Greek occasionally used ἔμελλον with the infinitive (see § 428).

The optative in past general suppositions only represents the corresponding subjunctive transferred to the past. This is, moreover, not to be treated as a primitive use of the optative, for reasons which apply also to the generic subjunctive (see §§ 11, b, and 17).

If the optative, at the time of its origin in some ancestral language, ever actually existed as a past form, as its terminations certainly seem to indicate, no effect has come down to the Greek from this remote origin, except perhaps the use of the optative to represent the subjunctive (and afterwards the indicative) transferred to the past in final constructions and indirect discourse. Even here, its relation to the subjunctive, which is probably all that is primitive in this use, is substantially that of a "remoter future," as it is in independent sentences and in protasis.

II.

ON THE ORIGIN OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF οὐ μή WITH THE SUBJUNCTIVE AND THE FUTURE INDICATIVE.¹

THE origin of the construction of οὐ μή has never been satisfactorily explained. While there is a general agreement as to the meaning of the two forms of expression in which this double negative occurs, that (1) οὐ μή γένηται or οὐ μὴ γενήσεται is *it will not happen*, and (2) οὐ μὴ καταβήσκει is *do not come down*, there is great diversity of opinion as to the manner in which these meanings are obtained from the Greek expressions, and still greater as to the origin of the constructions themselves. Most scholars have explained expressions of *denial* with οὐ μὴ and those of *prohibition* on entirely different theories, which involve different views of the functions of the negatives in the two forms. The explanation of the expressions of denial (like οὐ μὴ γένηται) which has gained most favour is that of an ellipsis after οὐ of a verb or other form denoting fear, on which μὴ γένηται depends; so that the full form would be οὐ δέος ἐστὶ μὴ γένηται, *there is no fear that it will happen*. Since a strong argument for this ellipsis is the existence of such examples as οὐ φόβος μὴ σε ἀγάγω, XEN. Mem. ii. 1, 25, and οὐχὶ δέος μὴ σε φιλήσῃ, AR. Eccl. 650, which, by omitting φόβος and δέος, would become οὐ μὴ σε ἀγάγω and οὐχὶ μὴ σε φιλήσῃ, it can hardly be said that this is supposed to be one of the unconscious ellipses which are no longer felt in actual use. This explanation,

¹ Reprinted, with a few changes, from the *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, vol. i. pp. 65-76.

however, does not help to account for the prohibitions in the second person, like οὐ μὴ καταβῇσει, for there is no freak of language by which οὐ δέος ἐστὶ μὴ καταβῇσει or even οὐ δέος ἐστὶ μὴ καταβῇσει (if we can suppose such an expression) could be transformed into οὐ μὴ καταβῇσει, in the sense *do not come down*. The prohibitions have, therefore, generally been explained, on Elmsley's theory, as interrogative; and οὐ μὴ καταβῇσει; is supposed to mean *will you not not come down?* i.e. *do not come down*. All subjunctives that are found in these prohibitions, as in οὐ μὴ σκώψῃς μηδὲ ποιήσῃς, AR. Nub. 296, have generally been condemned since Brunck and Elmsley, and such subjunctives are seldom seen in recent editions of the dramatists.

But all attempts to explain these constructions of οὐ μὴ on different theories lead to fatal difficulties. We cannot make all the prohibitions interrogative, nor can we change all the prohibitory subjunctives to futures without violence to the text; nor are all cases of οὐ μὴ with the second person of the subjunctive or of the future prohibitory. The following examples show a complete transition from one of the uses of οὐ μὴ to the other, and yet no line of distinction, on which different theories of construction can reasonably be based, can be drawn between any two of them:—

Οὔτοι σ' Ἀχαιῶν, οἶδα, μὴ τις ὑβρίσῃ, *no one of the Achaeans, I am sure, will insult you*. SOPH. Aj. 560. Οὐ σοι μὴ μεθέψομαι ποτε, *I never will follow you*. Id. El. 1052. Κούχῃ μὴ παύσῃσθε, *and you will not cease*. AR. Lys. 704. Ἀλλ' οὐ ποτ' ἐξ ἐμοῦ γε μὴ πάθῃς τόδε, *but you shall never suffer this from me*. SOPH. El. 1029. Οὐ μὴ ποτ' ἐς τὴν Σκύρον ἐκπλεύσῃς, *you shall never sail off to Scyros*. Id. Ph. 381. Οὐ μὴ σκώψῃς . . . ἀλλ' εὐφῆμει, *do not jeer (i.e. you shall not jeer), but hold your tongue*. AR. Nub. 296 (this cannot be interrogative). Οὐ μὴ προσοίσῃς χεῖρα μηδ' ἄψει πέπλων, *do not bring your hand near me, nor touch my garments*. EUR. Hipp. 606 (generally made interrogative).

It should be made a first requisite of any theory that it shall explain all these cases on the same general principle.

A preliminary question to be settled, if possible, is whether οὐ and μὴ merely combine to make a single strong negative, or whether οὐ as an independent adverb negatives μὴ and the verb taken together. The difficulty either of conceiving οὐ and μὴ as forming a single strong negative, as οὐ and οὐδέν or μὴ and μηδέν often do, or of understanding how μὴ γένηται, which by itself cannot mean *it will not happen*, can be strengthened by οὐ into an expression *with* this very meaning, has made it impossible to defend the former view on any recognised principle, even when it was adopted for want of something better, as in the earlier editions of the present work. The supposed analogy of μὴ οὐ forming a single negative with the infinitive will hardly hold as a support of this; for, while we cannot have a sentence like οὐχ ὁσιόν ἐστι μὴ οὐ βοηθεῖν continued by an infinitive with οὐδέ (e.g. by οὐδέ ἀμύνεσθαι), we frequently have sentences like οὐ μὴ καλεῖς με μηδὲ κατερεῖς τοῦνομα, where μηδὲ continues the prohibition without

repeating οὐ, showing the distinct force of each part of this double negative. But this only brings out more emphatically the perplexing question that lies at the basis of the whole discussion. If οὐ is an independent negative, as by every principle of Greek negatives it should be, what does it negative? It is clear that there is only one *active* negative in οὐ μή γένηται, *it will not happen*; and οὐ μή σκώψης, *do not jeer*, surely does not have one *more* active negative than μή σκώψης.¹

It seems obvious, therefore, that if οὐ is an independent negative in οὐ μή γένηται, the negative force of the μή must in some way be in abeyance, as otherwise the two simple negatives would make the sentence as a whole positive. We may naturally turn for a suggestion here to the principal form of expression in which the negative force of μή seems to be in abeyance,—to Plato's favourite subjunctive with μή as a form of cautious assertion, as μή φαῦλον ᾗ, *I think it will prove to be bad*, Crat. 425 B. (See § 264 and the examples.) Such expressions are, practically, cautious affirmative statements, the fear that something may prove true having by usage softened into a suspicion, and this again into an idea of probability or possibility, so that μή φαῦλον ᾗ, which originally meant *may it not prove bad* (as *I fear it may*), has come to mean *I suspect it may prove bad*, and finally, *I think it will prove bad* or *it will probably prove bad*. The expression, however, always retains at least the implication that the fact thus stated is an object of apprehension to *some one*, though it has lost all of its original reference to such apprehension on the part of the speaker.² If now a writer wished to express the negative of one of these cautious assertions, in which the original force of μή has practically disappeared, he would say, for example, οὐ μή φαῦλον ᾗ, *it will not prove to be bad*. We thus have a simple explanation of such sentences as οὐ μή οἶός τ' ᾗς, *you will not be able*, PLAT. Rep. 341 B, and οὐ μή δυνατός ᾔ, *I shall not be able*, Id. Phil. 48 D, the former being the negative of μή οἶός τ' ᾗς, *I suspect you will be able*, the latter of μή δυνατός ᾔ, *I suspect that I*

¹ The idea suggested rather than advocated by Gildersleeve (*American Journal of Philology*, iii. pp. 203, 205), that οὐ is an independent negative, *nay*, while μή introduces a question which expects a negative answer, was evidently held by the copyists of some of the best Mss. of Aristophanes or by their predecessors: thus, Rav. and several Paris Mss. have οὐ μὴ σκώψης (or σκώψης) in Nub. 296; Ven. 474 has οὐ μὴ ληρήσης in Nub. 367, and οὐ μὴ λαλήσεις in 505. See the Ms. readings given in *Transactions of the American Philological Association* for 1869-70, p. 52.

² I give the following passages of Plato, with Jowett's translation, to illustrate this idiom:—

Ἄλλως δὲ συνέειναι μὴ φαῦλον ᾗ καὶ οὐ καθ' ὁδόν, ᾧ φίλε Ἑρμογένες, *if they are not, the composition of them, my dear Hermogenes, will be a sorry piece of work, and in the wrong direction*. Crat. 425 B. Ἀλλὰ μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς, τὸ τοῦ Ἑρμογένους, γλίσχρα ᾗ ἢ ὁλκή αὐτῇ τῆς ὁμοιότητος, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ ᾗ καὶ τῷ φορτικῷ τοῦτω προσχρῆσθαι, τῇ ξυνθήκῃ, *but the force of resemblance, as Hermogenes says, is a mean thing; and the mechanical aid of convention must be further employed*. Ib. 435 C. Μὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκεπτέον ᾗ, *the only question which remains to be considered is, etc.* Crit. 48 C.

shall be able. So, by prefixing οὐ to μὴ ἀναγκαῖον ᾗ, it may be necessary, we have οὐ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον ᾗ, it will not be necessary. (See footnote, p. 394.)

This use of μὴ with the independent subjunctive in Plato, is, however, confined to the present subjunctive, and generally to ᾗ (or ἔχῃ with an adverb), while οὐ μὴ generally has the aorist subjunctive or the future indicative, and only rarely the present subjunctive, even in Plato. (See examples in § 295.) Still, the successful application of the principle to the few present subjunctives which are like those above quoted indicates that we are on the right track.

The independent subjunctive with μὴ is by no means confined to the Platonic construction above mentioned, although this is its chief representative in Attic Greek. It is familiar in Homer in expressions of apprehension combined with a desire to avert the object of fear; as μὴ δὴ νῆας ἔλωσι, *may they not seize the ships (as I fear they may)*, Il. xvi. 128. (See § 261.) In such expressions sometimes the fear itself and sometimes the desire to avert the danger is more prominent; see Od. v. 415: μὴ πῶς μὲ ἐκβαίνοντα βάλλῃ λίθακι προτὶ πέτρῃ κύμα μέγ' ἀρπάξῃ, μελέῃ δέ μοι ἔσσεται ὁρμή, i.e. *I fear that some wave may dash me upon a rock as I am emerging from the sea, and my effort will (then) be in vain* (the clause of fear being merged in a direct statement). See also Il. ii. 195, xviii. 8; Od. v. 356, xvi. 255. Between Homer and Plato, we find only eight cases of independent μὴ (or μὴ οὐ) with the subjunctive;¹ but in these we can see the transition from Homer's clause of apprehension to Plato's cautious assertion. (See § 264.) In four of these cases, the speaker expresses fear and a desire to avert its object. These are EUR. Alc. 315, μὴ σοὺς διαφθείρῃ γάμον;—OR. 776, μὴ λάβωσί σ' ἄσμενοι,—H. F. 1399, ἀλλ' αἶμα μὴ σοῖς ἐξομόρξωμαι πέπλοις,—Rhes. 115, μὴ οὐ μόλῃς πόλιν. In the other four we see either the cautious assertion found in Plato or a near approach to it. In HDT. v. 79, we have ἀλλὰ μάλλον μὴ οὐ τοῦτο ᾗ τὸ μαντήιον, *but I suspect rather that this will prove not to be the meaning of the oracle* (precisely Plato's usage). Cases of μὴ οὐ of course illustrate this use of μὴ with the subjunctive equally with those of the simple μὴ. In EUR. Tro. 982, Hecuba says to Helen, μὴ οὐ πείσῃς σοφούς, *I suspect you will not convince wise people*, with the same sarcastic tone which is in Plato's μὴ οὐκ ᾗ διδακτὸν ἀρετή, *I suspect it will prove that virtue is not a thing to be taught*, Men. 94 E (said by Socrates, who is arguing that virtue is οὐ διδακτὸν). In AR. Eccl. 795, most editions have μὴ γὰρ οὐ λάβῃς ὅποι (sc. ταῦτα καταθῇς), where the Mss. give an impossible λάβοις), *I suspect you will not find a place to put them down*, with the same affectation of anxiety as in the two preceding examples. In XEN. Mem. iv. 2, 12, we have one of the rare interrogative forms of the subjunctive with μὴ, in which Euthydemus says to Socrates, μὴ οἶν οὐ δύνωμαι (v. l. δύναμαι) ἐγὼ τὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἔργα διηγῆσασθαι; *do you suspect that I shall be*

¹ I depend here on Weber's statistics, given in his *Entwicklungsgeschichte der Absichtssätze*.

(or *am*) *unable to explain the works of Justice?* He adds, καὶ νῆ Δι' ἔγωγε τὰ τῆς ἀδικίας, *I assure you, I can explain those of Injustice.* Here the spirit of the expression is the same as in the other cases. Compare the similar interrogatives in Plato: Phaed. 64 C, Rep. 603 C, Parm. 163 D, Sisyph. 387 C. But for the eight cases of independent μή that have been quoted, we should never know that the construction existed between Homer and Plato. We have good ground for believing that it remained as a colloquial idiom in the language, though it seldom appeared in literature until Plato revived it and restored it to common use as a half-sarcastic form of expressing mildly a disagreeable truth. In Plato, the construction is not confined to this peculiar sense, for we find cases in which honest apprehension is expressed as in the older use. Weber quotes Euthyd. 272 C, μὴ τοῖν ξένων τις ταῦτο τοῦτο ὀνειδίσῃ, *I am afraid some one may insult the two strangers in this same way* (or *let no one insult them, as I fear some one may*); also Symp. 193 B, καὶ μή μοι ὑπολάβῃ, *I hope he will not answer me*; and Leg. 861 E, μὴ τοίνυν τις οἴηται.

It appears, therefore, that the independent subjunctive with μή was in good use in the fifth century B.C. in the two senses illustrated by EUR. Or. 776, μὴ λάβωσί σε, *I fear they may seize you*, and by EUR. Tro. 982, μὴ οὐ πείσῃς σοφούς, *I suspect you will fail to convince wise people.* From the persistence of the original meaning, even in Plato, we may probably assume that the expression more frequently included the idea of apprehension which is essential to it in Homer. But the other examples show that μὴ λάβωσί σε must have been in equally good use in the sense *I suspect they will seize you* (implying no apprehension). If now we suppose οὐ to be prefixed to μὴ λάβωσί σε, we shall have οὐ μὴ λάβωσί σε, which could be said with the meaning *I am not afraid that they will seize you*, and equally well with the meaning *they shall not seize you.* The former sense agrees precisely with that of some of the older uses of οὐ μή with the subjunctive. If the strange example from Parmenides (vs. 121) is genuine, we have οὐ μὴ ποτέ τις σε βροτῶν γνώμῃ παρελάσῃ, *there is no danger that any mortal will surpass you in wisdom.* In AESCH. Sept. 38 (one of the oldest cases, 467 B.C.), οὐ τι μὴ ληφθῶ δόλῳ, *I have no fear of being caught by any trick*, we can easily understand οὐ μὴ ληφθῶ as the negative of μὴ ληφθῶ, *I fear I may be caught.* So in Parmenides we have the negative of μὴ τις σε παρελάσῃ, *I fear some one may surpass you.* Οὐ μὴ τις ὀνειδίσῃ would be a natural negative of μὴ τις ὀνειδίσῃ, *I fear some one may insult*, in PLAT. Euthyd. 272 C. So, where there is no denial of apprehension, οὐ μὴ πάθῃς τόδε, *you shall not suffer this*, SOPH. El. 1029, may be the negative of μὴ πάθῃς τόδε, *I suspect you will suffer this*; and οὐ μὴ ἐκπλεύσῃς, Id. Phil. 381, may be the negative of μὴ ἐκπλεύσῃς, *I suspect you will sail away.* So οὐ μὴ ναὺς ἀφορμίσῃ (Kirchoff, -σῃς) χθονός, πρὶν ἂν, etc., *you shall not move your ships from the shore, until, etc.*, EUR. I. T. 18, will be the negative of μὴ ναὺς ἀφορμίσῃ, *I suspect you will move your ships.* These expressions with οὐ μή were always colloquial, as were also (at

least in Attic Greek) the expressions with $\mu\eta$ and the subjunctive from which they are here supposed to have sprung.¹

If it is thought that the limited number of cases of independent $\mu\eta$ with the subjunctive not implying apprehension do not justify the assumptions which have been based on them, it is easy to see how the change from the denial of an apprehension to the denial of a suspicion might have taken place within the $\text{o}\tilde{\upsilon} \mu\eta$ construction itself. If we suppose such expressions as $\text{o}\tilde{\upsilon} \mu\eta \lambda\eta\phi\theta\omega$ and $\text{o}\tilde{\upsilon} \mu\eta \tau\acute{\iota}\varsigma \sigma\epsilon \dot{\upsilon}\beta\rho\acute{\iota}\sigma\eta$ to have been established as the negatives of $\mu\eta \lambda\eta\phi\theta\omega$, *I fear I may be caught*, and $\mu\eta \tau\acute{\iota}\varsigma \sigma\epsilon \dot{\upsilon}\beta\rho\acute{\iota}\sigma\eta$, *I fear some one may insult you*, they must soon have fallen out of this relation to the parent forms, and have been felt in use to be mere future negative assertions, so that they could not long be restricted to sentences in which apprehension was implied. Thus, $\text{o}\tilde{\upsilon} \mu\eta \nu\alpha\upsilon\varsigma \acute{\alpha}\phi\omicron\rho\mu\acute{\iota}\sigma\eta \chi\theta\omicron\nu\omicron\varsigma$ would soon become as natural to those who used these forms as the older $\text{o}\tilde{\upsilon} \mu\eta \tau\acute{\iota}\varsigma \sigma\epsilon \dot{\upsilon}\beta\rho\acute{\iota}\sigma\eta$. According to this view, $\text{o}\tilde{\upsilon} \mu\eta$ with the subjunctive would come into the language in the sense of a denial of an apprehension, which is essentially the same general sense as that supposed by the theory of an ellipsis of $\delta\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}\nu$. But there is a great advantage in dispensing with this troublesome and improbable ellipsis, and deriving the meaning from the sentence as it stands. There is surely no more ground for assuming this ellipsis here than in the independent subjunctive with $\mu\eta$, which is an older construction than the dependent subjunctive with $\mu\eta$. And if we accept $\mu\eta \tau\acute{\iota}\varsigma \sigma\epsilon \dot{\upsilon}\beta\rho\acute{\iota}\sigma\eta$ as a complete construction, without the help of $\delta\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}\nu$, it is absurd to invent an ellipsis to explain $\text{o}\tilde{\upsilon} \mu\eta \tau\acute{\iota}\varsigma \sigma\epsilon \dot{\upsilon}\beta\rho\acute{\iota}\sigma\eta$ as a shorter form for $\text{o}\tilde{\upsilon} \delta\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\acute{\iota} \mu\eta \tau\acute{\iota}\varsigma \sigma\epsilon \dot{\upsilon}\beta\rho\acute{\iota}\sigma\eta$. In fact, dispensing with this ellipsis removes the most fatal objection to the view of the sentence on which the old theory was based.

¹ It may perhaps be urged, in opposition to the view here presented, that $\text{o}\tilde{\upsilon} \mu\eta \lambda\acute{\alpha}\beta\omega\iota \sigma\epsilon$, *they will not seize you*, cannot be the negative of $\mu\eta \lambda\acute{\alpha}\beta\omega\iota \sigma\epsilon$ in its sense of *I suspect they will seize you*, or even in that of *I fear they may seize you*, because the regular negative of this is $\mu\eta \text{o}\tilde{\upsilon} \lambda\acute{\alpha}\beta\omega\iota \sigma\epsilon$, as we may call $\mu\eta \text{o}\tilde{\upsilon} \pi\epsilon\lambda\omicron\varsigma \sigma\omicron\phi\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ (Eur. Tro. 982) the negative of $\mu\eta \pi\epsilon\lambda\omicron\varsigma \sigma\omicron\phi\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$. But $\text{o}\tilde{\upsilon}$ in $\mu\eta \text{o}\tilde{\upsilon} \pi\epsilon\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ negatives only the verb, whereas $\text{o}\tilde{\upsilon}$ in $\text{o}\tilde{\upsilon} \mu\eta \pi\epsilon\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ would negative the whole expression $\mu\eta \pi\epsilon\lambda\omicron\varsigma$. $\text{M}\eta \text{o}\tilde{\upsilon} \pi\epsilon\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ is a cautious negative, meaning *I suspect you will not convince them*, corresponding in a certain way to $\mu\eta \pi\epsilon\lambda\omicron\varsigma$, *I suspect you will convince them*. But $\text{o}\tilde{\upsilon} \mu\eta \pi\epsilon\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ would be the true negative of $\mu\eta \pi\epsilon\lambda\omicron\varsigma$, denying it absolutely, in the sense *there is no ground for suspicion that you will convince them*, or (sometimes) *there is no fear that you will convince them*, i.e. *you will not convince them*. There is all the difference in the world between suspecting a negative (e.g. suspecting that something will not happen) and negating a suspicion (e.g. denying that there is any suspicion that something will happen). Surely no one could understand $\mu\eta \text{o}\tilde{\upsilon} \delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\rho\acute{\omicron}\varsigma \tilde{\omega}$, *I suspect I shall not be able*, as the negative of $\mu\eta \delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\rho\acute{\omicron}\varsigma \tilde{\omega}$, *I suspect I shall be able*. The real negative is much rather $\text{o}\tilde{\upsilon} \mu\eta \delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\rho\acute{\omicron}\varsigma \tilde{\omega}$, *there is no chance that I shall be able*, in PLAT. Phil. 48 D. The negative power of $\text{o}\tilde{\upsilon}$ in negating $\mu\eta \lambda\acute{\alpha}\beta\omega\iota \sigma\epsilon$ in its sense of *I fear they may seize you* is perhaps still more apparent. Whereas $\mu\eta \text{o}\tilde{\upsilon} \lambda\acute{\alpha}\beta\omega\iota \sigma\epsilon$ in this sense would mean *I am afraid they may not seize you*, $\text{o}\tilde{\upsilon} \mu\eta \lambda\acute{\alpha}\beta\omega\iota \sigma\epsilon$ would mean *I do not fear (or there is no danger) that they will seize you*, which is felt as a strong negative, *they will not seize you*.

In whichever of the two ways above suggested the subjunctive with οὐ μή came to express a simple future denial, it was only natural that the Attic Greek should soon begin to use the future indicative in place of the subjunctive in the same sense. Thus we have in SOPH. EL. 1052, οὐ σοι μὴ μεθέψομαι ποτε, and in AR. Ran. 508, οὐ μὴ σ' ἐγὼ περιόψομαι, both expressing denial. At this stage all recollection of the original clause with μὴ and the subjunctive must have been lost, as there was no corresponding clause with μὴ and the future indicative in common use, of which οὐ μὴ with the future could be the negative. A most striking proof of the entire loss of this tradition is given by examples of indirect quotation of οὐ μὴ with the future. In SOPH. Ph. 611 we have τά τ' ἄλλα πάντ' ἐθέσπισεν, καὶ τὰπὶ Τροίας πέργαμ' ὥς οὐ μὴ ποτε πέρσοιεν εἰ μὴ τόνδε ἄγουντο, the direct form being οὐ μὴ ποτε πέρσετε ἐὰν μὴ τόνδε ἄγησθε. In XEN. Hell. i. 6, 32, εἶπεν ὅτι ἡ Σπάρτη οὐδὲν μὴ κάκιον οἰκιεῖται αὐτοῦ ἀποθανόντος, the future indicative is retained in an otherwise similar construction. In EUR. Ph. 1590, we find εἶπε Τειρεσσίας οὐ μὴ ποτε, σοῦ τήνδε γῆν οἰκούντος, εὖ πράξειν πόλιν, representing οὐ μὴ ποτε εὖ πράξει. We could not explain οὐ μὴ πράξειν as an independent expression on any theory, either with or without an ellipsis. Such forms show the advanced stage which the construction of οὐ μὴ had reached. (See § 296.)

We find in the Roman comic poets a few cases of *neque* with *haud* in the same clause, forming a single negative. Such are PLAUT. Bacch. 1037, *Neque* ego *haud* committam ut, si quid peccatum siet, fecisse dicas de mea sententia; and TER. Andr. 205, *Neque* tu *haud* dices tibi non praedictum. *Neque haud* may fairly be supposed to be a translation of οὐδὲ μὴ in a Greek original. If it is, it shows that the Roman poet understood οὐ μὴ with the subjunctive or the future indicative as a simple expression of denial.

When οὐ μὴ with the future indicative had been established as a regular form of future denial, the second person singular probably began to be used as a form of prohibition. As the future could be used in positive commands in an imperative sense, as in πάντως δὲ τοῦτο ὁράσεις, *but by all means do this*, AR. Nub. 1352, it could also take the simple οὐ in prohibitions, as in χειρὶ οὐ ψάύσεις ποτε, *you shall not touch me with your hand, or do not touch me*, EUR. Med. 1320. (See § 69.) The dramatists soon introduced the new form with οὐ μὴ into such prohibitions, generally with the future indicative, but occasionally with the more primitive subjunctive. Thus οὐ μὴ καταβήσῃ had the sense of *do not come down*, derived from *you shall not come down*, as οὐ ψάύσεις (above) from *meaning you shall not touch* came to mean *do not touch*. One of the strongest objections to the older views of the forms with οὐ μὴ is that they generally require a distinct explanation of this prohibitory construction. Elmsley's theory of a question with two negatives, explaining οὐ μὴ καταβήσῃ; as *will you NOT NOT come down?* hence *do not come down*, was stated in the *Quarterly Review* for June 1812, and in his note to EUR. Med. 1120

(1151 Dind.). Many who do not adopt Elmsley's theory in full still accept the interrogative form, and these sentences are now generally printed as questions. Long before Elmsley, the famous "Canon Davesianus" had proscribed all sigmatic aorist subjunctives with οὐ μή as well as with ὅπως μή. This edict removed nearly or quite all the troublesome subjunctives that would have opposed Elmsley's view, and left only the future indicative in his doubly-negated questions, which of course required an indicative. This again set up an artificial distinction in form between the prohibitory construction allowing only the future indicative, and the other construction allowing both subjunctive and future indicative.

But it has been more and more evident in later years that this distinction in form between the two constructions cannot be maintained. It was seen by Brunck, before Elmsley's interrogative theory appeared, that it would be absurd to distinguish sentences like ταῦτα οὐ μή ποτ' ἐς τὴν Σκύρον ἐκπλεύσῃς ἔχων, *you shall never sail away to Scyros with these arms*, SOPH. Ph. 381, from οὐ μή καταβήσῃ, *you shall not come down*, AR. Vesp. 397. He therefore wrote ἐκπλεύσεις in the former, with the note "soloece vulgo legitur ἐκπλεύσῃς." But ἐκπλεύσεις proved to be even a greater solecism than ἐκπλεύσῃς was thought to be, for the only classic future of πλέω is the middle πλεύσομαι or πλεσοῦμαι, and ἐκπλεύσει will not suit the verse. So ἐκπλεύσῃς had to be restored. Again, while almost all the sentences containing a prohibition with οὐ μή, followed by a positive command with ἀλλὰ or δέ, could admit of Elmsley's punctuation and interpretation,—as οὐ μή λαλήσεις ἀλλ' ἀκολουθήσεις ἐμοί; AR. Nub. 505, explained as *won't you not talk nonsense and follow me?*—another passage of the Clouds resisted both of these and also the prescribed form. In 296, the Mss. have οὐ μὴ σκώψῃς μηδὲ ποιήσῃς ἅπερ οἱ τρηνγοδαίμονες οἶδοι· ἀλλ' εὐφήμει. Brunck emended this without hesitation to οὐ μὴ σκώψεις μηδὲ ποιήσεις, with the note "soloece vulgo σκώψῃς . . . ποιήσῃς." But there was no place for Elmsley's interrogative mark, which could not stand after the imperative, and could not be inserted after οἶδοι without implying that the other sentences (like Nub. 505 above) were wrongly punctuated. The emendation σκώψεις was as unfortunate as ἐκπλεύσεις, as the future of σκώπτω is σκώφομαι, not σκώψω, so that a further emendation to σκώψει was needed. In this battered condition, and with no interrogative mark to help the interpretation, the passage usually appears, even in the latest editions. (See §§ 298, 300, 301.) So long as it is proposed to explain these prohibitions and the ordinary denials with οὐ μή on entirely different theories, with nothing common to the two constructions, it may not seem unreasonable to force a few examples like Nub. 296 and 367 into conformity with the general usage. But on any theory which makes no distinction in construction between the prohibitions and the other negative expressions of denial or refusal (for example, between οὐ μὴ ἐκπλεύσῃς, *you shall not sail away*, and οὐ μὴ καταβήσῃ, *do not come down*, i.e. *you shall not come*

down), there is no more reason for objecting to οὐ μή σκώψῃς than to οὐ μή ἐκπλεύῃς. An occasional subjunctive, like οὐ μή σκώψῃς or οὐ μή ληρήσῃς, is indeed no more than we should naturally expect in a construction which had its origin in the subjunctive. In such expressions, further, the analogy of the equivalent μὴ σκώψῃς and μὴ ληρήσῃς would tend to make the aorist subjunctive unobjectionable and perfectly natural. A reference to the list of passages quoted on page 390 will show the inconsistencies into which every one must fall who attempts to explain the prohibitions and the clauses of denial on different theories. We cannot separate οὐ μή σκώψῃς from οὐ μή ἐκπλεύῃς in construction, nor the latter from οὐ μή πάθῃς, nor this again from οὐ μή τις ὑβρίσῃ, on any consistent principle of interpretation.¹

Sentences of one class have been claimed as decisive witnesses in favour of the interrogative theory. They are represented by οὐ θάσσον οἶσεις, μὴδ' ἀπιστήσεις ἐμοί; *will you not more quickly extend it (your hand), and not distrust me?* SOPH. Tr. 1183. These are undoubted questions, but there is no construction with οὐ μή in them. They consist of one question with οὐ, implying an affirmative answer, *will you not extend your hand?* and another with μὴ, implying a negative answer, *and you will not distrust me, will you?* The compound of the two has the general sense expressed in the first translation above. (See § 299 and the examples.)

In conclusion, we may sum up the result of the investigation as follows. The original construction of οὐ μή with the subjunctive was developed as a negative form of the independent subjunctive with μὴ, which had already become an expression of apprehension with desire to avert its object, even if it had not passed into the stage of a cautious assertion; in either case, the real negative force of μὴ was in abeyance. The aorist subjunctive is the most common form here, the present being less frequent. This form of future denial next admitted the future indicative in the same sense as the subjunctive. The second person singular of this future with οὐ μή was used by the dramatists as a prohibition, without abandoning the sense which the future can always have in both positive and negative commands. In these prohibitions the future indicative, in which they had their origin, is generally used; but the subjunctive occasionally occurs, being analogous to the ordinary aorist subjunctive with μὴ in prohibitions; e.g. μὴ σκώψῃς supporting οὐ μὴ σκώψῃς.²

¹ For a further discussion of the form of the sentences with οὐ μή, in connexion with that of clauses with ὅπως and with the Canon Davesianus, see *Trans. of the Am. Phil. Assoc. for 1869-70*, pp. 46-55.

² Since this paper was written, I have seen that Kvičala, in two articles on οὐ μή in the *Zeitschrift für die österreichischen Gymnasien* for 1856, proposed an explanation of οὐ μή with the subjunctive, which at one important point came very near the view now presented. He states two (apparently theoretical) meanings which he supposes μὴ θάνησ to have had at some period (zwei Bedeutungsentwickelungen): one, "Du wirst doch wol am Ende, trotzdem dass ich es abzuwehren suche, sterben;" the other, "Ich fürchte,

III.

STATISTICS OF THE USE OF THE FINAL PARTICLES.

THE following tables are based on the statistics given by Dr. Philipp Weber in his *Entwicklungsgeschichte der Absichtssätze*.

1. Statistics of the use of the Final Particles in pure final clauses by different authors.

	"Οφρα. κε οτ δν.	"Ινα.	"Ως.	"Ως δν οτ ὥς κε.	"Οπως.	"Οπως δν with Subj. ¹
Homer . .	223	14	145	24 ²	38	9
Hom. Hymns	8	1 (opt.)	5	...	2 (opt.)	
Hesiod . .	10	...	11	3	3	
Pindar . .	11	...	...	3	1 (opt.)	1
Aeschylus .	...	...	2	23	11	11
Sophocles .	...	...	14	52	5	31
Euripides .	...	...	71	182	27	19
Aristophanes	...	...	183	3 ⁴	14	18 ⁵
Herodotus .	...	...	107	16	11	13 ⁶
Thucydides .	...	...	52	1	1	114
Xenophon .	...	...	213	83	8 ⁷	221
Plato . . .	...	...	368	1	...	23
Ten Orators .	...	...	579 ⁸	3 or 4 ⁹	...	42
Demosthenes	...	...	253	...	...	14

dass du doch wol (trotz meiner Abwehr) sterben werdest." By prefixing οὐ to μή θάψης in these meanings, he arrives at two uses of οὐ μή with the subjunctive. The second meaning comes so near the independent subjunctive with μή in Homer, that it is surprising that neither this nor the equally important μή in Plato is mentioned. But no use is made of the advantage here gained in explaining οὐ μή with the future indicative, either in prohibitions or in denials. The prohibitions are made interrogative, οὐ μή δυσμενὲς εἶσαι; being explained as "Nicht wahr?—du wirst doch nicht feindselig seyn?" The future of denial is explained simply as developed from the interrogative future, as a form of reply to this, by leaving out the interrogative element.

¹ For ὅπως δν with the optative in Attic Greek, see § 330.

² Omitting Od. xxi. 201. ³ In Agam. 364 ὅπως has the optative with δν.

⁴ Two of these occur in Lysistr. 1265, 1305, in the Χορὸς Λακωνῶν: the third is in Eccl. 286.

⁵ Including 10 with future indicative.

⁶ "Οπως. See Weber's erratum for his p. 130.

⁷ Omitting Cyr. viii. 3, 2 (see p. 400, footnote), and Xenophon's peculiar cases of ὥς δν with the optative (see § 326, 2). See Appendix IV.

⁸ Weber omits Dinarchus in p. 185 (see his p. 182).

⁹ DEM. xxiv. 146 is omitted, as ὥς cannot be final there. The only sure examples of ὥς final in the orators are ANT. v. 53, vi. 15; AND. i. 99. LYS. xxviii. 14 is probably corrupt (see *Am. Jour. Phil.* vi. p. 56).

2. Statistics of the use of the four Final Particles in pure final clauses in the Iliad and the Odyssey.

	SUBJ.		FUT. IND.	OPT.	
*Οφρα (pure)	{ Il. 89	2	22.....Il. 113		
	{ Od. 82	2	26.....Od. 110		
	171	4	48	—	223
*Οφρα κε	{ Il. 1	...	1.....Il. 2		
	{ Od. 6	...	0.....Od. 6		
	7		1	—	8
*Οφρ' αυ	{ Il. 2	...	0.....Il. 2		
	{ Od. 3	...	1.....Od. 4		
	5		1	—	6
Total cases of φρα					<u>237</u>
*Ινα (pure)	{ Il. 45	...	22.....Il. 67		
	{ Od. 48	...	30.....Od. 78		
	93		52	—	145 (total)
*Ως (pure)	{ Il. 10	...	6.....Il. 16		
	{ Od. 2	...	6.....Od. 8		
	12		12	—	24
*Ως κε	{ Il. 11	...	0.....Il. 11		
	{ Od. 9	...	5.....Od. 14		
	20		5	—	25
*Ως αυ	{ Il. 3	...	1.....Il. 4		
	{ Od. 6	...	3.....Od. 9		
	9		4	—	13
Total cases of ως					<u>62</u>
*Οπως (pure)	{ Il. 0	0	2.....Il. 2		
	{ Od. 1	1	5.....Od. 7		
	1	1	7	—	9 (total)

3. Examples of ως and όπως in object clauses in Homer after verbs of *planning, trying*, etc. (see § 341).

Simple ως with subjunctive: Il. ii. 4 (some read opt.), Od. v. 24. (2.) *Ως κε with subjunctive: Il. iv. 66 (= 71), ix. 112, xv. 235, xxi. 459; Od. i. 205, ii. 168, 316, 368, v. 31, vii. 192. (10.)

Simple όπως with subjunctive: Il. iii. 19, 110, xvii. 635, 713, Od. i. 77, xiii. 365, 386. (7.) *Οπως κε with subjunctive: Od. i. 270, 295, iv. 545; so Il. ix. 681, if this is subjunctive. (4.)

ὥς with optative: Il. ix. 181; Od. vi. 112. (2.) Ὅπως with optative: Il. xiv. 160, xxi. 137, xxiv. 680; Od. iii. 129, viii. 345, ix. 420, 554, xi. 229, 480, xv. 170, 203. (11.)

Weber cites ὅπως κεν σόφω in Il. ix. 681 as optative, and omits Od. iii. 19 as a suspected verse.

The following verbs are used to introduce this construction in Homer: φράζομαι and its compounds, 14 times; βουλεύω and βουλὴν εἰπεῖν, 5 times; περὶ, 5 times; μερμηρίζω, 4 times; ὀρμαίνω and λίσσομαι, each twice; and νοέω, λεύσσω, μῆτιν ὕφηνον, and μνήσομαι, each once. (36.)

IV.

XENOPHON'S PECULIAR USE OF ὥς, ὥς ἄν, AND ὅπως ἄν IN FINAL AND OBJECT CLAUSES.

IN FINAL CLAUSES.

I. (ὥς and ὥς ἄν.) 1. It is well known that Xenophon is almost the only writer of Attic prose who uses ὥς freely in the final constructions. Weber's statistics (p. 398) show that while ὥς is the favourite final particle in tragedy, it is hardly found in Aristophanes, Thucydides, Plato, and the Orators. Xenophon forms a strange exception to the prose usage, having ὥς or ὥς ἄν in 91 of his pure final clauses. There is nothing peculiar in his use of final ὥς with either subjunctive or optative, as it merely takes the place of another final particle.

2. In his use of ὥς ἄν in final clauses, however, several peculiarities appear, which show that Xenophon felt the original force of ὥς as a relative adverb of manner (§ 312). The following examples occur.¹

(a) Of eight cases of ὥς ἄν with the subjunctive, six are normal, while two show the relative force of ὥς:—

Ἐᾶσαι χρή τοὺς ἄνδρας τὸ μέτριον ἀποκοιμηθῆναι, ὥς ἄν δύνωνται ὑπνομαχεῖν, *that they be able to fight against sleep.* Cyr. ii. 4, 26. ὥς δ' ἄν μάθης, ἀντάκουσον. An. ii. 5, 16. Ἄλλ' ἔπεισθαι χρή καὶ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ὥς ἄν τὸ παραγγελλόμενον δύνῃσθε ποιεῖν. An. vi. 3, 18. So Cyr. viii. 7, 9; Ag. xi. 1; Eques. iv. 4.

ὥς ἄν δύνῃται σοι ὁ στρατὸς ἔπεισθαι, τῷ μέσῳ τῆς σπουδῆς ἡγοῦ, *lead on at a medium rate of speed, that the army may be able to follow you.* Cyr. ii. 4, 28. (The analogy of the following cases of the optative may justify the translation, *lead at a rate at which the army may be able to follow you.*) Αἱ μὲν κνῆμαι εἰς μέγεθος οὐ μάλα αὔξονται,

¹ See Weber, p. 224, where the examples of the optative with ὥς ἄν are also given. Weber cites Cyr. viii. 3, 2 as an example of the subjunctive; but this section has ὥς ἄν ἐξαγγεῖλη as a relative clause, but no final clause. I have added Cyr. vii. 5, 81 and Eques. ix. 3 to the examples of the optative given by Weber.

πρὸς δὲ ταύτας ὥς ἄν συμμέτρως ἔχῃ συναύξεται καὶ τὸ ἄλλο σῶμα, i.e. *the rest of the (horse's) body grows so as to be in the right proportion to the legs*. Eques. i. 16. These two cases are (as Weber says of those of the optative) on the line between final and consecutive sentences. The original relative and conditional force of ὥς (§ 312, 2) can here be plainly seen.

(b) The original relative force of ὥς, *as*, is much more apparent when ὥς ἄν takes the optative in Xenophon with a potential force, especially after primary tenses. These examples occur:—

Προσφέρουσιν ὥς ἄν ἐνδοίεν τὸ ἔκπωμα εὐληπτότατα τῷ μέλλοντι πίνειν, *they offer the cup in the most convenient way in which they can present it for the one who is to drink* (lit. *as they can present it most conveniently*). Cyr. i. 3, 8. 'Ὡς δ' ἄν καὶ οἱ πόδες εἶεν τῷ ἵππῳ κράτιστοι, εἰ μὲν τις ἔχει ῥᾶν ἄσκησιν, ἐκείνη ἔστω, *if any one has any easier exercise for keeping the horse's feet as strong as possible*. Hipp. i. 16. So also Eques. ix. 3: οὕτως αὖ εἰς τὸ θάπτον (χρῆ) προάγειν, ὥς ἄν μάλιστα λανθάνοι αὐτὸν ὁ ἵππος εἰς τὸ ταχὺ ἀφικνούμενος.

Ὁ Ἀρμένιος ἐφοβείτο, ὅτι ὀφθήσεσθαι ἐμέλλε τὰ βασιλεία οἰκοδομὴν ἀρχόμενος, ὥς ἄν ἱκανὰ ἀπομάχεσθαι εἴη, *beginning to build his palace so that it would be capable of defence (in a manner in which it would be)*. Cyr. iii. 1, 1. Ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ τοῦτο ποιῆσαι, ὥς ὅτι ἥκιστα ἄν ἐπιφθόνως σπάνιός τε καὶ σεμνὸς φανείη, *to do this so that he would appear, etc.* Cyr. vii. 5, 37. (Here the separation of ἄν from ὥς makes the potential nature of φανείη ἄν especially plain.) Εἰ δὲ μὲν μάλιστα ἀνθρώποι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ὁ δαίμων ταῦτα ἡμῖν συμπαρεσκεύακεν, ὥς δ' ἄν ἥδιστα ταῦτα φαίνοιτο αὐτός τις αὐτῷ ταῦτα παρασκευάσει, κ.τ.λ., *if, while God has helped to provide for us what men most desire, any one will then provide these for himself so that they would appear most agreeable to him, etc.* Cyr. vii. 5, 81. Συντεταγμένον οὕτως ἦγε τὸ στράτευμα ὥς ἄν ἐπικουρεῖν μάλιστα ἐαυτῷ δύναιτο, ἡσύχως δὲ ὥσπερ ἄν παρθένος ἢ σωφρονεστάτη προβαίνοι, *he led the army so ordered that it would be best able to help him, and as quietly as the most modest maiden would walk*. Ag. vi. 7. (Compare this with Cyr. ii. 4, 28 under *a*, and compare ὥς ἄν and ὥσπερ ἄν here.) See § 329, 2, for similar cases in Demosthenes.

II. (Ὅπως.) Xenophon's favourite final particle is ὅπως, but there is nothing peculiar in his use of it in pure final clauses with either subjunctive or optative. He further uses ὅπως ἄν with the subjunctive like other Attic writers (see examples in § 328).

With the optative he uses ὅπως ἄν in four cases with a distinct final and an equally distinct potential force. These examples are quoted in § 330. The only other case is THUC. vii. 65.

IN OBJECT CLAUSES AFTER VERBS OF *striving* ETC.

Xenophon is more peculiar in his use of ὥς, ὥς ἄν, and ὅπως ἄν in these clauses than in pure final clauses. Here he generally uses ὅπως with the future indicative, subjunctive, and optative, and occasionally

ὅπως ἂν with the subjunctive, like other Attic writers (see examples in §§ 339 and 348). But he distinctly violates Attic usage by having ὥς (in the sense of ὅπως) with both subjunctive and future indicative, and with the present, aorist, and future optative; also ὥς ἂν with both subjunctive and optative and ὅπως ἂν with the optative; and further by allowing the optative with ὥς ἂν and ὅπως ἂν to follow both primary and secondary tenses. His use of ὥς ἂν and ὅπως ἂν with the optative, especially after primary tenses, shows strongly the original relative and interrogative force of ὥς and ὅπως.

The examples of the exceptional uses are these.

(Ὡς.) Ἐπιμελοῦνται ὥς ἔχῃ οὕτως. Oec. xx. 8. Σκοπεῖτω τὰ ἔμπροσθεν, ὥς μηδὲν ἡμᾶς λάθῃ, *let him keep a look-out in front, to see that nothing escapes us.* An. vi. 3, 14. Πῶς δ' οὐ (χρῆ) φυλάξασθαι ὥς μὴ καὶ ἡμᾶς ταῦτ' οὐκ ἀποστήσῃ ποιῆσαι; Hell. ii. 3, 33. Ἐπέμελonto ὥς μὴ κωλύοντο πορεύεσθαι, *they took care that they should not be prevented from marching.* Cyr. vi. 3, 2. Ἐπεμελήθη ὥς τύχοιεν πάντων τῶν καλῶν. Cyr. vii. 3, 17.¹

Ὡς δὲ καλῶς ἔξει τὰ ὑμέτερα, ἔμοι μελήσει (like the regular ὅπως ἔξει). Cyr. iii. 2, 13. Ἐπεμελήθη ἡ ὅπως φύλόν τι ἀποστήσεται ἢ ὅπως τὸ ἀποστὰν μὴ ἀπόλῃται ἢ ὥς καὶ βασιλεὺς μὴ δυνήσεται πράγματα παρέχειν (two regular cases of ὅπως with one case of ὥς). Ag. vii. 7. Προεῖπον ὥς μηδεὶς κινήσοιτο μηδὲ ἀνάξοιτο. Hell. ii. 1, 22.

(Ὡς ἂν.) Subj. Τὸ ὅσα ἂν γινῶ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι ἐπιμελείσθαι ὥς ἂν πραχθῇ. Hipp. ix. 2. Οὐ φέρει καρπὸν ἣν μὴ τις ἐπιμελήται ὥς ἂν ταῦτα περαίνηται. Ibid.

Opt. Ἐπιμελονται ὥς ἂν βέλτιστοι εἶεν οἱ πολῖται, *they take care that (of the way by which) the citizens may be the best.* Cyr. i. 2, 5. Ἐπιμελούμενος τοῦτου ὥς ἂν πραχθείη, *seeing how this could be done.* Cyr. i. 6, 23. So Hipp. i. 12; Eques. ix. 3. Ἦν γνώσιν (αὐτὸν) δυνάμενον παρασκευάζειν ὥς ἂν πλέον ἔχοιεν τῶν πολεμίων, πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις κάκεινο λάβωσιν εἰς τὴν γνώμην ὥς οὗτ' ἂν εἰκῇ οὗτ' ἀνευ θεῶν ἡγήσαιτ' ἂν ἐπὶ πολεμίους, πάντα ταῦτα πιθανοτέρους ποιῇ. Hipp. vi. 6. (Compare ὥς ἂν πλέον ἔχοιεν, *to provide means by which they could be superior*, with ὥς οὐκ ἡγήσαιτ' ἂν, *to get the idea that he would not lead*, indirect discourse).

Ὡς ἂν ἀσφαλίστατά γε εἰδείην ὅποσον τὸ στράτεμά ἐστιν ἐποῖον, *I took the course by which I should know most accurately the size of the army.* Cyr. vi. 3, 18. Αἰσθανόμενος (αὐτὴν) ἀντεπιμελουμένην ὥς καὶ εἰσιόντι εἴη αὐτῇ τὰ δέοντα, καὶ εἴ ποτε ἀσθενήσειεν, ὥς μηδεὺς ἂν δέοιτο,

¹ See also ὥς with the subjunctive in An. iii. 1, 35 and 41; Cyr. i. 6, 24; Hell. v. 4, 33; Oec. vii. 34 (*bis*), xx. 4 (*bis*) and 16; Rep. Lac. xiv. 4; and ὥς with the optative in An. i. 1, 5; Cyr. v. 1, 18, vi. 3, 4, viii. 1, 42; Hell. iii. 4, 15, v. 2, 1 and 5; Ages. i. 19 and 22 and 23, ii. 31; Rep. Lac. iii. 3. This list includes all object clauses with simple ὥς not given above. All Weber's examples of these clauses in Xenophon which have ὥς with the future, ὥς ἂν with the subjunctive or optative, or ὅπως ἂν with the optative are quoted or cited in the text above, except Cyr. vii. 5, 81, which is classed with final clauses in p. 401.

ἐκ πάντων τούτων ἡλίσκετο ἔρωτι. Cyr. v. 1, 18. (Here the protasis εἴ ποτε ἀσθενήσῃεν causes the change from ὥς with the simple optative to the potential ὥς μηδενὸς ἂν δέοιτο, in which the separation of ἂν from ὥς is to be noticed.) Ἐκτεπονημένους ὥς ἂν κράτιστοι εἶεν, thoroughly trained to be the best (in the way in which they would be best). Hell. vi. 4, 28. So Cyr. v. 2, 2; Rep. Lac. vi. 1.

(Ὡπως ἂν with Opt.) Three examples after primary tenses are especially peculiar. Κελεύεις με ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ὅπως ἂν μὴ παντάπασιν ἀληθῶς πένης γένοιτο, you bid me see how you could escape becoming in truth absolutely poor. Oec. ii. 9. Σκοπῶ ὅπως ἂν ὥς ῥᾶστα διάγοιεν, ἡμεῖς δ' ἂν μάλιστα ἂν εὐφραϊνοίμεθα θεώμενοι αὐτούς, I try to see how they might live the easiest lives, and how we might take most delight in beholding them. Symp. vii. 2. Τί οὐ τὴν δύναμιν ἐλεξας, ὅπως εἰδότες πρὸς ταῦτα βουλευσόμεθα ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα ἀγωνιζοίμεθα, that we might take counsel (§ 324) how we might fight the best. Cyr. ii. 1, 4. Here belongs also PLAT. Lys. 207 E, προθυμούνται ὅπως ἂν εὐδαιμονοίης (349).

Εἰσῆλθεν ἐπιβουλεύσας ὅπως ἂν ἀλυπτότατα εἴποι. Cyr. i. 4, 13. Σκοπῶν δ' αὖ ὅπως ἂν καὶ ἡ πᾶσα ἀρχὴ κατέχοιτο καὶ ἄλλη ἔτι προσγίγνοιτο, ἡγήσατο. Cyr. vii. 5, 70. So iv. 2, 34, viii. 1, 14 and 47. Ἐλογιζόμεθα ὥς ἱκανὸν εἶναι εἴ τις δύναται ἐπιμεληθῆναι ὅπως ἂν καλὸς κάγαθός γένοιτο. Cyr. i. 6, 7. (Was the oratio recta here ὅπως ἂν γίνηται?) Ἐβουλευετο ὅπως ἂν μὴ βαρὺς εἴη τοῖς ξυμμάχοις. Hell. iii. 2, 1. So vii. 1, 33; An. iv. 3, 14, v. 7, 20. Πάντ' ἐποίησεν ὅπως ἂν δι' ἐκείνου ἐγκριθείη. Hell. iv. 1, 40. Τῷ μὲν θεῷ οὐδὲν ἐκονώσαντο ὅπως ἂν ἡ εἰρήνῃ γένοιτο, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐβουλεύοντο. Hell. vii. 1, 27.

V.

ON SOME DISPUTED POINTS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF ἔδει, χρῆν, ETC. WITH THE INFINITIVE.¹

SUPPLEMENT TO §§ 415-423.

THE familiar construction by which ἔδει, χρῆν or ἐχρῆν, εἰκὸς ᾗν, προσῆκεν, ἐξῆν, and other imperfects denoting obligation, propriety, or possibility, are used with the infinitive in an idiomatic sense, the whole expression becoming a form of potential indicative, and generally implying the opposite of the action or the negation of the infinitive, has already been explained in §§ 415-423. Some additional remarks, however, seem necessary, to guard against prevailing misapprehensions.

The important distinction between this idiomatic construction and the use of these imperfects as ordinary past tenses (§ 417) is generally

¹ Many parts of this paper are identical with the article with the same title in the *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, vol. i. pp. 77-88.

indicated only by the context, and not by the words themselves. It may even be doubtful in some cases which meaning is intended. Thus, in DEM. xviii. 190, τί τὸν σύμβουλον ἐχρῆν ποιεῖν; οὐ . . . ἐλέσθαι; nothing in the words shows whether the action of ἐλέσθαι is real or not; but the following τοῦτο τοίνυν ἐποίησα shows that the questions refer merely to a past duty which the speaker actually performed. Indeed, the idiomatic use of ἔδει etc. with the infinitive may be found in the same sentence with the ordinary use of these imperfects as past tenses without reference to any condition. A familiar case is in the New Testament, ΜΑΤΘ. xxiii. 23, ταῦτα δὲ ἔδει ποιῆσαι καὶ ἐκεῖνα μὴ ἀφείναι, *these (the weightier matters of the law) ought ye to have done, and yet not to have left the others (taking tithes) undone*. This is equivalent to two sentences, ταῦτα ἔδει ὑμᾶς ποιῆσαι, *ye ought to have done these (which ye did not do)*, and ἐκεῖνα ἔδει ὑμᾶς μὴ ἀφείναι, *ye were right in not leaving those undone (which ye did not leave undone)*. We have a decisive proof of the idiomatic use when the present infinitive with ἔδει etc. refers to present time, as when χρῆν σε τοῦτο ποιεῖν means *you ought to be doing this (but are not)*; for these words without the potential force could mean only *it was (once) your duty to do this*. This use of a past tense to express present time, which is found in Greek, Latin, and English (§ 417), is an important characteristic of this idiom.

It is generally laid down as an absolute rule that in this idiom the opposite of the infinitive is *always* implied. See Krüger, § 53, 2, 7, where the usual formula is given, that with ἔδει τοῦτο γίνεσθαι we must understand ἀλλ' οὐ γίγνεται, but with ἔδει ἂν τοῦτο γίνεσθαι we must understand ἀλλ' οὐ δεῖ. This principle was first formulated, I believe, by G. Hermann.¹ It covers nearly all the ordinary cases, and has generally been found to be a convenient working rule, though many passages show that it is not of universal application. The following three classes of examples show the need of a more flexible formula.

(1) In the following cases the opposite of the leading verb is implied far more than that of the infinitive, the action of the latter in the first case being emphatically affirmed:—

HDT. i. 39 (χρῆν σε ποιεῖν τὰ ποιεῖς), DEM. ix. 6, xxxiii. 37, and EUR. Med. 490 (reading συγγνωστὸν ἦν). These are quoted and discussed in § 422, 1.

(2) In concessive sentences introduced by καὶ εἰ, *even if*, οὐδ' εἰ, *not even if*, or εἰ, *although*, which contain unreal conditions, the action

¹ See Hermann, *de Particula* "Ar, i. 12. In discussing SOPH. Elec. 1505, χρῆν δ' εὐθὺς εἶναι τήνδε τοῖς πᾶσι δίκην, Hermann says: "Χρῆν dicit, quia oportere indicat sine condicione: nec potest opponi, ἀλλ' οὐ χρῆ; nam si oportet, quomodo potest non oportere? At non omnia fiunt, quae oportebat. Itaque quod opponere potes, aliud est: ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστι."

The "opposite" implied in a negative expression of this kind (even when the negation belongs to the leading verb) is an affirmative. Thus οὐ προσήκεν ἐλθεῖν, *he ought not to have gone*, implies ἀλλ' ἦλθεν, as ἔδει τοῦτους μὴ εἶναι implies ἀλλὰ ζῶσιν.

or negation of the apodosis must be distinctly affirmed (§ 412, 3). Here, therefore, the common formula cannot be applied.

See ISOC. xviii. 19, and ISAE. vi. 44, quoted in § 422, 2; and the following. Καὶ γὰρ ἄνευ τούτων (i.e. καὶ εἰ μὴ εἴχετε τούτους) ἐξῆν τοι ποιεῖν ταῦτα, i.e. *even if you had not all mankind with you, you could still do what you now do*. HDT. vii. 56. (Here ταῦτα ποιεῖν is of course affirmed.) Εἰ γὰρ ἦν ἅπασι πρόδηλα τὰ μέλλοντα γενήσεσθαι, . . . οὐδ' οὕτως ἀποστατέον τῇ πόλει τούτων ἦν, i.e. *Athens ought not even then to have withdrawn from this policy, which she followed* (ἀποστατέον ἦν = ἀποστῆναι ἔδει). DEM. xviii. 199. See also DEM. xv. 28. Εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν εἴχετε τῶν ἄλλων λογίσασθαι, μηδ' ἐφ' ὑμῶν αὐτῶν οἰοί τε ἦτε ταῦτα συνείναι, ἦν ἰδεῖν παράδειγμα Ὀλυμπίους τουτονοί, *for although you had no other cases to consider, and could not learn this lesson in your own experience, you might have seen an example in these Olympians*. Id. xxiii. 107.

These examples are important as showing that there is nothing in an expression like ἐξῆν σοι ποιεῖν τοῦτο, even in its idiomatic sense, which necessarily involves the denial of the action of ποιεῖν.

(3) In some concessive examples, in which the apodosis ought to be affirmed, we find the action of the infinitive denied.

See SOPH. O. T. 255, THUC. i. 38, ISOC. xii. 71, quoted in § 422, 2. These are important as showing that the real apodosis in these expressions with ἔδει etc. is not to be found in the infinitive alone.

It is well known that the imperfects in question (without ἄν) can be used with the infinitive in two ways,—(a) alone, with no protasis expressed or implied except the condition which is contained in the expression itself, as in ἔδει σε ἐλθεῖν, *you ought to have gone*; and (b) as the apodosis of an unreal condition, as in εἰ οὐτός σε ἐκέλευσεν, ἔδει σε ἐλθεῖν, *if he had commanded you, you should have gone*. It will be noticed that all the examples quoted above under (1) and (2) are of the latter class, for in HDT. vii. 56, ἄνευ τούτων represents εἰ μὴ εἴχετε τούτους. If now we take the apodoses of these sentences apart from their protases, we shall find that no one of them can then have the meaning which it now has. For example, in HDT. i. 39, χρῆν σε ποιεῖν τὰ ποιεῖς would not be Greek at all as a potential expression, for χρῆν σε ποιεῖν would mean *you ought to do* (something which you do not do). In DEM. xxxiii. 37, ἐνῆν αἰτιάσασθαι by itself would mean *he might have charged me* (but did not). Οὐκ ἐξῆν αἰτῶ δικάζεσθαι (ISOC. xviii. 19) could mean only *he could not maintain a suit as he does*; that is, it would mean nothing without a protasis. Οὐ προσήκεν αὐτοῖς Εὐκτῆμονος εἶναι (ISAE. vi. 44) by itself would mean *they ought not to belong to E.'s house as they do*. Οὐκ ἀποστατέον ἦν (DEM. xviii. 199) alone would mean *she ought not to have withdrawn as she did*. So ἦν ἰδεῖν παράδειγμα (Id. xxiii. 107) would mean *you might have seen* (but you did not see) *an example*. (Compare DEM. xxviii. 10, τὴν διαθήκην ἠφανίκατε, ἐξ ἧς ἦν εἰδέναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν, *the will, from which we might know the truth*.)

When these potential expressions without ἄν stand alone, they

always imply the opposite of the action or the negation of the infinitive; so that εἰκὸς ἦν σε τοῦτο παθεῖν by itself can mean only *you would properly have suffered this* (but you did not). This is necessary because the equivalent of this form, τοῦτο ἂν ἔπαθες εἰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἔπαθες, always involves οὐκ ἔπαθες τοῦτο, since τοῦτο and τὸ εἰκὸς are here made identical, and τὸ εἰκὸς ἔπαθες is denied. When, however, one of these expressions is made the apodosis of an unreal condition external to itself, it may be so modified by the new condition as no longer to imply the opposite of the infinitive as before. This is the case with the four examples under (1), in which we certainly do not find οὐ ποίεις, ἄλλο λέγει καὶ συμβουλεύει, οὐκ ἡτιάσατο, and οὐκ ἡρώσθης implied in the form of expression. The apparent paradox here is explained by the principle stated in § 511, that when several protases, not co-ordinate, belong to the same sentence, one always contains the leading condition, to which the rest of the sentence (including the other conditions) forms the conclusion; and when this leading condition is unreal, it makes all subordinate past or present conditions also unreal, so far as the supposed case is concerned, without regard to their own nature. A sentence like this, *If you had been an Athenian, you would have been laughed at if you had talked as you did*, shows the principle clearly. This has become the relation of the unreal protasis involved in εἰκὸς ἦν σε τοῦτο παθεῖν, when this expression is made the apodosis of a new unreal condition. Thus, when χρῆν σε ποίειν in HDT. i. 39, which by itself could admit only an unreal object, follows εἰ ὑπὸ ὀδόντος εἶπε τελευτήσκειν με, even τὰ ποίεις can be its object, and the whole can mean *if the dream had said I was to perish by a tooth, you would do what you now do if you did what was right*. The new chief protasis that has come in has changed the whole relation of the old implied protasis to the sentence as a whole.

It is often difficult to express in English the exact force of these expressions, even when no external protasis is added, and the opposite of the infinitive (not that of the leading verb) is therefore implied. Thus, a common translation of DEM. xviii. 248, οὐδ' ἀγνωμονήσαι τι θαυμαστὸν ἦν τοὺς πολλοὺς πρὸς ἐμέ, *it would have been no wonder if the mass of the people had been somewhat unmindful of me* (Westermann translates *entschuldigbar gewesen wäre*), would seem to require ἦν ἂν. But the strength of the apodosis lies in the infinitive, and the meaning (fully developed) is, *the mass of the people might have been somewhat unmindful of me (ἡγνωμόνησαν ἂν τι) without doing anything wonderful (i.e. if they had done a very natural thing)*. With θαυμαστὸν ἂν ἦν there would have been an undue emphasis thrown upon θαυμαστὸν. In PLAT. Rep. 474 D, ἄλλω ἔπρεπεν λέγειν ἢ λέγεις is equivalent to ἄλλος ἔλεγεν ἂν πρεπόντως ἢ λέγεις, *another would becomingly say what you say*, the opposite of λέγειν being implied. Ἐπρεπεν ἂν λέγειν would have caused a change of emphasis, but would have substantially the same general meaning, *it would have been becoming for another to say what you say*. See also DEM. xviii. 16, xlv 69, and

PLAT. Euthyd. 304 D, quoted in § 419; and the discussion of EUR. Med. 490 in § 422, 1.

We have seen that we cannot make the denial of the action of the infinitive an absolute test of the proper use of the form without ἄν where there is an external protasis added to the condition implied in the expression itself. The examples last quoted show that we cannot make the denial of the leading verb an absolute test of the proper use of the form with ἄν. In fact, this idiom is too flexible and too dependent on the momentary feeling of the speaker or writer to subject itself to any such strict rules as are usually forced upon it. The following rules seem to me to be as exact as the Greek usage warrants.¹

1. The form without ἄν is used when the infinitive is the principal word, on which the chief force of the expression falls, while the leading verb is an auxiliary which we can express by *ought, might, could*, or by an adverb.

2. On the other hand, when the chief force falls on the necessity, propriety, or possibility of the act, and not on the act itself, the leading verb has ἄν, like any other imperfect in a similar apodosis.

Examples of the form with ἄν are generally regular. See those quoted in § 423.² A standard case is DEM. iv. 1, εἰ τὰ δέοντα οἱτοὶ συμβούλευσαν, οὐδὲν ἄν ὑμᾶς νῦν ἔδει βουλευέσθαι, *if these had given you the necessary advice, there would be no need of your deliberating now*. Here, as in all the ten examples of ἔδει ἄν quoted by La Roche, we find ἔδει ἄν in its meaning *there would be* (or *would have been*) *need*, whereas in the form without ἄν we generally have ἔδει in the sense of *ought*, expressing *obligation* and not *necessity*. Of course, the idea of necessity is incompatible with that of an act not done. If La Roche's statistics are complete here, we see that the Greeks almost always expressed obligation or propriety, and generally expressed possibility, by the form without ἄν, reserving ἔδει ἄν for the idea of necessity, and ἐξῆν ἄν for a few cases in which the idea of possibility was to be made specially emphatic.

It is not surprising, under these circumstances, that the form without ἄν should often be used where we are at first inclined to think ἄν

¹ When an external protasis is added, there is no necessity for any denial of the action of the apodosis at all (see § 412). But this denial, though not essential, is generally implied in the apodosis of an unreal condition, and the apodosis (as a whole) happens to be denied in all the cases of the construction of ἔδει etc. with the infinitive which are discussed here. No notice is taken, therefore, of the principle of § 412 in this discussion.

² See La Roche on "ἄν bei ἔδει und ἐξῆν" in the *Zeitschrift für die oesterreichischen Gymnasien* for 1876, pp. 588-591. He professes to give all the cases; but his twenty-one examples of ἔδει ἄν include eleven in which ἔδει has the genitive of a noun and no infinitive. Omitting these, we have only ten of ἔδει ἄν with the infinitive: THUC. i. 74; LYS. Frag. 56 (88 Scheibe); ISOC. xv. 17; ISAE. iv. 4; DEM. iv. 1; PLAT. Rep. 328 C, Theaet. 169 E, Gorg. 514 A, Alc. i. 119 B; DEM. lvii. 47 (only the last three affirmative); with four of ἐξῆν ἄν: LYS. iv. 13, Frag. 47 (79 Scheibe); ISAE. x. 13; DEM. xxiv. 146. He finds χρῆν ἄν only in LYS. xii. 48, where he proposes to omit ἄν, overlooking χρῆν ἄν προσδοκῆσαι in DEM. xviii. 195. Both of these passages are discussed below, pp. 409, 410.

is required. It must be remembered that the real apodosis here is not the central infinitive alone, but this infinitive modified by the idea of obligation, propriety, or possibility in the leading verb, that is, conditioned by the implied protasis which the expression includes (see § 420). This modification may be so slight as to leave the infinitive the only important word in the apodosis; in this case the opposite of the infinitive is generally implied, as it always is when no protasis is added: thus, EUR. Med. 520, χρῆν σ', εἴπερ ἦσθα μὴ κακὸς, πείσαντά με γαμῖν γάμον τόνδε, implies ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐγάμεις πείσας με. It may be so great as to make the idea of obligation etc. a prominent factor in the apodosis, still stopping short of the point at which this favourite Greek idiom was abandoned and an ordinary apodosis with ἄν was substituted in its place. The Greeks preferred the form without ἄν almost always where we can express the apodosis by the verb of the infinitive with *ought*, *might*, or *could*, or with an adverb, although we sometimes find it hard to express the combined idea in English without giving undue force to the leading verb. Sometimes, when the idea of obligation, propriety, or possibility is specially prominent in the apodosis, although no ἄν is used, the opposite that is suggested combines this idea with that of the infinitive. This is the case with the examples in (1), in which the distinction between the two forms is very slight and of little practical account. In HDT. i. 39, the apodosis is *you would then properly do what you now do* (or *you would then, if you did what you ought, do what you now do*), implying *now you do not do this properly*. With χρῆν ἄν it would have been *it would then be your duty to do what you now do*, the chief force being transferred from the act to the duty or necessity. Still, this change might have been made without otherwise affecting the sense. In DEM. ix. 6, the apodosis is *in that case the speaker would properly talk of nothing else than this* (implying *now he may properly talk of another matter*); whereas with ἔδει ἄν it would be *there would then be no need of his talking of anything else*, with greater emphasis on the ἔδει and with a change of meaning. In DEM. xxiii. 37, ἐνῆν αἰτιάσασθαι means *he might then possibly have accused me*, implying *he could not possibly accuse me as it was*; with ἐνῆν ἄν it would have been *it would then have been possible for him to accuse me*, the emphasis being transferred with no other change of sense. The same is true of EUR. Med. 490. Likewise, in ISOC. xviii. 21, the apodosis, *in that case we ought not to wonder at him* or *we should not properly wonder at him*, is equivalent to οὐκ ἄν ἐθαυμάζομεν ἀξίως, with the opposite implied, *now we do wonder at him properly* (νῦν θαυμάζομεν ἀξίως). This combination of two ideas in an apodosis of this kind is analogous to that which we often find in an ordinary apodosis with ἄν; thus, in ISOC. vi. 87, οὐχ οὕτω δ' ἄν προθυμῶς ἐπὶ τὸν πόλεμον ὑμᾶς παρεκάλουν, εἰ μὴ τὴν εἰρήνην ἐώρων αἰσχρὰν ἐσομένην, *I should not exhort you with all this zeal to war, did I not see, etc.*, the apodosis which is denied includes οὕτω προθύμως.

A striking illustration of the modification of the infinitive in an apodosis of this kind by the force of the leading verb may be seen in

the examples under (3). Here in concessive sentences, in which the apodosis must be affirmed, we find the action of the infinitives denied. This shows that the infinitive alone is not the real apodosis. In SOPH. O. T. 255, the actual apodosis is *you would not properly leave the guilt unpurged* (implying *you do not properly leave it*). In THUC. i. 38, the apodosis is *they would fairly have yielded* (implying *they did not yield, but it was fair that they should*). In ISOC. xii. 71, it is *they would deservedly have received*, = ἔτυχον ἂν ἀξίως (implying that it was only undeservedly that they failed to receive the reward). The remarks that have been made above apply also to the concessive sentences in (2), in which nothing in the apodosis is denied. Here, too, the form with ἂν might have been used by transferring the force of the expression from the infinitive to the leading verb.

It has been seen that ἔδει ἂν with the infinitive differs from ἔδει without ἂν in meaning as well as in the balance of emphasis. On the other hand, ἐξῆν ἂν differs from ἐξῆν only in the latter respect. See ISAE. x. 13, τῷ μὲν πατρὶ αὐτῆς, εἰ παῖδες ἀρρεves μὴ ἐγένοντο, οὐκ ἂν ἐξῆν ἄνευ ταύτης διαθέσθαι, i.e. *in that case he would not have been permitted (by law) to leave his daughter out of his will*; and DEM. xxiv. 146, οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ἐξῆν ὑμῖν τιμὰν ὅτι χρὴ παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι, i.e. *if this law were passed, you would not have the power (which you now have) of assessing penalties*. Compare with these ISOC. xviii. 19, οὐκ ἐξῆν αὐτῷ δικάζεσθαι, *he could not (in that case) maintain a suit*, where ἐξῆν ἂν would only give more emphasis to the possibility, which is done in the preceding examples. For the ordinary use of ἐξῆν and the infinitive see PLAT. Crit. 52 C, ἐξῆν σοι φυγῆς τιμῆσθαι εἰ ἐβούλου, *you might have proposed exile as your penalty if you had wished to* (implying only οὐ φυγῆς ἐτιμῆσω).

It remains to discuss two passages in which χρῆν ἂν occurs, with a view to La Roche's disbelief in the existence of this form (see footnote 2, p. 407). In DEM. xviii. 195, we have χρῆν and χρῆν ἂν in close succession, with no essential change in meaning except the difference in emphasis above mentioned. The sentence is: εἰ μετὰ Θηβαίων ἡμῖν ἀγωνιζομένοις οὕτως εἴμαρτο πράξαι, τί χρῆν προσδοκᾶν εἰ μὴδὲ τούτους ἔσχομεν συμμάχους; . . . καὶ εἰ νῦν τριῶν ἡμερῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀττικῆς ὁδὸν τῆς μάχης γενομένης τοσούτος κίνδυνος καὶ φόβος περιέστη τὴν πόλιν, τί ἂν, εἰ ποὺ τῆς χώρας ταῦτό τοῦτο πάθος συνέβη, προσδοκῆσαι χρῆν; i.e. *when it was fated that we should fare as we did with the Thebans on our side, what ought we to have expected (which we did not find ourselves expecting) if we had not secured even these as allies? And, if so great danger and terror surrounded the city when the battle was fought two or three days' journey from Attica, what should we have had to expect (which we did not really have to expect) if this calamity had occurred within our own country?* Here the unreal supposition of not having secured the Thebans as allies, or (its probable consequence) the battle of Chaeronea having been fought in Attica, suits either form of apodosis, τί χρῆν προσδοκᾶν; or τί ἂν χρῆν προσδοκῆσαι; the expectation itself in the former case, and the

necessity for the expectation in the latter, being specially emphasised. It is hard to believe that the orator felt any important change in the general force of his question when he added *ἄν* in the second case.

In Lys. xii. 32, we have, addressed to Eratosthenes, *χρῆν δέ σε, εἴπερ ἡσθα χρηστός, πολὺ μάλλον τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἀδίκως ἀποθανεῖσθαι μνηστὴν γενέσθαι ἢ τοῖς ἀδίκως ἀπολουμένοις συλλαμβάνειν*, if you had been an honest man, you ought to have become an informer in behalf of those who were about to suffer death unjustly, much rather than (and not) to have arrested (as you did) those who were doomed to perish unjustly; but in 48, referring to the same man and the same acts, the orator says *εἴπερ ἦν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, ἐχρῆν ἄν πρῶτον μὲν μὴ παρανόμως ἄρχειν, ἔπειτα τῇ βουλῇ μνηστὴν γενέσθαι, κ.τ.λ.*, if he had been an honest man, he would have had, first, to abstain from lawlessness in office, and, next, to come before the Senate as an informer, etc. La Roche proposes to omit *ἄν* in the second passage, because it would be absurd to suppose that *ἀλλ' ἐχρῆν* is implied in the sense that *E. had a right to be lawless in office* ("er durfte paranómōws ἄρχειν") because he was not honest. What is implied is rather *ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐχρῆν μὴ παρανόμως ἄρχειν*, i.e. not being an honest man, he did not have to abstain from lawlessness in office, etc., which we can understand without absurdity. The passage, like so many sentences of this class, is simply an argument to prove that *E.* was not honest. If he had been honest (it is said), he would have had to do certain things (which, it is implied, all honest men do); but he did not do these (as is stated, *εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν καταστάς ἀγαθοῦ μὲν οὐδενὸς μετέσχευ, ἄλλων δὲ πολλῶν*); therefore he was not honest. There is a slight slip in showing (in the words last quoted) that he did not do the things in question, and not that he did not have to do them; so that of the two constructions, *χρῆν* in 32 and *ἐχρῆν ἄν* in 48, the former is more strictly logical. This use of *ἐχρῆν ἄν* is the counterpart of that of *χρῆν, ἔδει, ἐνῆν*, and *θανυμαστόν ἦν* in the passages quoted above (1), where the forms with *ἄν* might have been used.

The Latin follows precisely the same principle as the Greek in the use of such imperfects as *debebat, licebat* (= *χρῆν, ἐξῆν*), and *deberet, liceret* (= *χρῆν ἄν, ἐξῆν ἄν*), with reference to present time. But when such expressions are past, the Latin uses *debuit* or *debuerat* in the sense of *χρῆν*, and *debuisse* for *χρῆν ἄν*, both with the present infinitive; while the Greek keeps the imperfect in all cases. See Cic. Phil. ii. 99, *Quem patris loco, si ulla in te pietas esset, colere debebas* (= *χρῆν σε φιλεῖν*), you ought to love (but you do not); and Cluent. 18, *Cluentio ignoscere debebitis quod haec a me dici patiatur; mihi ignoscere non deberes si tacerem* (= *οὐ ἄν σε ἐμοὶ συγγιγνώσκειν χρῆν εἰ ἐσίγω*), it would not be right for you to pardon me if I were silent. In the former case the emphasis falls on *colere*; in the latter on *non deberes*, which is in strong antithesis to *debebitis*. See also Cic. Verr. ii. 5, 50: *Qui ex foedere ipso navem vel usque ad Oceanum, si imperassemus, mittere debuerunt, ei, ne in freto ante sua tecta et domos navigarent, . . . pretio abs te ius foederis ad imperii condicionem*

distinct antecedents, when these depend on expressions implying doubt, perplexity, or ignorance. See examples in § 572, 2. Thus, in οὐ γὰρ ἄλλον οἷδ' ὅτῳ λέγω, we cannot distinguish the modal force of the subjunctive from that in οὐ γὰρ οἷδ' ὅτῳ ἄλλῳ λέγω, the subjunctive being deliberative in both. The former is the result of a simple evolution, by which a relative clause derives its modal force from an interrogative form. Whatever final force is felt in the expression comes from the intimate relation between the deliberative and the hortatory subjunctive (see § 291). See A. Sidgwick in the *Classical Review* for 1891, p. 148. We have the evolution actually going on in XEN. An. i. 7, 7, where μὴ οὐκ ἔχω ὃ τι δῶ is interrogative and μὴ οὐκ ἔχω ἱκανοὺς οἷς δῶ is purely relative, while the modal force of δῶ must be the same in both. See also XEN. Hellen. i. 3, 21, SOPH. Phil. 692, THEOC. xxv. 218. In AESCH. Prom. 470, Lys. xxiv. 1, Isoc. xxi. 1, we may call the dependent clause an indirect question, depending directly on the idea *I cannot (could not) see*. See Tarbell in *Classical Review* for 1891, p. 302.

4. While most of the optatives quoted in this discussion are simply explained as correlatives of the deliberative subjunctive, a very different problem is presented by the examples in § 573. In SOPH. Tr. 903, κρίψουσ' ἐνυτὴν ἔνθα μὴ τις εἰσίδῃ, we cannot suppose an Attic construction like κρίψω ἐμυτὴν ἔνθα μὴ τις εἰσίδῃ, for we should certainly find εἰσόψεται, as in SOPH. Aj. 658, κρίψω τὸδ' ἔγχος ἔνθα μὴ τις ὀψεται. (For an occasional future optative, see § 574.) In AR. Ran. 97, ὅστις λάκῳ clearly expresses purpose, and we cannot think of substituting ὅστις λάκῃ for it; and ὅστις φθέγγεται, the true Attic expression, is found in the next verse: the latter decides the force of ὅστις λάκῳ. It would seem that the optative, which is further removed than the subjunctive from the original deliberative construction, took another step in the process of "extension," and gave us a few such expressions as have been quoted. Another case of final optative is PLAT. Rep. 398 B, ὃς . . . μιμούτο καὶ . . . λέγοι. In Rep. 578 E, εἰ τις θεῶν ἄνδρα θέλῃ εἰς ἐρημίαν, ὅπου αὐτῷ μηδεὶς μέλλοι βοηθήσειν, *if some God should put a man in a desert, where there should be nobody likely to help him*, we might take the second clause as either final or conditional; it probably combines a final with a conditional force, expressing the purpose of putting the man into a desert and also continuing the condition of the preceding clause.

In SOPH. Phil. 279-282, ὁρῶντα (past) ναῦς βεβώσας, ἄνδρα δ' οὐδέν' ἔντοπον (sc. ὄντα), οὐχ ὅστις ἀρκέσειεν οὐδ' ὅστις συλλάβοιτο, I formerly classed the optatives with those in § 573; but it now seems to me that οὐδεὶς ἔντοπός ἐστιν ὅστις ἀρκέσῃ would be as natural as ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐκέτ' ἐστὶν εἰς ὃ τι βλέπω in Aj. 514, and I have therefore included this passage with the examples under § 573, 2.

Pers.	337	915 ²	Sept.	712	859	Acharn.	955	955
	426	613 ¹		720	373		1021	228
	437	608		754	148,		1060	348
	450	702			880	Av.	36	811
	457	587 ¹		790	373		54	253
	503	889		1015	480		120	489
	510	608		1037	860		131	273
	714	777 ¹		1048	628		180	242
	730	608		1057	290		194	686
	791	454	Suppl.	228	295		280	39
	912	290		233	328		448	750
Prom.	23	900		472	447		461	296
	68	272, 277		474	447		700	633, 658
	152	333, 732		499	155		759	71, 407
	165	642		772	629		964	627
	203	347, 353		924	447		1186	252
	248	807					1187	89
	292	241					1350	103
	311	447		ANDOCIDES.			1390	472
	332	260		I. 7	642		1494	275
	375	617		21	428		1508	326
	457	617		23	687		1598	513
	470	572 ² , 677		43	324, 628		1661	750
	479	633		49	711		1679	99
	616	236		62	136	Eccles.	151	333, 426
	617	236		81	614, 702		236	758
	625	74		II. 12	427		297	275
	627	747		IV. 20	607		350	778
	697	617					355	47
	705	326		ANTIPHON.			375	144, 887
	712	784		I. 2	419		495	324
	747	333		12	355		537	868
	760	917		23	355		623	348
	771	875 ³		V. 1	425		629	648
	786	811		8	212		719	331
	824	328		19	525		794	679
	834	482		21	686		795	264
	905	681		27	38		952	273
	907	681, 875 ¹		38	218		1000	686
	918	811		66	580	Equit.	80	348
	979	94, 177,		78	31		112	370
		455		79	146		453	273
	999	903 ²		VI. 11	244		495	273
	1002	260		23	136		696	60
	1049	725		29	494		698	454
	1051	725		45	31		917	348
	1068	915 ¹		Tetr. A. α, 2	653		926	348
Sept.	38	295		β, 13	414		935	903 ^a
	76	118		γ, 1	897		1252	227
	195	472					1256	355
	196	447					1295	210
	199	295		ARISTOPHANES.		Lysist.	384	324
	250	70		Acharn.	26		450	923
	253	785			339		511	162
	257	540			108		704	295
	281	295			312		917	686
	429	127			343		1223	328
	462	110			536	Nub.	5	227, 483
	656	790			662		63	36
	662	410			816		116	178, 505

Nub.	124	902	Pac.	1199	150, 845	Eth.	x. 3, 4	97
	125	29		1302	296		9, 2	490
	181	837	Plut.	146	799	Met.	x. 5, 3	710
	229	476 ²		210	898	Pol.	ii. 9, 17	597
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